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Abstract 
 
This study departs from existing scholarship by analysing and documenting nine cases 
of national ‘success’ to inform three primary objectives: (1) To catalogue cases of 
success for future reference; (2) To producing ‘lessons’ that may improve the 
effectiveness of interventions whilst reducing inadvertent negative outcomes; (3) To 
reconcile the discrepancy between national and international effects of interventions at 
the source.  
A comparison of the nine cases of national success found: (1) All governments 
perceived suppression as in its best interest; (2) All possessed authority throughout 
opium producing areas; (3) In all but two cases the state offered incentives from which 
farmers perceived some benefit to the cessation of opium production; (4) All 
governments possessed the capability to monitor opium farmers; (5) All interventions 
administered law enforcement. As these five factors presented across all or most cases 
they can be considered necessary for a successful outcome.  
Additional factors, which crossed more than one case, were deemed facilitative of 
the five necessary factors, and included: development-orientated approaches; 
community punishments; negotiated eradication; and conflict resolution/limitation. The 
findings suggest that the primary objective when planning a national intervention must 
be the establishment or maintenance of the five necessary factors. As such, premature 
eradication - which often deviates from the establishment/maintenance of the five 
necessary factors - represents an erroneous path, which can be costly in terms of time 
and resources. The case of Afghanistan is used to further clarify and explore the cross-
case findings in a practical context. 
 
Key words: Alternative development; Case study; Displacement; Drug law 
enforcement; Heroin; Opium; Supply side drug policy. 
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Section I 
1. Introduction 
There is a general acceptance amongst many academics that interventions to control the 
production of opium at the source are of limited utility (see Chouvy, 2009; Nadlemann, 
1988; Boyum and Reuter, 2008; Room and Paige, 1999; Stevenson, 1997; essays in 
Keefer and Loayza, 2010). The International Drug Policy Consortium’s ‘Drug Policy 
Guide’1 notes:  
 
… it has become clear that traditional policies and strategies have 
been unable to achieve a significant and sustained reduction in the 
overall scale of drug markets. On a global scale, successive UN 
campaigns and commitments to eliminate or significantly reduce drug 
markets have failed to achieve their objectives (Armenta et al., 
2010:30).  
 
This study does not challenge this conventional position: the data presented in Annex 
three demonstrates that global production has increased since the 1970s.2 Instead, it 
attempts to reconcile the discrepancy between national and international effects of 
interventions at the source, by demonstrating how a number of states have successfully 
achieved national policy objectives of suppressing illicit production or diversion from 
regulated production. Using the outcome measurement of success (henceforth success) 
of an excess of 90 percent reduction which brings potential production national below 
20 metric tonnes, nine cases of national success were identified: China (under the 
Imperial/Republican regimes); the People’s Democratic Republic of China; Iran (under 
the Pahlavi Dynasty); Turkey; the Islamic Republic of Iran; Thailand; Pakistan; the 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.  
Whether production subsequently increases in a foreign nation should not detract 
from national success. This is, however, often the case: 
 
                                                 
1
 The guide was compiled by 28 leading academics and lobbyists. 
2
 This said, as is discussed in Chapter 2:4:3, an often neglected aspect of increased production 
and trafficking is the impact of technological innovations and trade liberalisation (i.e. 
globalisation). 
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Operational successes in particular countries, or against particular 
trafficking groups, have quickly been offset by the ‘balloon effect’. 
The illegal activities that have been eradicated by law enforcement 
efforts are quickly replaced in different areas, by different groups or 
with different substances, often creating greater problems than those 
that existed before (Armenta et al., 2010: 30). 
 
In many respects, this study supports the position of Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter 
(2009:8) who remain ‘pessimistic about the long-term prospects for shrinking the global 
production of illegal opiates’ whilst acknowledging that ‘lasting national or regional 
reductions in opiate production are possible’ (also, Reuter and Trautmann, 2009). Such 
national interventions may, however, have contributed to the global containment of non-
medical/scientific opiate consumption by engineering unnaturally high prices and 
scarcity.  
This study departs from existing scholarship by documenting cases of national 
success rather than global failure. This study may help inform a ‘positive spiral’ (Farrell 
and Windle, forthcoming) by illustrating that success is achievable and elucidating what 
works, rather than providing pessimistic accounts of what does not work. Policy-makers 
may be informed by the ‘lessons learned’ and motivated by the realisation that national 
success is an achievable policy objective.    
This is the first study to document, synthesize and compare the population of 
national cases of successful production/diversion suppression in the Middle 
Eastern/Asian ‘opium zone’. In general, the research-base on supply side drug policy is 
lacking (Paoli et al., 2009). That in-depth cases of success have not previously been 
compared is (in some respects) unsurprising: the production of high-quality comparative 
case studies are time consuming and require extensive resources (Yin, 2007). As such, 
this study will provide a contribution by: 
 
(1) Cataloguing cases of success for future reference;  
(2) Producing ‘lessons’ that may improve the effectiveness of interventions whilst 
reducing inadvertent negative outcomes;  
(3) In some respects, reconciling the discrepancy between national and international 
effects of interventions at the source.  
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The remainder of this introductory chapter shall introduce the production, 
manufacture and consumption of opium and its derivatives before summarising some of 
the major findings of this study. 
1.1. Opiates  
Opium poppies (papaver somniferum) can be grown in temperate and sub-tropical 
climates. It requires long hours of sunlight and cool nights, and cannot endure extreme 
cold or strong winds. Insufficient irrigation, cloudy or rainy weather can reduce the 
quantity and quality of opium harvested (Booth, 1997; Choudhary, et al., 1977; Der 
Meer, 1989).  
Opium is a labour intensive crop, whether produced under state regulation for 
medicinal/scientific consumption or clandestinely for black markets. The earth must be 
ploughed four to five times before it is ready for sowing. Once the plant begins 
maturing, farmers must regularly remove weeds and unhealthy poppies; which can 
restrict growth and yield. Production is a skilled and time-consuming job which may 
necessitate an entire family (or village), plus labourers, working uninterrupted for 
several weeks. Farmers incise the poppy capsules to free the latex which gradually 
solidifies on contact with the air to produce the raw opium.  This is later scraped off the 
capsule; the process is repeated several times (see Allen, 2002; Booth, 1997; Mansfield, 
2001; Westermeyer, 2004).  
Farmers or merchants then boil and filter the 
raw opium several times to remove impurities 
such as adulterants or plant matter. The pure 
opium is then dried into solid blocks (referred to 
as prepared opium) which can be consumed 
(smoked or eaten) or manufactured into other 
opiates; predominantly heroin and morphine for 
the illicit market (see Booth, 1997; Zerel et al., 
2005). Diagram 1:1 illustrates the different 
chemicals which are added to extract the 
morphine base and eventually heroin; each stage 
requires further boiling and filtering. On average, 
the process reduces 10kg of opium down to 1kg 
of heroin (Zerel et al., 2005). 
 
Diagram 1:1 
 
Adapted from Zerel et al. (2005) 
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Opiates1 are the main ‘drugs of abuse’ in Asia, Europe and much of Oceania. 
Globally, in the late-2000s, an estimated 15.6 million people consumed an opiate for 
non-medical/scientific purposes (i.e. illicitly); of which 11 million consumed heroin. 
Indicators suggest that illicit consumption is increasing (WHO, 2009:6). 
Prepared opium has been consumed in many regions of the world for religious, 
cultural, medicinal and/or recreational purposes for centuries.2 It has been (and still is in 
some parts of the world) used to treat: conjunctivitis; colic; diarrhoea; coughs; insomnia 
and to relieve pain (see Berridge and Edwards, 1981; Booth, 1997; Bulletin of 
Narcotics, 1953; Musto, 1987; Trocki, 1999). Prepared opium consumption remains 
prevalent in some areas of Asia and the Middle East, for example, it is the principal 
illicit drug consumed in Iran (Windle, 2011a) and Laos (Windle, 2011b). While 
prepared opium consumption is uncommon in western nations, seizures have indicated 
an increased supply to Western Europe (Tendler, 2006).3 Consumption of prepared 
opium produces effects which are similar to its derivatives yet milder in intensity (Ray 
et al., n.d.). 
A Professor of Pharmacology at Stanford University has described opiate 
consumption as providing:  
 
… not only direct relief of pain, but also suppression of the anxiety 
and distress associated with pain. Moreover, opiates relieve emotional 
pain, even in the absence of physical pain….. [They offer] immediate 
satisfaction, immediate pleasure, immediate escape from misery 
(Goldstein, 2001:81).4  
 
Unwanted side-effects can include constipation, and the suppression of appetite for 
sexual intercourse and food. Regular consumption may lead to increased tolerance (i.e. 
                                                 
1
 Opiate refers to all ‘alkaloids derived from the opium poppy’ (i.e., heroin, codeine, morphine). 
This excludes synthetic opioids (i.e.  fentanyl) (WHO, n.d.). 
2
 There is evidence of opium consumption in Egypt (Hubbies, 1998) and Greece (Pietschmann 
et al., 2009) around 1500BC. 
3
 There is some evidence of opium consumption by refugee communities in the UK (Mills, 
2010). 
4
 Thomas De Quincey (1856/1998) famously became addicted to opium after self-medicating to 
relieve the symptoms of toothache and what is now termed ‘Ekbom Syndrome’ (for which 
codeine is currently prescribed).  
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greater amounts are required to achieve the initial sensation) (McBride, 2009) and 
dependency5 which can be ‘exceedingly difficult to treat… [and] success is 
unpredictable and often only partial’ (Goldstein, 2001:176).  
Both the type of opiate consumed and the method of administration factor in the 
development of dependence, for example, an intravenous heroin consumer will likely 
develop dependence quicker than an individual who eats prepared opium. Dependent 
consumers may experience withdrawal symptoms (Musto, 1987) which (for heroin and 
morphine) usually present within eight to twelve hours of the last dose and can last for 
seven to ten days. Symptoms may include: ‘craving, anxiety, dysphoria, yawning, 
sweating, piloerection… lacrimation, rhinorrhoea, insomnia, nausea or vomiting, 
diarrhoea, cramps, muscle aches, and fever’ (WHO, n.d.:n.p.); in other words, ‘a very 
severe case of the flu’ (Goldstein, 2001:161).  
Opiate dependence represents a ‘global health problem which presents enormous 
economic, personal and public health consequences’ (WHO, 2009:6). Heroin is 
generally considered one of the most harmful drugs to the individual and their 
community (see Degenhardt et al., 2006; McCoun and Reuter, 2001; Nutt, 2009; 
Kleinman, 1992; Reuter et al., 1997). Prepared opium, however, is often argued to be 
no more harmful than some drugs unconstrained by international law to 
medical/scientific purposes (i.e. alcohol) (see Charles and Britto, 2001; Edwards, 1924; 
Dikötter et al., 2002; Ganguly et al., 1995; Newman, 1995; Saxena, 1995). This said, 
prepared opium is not harm-free. Research in Laos has associated heavy consumption 
with: reduced productivity; increased impoverishment (Cohen, 2004; Cohen and 
Lyttleton, 2002; Epprecht, 2000; see Smart, 1995 for India); and domestic abuse 
(UNODC, 2005a).   
This study will not engage with the debate on the reclassification of opiates or other 
drugs at the national or international level. The objective of the study is essentially to 
solve a problem defined by international and national laws (how to prevent farmers 
from producing opium) rather than a critical appraisal of the legal (or moral) 
                                                 
5
 Dependence is defined as the presence of three or more of the following features:  
A strong desire or sense of compulsion to take opioids; difficulties in 
controlling opioid use; a physiological withdrawal state;  tolerance; 
progressive neglect of alternative pleasures or interests because of opioid 
use; persisting with opioid use despite clear evidence of overtly harmful 
consequences (WHO, 2009:5).  
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construction of prohibition, especially as extensive research and commentary exist on 
the subject of reclassification.6  
1.2. Structure and major findings 
Section I: Context, theory, concepts and methodology 
The broader context within which this study develops is provided for in Chapter 2, 
which outlines: the international legal drug control framework; key concepts and terms; 
and key areas of theory. The chapter presents a foundation which allows the case study 
chapters to focus upon the empirical evidence and particular nuances of theory related 
to individual countries.  In turn, this facilitates the identification of common themes and 
issues across countries that form the concluding section of the thesis.  
Chapter 3 introduces the research design and methods of data collection and analysis 
employed in this study. Case selection centred upon five criteria, all: had been major 
opium producing nations; were situated in the Asian/Middle Eastern ‘opium zone’; 
administered interventions to suppress opium production during the twentieth-century; 
opium was produced for sale to illicit markets; conformed to the outcome measurement 
of success. Process-tracing, the method of within-case analysis utilised in this research, 
is then described: in-depth narratives, guided by the employment of theoretical variables 
(identified in Chapter 2:3) are presented to illustrate the process of causal factors 
through which national success was reached. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
on the distortions and difficulties of both qualitative (documentary) and quantitative 
data. Triangulation and contextualisation emerge as central themes in overcoming 
evidentiary limitations.  
Section II: Case studies 
Section II presents the nine case studies. The nine cases are split into six country 
chapters: China (including the Imperial/Republican and People’s Republican 
interventions); Iran (including the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic interventions); Turkey; 
Thailand; Pakistan; Viet Nam and Laos. As the Vietnamese and Laotian histories are so 
intertwined, the provision of individual chapters would have resulted in significant 
                                                 
6
 Consultation of the following accounts should produce a balance between legalisation, 
prohibition and depenalisation: Goldstein (2001); Hughes and Stevens (2010); Krauss and 
Lazear (1991); Kleinman and Saiger (1990); Murji (1998); Nadelamn (1988, 1997); Reuter and 
McCoun (2001); Stevenson (1997); Trebach and Zeese (1992); Wilson (1990). 
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replication. The narratives structures situate suppression interventions within a 
historical context which illustrates the extent of illicit production/diversion. Further 
contextual depth is provided with the accompanying in-depth chronologies (Annex 1:1-
7).  
Imperial/Republican China: Interventions tended to be centred upon a highly 
repressive incarnation of law enforcement. Farmers were subjected to widespread and 
systematic: forced displacement; destruction of property; public torture; public 
humiliation and public execution. Crops were forcefully eradicated and resistance was 
often brutally suppressed by the military. While prohibition was intended to be gradual, 
the linkage of prohibition to career advancement quickened the pace of bans; this may 
have inflated the repressive nature of local officials. Few projects to develop alternative 
incomes were made available and as farmers received little reward for compliance, 
many prepared for a relaxation of the ban. Between 1906 and 1911, production had 
decreased by 89 percent and continued to decline until 1917. While the level of 
clandestine production from 1915 is unknown, accounts suggest that China achieved 
success around 1917. The interventions’ negative consequences, however, were 
significant: the systematic abuse of farmers’ rights would today constitute a crime 
against humanity. Preventive measures ceased with the dissolution of the state in 1917.  
People’s Republic of China: The intervention differed depending on state authority. 
In areas where authority was strong, bans on production were enforced quickly and 
centred upon: public humiliation and executions; near constant surveillance and 
administrative punishments. Whereas, in more remote areas, the state sequenced bans 
only after state extension and agricultural reform. Opposition to suppression may have 
been lessened by feelings of indebtedness and loyalty expressed by many of the rural 
poor to the Chinese Communist Party. This said, by the early-1960s agricultural 
mismanagement - at considerable cost to human life - may have diluted revolutionary 
zeal. Nevertheless, by this point China had developed a highly repressive, intrusive and 
hegemonic state. China realised success during the late-1950s/early-1960s. The 
intervention was, however, highly repressive, violated individual rights and, there is 
minimal evidence of drug control improving opium farmers’ welfare.  
Pahlavi and Islamic Republic of Iran: Both interventions were centred upon: 
forced eradication; punitive law enforcement (including community punishments); and 
extensive and intrusive surveillance of opium farmers. The public execution of ‘drug 
offenders’ may have produced an anticipatory effect. The Islamic Republican 
intervention differed only by the provision of incentives in the form of redistribution of 
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land, the removal of a loathed regime, and religious affiliation. Opposition to 
suppression may have been lessened by feelings of indebtedness and loyalty expressed 
by many of the rural poor to the Revolution. Intense loyalty to the Revolution and fear 
of persecution established a system of extensive and intrusive surveillance which was 
intensified by state-sanctioned vigilante groups. While details of production are mired 
by potential bias and national self-interest, there is a general agreement that production 
ceased by 1996 at the latest. The lack of economic assistance and widespread human 
rights violation suggest a negative impact on opium farming communities. 
Turkey: The Turkish intervention began in 1940 with the restriction of areas 
authorised to produce opium to those in which the state possessed greatest authority. 
While there is little information on the specifics of the bans, it appears that there was 
some crop substitution; the coercive use of the military can be neither verified nor ruled 
out. Control, however, remained inadequate and ineffective. Successful suppression of 
diversion centred upon the administration of a highly effective control system which 
placed farmers under prolonged and extensive surveillance whilst providing 
‘sufficiently harsh’ individual and community disincentives. Since 1974, diversion or 
illicit production has been minimal and the intervention appears to have positively 
impacted opium farming communities.  
Thailand: During the 1960s, the military employed repressive law enforcement 
techniques against producers in areas with high Communist insurgent activity. 
Nevertheless, in the early-1970s highland opium production suppression began to 
follow a path in which state extension into a formally isolated area was sequenced 
before drug control and centred primarily upon development-orientated approaches. A 
moratorium on eradication permitted the state to capitalise on highland farmers’ 
awareness of the unsustainability of opium production until the state possessed 
sufficient authority to enforce negotiated eradication. From 1985, the risk of eradication 
has averaged 60 percent, indicating a high-risk environment and capability to enforce 
negotiated eradication schedules. In 1994, production fell below 20mt to 9.33mt; 
representing a 95 percent reduction from the 1970 peak of 200mt. The intervention has 
improved the livelihoods of many ex-opium farming communities whilst adding to the 
stabilisation of Northern Thailand.  
Pakistan: In 1979, a campaign centred upon law enforcement suppressed production 
throughout areas in which the state exercised sufficient authority. Because of 
insufficient access to alternative incomes, the campaign pushed many communities 
deeper into poverty. The intervention after 1979 is essentially one of state extension 
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through development-orientated projects; mainstreamed after 1984 into provincial rural 
development. Centrally, all eradication and law enforcement was negotiated with tribal 
or district leaders. Between 1996 and 2001, the risk of eradication averaged 70 percent, 
indicating a high-risk environment and capability to enforce negotiated eradication 
schedules. In 2000, production fell below 20mt to 9.5mt; representing a 99 percent 
reduction from the 1979 peak of 753.75mt. The decline from the 1979 peak to 44mt in 
2009 (the most recent harvest) represents a 94 percent reduction.  Hence, while Pakistan 
resumed production above 20mt shortly after achieving success, it continued to conform 
to the 90 percent reduction criteria. The intervention has improved the livelihoods of 
many former opium farming communities. 
Viet Nam: The intervention was centred upon extensive surveillance, military 
coercion (‘persuasion’), and potentially repressive law enforcement. The public 
execution of traffickers may have added leverage to negotiations. Development projects 
in opium producing areas appear to have had little success in alleviating poverty during 
the intervention period: tourism emerged as one of the only viable alternative income 
generators. That the administration of development appears to have been insufficient 
suggests that disincentives provided the primary motivation for the cessation of opium 
production. In 1992, production fell below 20mt to 2mt; representing a 99 percent 
reduction from the 1990 peak of 90mt. The intervention appears to have negatively 
impacted many opium farming communities. 
Laos: The original intervention (1994+) adopted a ‘gradual approach’ to suppression 
which emphasised ‘community-based’ development, tolerated small-scale opium 
production and sequenced eradication after the establishment of alternative livelihoods. 
While initially similar to best-practice developed in Thailand, significant and often 
negative departures included the use of resettlement, the Green Anti-Drug Project, and 
insufficient emphasis on marketing substitute crops. In 2000, Laotian policy shifted to 
the ‘accelerated rural development programme’, which emphasised the sequencing of 
eradication and law enforcement before alternative livelihoods were established. Since 
2001, military coercion (‘persuasion’) appears the primary motivator for the cessation of 
opium farming. In 2006, production fell below 20mt to 14mt; representing a 95 percent 
reduction from the 1989 peak of 328mt. The intervention appears, however, to have 
negatively impacted many opium farming communities. 
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Section III: Synthesis, comparison and policy-implications 
The documentation of cases of national success is by itself an important contribution to 
the knowledgebase on source country drug policy and may provide a useful reference 
for scholars and practitioners. Nonetheless, in order to extract ‘lessons’ which may 
improve the effectiveness of interventions, Chapter 10 presents the findings of a 
synthesis and cross-case comparison.   
The cross-case comparison in Chapter 10:3 found five factors presented in all (or 
most) cases and were thus deemed necessary for success. These were:  
 
(1) All governments perceived suppression as being in its best interest;  
(2) All states possessed a strong presence throughout opium producing areas;  
(3) All but two states presented an incentive with which opium farmers could 
perceive some benefit;  
(4) All states possessed the capabilities to monitor opium farmers;  
(5) All interventions administered law enforcement.  
 
Additional factors that crossed more than one case were deemed supportive or 
facilitative of the necessary factors. A model illustrating the optimal relationship 
between the necessary and supportive factors was developed. The findings suggest that 
the primary objective when planning a national intervention must be to facilitate or 
support the establishment or maintenance of the five necessary factors.  These findings 
were supported by the semi-deviant case of Imperial/Republican China, in which failure 
to sustain production below 20mt was attributable to the loss of state authority and lack 
of incentives for farmers to cease production. 
Chapter 11 explored and further clarified the findings presented in Chapter 10:3 by 
placing them in the practical context of contemporary Afghanistan. The chapter 
concluded by illustrating how premature law enforcement could create an erroneous 
path in which farmers are further impoverished and alienated. This in turn facilitates 
conflict and consecutively decreases state authority. As the loss of authority and 
political capital require greater law enforcement to achieve the same outcome, a 
negative spiral is established whereby the provision of incentives are used to gain entry 
into the (even further) isolated and hostile areas. Consequently, time and resources 
would have been better spent on establishing the five necessary conditions rather than 
undertaking policies counter-productive to their establishment. 
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2. Context, theory and concepts 
This chapter outlines the international legal context for drug control, key concepts and 
terms, and key areas of theory. This chapter shall provide a foundation for the remainder 
of the thesis. This means that concepts and terms defined here can be repeated 
throughout the thesis without definitional ambiguity. Most of the theory outlined in this 
chapter is common to all of the country-level case studies that follow. This allows the 
individual case study chapters to maintain their focus on the empirical evidence and 
particular nuances of theory as it relates to individual countries. It turn this will facilitate 
the identification of common themes and issues across countries that will form the 
concluding section of the thesis.  
It is worth noting at the outset that interventions against coca production in South 
America have received greater academic attention than those against Asian/Middle 
Eastern opium production. Furthermore, some issues pertinent to opium suppression, 
such as aerial fumigation, have been discussed primarily in reference to coca. Since 
suppression strategies relating to opium and coca leaf production are closely related (see 
Morrison, 1997), it is appropriate that this chapter draws on both these areas of research.  
Before progressing, the difference between illicit production and diversion must be 
made apparent. Diversion (the theft of opium at any point along regulated production 
and distribution lines) and illicit production (the clandestine extraction of the juice of 
the opium poppy) produce the same outcome yet operate in distinct environments and 
require different approaches. Licensed farmers are strongly linked to the state machine 
and divert opium from under its scrutiny, while illicit production tends to occur in 
remote areas distant from state authority.  
2.1. Overview: objectives of source country 
interventions 
The preambles of the contemporary international drug control conventions express three 
objectives: the adequate provision of medicinal drugs; the prevention of addiction and 
the limitation of the use of drugs for medicinal and scientific purpose. The objectives 
are framed as concern for the negative effects of consumption of, and trade in, illicit 
drugs on both individuals and societies (UN, 1961, 1971, 1988).  
Although the specifics of the theory of specific strategies are reviewed further below, 
the broad theoretical argument in support of source control is fairly simple: reduced 
illicit drug supply will reduce consumption, and this is the main goal implied by the 
international conventions. Much of the theory of supply reduction focuses on trafficking 
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risks and illicit drug prices - in theory, reducing the supply of illicit drugs leads to price 
increases for consumers. These consist of actual price increases plus effective price 
increases due to reduced availability and ease of transaction. The anticipated end result 
is the prevention of consumption, particularly initiation, and the instigation of 
desistance as consumers are expelled from the market (see Falco, 1996; Moore, 1990; 
Murji, 1993, 1998; Kleinman, 1992; Kleinman and Reuter, 1986). Supply reduction is 
theorised to be possible through law enforcement and border controls targeted at any 
point of the distribution chain as a set of strategies that complement supply reduction at 
the source (Moore, 1990).  
The focus of this thesis is the first stage of the supply chain, that is, opium poppy 
cultivation and opium production. This area of strategy is often termed ‘source control’ 
as it is based in ‘source countries’. It is a major area of policy and practice and the focus 
of many national and international efforts of various kinds as detailed herein. Strategies 
relating to the adjacent stages of the supply chain (i.e. interdiction of laboratories and 
the arrest of traffickers) are also discussed herein when such strategies are relevant to 
reducing opium production.  
Proponents of source control suggest that locating and destroying opiates at source 
removes the greatest quantity of drugs (ONCDP, 2009), whilst being easier and more 
cost-effective than interventions in consumer markets. A key aspect of interest is the 
suggestion that poppy fields are easier to detect than concealed packages of heroin. 
Additionally, a cornerstone of source control theory is that as the farmgate represents 
the cheapest link in the distribution chain, traffickers invest fewer resources in its 
protection (Perl, 2007; Wrobleski, 1989; Wyler, 2009; INCRS, 2008).  
The fact that opium is cheapest at the farmgate is the origin of what is probably the 
single most critical theoretical argument against source control policy (Tullis, 1994, also 
Mejia and Posada, 2010). This criticism is that interventions at source are the least cost-
effective means of controlling consumption (Moore, 1990).  The essence of the 
argument is that, because opium is produced in areas with low risk and profuse cheap 
labour, traffickers can absorb farmgate price increases with minimal effect on profits or 
retail price (Holahan and Henningsen, 1972; Kleiman and Reuter, 1986; also, Caulkins 
et al., 2010; Falco, 1996; Keefer et al., 2010; Reuter, 2009, 2010; Reuter and 
Trautmann, 2009; Riley, 1993). For example, a contemporary estimate of the price 
mark-up between farmgate in Afghanistan and the street retail price in the UK is 15,800 
percent (Wilson and Stevens, 2008).  
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Depending on the analysts perspective, a second key area of theoretical criticism of 
source control strategies is that western markets are ‘buffered’ by markets closer to the 
source (Caulkins and Hao, 2008; Caulkins et al., 2010). For example, Pietschmann 
(2005; also Paoli et al., 2009) found that a reduction in Afghan opium production in 
2000 was felt most intensely in the neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan rather 
than Western Europe. As profits to be made from the industrialised West are typically 
greater, traffickers ensure that any short-term reduction in supply is absorbed by 
reduced sales in more local markets with little impact on the more lucrative markets 
elsewhere.  
Moore (1990:109) has argued that a ‘portfolio of programs is stronger than any 
single program alone’. This can be interpreted as suggesting that source country 
approaches could, in theory, reduce consumption. The corollary, however, seems to be 
that a country must invest in a broad portfolio of supply reduction efforts. This is costly 
and encounters many practical difficulties, many of which are discussed further herein.  
A further criticism of supply reduction is that it can induce some negative 
consequences. In particular, it has been suggested that reduced supply implies a greater 
need for treatment and harm-reduction efforts, and that where these are unavailable the 
effects can be negative. For example, in 2001 reduced Afghan production caused an 
acute heroin shortage in Iran. During the shortage the number of heroin related deaths 
increased by 60 percent (UNDCP, 2001). Australia also witnessed an acute heroin 
shortage in 2001 which has been attributed to either reduced Afghan production 
(Prunckun, 2006; Jiggins, 2008) or improved border controls, supported by reduced 
Burmese production (Degenhardt et al., 2005a).1 Nonetheless, the Australian experience 
produced several positive outcomes, including reductions in overdose, intravenous drug 
use (Degenhardt et al., 2005b) and heroin related fatalities (Longo et al., 2004). Further, 
between 2,745 and 10,560 individuals may have been prevented from initial contact 
with heroin (Day et al., 2006:308). To paraphrase Moore’s (1990:136) analysis of the 
early-1970s New York heroin shortage, this represented a barrier to a ‘cohort’ of 
Australian youths who passed through a ‘period of vulnerability’. The difference in 
impact between Iran and Australia may be that Australia had developed sophisticated 
harm reduction and treatment services, (UNODC, 2008) while Iranian services were 
insufficient (see Aliverdinia and Pridemore 2008; Nissaramanesh et al., 2005). 
                                                 
1
 For Wood et al. (2006) Burmese reduction represented the primary contributing factor. 
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While opium producing areas tend to possess higher than average levels of opiate 
consumption2  (Westermeyer, 1981, 2004; also, Epprecht, 2000; Gebert and Kesmanee, 
1999), reducing consumption is but one motivator for a government to suppress opium 
production. Alternative or parallel objectives may include: decreasing the negative 
effects of large-scale production and trafficking;3 state extension into remote areas; 
counter-insurgency; attracting foreign aid; or improving foreign and international 
relations. Conversely, international legal objectives are often subverted by political or 
economic objectives4 (see Berridge and Edwards, 1981; Lewis, 2001; Levin, 2003; Pan 
and Bruun, 1979; Price, 2006; Trocki, 1999; Walker, 1991, 1994, 2007). Such issues 
mean that supply reduction policy and practice is far from simple. It is often mired in a 
political context of competing and sometimes contradictory national and local policies 
and programmes. In terms of theory this means that implementation of strategies is a 
key area of difficulty, as will become apparent in relation to many of the country-level 
studies.  
2.2. International legal context 
While section 2:1 discussed the primary objectives of contemporary international drug 
control laws, several of the cases analysed in this thesis occurred before the 1961 Single 
Convention and were thus bounded by different international obligations. Tables 2:1 
and 2:2, illustrate how each treaty draws on the previous to become stricter (Bassiouni, 
1997) whilst shifting the emphasis from obligations to enact regulatory controls on licit 
trade to the criminalisation of all non-authorised production and distribution. 
                                                 
2
 For example, in 2007, the prevalence rate of opiate consumption in the US was 0.58 of the 
population. In Pakistan and Iran, it was 0.7 and 2.8 percent respectively (Windle, 2011a, 
2011b). 
3
 Large-scale illicit opium production can sustain or escalate: high levels of corruption; political 
instability (see Dupont, 1999; Chandran, 1998; Guizado, 1994; Thoumi, 1987, 2010; Thoumi 
and Navarrete-Frias, 2005; Kursawe, 2007; Paoli et al., 2009); and violent conflict (see 
Björnehed; 2004; Chalk, 2000; Cornell, 2007; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Garces, 2005; Labrousse, 
2005; Kleinman, 2004). While it is generally considered to be obstructive to long-term national 
economic growth (Atkins, 1996; Dupont, 1999; Thoumi, 1987, 2005; Wert, 1994) in some cases 
suppression may have a negative effect on national economies (Paoli et al., 2009; Tullis, 1994). 
4
 For example, institutions may emphasis source country interventions utility to justify their 
existence (see, Dorn et al., 1994; Malamud-Goti, 1992). Private military (Ortiz, 2010; Singer, 
2001) and development companies (Hafvenstein, 2007) subcontracted to drug control may 
lobby institutions to protect industrial interests. 
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Conceptions of legitimate use, production and distribution are gradually narrowed to 
within the parameters of medical or scientific purpose.5 To guide the reader in 
navigating this thesis a glossary of key legal terms is provided on page iv. 
 
Table 2: 1. The criminalisation of acts under international law 
Treaty Acts criminalised 
League of 
Nations 
(1925) 
Agree to punish violations of domestic law and ‘examine’ possibility of 
criminalising unauthorised acts. 
League of 
Nations 
(1936) 
Unauthorised: Cultivation; Extraction; Production; Conversion; 
Preparation; Manufacture; Possession; Offering/sale; Distribution; 
Purchase; Brokerage; Dispatch; Transport; Importation; Exportation. 
UN (1961) As of 1936 
UN (1988) 
Unauthorised: Organisation, management or financing of offences; 
Acquiring or possessing property which was derived from an offence; 
Inciting others to commit an offence. 
                                                 
5
 For in-depth discussions on historical and contemporary international drug control conventions 
see Chatterjee (1988); Krajewski (1999); Renborg (1963); Pietschmann et al. (2009). 
Table 2: 2. Development of international drug control law 
Obligation 
Treaty 
League of Nations 
(1912)2 
League of Nations 
(1925)3 
League of Nations 
(1931) 
League of 
Nations (1953) 
UN (1961)5 UN (1972) UN (1988) 
Raw/prepared 
opium 
Enact ‘effective’ laws or 
regulations for the 
control of production 
‘Take measures’ for 
the gradual suppression 
of prepared opium 
‘Ensure’ effective 
control of 
production through 
domestic laws 
 
Prohibit distribution/ 
manufacture of any 
product obtained from 
opium ‘not in 
use….for medical or 
scientific purposes’  
Production 
must be 
regulated by a 
monopoly 
(Renborg, 
1963) 
Limited 
‘exclusively to 
medical and 
scientific 
purposes’ 
 
Seized 
plants to be 
destroyed 
Prevent and 
eradicate, rather 
than seize and 
destroy 
unauthorised 
poppies. 
Supports DOA6 
Export/import 
Prevent or restrict export 
to states that prohibit or 
restrict importation 
 
Import-export 
authorisation 
system established4 
 Permits seven 
states to export 
opiates 
(Steinig, 1968) 
Import/export 
system continued 
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Prohibit ‘if ready’ 
prepared opium imports/ 
exports 
‘Endeavour’ to control 
persons 
importing/exporting 
manufactured opiates 
Manufacture 
of derivatives 
‘Take measures’ to 
confine morphine to 
medical or legitimate 
purpose 
‘Endeavour’ to control 
persons manufacturing 
morphine and heroin 
 
Enact laws to limit 
morphine and 
heroin to ‘medical 
and scientific’ 
purpose 
Recommends 
licensing, all 
persons engaged in 
trade 
 
To manufacture no 
more than is required 
for licit use 
    
← Pre-1912, no obligations1 
 → Prepared opium prohibited.  
 → Import-export regulated. Manufactured opiates limited to medical/scientific purpose. 
 → Raw opium production and distribution limited to medical/scientific purpose. 
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Notes for Table 2:1 
1. In 1909, an ‘international’ conference produced non-binding recommendations 
centred upon respecting Chinese sovereignty (Bull, 2008). Nations were 
requested to ban the exportation of opium to nations prohibiting importation 
whilst creating legislation restricting non-medical opium consumption and the 
manufacture and distribution of synthetic opiates (Steinig, 1968).  
2. The preamble to the 1912 Convention provides the objective of gradually 
suppressing the ‘abuse’ of opium and its derivatives. Articles concerned with 
raw and prepared opium or protecting Chinese sovereignty contained stronger 
language than those regarding manufactured opiates (i.e., ‘shall’ as opposed to 
‘use their best endeavours’) indicating the Conventions priorities.   
3. The 1925 Convention’s primary objective was the control and supervision of 
pharmaceutical trade (Steinig, 1968).  
4. The system obliged merchants to carry government issued authorisation 
certificates, which had to include details of: the quantity being 
imported/exported; the name and address of the importer/exporter; and the 
period for which authorisation was valid. Exporters had to possess a certificate 
issued by the government of the importing nation declaring their support.  
5. The 1961 Convention was established to update, simplify and unify existing 
treaties. It succeeded all previous treaties (May, 1955).  
6. Article 14(3)(a-c) allows Parties to ‘increase the effectiveness of eradication 
efforts’ which may include support for ‘integrated rural development leading to 
economical viable alternatives to illicit cultivation’.  It also calls for cooperation 
and exchange of ‘scientific and technical information’ on eradication. 
 
2.3. Theories of source control 
This section addresses theory and practice in two main areas of source control: 
development-oriented and law enforcement approaches. In each instance, a roughly 
chronological overview of developments in theory and practice is followed by a section 
outlining key problems. In practice, the two areas overlap because, in a cost-benefit 
formulation of these strategies, development assistance equates roughly to benefits and 
punishment equates roughly to costs. Hence, the strategic manipulation of these costs 
and benefits (which include psychological and other elements in addition to monetary 
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costs and benefits) is the overarching theoretical framework within which this 
discussion takes place.  
2.3.1. Development-Orientated Approaches (DOA)  
DOA1 to drug control are centred upon a perception that illicit production is ‘closely 
linked to development problems’ (Berg, 2003:4). While the beginnings of DOA are 
often traced to projects administered in early-1970s Turkey (Chouvy, 2009) or Thailand 
(Pleumpamya, 2009) there is documented evidence relating to India and Iran that DOA 
has been around for a minimum of well over a century.  Fairly sophisticated DOA were 
undertaken in India in the late-nineteenth-century after Chinese competition pushed 
legally produced, but illicitly exported, Indian opium from the market. While there was 
no opium ban improved transport infrastructures allowed farmers to grow bulkier and 
more perishable crops and the Government of India began to diversify its exports thus 
creating markets for alternative crops (Windle, 2011). 
During the mid-1920s, a League of Nations Commission was sent to Iran to 
investigate opium production. The Commission suggested a 15 percent increase in the 
yield of certain crops would make them as profitable as opium and they recommended: 
teaching modern agricultural techniques; re-establishing the silk industry; increasing 
trade with neighbours; and a gradual reduction in opium production after development 
projects had begun (Delano, 1926; League of Nations, 1926). This said, a lack of 
foreign support or funding prevented inauguration (League of Nations, 1927).  
In the early-1970s, the UN supported its first DODCP with the administration of 
‘crop substitution’ projects in Thailand and Pakistan. The projects were centred upon 
finding crops that could compete with opium in terms of agricultural and economic 
viability. The underlying theory is relatively straightforward: farmers will have 
sufficient incentive to reduce the cultivation of illicit crops when provided with 
agriculturally viable alternatives. UN experience and resources were, however, limited 
(UNDCP, 1993) and project workers were often ignorant of local cultures and traditions 
(Bruun et al., 1975): they seldom included the target populations in design and 
administration (Renard, 2001). Several potential substitute crops were identified but by 
the mid-1970s, it had become apparent that projects would require significant 
supporting infrastructure. In particular, adequate processing, transportation and 
                                                 
1
 The GTZ define their organisational approach as ‘development-orientated drug control’ (Berg, 
2003). The term is used here to catch the diversity across approaches centred upon incentives 
rather than disincentives. The term could, however, be perceived as contrary to AL theories 
which argue that development should not be orientated by reducing drug production.  
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marketing of new or improved crops proved to be fundamentally necessary conditions if 
substitute crops were to produce any income (UNDCP, 1993; also Berg, 2003b; 
Mansfield, 1999; Renard, 2001).  
In the late-1970s in Thailand and the early-1980s in Pakistan, crop substitution 
gradually gave way to ‘integrated rural development’. These projects placed greater 
emphasis on: facilitating marketing by constructing transport infrastructures, processing 
and storage facilities; generating off-farm employment and extending social welfare (i.e. 
healthcare and education) (UNDCP, 1993). The underlying theory had developed to 
become thus: farmers will have sufficient incentive to reduce illicit crop cultivation if 
provided with alternatives that were agriculturally and economically viable. Theory 
aside, projects were often poorly designed, and a key source of problems was held to be 
the exclusion of local populations (the farmers and their local community) from project 
planning and implementation (UNODCCP, 2000).  
In the 1990s, the theory of crop substitution was superseded by that of ‘Alternative 
Development’ (AD)2 (Renard, 2001). UNGA (1998:preamble) define AD as 
‘specifically designed rural development’ with the primary objective of suppressing and 
preventing illicit crop production. Poverty reduction was a secondary objective. AD 
projects should be culturally, legally, socially, economically and ecologically specific to 
the project area and contribute to the promotion of democratic values. Thus, target 
populations are included in project design and administration.3 Additionally, projects 
should extend demand reduction and addiction treatment services (UNGA, 1998:para 
18; see UNODC, 2009). Here, articulation of the underlying theory is a more complex 
task: farmers will have sufficient incentive to reduce illicit crop cultivation if they have 
ownerships of (i.e. involved in the design and implementation) economic alternatives, 
which can include but are not limited to agricultural activities that significantly enhance 
the welfare of both the individual and the community as a whole. Nevertheless, it is also 
clear that in some instances drug control was a secondary objective to more general 
economic development. In that context, the underlying theory is that illicit cultivation 
would be reduced as a side-effect of general economic development.  
These apparent developments in theory and practice have taken place mainly in the 
last four decades. Mansfield (2007; Mansfield and Pain, 2005) has criticised AD 
                                                 
2
 The term is criticised by Mansfield and Sage (1997) as misleadingly implying that drug crops 
support development. 
3
 The utility of target population participation had been illustrated by scholars of development 
studies in the early-1980s (Renard, 2001). 
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projects for: often consisting of little more than crop substitution; being unconnected to 
national development objectives and administered by drug control agencies that possess 
no comparative advantage for the delivery of effective development. These weaknesses 
and the growing knowledge base of what motivates opium farmers as individuals or 
communities rather than a homogeneous transnational group (see Atkins, 1996; 
Chouvy, 2009; Mansfield, 1999, 2007b; Mansfield et al., 2006; Potulski, 1991, 1992; 
Smith, 1992; Ward et al., 2008; chapters in Bennett et al., 1992) resulted in the 
formation of the ‘Alternative Livelihoods’ (AL) model.  
In AL, ‘the structural and institutional factors that shape... [farmers’] decisions to 
grow’ (Youngers and Walsh, 2010:11) are purportedly addressed. Thus, increasing state 
legitimacy in production areas (Armenta et al., 2010) and building a foundation for 
sustainable reductions (Brown et al., 2005; Mansfield and Pain, 2008) are key elements 
of the AL approach. It is also intended that AL projects are administered by 
development practitioners and supported by advice from drug control experts on what 
drives opium farmers (Mansfield, 2007). As development is the primary objective, 
rather than a means to reduce opium production (Mansfield and Pain, 2005; see 
Youngers and Walsh, 2010; Vargas, 2005), projects are ‘mainstreamed’ into national or 
local development strategy (Byrd, 2010; EC et al., 2008; Mansfield, 2007; Mansfield et 
al., 2006; Ward and Byrd, 2004; Ward et al., 2008; Youngers and Walsh, 2010). For 
example, drug control might dovetail with the strengthening of state institution 
(Mansfield and Pain, 2005; Youngers, 2010; World Bank, 2005) or conflict resolution 
(Byrd, 2010; Mansfield et al., 2006). In this framework, illicit crop output should be one 
of several measures of success (Mansfield and Pain, 2008) and conditionality should be 
based on multiple development targets rather than drug control (Mansfield et al., 2006). 
As such, AL resembles more traditional rural development projects, with the addition of 
‘sequenced law enforcement’ when appropriate (World Bank, 2005:122). 
Apparently ‘new’ AL concepts such as mainstreaming have been around for some 
time. ‘Mainstreaming’ was proposed by academics (Bruun et al., 1975; Der Meer, 
1987) and practised by the Thai Royal Family in the 1970s (Renard, 2009; Pan and 
Bruun, 1979). Institutional change was part of BMZ (2004; also Berg, 2002) AD 
projects during the 1990s and had been advocated by academics (Lee, 1991; Riley, 
1996). The significance of AL may be as a progression of nuance; each theory has fine-
tuned the previous.  
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Implementation, negative outcomes and utility 
DOA require significant political and resource commitments from, and cooperation 
between, multiple domestic and foreign state institutions, international organisations 
and NGOs (Brown et al., 2005; UNODC, 2000). It is often administered in areas where 
state authority is minimal. Previous or ongoing violent conflicts may have devastated 
rural institutions, markets and rural-infrastructures (see Brown et al., 2005; EC et al., 
2008; Farrell, 1996, 1998). Belligerent groups may perceive DOA as being in 
opposition to their interests (Hafvenstein, 2007). These difficulties can be exacerbated 
by corrupt state institutions, such as unofficial tolls on roads established to facilitate 
market access (Croker and Martin, 1992; Ghufran, 2007).  
Practical barriers to success of projects may be erected by donor nations. For 
example, donors may block substitute produce perceived as competing with their own 
industries (see Gua, 1975; Hafvenstein, 2007; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; McCoy and 
Block 1992; Wert, 1994) or reduce profitability by flooding markets with cheap exports 
(Atkins, 1996; Rubin and Sherman, 2009). Inadequate market research has also been a 
barrier as farmers have produced goods for which there is no available national or 
international market (Carpenter, 2003; Morales, 1994; Potulski, 1991; Thoumi 2005).  
There is a supposition that no licit crop can economically compete with opium 
(Andreas et al., 1994; Carpenter, 2003). This is rejected by several practitioners 
(Mansfield et al., 2006) as opium’s relative profitability depends on several factors (i.e. 
farmers’ ability to negotiate prices or amount of land available) (Berg, 2002). 
Furthermore, as opium is labour intensive, after rent and labour costs are deducted, per 
hectare net returns are often lower than licit crops (Der Meer, 1987; Khan, 1987). Any 
reduction in profit may be offset by improvements in living standards established by 
projects, such as: improved access to social welfare; increased food availability; access 
to cheaper goods through market access (Potulski, 1991); reduced opium consumption 
(Epprecht, 2000) or safe access to credit (Ward et al., 2008). For example, Kunstadter 
(2000) found that the provision of village health stations in Thailand was a statistically 
significant factor for the cessation of opium production. 
Opium does, however, have some benefits. It can be stored for long periods and thus 
used as savings while merchants will often buy at the farmgate and provide credit, often 
unavailable in developing and remote areas (Chouvy and Laniel, 2007). Risk-adverse 
farmers may be slow to replace a familiar crop and market (Der Meer, 1987; Lee, 1991; 
Potulski, 1991; Reuter, 2010; Tinker, 1992). Even if they are persuaded, the slow 
process can frustrate farmers who may lose interest (Atkins, 1996; Stares, 1996). The 
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same applies to donors who are often unwilling to commit resources to long-term 
projects (Brown et al., 2005). Discouraged by the slowness of projects in achieving 
drug control objectives (GOA, 1979) some donors have withdrawn aid after project 
initiation. This led Brown and colleagues (2005:iii) to describe AD/AL as a ‘marginally 
supported and little honoured social safety net’. The lack of support may have limited 
AD/AL full potential from being realised: just five percent of Asian opium farmers have 
received AD/AL support (EU et al., 2008; UNODC, 2005). 
Brown and colleagues (2005:6-8) note how in practice the conception of AD ranges: 
narrow crop substitution; non-mainstreamed ‘discrete projects’; the UNGA (1998; 
CND, 2009) definition of AD and what is termed here AL. The confusion limits 
coordination between practitioners and donors. For example, while the Afghan 
Government and foreign donors officially follow an AL model (Mansfield, 2007; 
Wyler, 2009) many ‘AL’ projects closely resemble an AD model: promises of aid are 
used as leverage to establish ‘voluntary’ eradication, success is measured in drug 
control terms and projects are seldom linked to wider development strategies (Chouvy, 
2009; Mansfield, 2007; Mansfield and Pain, 2005). 
Moreover, DOA can support illicit activities (Farrell, 1998). For examples: new 
roads can assist trafficking (Carpenter, 2003; Stares, 1996); enhanced irrigation (Ward 
et al., 2008) and agricultural techniques can improve opium yields; multi-cropping can 
provide insurance against eradication (Clawson and Lee, 1996); while farmers may start 
growing illicit crops to attract aid, a development known as ‘reverse conditionality’ 
(Farrell, 1998; see Brown et al., 2005; World Bank, 2005).  
Reverse conditionality is a perverse or inadvertent outcome of development projects. 
Communities that did not receive development assistance would threaten to begin or 
increase their illicit crop cultivation if they did not receive economic assistance. This 
unexpected turn highlighted what might be termed a dilemma in this area of theory. It is 
paradoxical that development assistance is, in effect, a reward to those who undertake 
the most illicit cultivation while communities that do not undertake illicit cultivation 
received less economic aid. It seems likely that this development, in theory and practice, 
is one of the reasons that law enforcement has retained credibility as a necessary and 
complementary aspect of drug control development strategies. While law enforcement 
is sometimes represented as (and can be) unnecessarily punitive, in this broader 
theoretical context it can also be viewed as a policy tool that promotes a more equitable 
distribution of economic assistance.  
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2.3.2. Law enforcement approaches 
While DOA provide incentives to ceasing production, punitive strategies provide 
disincentives to continuing production. Forced eradication, often administered or 
supported by the police or military is conducted either manually (i.e., ploughing, 
burning, beating or slashing poppy fields) or by herbicides sprayed from the ground or 
air. The US Government considers forced eradication to be the: 
 
most cost-effective means of cutting supply. Drugs cannot enter the 
system from crops that were never planted, or have been destroyed or 
left unharvested; without the crops there would be no need for costly 
enforcement and interdiction operations (INCRS, 2007:15). 
 
While there seems to be an emerging consensus that development alone cannot 
reduce output (Feldafing Declaration, 2002:4) the UN has expressly mandated 
eradication as an intervention supportive of DOA, which may not be appropriate for 
poorer farmers (CND, 2009; UNGA, 1998) until viable alternative incomes are 
available (Chawla and Pietschmann, 2005). Thus, there is some support for 
discriminating against farmers who can access the resources to attain alternative 
incomes (Byrd and Buddenberg, 2006; UNODC, 2005; Mansfield and Pain, 2006; 
Pothier, 2009; Ward et al., 2008). The convergence of incentives and disincentives can 
make licit livelihoods more attractive in an environment of increased risk (Farrell, 1998; 
Potulski, 1991; UNGA, 1998; UNODC, 2005). 
Riley (1993) posits two types of eradication strategies. Shock policies are focused on 
one production period. For example, the 2001 Taliban ban represented a one-year 
discrete but extensive national campaign. Whereas periodic policies are applied year 
round, for example, since 1974 any unregulated opium poppies found in Turkey have 
been immediately eradicated, representing continuity rather than shock.  
During the mid-1980s, UN sponsored projects began to perceive development alone 
as insufficient to reduce opium production. Thus, negotiated or ‘voluntary’ eradication 
became central to AD. Projects negotiated contracts with target populations or local 
elites specifying that the project will provide development assistance in exchange for 
farmers’ observing scheduled decreases in opium poppy cultivation. Here, the key 
theoretical development is the addition of an explicit disincentive to the policy formula, 
introduced via the contract and the threat of law enforcement. The key theoretical 
element of the contract was termed ‘conditionality’; wherein farmers only receive 
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development assistance as a condition of meeting specified drug control goals. Such 
contracts often contain caveats providing for forced eradication if the schedule is not 
adhered to (see Farrell, 1996; UNDCP, 1993). This law enforcement disincentive was a 
politically contentious development for some parties in a context where farmers of illicit 
crops were, rightly or wrongly, perceived as the victims of impoverishment. The 
corollary to this argument was that, while most farmers clearly lived in impoverished 
areas, not all people in these areas resorted to illicit crop cultivation, and people in other 
parts of the world in similar conditions also did not resort to illicit crop cultivation. 
While eradication was and remains contentious, in some USAID projects non-adherence 
can result in the removal of aid (Mansfield, 2007). There was also some diversification 
in strategy as more international agencies undertook efforts. In some instances, farmers 
could ‘voluntarily’ cease production if paid compensation, though this was an approach 
seldom used by UN projects (BMZ, 2004).  
‘Sequencing’ is a closely related concept representing the choice of when to enforce 
the law. US sponsored projects have often eradicated crops and then presented 
populations with aid (Blanchard, 2009; Wert, 1994) or demanded cessation of 
production as a precondition for aid (Veillette and Navarrete-Frias, 2007). Many other 
donors – following UNGA (1998; CND, 2009) guidelines - have postponed punitive 
measures until alternative incomes have been established (Mansfield and Pain, 2005, 
2006; World Bank, 2005). A conference convened by BMZ and UNODCCP, and 
attended by NGO and government practitioners concluded that AD: 
 
… should neither be made conditional on a prior elimination of drug 
crop cultivation nor should a reduction be enforced until licit 
components of livelihood strategies have been sufficiently 
strengthened. (Feldafing Declaration, 2002:art. 4).  
 
What constitutes an appropriate sequence has been narrowed further to exclude law 
enforcement during violent conflicts (Chouvy, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Hagan, 
2001; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007; Ruben and Sherman, 2009) in order to avoid 
conflicting with counter-insurgency or state building objectives (Felbab-Brown, 2010; 
Caulkins et al., 2010). 
Law enforcement operates in various ways. It can remove actors and illicit drugs 
from the market through: interdicting goods at any point along the distribution chain; 
destroying laboratories and resources used to manufacture drugs, possibly through aerial 
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or artillery bombardment (in Bolivia see Healy, 1988) and arresting and punishing 
actors, including farmers growing illicit crops or diverting from licit farms.  
Several interventions analysed in this thesis employed methods designed to create a 
perception of increased risk (to motivate the cessation of opium production), even if the 
actual risk had yet to change. While referred to as ‘anticipatory benefit’ in the crime 
prevention literature (Smith et al., 2002; see Hamilton-Smith, 2002; Johnson and 
Bowers, 2003), as many of the interventions employed methods which contravene 
international laws (predominantly public executions and torture) the term ‘anticipatory 
effect’ is favoured. 
What could be termed covert disincentives can be achieved through the arrest of 
middle/high-level traffickers. This may deflate the farmgate price of opium through 
increasing the risk of transactions without directly confronting or alienating farmers (see 
Byrd and Jonglez, 2006; Pothier, 2009; Ruben and Sherman, 2009; Sajjan, 2009; World 
Bank, 2005) thus making DOA appear more attractive (Wert, 1994; Feldafing 
Declaration, 2002).4 
The essence of the theory underpinning law enforcement can be stated in a rather 
straightforward fashion: costs of various sorts are imposed on farmers which serve as 
disincentives and thereby reduce illicit cultivation. As the different types of enforcement 
arguably trigger different types of disincentive mechanism, this broad statement of 
theory varies in its specifics for each type of punitive tactic as well as when different 
tactics are combined.  
Implementation, negative outcomes and utility 
Traffickers seek out states with weak criminal justice institutions (Caulkins et al., 2010; 
Paoli et al., 2009; Thoumi, 2005). Many significant producing nations lack the means to 
deter or punish illicit activity (for Afghanistan see Windle and Farrell, 2010; Felbab-
Brown, 2009; Rubin and Sherman, 2009) as their institutions may be inefficient (Hagan, 
2001; Navarrete-Frias and Thoumi, 2005) and corrupted (see Andreas et al., 1994; Lee, 
1991). Furthermore, state actors may tolerate or facilitate the illicit trade for military or 
political interests (Andreas et al., 1994; Lifschultz, 1992; McCoy and Block, 1992; 
McCoy, 2003). Additionally, the danger and expense of manual eradication or law 
enforcement can be magnified as much opium is produced in inhospitable terrain where 
                                                 
4
 For example, a 1989 campaign against Bolivian laboratories and Columbian traffickers 
depressed the Bolivian farmgate price of coca and forced farmers to seek out DOA (Clawson 
and Lee, 1996; Crane et al., 1997). 
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state authority is minimal and the populations are heavily armed (ICG, 2008; Riley, 
1996; Wert, 1994).  
Convergence of these factors can reduce the risk of participating in the illicit trade. 
Between 1990 and 1994, the global risk of eradication averaged below 10 percent 
(Farrell, 1998). Driven by South American eradication, global risk increased somewhat 
between 1995 and 2007 (Figure 2:1), although, risk in Asia has often remained below 
five percent (Figure 2:2).  
 
Figure 2: 1. Global harvest/eradication ratio (1995-2007) 
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Source: UNODC (various years). Note: includes, Afghanistan; Burma; Columbia; Mexico; 
Pakistan; Laos; Thailand; Viet Nam. 
 
Figure 2: 2. Asian harvest/eradication ratio (1995-2007) 
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Source: UNODC (various years). Note: includes, Afghanistan; Burma; Pakistan; Laos; 
Thailand; Viet Nam. 
 
Proponents of the aerial spraying of herbicides maintain it is the safest and most 
efficient means of eradication without employing highly-repressive measures (INCRS, 
2008; US Senate, 2009), whilst being safer for eradication teams (UNGA, 2007). 
Vargas (2005), however, found that, in Columbia, for every 13.3ha sprayed in 2002 just 
one hectare was eradicated whereas, 63.20 percent of successfully eradicated crops were 
destroyed manually.5 As the analysis is a one-year snapshot of decades of aerial 
eradication the evidence is insufficient to support the conclusion that the ‘effectiveness 
of aerial fumigation is incomprehensible’ (Vargas, 2005:139). 
This said, the supposition is supported by some Columbian officials who claim 
manual eradication as cheaper and more effective. This is partly due to an estimated 70 
percent of aerially eradicated crops being re-planted, whereas 15-20 percent of manually 
eradicated crops were replanted (ICG, 2008). While others stress that the area under 
cultivation in Columbia has stayed constant since 1988 regardless of aerial eradication 
(TNI, 2007; Van Ham and Kamminga, 2007), the risk of eradication is higher in 
Columbia than in any other major opium producer nation. 
 
Figure 2: 3. Columbian harvest/eradication ratio (1995-2007) 
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Source: UNODC (various years). 
                                                 
5
 Of 130,364ha sprayed, 9,797ha were destroyed. There are inconsistencies in Vargas data that 
are likely a result of using data from three organisations with different objectives and 
methodologies. 
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While law enforcement may increase operational risks, it can also generate negative 
outcomes. Mena and Hobbs (2010:66-67; Barrett et al., 2008) posit that prohibition 
‘exacerbates conditions’ which limit the full realisation of the rights established by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the right to: life; liberty; to be free of 
torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment; and freedom of movement (violated 
through forced displacement). As shall be illustrated in the case studies, punishments 
for opium farming have often been draconian. Abuses may be exacerbated by the 
inclusion of military units trained to fight rather than respect human rights (see ICG, 
2008; Wert, 1994), especially if farmers oppose eradication (Armenta et al., 2010).  
As many opium farmers survive on or below the poverty line, eradication (Armenta 
et al., 2010; Chouvy, 2009; Mansfield, 2009; Ruben and Sherman, 2009; Ward et al., 
2008) and the incapacity of farmers through imprisonment or death can intensify 
impoverishment. Furthermore, corruption often ensures that poorer farmers take the 
brunt of punitive measures (Byrd, 2010; Byrd and Jonglez, 2006; Mansfield and Pain, 
2006; Landay, 2007; Sajjan, 2009; World Bank, 2005).  
As herbicides indiscriminately destroy all foliage, aerial eradication represents a 
communal punishment (Khan, 1991) which can increase poverty and malnutrition by 
reducing cash and food crop harvests (Branford, 2002, 2005; Earth Justice, 2002; 
Forero, 2001; ICG, 2008; Jelsma, 2001). Additionally, livestock and/or human illness6 
have been reported (see Atkins, 1996; Branford, 2005; Earth Justice, 2002; Forero, 
2001; Rohter, 2000; WOLA, 2008; Sherret 2005). A UN Special Rapporteur expressed 
the ‘preliminary view’ that:  
 
… there was credible and reliable evidence that the aerial spraying of 
glyphosate along the border damages the physical and mental health 
of people living in Ecuador (UNGA, 2007:para.17).  
 
Conversely, Columbian authorities, the US Environmental Protection Agency and 
US State Department7 (2004, 2006), and independent researchers (Soloman et al., 2005, 
2007, 2009) assert that the application used in Columbia produced minimal health or 
                                                 
6
 Ecuadorian biologists found that the formulation used in Columbia damages human DNA 
(Paz-y-Miño et al., 2007). 
7
 US Ambassador Wood of Afghanistan offered to spray himself with Round-up to illustrate its 
safety (O’Shea, 2007). 
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environmental effects (see review in Lubick, 2007). Nonetheless, as allegations of 
vested interest, bias and poor scholarship have marred some research into the harms of 
aerial spraying, the extent of the inadvertent consequences remains open to debate (see 
Lubick, 2007; Sherret 2005).8 For example, in Afghanistan in 2004, after spraying 
inactive pellets American officials were confronted by farmers blaming crop failure and 
deteriorating human health on the (placebo) herbicide (Landay, 2007). 
Regardless of utility or physical harms, aerial spraying can have political 
consequences. Afghan peoples, for example, have negative associations with objects 
dropped from planes (Blanchard, 2009). Thus, aerial eradication could be utilised as 
propaganda by anti-government forces (Byrd, 2010).  
Generally, any measure damaging the interests of opium farmers can be detrimental 
to rural-state relationships (Caulkins et al., 2010; Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Paoli, et al, 
2009; Van Ham and Kamminga, 2007; Ward et al., 2008). Interventions have resulted 
in political (Healy, 1988; Jelsma, 2001; Lee, 1991; Riley, 1996; Tullis, 1994) and 
violent opposition (Carpenter, 2003; Hafvenstein, 2007; Kleinman, 2004; Lee, 1991; 
Youngers and Walsh, 2010), including inflating support or incomes for insurgent groups 
(Carpenter, 2004; Felbab-Brown, 2009, 2010; Paoli et al., 2009; Ruben and Sherman, 
2009; Van Ham and Kamminga, 2007). While interdicting middle/high-level traffickers 
is perceived as less politically sensitive, this wrongly presumes farmers are ignorant of 
the state manipulating their market (Felbab-Brown, 2009).  
Law enforcement may further alienate rural peoples from the state, which can 
augment regime destabilisation and erect barriers to democratic governance (Felbab-
Brown, 2010; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007; Ruben and Sherman, 2009) whilst inflating 
military budgets and authority in rural areas. This can strengthen the military against 
civilian rule (see Chouvy, 2009; Healey, 1994, Riley 1996). 
The alienation of farmers by law enforcement may be counterproductive. Greater 
state authority in an area facilitates more effective, easier and sustainable drug control 
interventions (Thoumi, 2005; Thoumi and Navarrete-Frias, 2005), including DOA 
(Armenta et al., 2010; Chawla and Pietschmann, 2005; UNODC, 2005, 2009). 
Additionally, as opium is often produced in developing or low-income nations law 
enforcement can displace resources from where they are most needed (i.e. social welfare 
or rural development) (Armenta et al., 2010; Keefer et al., 2010; Mena and Hobbs, 
2010; Reuter and Trautmann, 2009).  
                                                 
8
 For criticism of Solomon et al.’s work see TNI (2005) and Vargas (2005). See Soloman et al. 
(2005a) for a defence of criticism of their study. 
   
 36
Law enforcement may reinforce the drivers of production (Byrd, 2010; Chouvy, 
2009) whilst inflating the farmgate price of opium9 and thus encouraging greater 
production (Atkins, 1996; Byrd, 2010; Clawson and Lee, 1996; Mansfield and Pain, 
2008). Farmers may not cease but develop ‘adaptive responses’ (a form of 
displacement) (Farrell, 1998) such as: camouflaging fields; moving location; developing 
herbicide resistant plants; improving yields (see Clawson and Lee, 1996; Farrell, 1996; 
GOA, 1979; ICG, 2008; Thoumi, 2005); and increasing the area under cultivation 
(Atkins, 1996; Farrell, 1998; Jelsma, 2005; Youngers and Walsh, 2010; Riley, 1993; 
Stares, 1996).  
For example, in 2010, 32 of 36 Afghan villages which had experienced forced 
eradication re-planted and ‘eradication did not seem to have a significant influence on 
[the] decision to continue or stop opium cultivation’ (UNODC, 2010b:12). This may be 
because, without access to alternative incomes, farmers may have little choice but to re-
plant (Atkins, 1996; Hagan, 2001; Youngers and Walsh, 2010) in order to repay debts 
or re-establish assets (Byrd, 2010; Jelsma and Kramer, 2005; Mansfield and Pain, 2006, 
2008; McCoy and Block, 1992). If ‘offenders [opium farmers] displace their criminal 
behaviour only when the risks and effort of committing new crimes are worth the 
reward’10 (Guerette, 2008:10) and the risk of not producing opium outweighs the risk of 
law enforcement then the likelihood of displacement would appear high (Mansfield and 
Pain, 2006).  
Riley (1993) posits that as farmers will likely plant new crops in anticipation of 
future eradication, if opium poppies are eradicated each year (‘periodic eradication’) 
farmers will continue to increase the area under cultivation above that which was 
originally sown; especially if the efficiency of eradication decreases over time (i.e. 
through corruption or adaptive responses). Hence, discrete ‘shock eradication’ has a 
more effective impact as it creates short-term market disruption without increasing 
production beyond the original level. Conversely, periodic eradication may present a 
greater utility when associated with DODCPs. As access to licit incomes increases 
farmers may be provided with something to lose, which in turn increases the perceived 
                                                 
9
 Scarcity brought about through interdiction can also increase farmgate prices and attract 
increased production (Farrell, 1995). 
10
 Guerette (2008) suggests that displacement is most likely if the offenders are highly-
motivated and/or driven by money or drug addiction. Opium addiction and poverty represent 
significant motivators.  
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risk of periodic eradication; whereas, shock eradication may present insufficient risk to 
prevent production in a sustainable way (unless law enforcement was rotated around an 
area, maximising criminal justice resources whilst sustaining a perception of high-risk: 
see Sherman, 1990).  
The harms and utility of negotiated eradication depend largely on the outcome of 
negotiations, the commitment of actors and agreed sequencing (UNODC, 2005). If 
negotiations contain elements of coercion (Youngers and Walsh, 2010) and alternative 
incomes are not established before opium is removed, then harms associated with law 
enforcement approaches may develop. Such developments may damage the working 
relations required for project success (Berg, 2002; Jelsma, 2001; Ruben and Sherman, 
2009; World Bank, 2005).  
Negotiated eradication linked to compensation has seldom been found to be 
effective. Money may be invested in improving opium yields (Carpenter, 2004; 
Clawson and Lee, 1996; Tullis, 1994) or as a ‘minimum wage’ (Farrell, 1996; Reuter, 
2010; Riley, 1993) but with little impact on illicit cultivation. In addition, as alternative 
incomes are not established some farmers re-plant once compensation is received 
(UNDCP, 1993; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Mansfield, 1999; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2007). In 
2003, in Afghanistan, as payments were lower than illicit prices (Paoli et al., 2009) and 
often failed to reach farmers (Felbab-Brown, 2010; World Bank, 2005), many farmers 
were pushed deeper into poverty and alienation increased. 
2.3.3. Contextual factors  
While Reuter (2010) and Thoumi (2010) remind us that each producing country 
presents unique characteristics, several commentators have posited that certain 
contextual factors reduce the risk premiums of engaging in illicit narcotic activities 
(Thoumi 1992, 2005). Hence, the suppression of production may require altering these 
socio-economic/political conditions.11 A key factor for Morrison (1997, also Thoumi, 
2010b) is a weak state which, while undefined by Morrison, can be characterized as 
being governed by unstable12 (Eizenstat et. al., 2005) and inefficient institutions 
(Krasner and Pascual, 2005). Connected to institutional effectiveness is the existence of 
medium-to-high levels of official corruption (Morrison, 1997; also Lee, 1991; Kramer 
et al., 2009). 
                                                 
11
 Thoumi (1993, 2010) emphasises a culture conducive to violence and criminality. The 
analysis of this factor is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
12
 For Chouvy and Laniel (2007) a key factor is that the country is politically unstable. 
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The concept of a weak state can be narrowed further to include a lack of authority 
over rural areas (Byrd and Ward, 2004; Gibson and Haseman, 2001; Lee, 1991; Renard, 
2001; Paoli et al., 2009; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2009; Thoumi, 2005), including 
geographical isolation (Morrison, 1997). This is often through a lack of transport 
infrastructure and the existence of dense forest or mountains and populations which 
afford greater loyalty to family, ethnic or tribal groups rather than the state (Paoli et al., 
2009; Thoumi, 2005).  
In addition, there may be medium-to-high levels of armed conflict (Morrison, 1997; 
Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Cornell, 2007; Kramer et al., 2009; Rubin and Guáqueta, 
2009) and the population will likely be highly impoverished (Berg, 2003; Byrd and 
Ward, 2004; also Kramer et al., 2009; Potulski, 1991, 1992; Thoumi, 1992). In short, 
opium production tends ‘to concentrate in the areas where enforcement of prohibition is 
less intense’ (Paoli et al., 2009:237). Thus, illicit production is theorised to be attracted 
to areas: 
 
(1) Where state authority is low;  
(2) Which are geographically isolated;  
(3) With high levels of rural impoverishment;  
(4) With medium/high levels of corruption;  
(5) Which are politically unstable;  
(6) With medium/high levels of violent conflict;  
(7) Which possess inefficient state institutions.  
 
The theory that such factors must change before sustainable reductions can be 
accomplished parallels theories of institution change posited by alternative livelihood 
theorists (see Byrd, 2010; Mansfield et al., 2006; Mansfield and Pain, 2005; Youngers, 
2010; World Bank, 2005). 
2.4. Other key theoretical issues 
2.4.1. Displacement, diffusion and deflection 
Displacement, the reaction of crime to a preventive intervention, often implies an 
‘extreme-case-pessimist’ position (Barr and Pease, 1990). In the drug control literature 
displacement is often represented as the outcome of costly interventions (Andreas et al., 
1994; Carpenter, 2004; Chouvy, 2009; Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Sercombe, 1995) 
which simply moves production around with minimal net impact (see Armenta et al., 
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2010; Byrd and Jonglez, 2006; Chouvy and Laniel, 2007; Clawson and Lee, 1996; 
Eisenlohr, 1934; Falco, 1996; Farrell, 1996; Hagan, 2001; Nadlemann, 1989; Keefer et 
al., 2010; Sercombe, 1996).  
More negatively is the position that interventions expel weaker traffickers whilst 
forcing stronger traffickers to become more sophisticated and hence harder to suppress 
(Atkins, 1996; McCoy, 1992; McCoy and Block, 1992; Sercombe, 1995). Further, 
Reuter and Trautmann (2009:46; also Paoli, et al., 2009) maintain production (or 
trafficking) is often displaced to areas in which the activity is more harmful and: 
 
... the positive effects of reducing production in the initial country are 
in general more than outweighed by the damage done in the new 
producer country.13 
 
It should however be kept in mind that displacement is often driven by more than law 
enforcement. Political, economic or weather conditions may force traffickers to seek 
new suppliers, which requires the existence of suitable alternatives (Friesendorf, 2005). 
Traffickers may choose to change the source of their raw opium without imposed 
disincentives. The (hypothetical) decision for Tesco’s to procure tomatoes from Kenyan 
rather than British farmers was driven by market forces, rather than law enforcement. 
This said, law enforcement limits choices and forces traffickers to operate in less 
favourable conditions (Farrell and Windle, forthcoming); if opium were legal it is 
unlikely that it would be grown in remote mountain areas with relatively poor soil and 
insufficient irrigation (Der Meer, 1989). Further, displacement and reorganisation 
induce significant additional costs on farmers and traffickers (Farrell and Windle, 
forthcoming).  
Building upon developments in the crime prevention literature (see Clark and 
Weisburd, 1994; Eck, 1993; Guerette, 2009; Guerette and Bowers, 2009) Farrell and 
Windle (forthcoming) indicate how displacement is but one side-effect of an 
intervention. The opposite, termed the ‘diffusion of drug control benefits’, is positive 
and can take many forms. For example, DOA and eradication increase both the profit of 
corn and the risk of opium farming in a village. As this inflates the regional farmgate 
price farmers from a neighbouring village produce opium for the first time 
(displacement effect). Conversely, perceptions of increased risk may discourage farmers 
                                                 
13
 Referred to as ‘malign displacement’ in crime prevention literature (Clark and Weisburd, 
1994). 
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in other villages. As the initial success of the village indicates what is achievable, the 
Government and development NGOs increase their efforts, escalating national risk and 
bringing aid to otherwise neglected communities (two diffusion effects). The example 
also illustrates how ‘drug markets and law enforcement continuously interact and shape 
one another’ (Dorn et al., 1992:75). 
The term ‘deflection’ (Barr and Peace, 1990) may be more appropriate than 
displacement as production is deflected to where it is least harmful (Farrell and Windle, 
forthcoming) for the original nation. While suppression in Thailand may have increased 
Burmese output (displacement effect), Thailand achieved a policy objective by 
deflecting production from where the government perceived it as most harmful to 
national self-interest (deflection). Experiences gained in Thailand were then extended to 
Burma (diffusion effect). As Zimmer (1990:64-65) (in his analysis of a police campaign 
against an open-air drug market in New York) has suggested:  
 
... displacement is of value to residents…. who, for a long time, were 
bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of a drug problem that 
extends beyond the boundaries of their neighbourhood; they had 
reason to favour a more equitable distribution of that problem, even if 
it meant pushing it to other communities. 
 
Figure 2: 4. European and US retail heroin prices (1990-2006) 
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Source: UNODC (various years). 
2.4.2. Containment and globalisation 
Displacement represents one possible factor relating to increased global output (Annex 
3) and decreasing heroin retail prices in western nations since the 1970s (Farrell, 1995; 
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Figure 2:4). This has led some commentators to proclaim prohibition (Carpenter, 2004) 
or traditional strategies (i.e. DOA or law enforcement) as a failure (Chouvy, 2009; Van 
Ham and Kamminga, 2007). Such arguments fail to account for globalisation or the 
containment hypothesis. 
The globalisation14 thesis argues that increased global demand has motivated 
production whilst globalisation has decreased the cost and risk of transactions; 
decreasing the net impact of national and regional interventions. The liberalisation of 
national economies and advancement of technology has facilitated the ease and speed of 
transnational flows of both licit and illicit commodities including people and money 
(Keh and Farrell, 1997; Price, 2006; Raustiala, 1999; Stares, 1996; Storti and Grauwe, 
2009; Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon, 2003).15 An example is that of easing the 
distribution of improved agricultural techniques and technology to opium farmers, 
which in turn, improves yields (Storti and Grauwe, 2009). Additionally, global demand 
has been expanded by the opening of new markets since the end of the Cold War, 
especially in highly populated countries such as China and Russia (see Lee, 1995; Lee 
and McDonald, 1993; Swanström, 2006; Swanström and He, 2006; Yang, 1993; 
Yongming, 2000).  
Nonetheless, opium remains more expensive and scarce than if it were a legal 
commodity. High prices and low availability are a consequence of illegality and 
suppression interventions (Moore, 1990, 1993; Wilson and Stevens, 2008). 
Accordingly, increases in the size and capacity of the illicit drug industry would have 
been far greater in the absence of national and transnational drug policy interventions. 
This is the essence of the ‘containment hypothesis’ (Farrell and Windle, forthcoming; 
see Chawla and Pietschmann, 2007; UNODC, 2007).  
2.5. Summary 
The objectives of contemporary international drug control laws are to provide adequate 
access to medicinal drugs, prevent addiction and to limit consumption and production to 
medicinal and scientific purposes. These objectives are often dovetailed by, or are 
prioritised beneath, alternative national policy objectives, such as: state extension into 
                                                 
14
 For more in-depth and critical discussions on ‘globalisation’, refer to essays in Held and 
McGrew (2003). 
15
 The forces of globalisation are also identified as a cause of increased human trafficking 
(Nicola, 2005). 
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formerly isolated areas; rural development; counter-insurgency; international diplomacy 
or to reduce the negative side-effects of illicit production and trade. 
The essence of the set of theories of supply side interventions is that they limit 
consumption by reducing availability of illicit drugs and increasing the prices paid by 
consumers. The theory suggests that source country control is easier, more efficient and 
less costly than law enforcement at the border or on the street. The opposing theory of 
risks and prices, however, suggests that reducing consumption in western nations 
through source control is unrealistic as increases in farmgate prices are absorbed 
throughout the distribution chain. Such theories debate whether source control 
interventions have a greater effect on consumers closer to the source. Whether that is 
interpreted as an indicator of proximal success or of distal failure seems to be a matter 
of personal preference among scholars, and there is some evidence for both. In addition, 
it is argued that effective source control can have negative secondary effects, 
particularly upon the health of illicit drug users, unless sufficient services to counter 
harms associated with price increases and scarcity are provided.  
Source country interventions can have significant negative consequences for the 
individual farmer, the local community and/or nation state. As law enforcement can 
reinforce the drivers of opium, whilst inflating the farmgate price, interventions that fail 
to provide alternative sources of income can increase output. For some, not producing 
opium may represent a more significant risk than eradication or law enforcement. 
It has frequently been argued that interventions simply move production around, 
often with negative consequences. Displacement, however, is driven by more than drug 
control interventions and incurs significant costs on the displaced. Further, displacement 
is often paralleled by positive gains, referred to as diffusion of benefits. The term 
deflection may be more appropriate than displacement as a government has effectively 
achieved a major success if it deflects production outside of its national territory. 
While rising global output since the 1970s is often framed as a failure of prohibition 
or traditional approaches, much analysis fails to account for globalisation. Improved 
technology and trade liberalisation have made trafficking easier and quicker whilst 
opening new markets. Despite that, a consequence of the enforcement of drug control 
laws is that illicit opiates are, relative to the absence of enforcement, expensive and 
scarce.  
My thesis, to be developed in what follows, is that national successes have been 
achieved in several instances and that such successes provide lessons that may improve 
the effectiveness of interventions whilst reducing inadvertent negative outcomes. This 
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chapter has shown that drug policy is often a contentious mix of primary and secondary 
outcome measures that can be contradictory, alongside extremely difficult 
implementation environments and significant difficulties in measuring outcomes and 
impact. Many such issues raise their head in the country-level specifics of chapters that 
follow. The aim of this chapter has been to provide the broader context by outlying key 
areas of theory and concepts.    
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3. Methodology 
In the following chapters nine national-level cases (henceforth cases) of successful 
opium suppression shall be presented, synthesised and compared in order to engage 
three objectives: (1) To catalogue cases of success for future reference; (2) To produce 
‘lessons’ that may improve the effectiveness of interventions whilst reducing 
inadvertent negative outcomes; (3) In some respects, to reconcile the discrepancy 
between national and international effects of interventions at the source. In other words, 
this thesis offers narratives of individual cases and cross-case comparison to draw out 
trends and infer generalisations. This chapter shall introduce the case study and process-
tracing methods used to meet these objectives. It shall clarify for the reader the research 
design, data collection and analysis. 
3.1. The use of case studies 
A case is defined as:  
 
… an instance of a class of events. The term “class of events” refers 
here to a phenomenon of scientific interest …. that the investigator 
chooses to study with the aim of developing theory ….. A case study 
is thus a well defined aspect of a historical episode that the 
investigator selects for analysis, rather than the historical event itself 
(George and Bennett, 2005:17-18).  
 
While George and Bennett’s definition expresses historical analysis’s centrality to 
case studies, Yin (2009) confines the subject to contemporary phenomenon. If Yin’s 
restrictive definition was accepted this thesis would be better defined as ‘comparative 
historical analysis’: a method which compares ‘similar and contrasting cases’ of 
historical sequences to explain and identify ‘causal configurations’ (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer, 2008a:11-13, my italics; see Goldstone, 2008). This definition 
downplays the utility of, and thus excludes primarily, descriptive case studies.  
Such restrictive definitions are rejected by Stake (2005:443) who maintains that a 
‘case study is defined by interest in an individual case, not by the method of enquiry 
used’. The case represents ‘whatever “bounded system”…. is of interest’ (Stake, 
1978:23).  
Debate exists over whether studies should be limited to one case. Proponents of 
comparative analysis argue that in-depth and contextual comparisons of a small number 
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of cases can strengthen generalisations whilst presenting more powerful arguments 
against rival theories (George and Bennett, 2005; contributors to Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer, 2008a; Yin, 2009). Conversely, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that as good 
single case studies will be comparable to other single cases the investigator should 
concentrate on examining the minute details of one case (also, Stake, 2005). 
Comparison, however, requires not only the existence of up-to-date and in-depth cases 
but similar parameters and units of analysis.1 There is no continuity between the few 
existing studies of successful opium production suppression.  
There is scholarly agreement that case studies must be contextual and in-depth 
descriptions (see Eckstein, 1983; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Hammerseley and Gomm, 2008; 
essays in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2008; Mitchell, 1983; Ragin, 1989; Ragin and 
Rubinson, 2009; Stake, 1978, 2005; Yin, 2009) that represent social phenomena rather 
than abstraction (Yin, 2009). For example, an act of torture may be studied as a case, 
torture may not. 
Thus, cases are any well-defined instance of a class of events. A case becomes a case 
study when it is in-depth and contextualised; when the complexities of the event are 
provided. Cases are used in this thesis to execute two objectives. Firstly, to ‘capture’ 
and interpret ‘the particular and unique’ (Eckstein, 1983:121) characteristics of 
successful national opium production suppression interventions; national cases of a 
‘class of events’. Secondly, to compare cases to draw out similarities and differences. 
The two objectives combined will provide ‘the optimum conditions for the acquisition 
of those illuminating insights which make formerly opaque connections suddenly 
pellucid’ (Mitchell, 1983:183).  
This thesis follows a tradition of key drug control studies. Murphy and Steele (1971) 
produced descriptive case studies of major opium producing nations. Historical and 
contemporary cross-case comparisons have been utilised by Tullis (1995) to illustrate 
the ‘unintended consequences’ of drug policy and McCoy and Reed (1972), who 
demonstrated how the opiate trade flourishes under political protection.  More recent 
case study works have illustrated the linkages between insurgent groups and drug 
trafficking (Felbab-Brown, 2010) and the limitations of supply-side interventions (Paoli 
et al., 2009). Historical analysis has been used to analyse American prohibition and its 
global effect through a single case (Musto, 1987) and two case comparisons (Friman, 
1996).  
                                                 
1
 Thoumi (2002) is critical of a UN funded research project on drug control for lacking these 
qualities 
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There are a limited number of individual case studies of national success. Works on 
Pakistan (Murphy, 1983) and China (Yongming, 1999) relied largely on published and 
archival documents. Analysis of Thai (Renard, 2001) and Iranian interventions 
(McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) supplemented direct observation with consultation of 
documents. Additionally, ethnographic accounts (Dirksen, 1999; Gillett, 2002; 
Epprecht, 2000) or direct observations (Cohen and Lyttleton, 2003) have been produced 
on individual AD projects. This study is however the first to document the population of 
national cases of successful opium suppression and does so with the consistency 
necessary to compare and contrast such cases to produce –for the first time – cross-case 
comparison of successful opium suppression interventions.  
3.2. Research design  
Much of the research design is an amalgamation of advice drawn from George and 
Bennett (2005:75-88) and Yin (2009). The research design began with the specification 
of objectives. The initial theory motivating the study was that there had been instances 
of successful cases of opium production suppression. This represented a challenge to the 
reigning theoretical orthodoxy that ‘nothing works’. The objective presented the class of 
events (successful opium suppression interventions) and outcome (success). A natural 
extension of this objective was to question how interventions arrived at the outcome. 
From this three narrower objectives were formulated: 1) Catalogue cases of success for 
future reference; 2) Produce ‘lessons’ for future interventions; 3) Reconcile the 
discrepancy between national and international effects of interventions at the source.  
The remainder of section 3:3 shall describe the development of the strategy for 
achieving these objectives. Section 3:3:1 shall illustrate the rationale behind the 
specification of the outcome (or dependent variable). Potential causal factors 
(independent variables) were identified through the compilation of the literature review 
(see Chapter 2:3). Section 3:3:2 below shall describe how the specification of variables 
facilitated the case selection process.  
3.2.1. Specification of outcome measurement of success 
The research objective is centred upon cases of successful opium suppression. This 
section shall specify the outcome measurement of success through critically reflecting 
upon alternative measures of success employed in the literature. While UNODC (2007, 
2008) have designated Laos, Pakistan and Thailand ‘opium-free’, no authoritative 
definition of the term is communicated in any open-published UNODC document. In 
Afghanistan and Burma the term refers to provinces cultivating less than 100ha of 
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opium poppies (UNODC, 2009b). At the national level there is no such consistency and, 
indicative of the lack of boundaries, in one document three variations of the term are 
interchangeably employed (UNODC, 2007).2 Table 2:1 illustrates how UNODC’s 
parameters of national success for three opium producing countries range 213 to 
2,500ha and five to 20mt. In contrast, INCSR illuminate failure rather than success by 
classifying ‘Major’ drug producing nations as those cultivating excess of 1,000ha. As 
such, in 2006 Laos was classified as both ‘opium-free’ by UNODC and a ‘major’ 
producer by the US State Department.  
 
Table 3: 1. Cultivation/production when declared ‘opium-free’ by UNODC 
 Area under cultivation (ha) Potential production (mt) 
Thailand (2002) 750 9 
Pakistan (2001) 213 5 
Laos (2006) 2,500 20 
Source: UNODC (2010).  
 
The utility of cultivation indicators is limited by lack of reference to yield differences 
between or within nations. Because of growing conditions and poppy varieties, 
Afghanistan averages significantly higher yields than Laos (UNODC, 2009a, 2009b) 
and thus requires less land to producer greater amounts of opium. To demonstrate this 
point, Figure 2:1 compares the reported potential production of Laos, Pakistan and 
Thailand in the years they were declared ‘opium-free’ with that which would have been 
produced if the 2009 Laos and Afghan yields applied. This illustrates that if growing 
conditions were better in Laos or Thailand both would have surpassed the ‘opium-free’ 
parameter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 ‘Opium free’, ‘poppy free’ and ‘opium poppy free’. Opium-free may indicate that poppies are 
cultivated for reasons other than opium extraction. Poppy-free would indicate the removal of all 
opium and non-opium yielding varieties of poppy. Opium poppy-free would indicate the 
removal of opium yielding poppies. 
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Figure 3: 1. Yield differences 
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Source: Reported: Table 2:1. Laos and Afghan yields: UNODC (2009c). 
 
Failure to place cultivation indicators in a context of percentage of arable land skews 
perceptions. In 2008, for example opium poppies were cultivated over similar units of 
land in Pakistan and Laos; however, as Laos possessed less arable land than Pakistan 
opium production could be viewed as nationally more significant. Conversely, while 
Viet Nam cultivated opium on a significantly smaller area of land than Pakistan a 
similar percentage of arable land was utilised. Thus, percentage of arable land may be 
an informative indicator of the national prevalence of opium cultivation as it places 
production in a national rather than international context. 
 
Table 3: 2. Area under cultivation as percentage of arable land 
 
Arable land 
(ha) 
Opium cultivation 
(ha) 
% of arable land under opium 
cultivation 
Afghanistan 
(2007) 
7,911,500 193,000 2.439 
Burma 
(2007) 
10,101,300 27,700 0.274 
Pakistan 
(2007) 
19,456,600 1,701 0.008 
Laos  
(2007) 
949,600 1,500 0.157 
Thailand (2002) 14,131,300 9 0.00006 
Viet Nam 
(1999) 
6,670,600 442 0.006 
Source: CIA Fact book (2010); UNODC (2010). 
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Cultivation is an unsophisticated measure when used without reference to yield. 
Extrapolation of metric tonnes produced from cultivation and yield estimates represents 
a more useful measure of success. Percentage change, an often-used expression of 
trends in national crime surveys, is underutilised in analysis of drug control. 
Consequently, the higher UNODC parameter of ‘opium-free’ (20mt) shall be used in 
conjunction with a percentage change of 90 percent. Thus, success is defined as an 
excess of 90 percent reduction that brings potential production below 20mt.  Percentage 
of arable land and area under cultivation will be used in the case studies or comparative 
analysis as secondary measures. 
3.2.2. Case selection 
Relevance to the research objective should be the primary decision making factor in 
case selection. Once the objective is established defined parameters must be set (see 
George and Bennett, 2005; Stake, 1978, 2005; Yin, 2009). The definition of the 
outcome measurement of success and of the class of events as opium production 
suppression set the initial two parameters. The class of events permitted the exclusion of 
interventions centred primarily upon: export or manufacturing interdiction; demand 
and/or harm reduction; precursor chemical controls; or interventions against the 
production/manufacture of non-opiate illicit narcotics.  
Four additional parameters were established to further bound cases: (1) Spatial, 
Murphy and Steel (1971:5) described an opium ‘zone extending from the Plains of 
Anatolia in Turkey to Yunnan Province in China’. The zone encompasses the major 
historical and modern sites of licit and illicit Asian/Middle Eastern production; (2) 
Major producer, this parameter was set at 50mt to exclude smaller producers. The 
figure of 50mt was calculated from the INCRS classification of a major producer 
(1,000ha) and the 2009 Afghan yield of 48.8 kg/ha (and rounded-up to 50mt) (UNODC, 
2010). Hence, national production must have exceeded 50mt for at least five years; (3) 
Illicit trade, produce must have been consumed in, or exported to, markets that prohibit 
unregulated consumption/import. This includes domestic consumption; (4) Temporal, 
the intervention must have been administered during the twentieth-century. 
During the initial investigation a number of cases were identified in the literature as 
‘successes’: China (Kleinman and Reuter, 1986; Reuter, 1985; UNODCCP, 2000); 
India and Iran (Farrell and Thorne, 2005); Lebanon (UNODCCP, 2000); Pakistan 
(Farrell, 1998; UNODCCP, 2000); Thailand (Chalk, 2000; Falco, 1996; Farrell, 1998; 
Riley, 1996); Turkey (Boyum and Reuter, 2005; Falco, 1996; Farrell, 1998; Fazey, 
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2005; Kleinman, 1992; Moore, 1990) and Viet Nam (UNODCCP, 2000). India and 
Lebanon, and two other potential cases, failed the parameter test:  
Egypt: Production by Egyptian Bedouin in Sinai began in the early 1990s. During 
the mid-1990s, the DEA estimated production at 50-60mt (Hubbies, 1998), however, 
fieldwork by Hubbies (1998) suggested that production was closer to 288-540kg due to 
poor yields. Since 1996, the INCRS (1996-2007) has reported that efficient surveillance 
and forced eradication have limited production. Egypt falls outside of the major 
producer parameter. 
Lebanon: While opium was produced in the Northern Bekaa Valley in the 1980s 
(UNODC, n.d.) it may be inferred by exclusion from early NNICC (1978, 1983, 1986) 
reports that this was minimal until around 1987 when production of 6mt was reported 
(RCMP, 1987). Production increased to 30-40mt by 1991 (RCMP, 1988, 1991). 
Between 1992 and 1994, forced eradication by the military reduced production to 4mt 
(NNICC, 1993). UNODCCP (2000) followed with AD projects. Production, which had 
virtually ceased by 1996 (INCRS, 1996), has been kept low by large-scale forced 
eradication (INCRS, 1996-2006). Lebanon falls outside of the major producer 
parameter.3 
India: Following affirmations of Indian success at suppressing the diversion of 
opium from licit sources (Banerjee, n.d.; Bhattacharji, 2007; Deshpande, n.d.; Farrell 
and Thorne, 2005) India was investigated. From 1799, production and distribution were 
regulated by a state monopoly that facilitated export to markets that prohibited opium 
imports. Much was diverted from the monopoly. Throughout the early/mid-twentieth-
century India gradually conformed to increasingly stringent international regulations.  
Nonetheless, whilst investigating the case it was found that throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, between 10 and 50 percent of all opium produced under state regulation was 
diverted to the black market. This would indicate India as the world’s third or fourth 
largest source of illicit opium (Windle, 2011, forthcoming; also, Paoli et al., 2009) and 
outside the parameter of success. 
Mexico: A major source of opium to the American market in the 1970s. Production 
was largely suppressed in the 1980s, although resumed by the end of the decade (see 
Bucardo et al., 2005; Reuter and Ronfeldt, 1992; Torro, 1995). While forced eradication 
has continued to be extensively applied, large-scale production has been sustained 
                                                 
3
 In-depth case studies of Egyptian and Lebanese illicit production could offer significant 
insights into the utility of conducting interventions before production and distribution have 
matured.  
   
 69
throughout the 1990s and 2000s (INCRS, 1996, 2000, 2009). Mexico is thus outside of 
the parameters of geography and success. 
The only nations which have conformed to these parameters are: China; Iran; 
Turkey; Thailand; Pakistan; Laos and Viet Nam. Whilst investigating China and Iran it 
was found that both nations administered two separate successful opium suppression 
interventions: China in 1909-17 and 1949-50s and Iran in 1955-75 and 1979-88/94. 
Hence, nine case of national success shall be investigated. 
3.3. Within-case analysis 
Within-case analysis will use the technique of process-tracing: ‘the story of how 
something inevitably got to be where it is’ (Becker, 1992:228).4 The foundation of 
process-tracing is the identification of causal factors and their interaction in a specific 
context (George and Bennett, 2005) to show how: 
 
… social phenomena…. can result from dynamic and sometimes 
enigmatic causal chains, interaction effects, catalysts, contingent 
conditions, different causal paths that lead to the same outcome 
(equifinality), or a simultaneous presence of different causal forces 
(Friesendorf, 2005:42). 
 
Prior theories are used to establish potential causal factors (independent variables) 
(see Chapter 2:3) to be accounted for in the narrative.5 A strength of process-tracing is 
that factors unidentified by previous theorists may be found through the compilation of 
narratives (George and Bennett, 2005:147; see Goldstone, 2008). Thus, process-tracing 
shall permit the investigator to test and create theory through examining the interplay of 
multiple causal factors in the process by which a major opium producing nation reduces 
production by 90 percent to below 20mt. 
Process-tracing shares similarities with fault-finding methods used by electricians. 
Few electrical wiring circuits consist of one cable linking an electrical distribution-
board (fuse-board) to a light. Multiple cables pass through connections (i.e. lights, 
switches, joints) to reach the last light in a circuit; cables and connections represent the 
factors allowing electricity to reach the light. The electrician must take into account 
                                                 
4
 Becker (1992:228) refers to ‘process or narrative analysis’. 
5
 Hall (2008) argues that it is the grounding of the process in theory that differentiates process-
tracing from historical explanation. 
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factors not immediately connected to the circuit (the context). For example, nails may 
have broken a cables insulation; connections may be under floorboards or cables may be 
protected by pipes. Additionally, an electrician is trained (has the theoretical 
knowledge) to see a circuit where others see a tangle of cables.  
Thus, the method of process-tracing used in this thesis is a detailed narrative guided 
by the employment of theoretical factors (variables) drawn from previous research 
findings. Each individual case shall engage with established theories. To place the 
interventions in context whilst elucidating the steps taken, in-depth chronologies are 
included in Annex 1:1-6. Only once national-level processes have been established can 
the cross-case analysis (Chapter 10) be undertaken (Goldstone, 2008).  
3.4. Search methods 
Yin (2009:47/123) advises that ‘construct validity’ be established by consulting 
multiple sources of information and by communicating the ‘chain of evidence’. 
Following Yin’s advice the ‘chain’ began with the formulation of research objectives 
(see section 3:3) on which individual Case Study Protocols were based. All information 
was entered into databases so that citations could be cleanly traced back to their source. 
Databases included in-depth notes entered into a literature review template and 
abstracted into an annotated bibliography. Quantitative data was entered into Excel 
databases. The search can be split into four stages:  
Stage One: The objective of Stage One was the formulation of a literature review 
that defined and evaluated important theories and interventions whilst placing source 
country drug control in wider legal and social contexts. The review permitted the 
refinement of research objectives, the establishment of case study parameters, and a 
strengthening of theoretical understating. This established a foundation for more 
effective individual case document searches (Trachtenberg, 2007). Case Study Protocols 
were developed for each case as a means of increasing reliability whilst directing and 
focusing searches (Yin, 2009; see George and Bennett, 2005). An extensive ‘to find’ list 
was composed from cross-citation. 
To formulate the review the net was initially cast wide. Metalib 4.00 was employed 
to search nine separate databases.6 As advised by Trachtenberg (2007), Google Scholar 
                                                 
6
 ArticleFirst; Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts; British Humanities Index; 
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences; Sociological Abstracts; Web of Science; 
World Almanac; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Zetoc. 
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was then searched. All searches were limited to English language sources7 and used the 
terms: cocaine; heroin; opiate; opium and narcotic.8 RAND, TNI and UNODC websites 
were then consulted. Manual searches were conducted at the Loughborough University 
and London School of Economics libraries.  
Stage Two: Ideally documents identified during Stage One would have been 
collected in Stage Two, however, as the investigator interned at UNODC (in Austria) 
during the period specified for Stage Two a search of the UN Library was conducted. 
This had initially been scheduled for a later date. The library staff and UNODC 
researchers were most helpful and identified a number of restricted and open-archived 
documents not catalogued on the electronic system. Informal discussions with UNODC 
staff, academics and policy-makers significantly widened the investigator’s practical 
and theoretical knowledge.  
Stage Three: By Stage Three documents (or notes taken on them) collected in 
previous stages had been stored in individual electronic or hard-copy case study folders. 
A considerable ‘to find’ list had formed. Each case study was allocated two months to 
find and analyse all identified documents. To be near the Bodleian Library the 
investigator moved to Oxford. The Oxford University Online Catalogue was initially 
searched. Physical searches of relevant libraries9 uncovered many previously 
unidentified books, out-of-service journals and archived documents. Media documents 
were then searched for in: Chadwyck Periodicals; Economist Archives; Nexus-Lexis  
and Times Archives. 
The Bodleian Official Documents Library was searched for UN/League documents. 
Once documents had been stored and in-depth notes taken the investigator visited the 
British National Archives. Across all cases approximately two months was spent 
searching the archives. All relevant documents were recorded using a digital camera 
                                                 
7
 While it is acknowledged that non-English texts - especially those produced within the 
countries under study -could be of significant importance, time and resource considerations 
prevented this. The inclusion of foreign language documents would have required the 
investigator to search, locate and then translate documents from several Asian, Middle Eastern 
and European languages. 
8
 As ‘drug’ produced hits related to pharmaceutical drugs it was excluded. 
9
 Bodleian Law Library; Centre for Criminological Research Library; Chinese Studies Library; 
Indian Institute Reading Room; Middle East Centre Library; Radcliffe Science Library and 
Social Science Library. 
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(producing in excess of 8,000 images). Throughout this stage authors were contacted for 
hard-to-find or restricted/closed documents.  
Stage Four: After all cases had been drafted the investigator returned to Oxford to 
locate additional documents. Those not located in Oxford were found through inter-
library loans and contact with authors. Draft case chapters were then sent to key 
informants to validate the information presented. Responses often represented new 
information and/or were accompanied by unpublished work. The investigator also 
visited Thailand to observe DOA in action. 
3.5. Source problems/limitations 
This section shall describe the methods used to analyse documentary evidence. Scott 
(1990:20) developed a typology of documents based upon access and authorship. If 
document access is Closed or restricted ‘outsiders’ (i.e. non-UNODC personnel) are 
barred from accessing the document or must obtain the authors permission; whereas 
Open-published or open-archival documents can be accessed by the public. The four 
types are further divided between state and private (i.e. academic, media or NGO) 
authorship. As the terms ‘state’ fails to account for intergovernmental organisations, 
such as the UN, public is deemed here more appropriate. 
To ensure the validity and reliability of documentary evidence, investigators must 
reflect on the documents’ storage and production. To achieve this Scott 
(1990:96/Chapter 1) posits four ‘quality control criteria’ to be asked of documents.  
Initially the investigator must establish whether the document is of unquestionable 
authenticity and has not been corrupted. If the document appears to be a copy of the 
original its soundness must be extrapolated by identifying - malicious or accidental - 
omissions or errors. Authenticity can be established through physical examinations of 
documents (i.e., whether the language is consistent throughout) (Scott, 1990), 
triangulation, and knowledge of context (Trachtenberg, 2007).  
To extract meaning (what is being communicated) the investigator must initially 
establish whether the content is clear and intelligible. Foreign language, technical 
terminology or unfamiliar terms may prevent an understanding of what the author was 
attempting to communicate (Scott, 1990). Furthermore, the investigator must reflect on 
how their interpretations of accounts are social constructions. The interpretation may 
differ from the author’s meaning (Erikson, 1973). For example, in several of the FO 
documents reporting the Imperial/Republican Chinese intervention (Chapter, 4:2) 
punishments were described only as ‘brutal’ - a vague term bounded by the author’s 
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perception of brutality. This was overcome by reading multiple accounts that described 
in detail the punishments administered in the course of opium suppression and by the 
regime more generally.   
Investigators must validate the credibility of an author’s account (Scott, 1990). This 
requires an initial reflection on who is communicating to whom, for what purpose and in 
what context (George and Bennett, 2005). Greater depth can be achieved by following 
Langlois’ and Seignobos’ (1904:167-177) criteria for identifying distortions. 
Investigators reflect on whether authors:10  
 
• Sought advantage by distorting the facts of an event;  
• Were in a situation which forced them to distort events;  
• Prejudices produced erroneous reporting;  
• Egotism facilitated a distorted perception of themselves or a group;  
• Sought to please or not shock the public;  
• Sought to instil dramatic effect;  
• Were poorly situated for valuable observation;  
• Failed to record observations immediately or systematically;  
• Reiterated official versions of events;  
• Claimed to have observed events which they could not access. 
 
Narroll (1962, in Platt, 1985:175) suggests additional criteria if the author reports 
events in a foreign nation:  
 
• How were case reports collected? 
• What were the authors’ roles in society; were they direct observers or participants? 
• How long did the authors stay in the country and were they familiar with the 
language? 
                                                 
10
 An example of multiple distortions: Between 1949 and 1967 the US Bureau of Narcotics 
declared that the Chinese Communist Party was officially facilitating the production and export 
of opium to foreign black markets (Chapter 4:7). The later discredited reports were distorted by 
a prejudiced author’s perception of the accusation being advantageous to US interests in the 
context of the Cold War. Somewhat vague reports were produced for dramatic effect and 
reiterated information gathered from the Chinese Government in exile (see, Kinder and Walker, 
1986). 
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• How ambiguous was the report? 
 
Trachtenberg (2007:147) argues that closed/restricted documents - which later 
become open-archival - are ‘far and away the best source there is’. As privacy allows 
authors to express themselves more freely than they would in public they tend to be 
more reliable and less distorted than open-published documents and can: 
 
… normally be taken as genuine….. Documents, after all, are 
generated for a government’s own internal purposes, and what would 
be the point of keeping records if those records were not meant to be 
accurate? It’s just hard to believe that a major goal…… would be to 
deceive historians thirty years later…..you can be reasonably sure that 
it’s not a pure fabrication (Trachtenberg, 2007:147). 
 
For example, Pakistani opium farmers reported to Assad and Harris (2003) that much 
foreign funding designated to AD projects was appropriated by local officials. While 
knowledge of the extent of corruption in Pakistan would suggest the feasibility of the 
accusation, this is unacknowledged by public-access documents produced by 
implementing agencies. While the authors likely possessed valid reasons for not 
disclosing such practices, the example illustrates how entering the public domain can 
lead authors to distort their observation of an event for institution interests.  
When considering archived evidence the investigator must reflect on why the 
document has been preserved (Erikson, 1973) or survived (Platt, 1985) and whether the 
document appears representative of the totality of relevant documents. The document 
used may be indicative of that which was permitted to survive rather than representative 
of all documents produced on the subject at the time of authorship. Unrepresentative 
documents can be identified through knowledge of the population of documents (Scott, 
1990) and by placing the document in context and triangulating it with other sources 
(Trachtenberg, 2007).  
Use of a quality control template supported continuity in the critical analysis of all 
documents (see Table 2:3 for an example). While reference to the template highlighted 
distortions, many could be accounted for by triangulation and contextualisation. A 
central tenant in document research is: the greater the number and diversity of sources, 
and depth of knowledge, the better the chance of identifying something close to the 
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truth (see Ritchie, 2006; Stake, 2005; Trachtenberg, 2007; Yin, 2009). Thus, as 
knowledge of a case grew, key earlier documents were revisited (Scott, 1990). 
To compensate for the shortfall in access to English language documents secondary 
sources were occasionally relied upon. The lack of control over interpretation of sources 
is most evident in the case of (PR) China (Chapter 4:7). Using recently released Chinese 
archival documents and interviews with scholars, Yongming (1999) provides the most 
extensive analysis of the intervention conducted to date. The Chinese Communist Party 
are believed to have rewritten histories and archival documents to conform to their 
political objectives (Shuyun, 2006) and had banned any written reference to drugs in 
1952 (Yongming, 1999). Yet, Yongming fails to reflect critically on potential 
distortions or why certain documents were preserved. It is possible that the documents 
accessed by Yongming may have been those the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
permitted to be written or deemed sufficiently acquiescent to be kept alive by archivists. 
It is also possible that documents were written at a later stage or with the foreign reader 
in mind. Thus, Yongming’s work is triangulated with information on the specific 
intervention and the context with which it was conducted.  
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Table 3: 3. Quality control framework 
 Hosie (1911) {China} Radji (1959) {Iran} UNODC (2005) {Laos} 
Document type Public open-archived (formerly restricted) Public open-published Public open-published 
Meaning Language clear Language clear Language clear. Some technical lingo 
Authenticity 
In National Archives. No physical 
distortion. Cited by others 
In official UN publication. No physical 
distortion 
Official UN publication. No physical distortion 
Representativeness 
All documents in series consulted. No 
evidence of destruction 
Only document published 
All open-published documents in series 
consulted 
By whom British consulate to China Iranian Minister of Health UNODC, GoL, BMZ, US and NCA 
For whom 
British consulate. Indirectly to Chinese 
Government & lobbyists 
UN & academic audience GoL, UN & foreign donors 
Purpose To monitor Anglo-Chinese agreement 
Defence of decision to resume licit 
production 
Analyse AD projects’ impact on opium 
production 
Context Politically unstable. Repressive suppression 
Politically repressive. Modernisation 
drive 
Politically stable. Extensive external criticism 
of GoL intervention 
Seeking advantage Potential diplomatic advantage Advantage in highlighting success Advantage in highlighting project success 
Forced to distort events No indication Criticism may have impacted career No indication 
Egotism No indication Possible national/professional pride Possible national/professional pride 
Dramatic effect Unlikely, internal No indication No indication 
Sought to please public Not intended for public Possibility of media use Possibility of media use 
Poorly situated No, extensive monitoring Prime location as central to reform No, extensive monitoring 
Failed to record observations Little time lapse between event and report. Little time lapse between event and Little time lapse between event and report. 
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immediately / systematically Systematic report. Systematic Systematic 
Reiterated official version of 
events 
No, critical of provincial reports Developer of official version of events Critical of GoL. Supportive of UNODC policy 
Claimed to have observed 
events which they could not 
access 
No No No 
Intensity of the authors’ 
involvement in the event 
Meant as objective observer. Bounded by 
FO interest 
Personally involved 
Personally involved. Different perspectives and 
interests may have counterbalanced this 
Method of observation Extensive tour of province Direct involvement Aerial and village surveys 
Direct observation / 
participation 
Observer Participant Participants and observers 
Length of the stay in country Unknown (likely extensive) Iranian citizen Unknown (likely extensive) 
Familiarity with language Unknown Iranian citizen Unknown 
Ambiguity Comprehensive Fairly comprehensive Comprehensive 
 Note: Scott (1990) advises that templates should not be used for every document but rather kept in view to direct analysis. Thus, the template is produced here to 
portray the authors thought process.  Sources: see individual chapters.
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3.6. Measurement issues 
INCRS and UNODC are the primary contemporary sources of quantitative data on 
illicit opium trends. UNODC’s source country data is collected by national governments 
and annually reported to the Secretariat; UNODC assists major producing nations. As 
UNODC’s methodology is accessible and detailed, the following discussion will focus 
on UNODC supported monitoring. This said, national governments (for Thailand see 
ONCB, 2003, Pennington, 2001) and the INCRS employ similar methods (see Mejia 
and Posada, 2010). 
Satellite images or aerial photographs are taken of samples of high-density 
production areas. Ground surveys verify these findings whilst establishing how much 
opium can be produced per hectare. Yield estimates are calculated by counting the 
number of poppies per hectare and measuring the size of poppy capsules. National 
cultivation and production estimates are extrapolated from these samples1 (UNODC, 
2007, 2009a/b/c).  
Aerial or satellite surveillance are triangulated with ground surveys to avoid the 
limitations of individual methods. White (2003:1554) argues that ground surveys tend 
to be the most reliable as ‘factors such as plant density, soil fertility, harvesting 
efficiency, and potential crop yield’ can be included. This said, until a level of trust has 
been established, dubious responses can be common (Roth, 1974; also, Chawla, 2004; 
Mejia and Posada, 2010). Furthermore, geographical isolation, violent conflicts or 
hostile populations can limit access (INCRS, 2008; UNODC, 2009a; White, 2003). 
While geography can be overcome with aerial photography, heavily-armed hostile 
populations can pose a significant threat (GOA, 1988). While such barriers can often be 
circumvented by satellite imagery (Mansfield, 2009) accuracy can be limited by 
intercropping opium with licit crops (Renard, 2010), high-altitudes or extensive cloud 
cover (Veillette and Navarrete-Frias, 2007). Thus, while satellite technology has 
improved during the early twenty-first-century (UNODC, 2009) data can be skewed 
unless verified by ground surveys (Mejia and Posada, 2010; White, 2003). 
                                                 
1
 Advised by experts on the ground UNODC researchers create models of high-density 
production areas. These are based upon potential cropping patterns and geographical locations. 
For example, in Laos previous experience indicated how the majority of opium was produced 
within 4,000m of agricultural areas, at heights of 700m in altitude and on slopes with inclines 
over 10 percent (UNODC, 2009b). 
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Whilst criticising the unreliability of amphetamine-type stimulant estimates, a 
UNODC employee (who wished to remain anonymous) informed the author that opium 
production estimates are as accurate as technology allows and present relatively reliable 
indicators. This is partly attributed to the retention of researchers who have refined their 
skills and knowledge of major producing countries and methodologies over a number of 
years (personal communication, 2008). The INCRS (2008:30) similarly report how 20 
years of experience of crop monitoring has resulted in reasonable accurate estimates. 
 
Figure 3: 2. Average INCRS and UNODC production estimates (1987-2007) 
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Source: UNODC (various years), INCRS (various years). 
 
Figure 3: 3. Thailand: Production estimate comparison (1980-2002) 
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Source: NNICC (various years); INCRS (various years); UNODC (various years); RCMP 
(various years). Thai Government reported in De Meer (1989); Renard (2001). 
 
This said, the often significant differences between surveying agencies may present 
the greatest indictment against the precision of measurements. Figure 2:2 illustrates 
variations between UNODC and INCRS production estimates. This variance can be 
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illustrated by the example of Thailand: between 1980 and 2008 five different agencies 
posited often widely different production estimates (Figure 3:3). Significantly, in 1987, 
two US monitoring agencies (NNICC and INCRS) reported a difference of 8mt. 
Differences aside, the downward trend in Figure 3:3 illustrates that while estimates 
should not be viewed as precise figures they are useful for determining trends over time 
(INCRS, 2009) and: 
 
… methodological deviations between different agencies may be a 
beneficial way of validating…. trends. The confidence with which 
overall patterns of drug supply are regarded should increase when 
separate agencies report similar changes or trends (Morrison, 2003:5).  
 
Older data must be treated with even greater caution. Reuter and Ronfeldt (1992:135) 
suggested that American data on Mexico during the late 1970s/80s  ‘relied on often 
inconsistent and inadequately described methodologies, leading some analysts’ 
including one US State Department employee ‘to conclude that actual drug production 
is “unknowable” and that the agency’s estimates are, at best, rather unscientific 
guesswork’. Alarmingly, Mexico represented a best-case-scenario. As the US 
committed fewer resources to monitoring Asian/Middle Eastern production data, the 
Americas tended to be of better quality. This was magnified by the isolation of many 
major opium producers throughout the 1970s/80s (see Walker, 1992): Afghanistan was 
a warzone while Burma, Iran, Laos and Viet Nam were largely isolated from US and, to 
a lesser extent UN, interference.  
Data has ‘been notoriously manipulated to serve policy preferences and to 
demonstrate programmatic success’ (Stares, 1996:10; also Jelsma and Kramer, 2008; 
Tullis, 1995). For example, to achieve diplomatic objectives US production estimates 
may have been understated in pre-Communist Laos (Feingold, 1970) and exaggerated in 
Islamic Iran (Haq, 2000). While Geddes (1970:7) reported that Royal Thai Government 
(RTG) estimates throughout the 1960s were underestimated partly for ‘concern for the 
good reputation of the country’. Data illustrating decreasing opium production 
throughout the 1970s may have been manipulated to attract foreign aid (Lee, 1994). The 
US has accused the Burmese, Pakistani and Thai Governments of politicising their 
estimates (GAO, 1988).  
Scepticism increases as time recedes. The FPA (1924) criticised the League of 
Nation’s Chinese production estimates as little more than guesswork. China in the 
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early/mid-1920s was characterised by multiple belligerent warlord factions and an 
unstable central government. Even with the technological and methodological advances 
of recent years, monitoring would have been difficult. It may be significant that 
amongst 600 FO reports on Chinese opium production consulted by the author,2 just one 
attempted a national production estimate. Additionally, MacCormack and colleagues 
(1925:9) reported of Persia ‘it is absolutely impossible to furnish accurate statistics… 
owing to the large area [cultivated]…. and the secrecy observed’ by merchants.  
Thus, the more historical the data the less precise the estimate. This said, both 
historical and contemporary data are of use when viewed as long-term trends and 
triangulated with other quantitative and qualitative observations.  
 To draw out trends and permit comparison, all legitimate data was recorded into 
Excel databases. For continuity all data was transformed, where appropriate, into 
hectares, metric tonnes or kilograms. When conflicting data presented, the mean figure 
was extracted to illustrate trends. 
 
Table 3: 4. Data transformation calculations  
Original measure 1 imperial tonne 1 pound 1 chest 1 picul 1 acre 1rai 1 mu 
Equivalent to: 
1.016 
mt 
0.4536 
kg 
63.5 
kg 
60.453 
kg 
0.4047 
ha 
0.16 
ha 
0.067 
ha 
Sources: chest/picul (Pietschmann et al., 2009); mu (Yongming, 2000); rai/pound/acre/imperial 
tonne (Rowlet, 2000). 
3.7. Summary 
This chapter has defined case studies as in-depth and contextualised narratives of non-
abstract and well-defined instance (cases) of a class of events. The cases to be analysed 
in the following chapters are national level opium production suppression interventions. 
The research design communicated in this chapter was based upon the specification of 
three narrow sub-objectives: 1) Cataloguing cases of success for future reference; 2) 
Producing ‘lessons’ for future interventions; 3) Reconciling the discrepancy between 
national and international effects of interventions at the source.  
A key element of the design was the specification of the outcome (dependent 
variable). Success was defined as an excess of 90 percent reduction that brings potential 
production below 20mt.  Percentage of arable land will be used as a secondary outcome 
measurement of success. Area under cultivation was rejected as a flawed indicator when 
                                                 
2
 Although not necessarily cited. 
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not validated by reference to yield or percentage of arable land. The discussion 
highlighted the imprecise nature of UNODC and INCRS proclamations of 
success/failure.  
To guide case selection six parameters were designated. All cases had to have: been 
major opium producing nations; been situated in the Asian/Middle Eastern opium zone; 
administered interventions to suppress opium production during the twentieth-century; 
conformed to the outcome measurement of success. 
Within-case analysis will be conducted through the construction of detailed 
narratives. Guided by the employment of theoretical variables drawn from previous 
hypothesis, each case shall illustrate the process of causal factors through which the 
outcome measurement of success was reached. Process-tracing will identify the 
combination of factors present within each case.  
To validate the construction of the individual cases, the document search process and 
analysis were described. Analysis requires reflecting upon a number of quality control 
criteria to establish both document and authors authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning. The theoretical guidelines were supported by examples 
of reflections on documents found and used in the thesis. 
The distortions and difficulties of using quantitative measurements of production 
were identified. It was established that while the reliability and sophistication of 
cultivation and production data have increased in recent years they must be viewed as 
long-term trends rather than precise figures. Furthermore, all data must be placed in 
context and triangulated with alternative quantitative and qualitative observations. 
Triangulation and contextualisation are central themes in overcoming the limitations of 
both qualitative (documentary) and quantitative evidence.   
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Section II 
4. China 
4.1. Background and context 
In 1860 China repealed prohibitions (established in 1780 and 1796) on the import and 
consumption of opium; increasing foreign imports and stimulating domestic production 
(see, Dixon, 1922; Newman, 1995; Reins, 1991; Spence, 1990; Wakeman, 1977; 
Windle, 2011) which, before 1860, had never exceeded 300 tons (Pietschmann et al., 
2009). During the 1870s Yunnan Province was permitted to tax opium production to 
fund a counter-insurgency (Yongming, 1999); other provinces followed the Yunnanese 
example and de facto legalisation preceded the official repeal of the prohibition on 
production in 1880 (Brown, 1973; Yongming, 1999; Walker, 1991).  
Thus, by the 1870s domestic opium was competing with foreign imports in terms of 
both quality and price (Agassiz, 1884; Reins, 1991; Windle, 2011). Between 1905-1907 
China produced between six (Taylor, 1913) and eight times more than it imported 
(Newman, 1995); Sichuan alone produced four times that of India, China’s major 
foreign source (Hosie, 1911a). Almost all opium was consumed within China with a 
small amount exported to Indochina (FO, 1913k; Trocki, 1999). 
Low prices and profuse availability increased consumption to exceptionally high 
levels. In 1890, an estimated 10 percent of the Chinese population smoked opium; this 
may have been as high as 60 to 80 percent in some areas (Spence, 1975) while as low as 
five percent in others (Newman, 1995). The Chinese delegate to the 1909 International 
Opium Commission declared that 6.3 percent of the population consumed opium. 
Conversely, the 1906 Regulations Giving Effect to the Imperial Decree reported 
consumption rates of 30-40 percent (reproduced in FO, 1907).1 
Between 1887 and 1906, customs and internal transit taxes on opium contributed 
between five and seven percent of the national budget (Reins, 1991) and significantly 
                                                 
1
 Trocki (1999) estimates that in the late-nineteenth-century China annually consumed 50,000mt 
of opium; 45,000mt more than the combined licit and illicit global consumption of the late-
1990s. 
This said, the majority of consumers took small quantities (Dikötter et al., 2004), with an 
estimated 2.5 percent of the population being considered as heavy or regular consumer 
(Newman, 1995).  
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more to many provincial governments (Jordan, 1908). Nonetheless, opium was 
increasingly perceived as a barrier to economic and military advancement. After China 
was defeated by Japan (where opium was prohibited) in 1894/95, a propaganda 
campaign was initiated to ‘deglamorise’ opium and shift the popular perception from an 
expression of wealth to one of poverty and destitution (Paulès, 2008:259, also Madancy, 
2001, Walker, 1991; Yongming, 1999). Additionally, external barriers to prohibition 
were weakened when the British administered India - China’s primary source of foreign 
opium – began to soften its opposition to prohibition (Windle, 2011) and the US began 
lobbying for global controls (Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000).  
4.2. Intervention (Imperial/Republican: 1906-1917) 
In 1906, an Imperial Decree ordered the gradual suppression of production, distribution 
and consumption (FO, 1907; Scheltema, 1910). This was followed by the Regulations 
Giving Effect to the Imperial Decree which obliged provincial governors to: produce 
estimates of the area under cultivation; license and meticulously monitor farmers; 
annually reduce the area, and number of farmers, by one-ninth; confiscate land used by 
unlicensed farmers. The Regulations provided rewards for governors which ended 
production prematurely (reproduced in FO, 1907). Two months later governors were 
ordered to halve the area under cultivation within two years (IAOA, 1924b). To reduce 
the economic shock land and transport taxes were increased (FO, 1911b; IAOA, 1922). 
Once the ban was enforced, China negotiated (FO, 1908) the 1908 Anglo-Chinese 
Ten-Year Suppression Agreement, which obliged British administered India to reduce 
annually exports to China by ten percent and China to concurrent reductions in 
production. China agreed to allow British consulates to monitor progress (Dixon, 1922; 
Scheltema, 1910). The subsequent Prohibition on Opium (1908, reproduced in Leech, 
1908) ordered provincial governors to suppress production by 1915/16. The Anglo-
Chinese Opium Agreement (1911) later stipulated that any province proving to a Joint 
British-Chinese Commission of Investigation  (henceforth Joint Investigation) that they 
were ‘opium-free’2 could prohibit the importation of Indian opium (see FO, 1915f). 
In 1911, the Imperial regime was, however, removed and a Republic declared. While 
there was an initial resurgence during the revolutionary period (Central China Post, 
1912), production remained below 1906 levels (Jordan, 1913b). Nonetheless, in 1912 
the new President ordered all officials to renew suppression efforts, the prohibition was 
                                                 
2
 An abridged term used by FO reports to denote ‘effectively suppressed the cultivation… of 
native opium’ (FO, 1915f:1). 
   
 92
reiterated by the second president of the Republic (Yuan Shikai) and supported by the 
majority of revolutionaries (Walker, 1991). The regime declared that stocks of opium 
accumulated during the Revolutionary period could be sold to state registered addicts; 
the tax revenue from which funded eradication teams and the administration of 
treatment programmes (FO, 1912a). Joint Investigations continued (Cheng, 1913; FO, 
1913d, 1913l; Grey, 1913) and FO accounts report that the regime initially surpassed 
‘the rigors of the Manchu rulers’ (Dixon, 1922:2) and a:  
 
... general survey of the whole evidence leads to the conclusion that 
with the exceptions of Kweichow…. the authorities throughout the 
Republic are making strenuous efforts (Jordan, 1913a:14).3 
4.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches 
To motivate crop substitution, in 1911, the national Financial Commissioner relieved all 
farmers growing cereals of land tax for a year and a half; this stimulated some provinces 
to experiment with foreign cereals (Changsha Jih Pao, 1911). As no ‘serious attempt’ 
was, however, made to provide alternative incomes, many farmers were pushed deeper 
into poverty and provincial government budgets were depressed (IAOA, 1922:21). The 
lack of state support is exemplified by crop substitution being mentioned just 11 times 
in the 472 FO reports (written between 1907 and 1917) consulted (but not necessarily 
cited) by this author. One reports how a Sichuan district provided no support (FO, 
1910c) whilst another recounts how, due to inactivity by the provincial government of 
Yunnan, a British diplomat introduced improved cotton from India (Rose, 1910). 
Substitute crops were provided in four provinces (FO, 1908b, 1912c, 1913j, 1914e, 
1914g; Rose, 1913; Turner, 1914; Wilkinson, 1910; see Wyman, 2000) and some 
farmers were compensated in Yunnan (FO, 1909).  
Rose (1910:34) reported how the lack of alternatives and increasing impoverishment 
made prohibition unpopular with farmers, whilst the outflow of silver for illicitly 
imported opium made it unpopular with officials - especially in Yunnan Province which 
possessed few exportable commodities. Insightfully concluding that:  
 
... the first sign of relaxation in …. attitude towards the opium 
question would assuredly be the signal for the poppy to spring up 
                                                 
3
 Kweichow was the last provinces to come under Shikai’s rule (Central China Post, 1913). 
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throughout the miles of territory now lying fallow for want of capital 
and knowledge and suitable crops.  
 
Many farmers planned for this time by storing opium seeds (Turner, 1914; Wandering 
Naturalist, 1922; Wyman, 2000).  
4.2.2. Law enforcement approaches 
Before and after the Revolution, forced eradication was administered by eradication 
teams or farmers were compelled to eradicate their own crops by the military (Hosie, 
1912; FO, 1911a, 1913c, 1913e). For example, in Swatow, during village meetings (FO, 
1915g) farmers’ were ordered to eradicate their own crops within five days or face 
military punishment (FO, 1913a; also FO, 1912a). One witness reported that: 
 
... crops were uprooted and trampled on; men were beaten senseless 
by the roadside in the midst of their ruined fields; the job was done 
with a savage thoroughness which defies parallel (Wandering 
Naturalist, 1922:466). 
 
From 1911, the official punishment for opium farming or if a government official 
refused to enforce the ban - mandated by the Financial Commissioner - was one to three 
years imprisonment and the confiscation of land (Changsha Jih Pao, 1911). In practice 
pre-and post-Revolution punishments, often enforced by the provincial military, for 
cultivation and/or resistance included: torture (FO, 1910b, 1913a); execution (Central 
China Post, 1912; FO, 1913h, 1914b, 1914d, 1914m; Giles, 1913; Hosie, 1910; Taylor, 
1913, 1914); branding (FO, 1914n); caning (FO, 1909); public shaming (FO, 1910b; 
1914n, 1915h); fines (SCSF, 1910); and the destruction of property (FO, 1913a, 1913e, 
1917a; Turner, 1914) or entire villages (FO, 1910b).  
In Fukien Province the Joint Investigation described a magistrate who: arrested and 
fined farmers; confiscated their land; burnt their houses; and executed any which 
‘received these corrections with ill grace’ (Turner, 1914:n.p.; also FO, 1914d); another 
noted how ‘the sacrifice of lives and property’ was ‘no obstacle’ (FO, 1913g:2). At the 
extreme an entire village was massacred as a warning in Yunnan (FO, 1913f) whilst a 
‘few hundred’ farmers were executed in Shensi (FO, 1917d:3).  
Pre- and post-Revolution local gentry (FO, 1910b) or village leaders (FO, 1910c) 
were often punished – with imprisonment or execution (FO, 1913c, 1914f; Turner, 
1914) - for not preventing cultivation within their sphere of influence while civil service 
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career advancement was depended on opium suppression (FO, 1910c; Leech, 1908; 
Spence, 1990). After the Revolution lower officials were ‘severely’ punished (FO, 
1915d:26) or ‘removed’ (FO, 1915h:164) for non-compliance, unsatisfactory results 
(FO, 1913b; 1917f), or corruption (Turner, 1914). Hence, fear of failure instilled a 
motivation to thoroughly enforce prohibition (SCSF, 1910). This may have extended to 
the wider population as there is evidence of farmers being executed for not informing 
authorities of production (FO, 1917d). 
4.3. Success? 
As can be expected from a state twice the size of Europe the campaign progressed 
unevenly across and within provinces (FO, 1910a, 1910b; Hosie, 1909; Wyman, 2000). 
While conformity was slower in major producing provinces, they all eventually 
conceded to prohibition (FO, 1908). For example, the Chihli Governor-General 
provided a ten-year grace period in which a gradual reduction was advised (FO, 1908). 
Nonetheless, by mid-1910 provincial leaders had succumbed to pressure and the ban 
was stringently enforced (SCSF, 1910).  
While Chinese proclamations of national cessation of production in 1911 
(Wandering Naturist, 1922) were premature many province had already been declared 
‘opium-free’. In 1911, national production was estimated at 4,000mt which represents a 
89 percent reduction from the 1906 peak of 35,353mt.  
After a brief resurgence during the Revolutionary period, by 1913 half of all 
provinces had been declared ‘opium-free’ by Joint Investigation; the export of Indian 
opium unofficially ceased in 19134 (FO, 1913g; Eisenlohr, 1934). While no quantitative 
data exists, by the end of 1917, all provinces had been declared ‘opium-free’ after a 
comprehensive investigation by a Joint British-Chinese Commission. Indian exports 
were officially discontinued (FPA, 1924; IAOA, 1924b). Illicit production 
recommenced in outlying provinces the following year (FPA, 1924).  
Several British officials reported their suspicion that from 1915 prohibition was 
enforced in some areas purely for the benefit of the Joint Investigation (FO, 1915b, 
1917b, 1915d, 1915h, 1917c, 1917e) or that suppression was limited by corruption (FO, 
1914a, 1914e; 1915a, 1915b, 1915g).5 Furthermore, the British Joint Investigation for 
                                                 
4
 To be partly replaced by illicitly imported Turkish and Persian opium (FO, 1914i). 
5
 In 1915 the central Government procured all existing stocks of imported opium to sell to aged 
smokers under a monopoly system (Walker, 2007). Under international and national pressure 
the stock was destroyed and the monopoly abandoned (Yongming, 1999), however, there are 
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Shensi Province reported that President Shikai had initially clandestinely facilitated and 
profited from production in the province to support his eventual ascension to the throne, 
before ruthlessly enforcing the ban (FO, 1917d; see also Yongming, 1999).  
 
Figure 4: 1. China: Opium production (1836-1911) 
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Source: adapted from, AOAI (1922); Pietschmann et al (2009); Newman (1995); Wyman 
(2000). Note: grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of success. Missing values 
indicates missing data. Jordan (1908) estimates national production at 20,268mt for 1906. 
4.4. Rival explanations of success 
An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as 
such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how success was realised. 
Yongming (1999:25) maintains that the central factor for success was mass support for 
prohibition: the ‘majority of Chinese society was on common ground, thereby 
provoking minimal resistance’ (also Alexander, 1925; Britannicus, 1922; FO, 1908). 
For example, the IAOA (1922:22) supported their claim that ‘the farmer was a keen 
sufferer’ by the lack of violent resistance (also Alexander, 1925; Britannicus, 1922; FO, 
1908). While increased food available was welcomed by many (FO, 1910c), the 
repressive nature of the state may have prevented criticism of prohibition (Madancy, 
2001). 
                                                                                                                                               
accounts that officials diverted some of the supposedly destroyed opium to the black market 
(Buckley, 1931). 
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Furthermore, FO records illuminated significant violent and non-violent resistance to 
eradication, before and after the Revolution6 (see FO, 1911a, 1912b, 1913a, 1913k; 
Hosie, 1910; Rose, 1913; SCSF, 1910; also Bianco, 2000; Madancy, 2001; Spence, 
1990). For example, in Sichuan (FO, 1910c, 1913e) and Hunan (FO 1913l, 1913m) 
secret societies were formed to protect farmers (FO, 1915g, 1915a). Furthermore, 
Adshead (1966) has suggested that discontent at prohibition may have motivated many 
former Sichuan farmers to support the 1911 Republican Revolution (Adshead, 1966).  
Analyses in Sichuan (Wyman, 2000), Yunnan (Hosie, 1911b), and nationwide 
(Taylor, 1913) partly attribute success to the commitment, belligerence and authority of 
provincial governments. The linkage of prohibition to career advancement accelerated 
suppression and likely inflated the repressive nature of local officials. The evidence 
suggests that the key factor for success between 1906 and 1917 was a commitment by 
local officials to what would today constitute a crime against humanity rather than rural 
support for prohibition (for a definition of crimes against humanity see Cassese, 2003). 
An additional factor may be that repressive law enforcement against consumers 
depressed the market which decreased the rewards for producing opium. 
4.5. Background and context (1917-1949) 
From 1911, numerous warlords had been consolidating their authority. Then after 
President Shikai abdicated in 1916 – in response to multiple uprisings - many other 
southern warlords declared independence, fragmenting the Chinese state (Wakeman, 
1977). While suppression officially continued in areas under Beijing control7 the central 
Government was unstable and composed of belligerent northern warlords (see Barnett, 
1963; Meyer and Parssinen, 1998; Slack, 2000). The British consulate, aware of 
resurgences, noted the futility of approaching the impotent central government (Dixon, 
1922). 
                                                 
6
 Instances of violent resistance may have increased during Republican rule (see, FO, 1913i, 
1913h) in remote tribal areas where provincial governments lacked authority (FO, 1913e, 
1914c, 1915e, 1917d). 
7
 The central Government continued to strengthen the legal basis of prohibition. The Criminal 
Code (1919) punished production with a minimum prison term of three years. Heroin was 
prohibited by the Amended Laws Concerning Morphia (1920) and The Opium Suppression Act 
(1920) obliged all officials to eradicate opium poppies and ordered the execution of officials 
who coerced farmers to produce opium.  
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Many warlords facilitated opium production to finance conflicts8 over territories, the 
central Government (IAOA, 1924b; Paulès, 2008) and eventually areas important to the 
opium trade (IAOA, 1924a, 1924b; see Bianco, 2000). The warlord era brought: 
 
... economic and social distress to China: opium poppies were planted 
in times of extreme famine, government administration became 
meaningless in many provinces, and the dislocation of legitimate trade 
impeded industrial growth and the modernisation of agriculture. 
Furthermore banditry flourished and Chinese politics became even 
more militarised (Walker, 1991:35).  
 
FO records suggest that dual authority often existed (Cole, 1920; FO, 1920n, 1922; 
Hind, 1922). Several provincial civil governments opposed opium production (Aspland, 
1925; FO, 1920b, 1920g, 1920i; IAOA, 1922b) whilst warlords simultaneously 
facilitated the trade,9 in some cases violently resisting eradication (FO, 1920n; IAOA, 
1922b, 1924c).  
Other civil authorities were apathetic or administered their own monopolies 
(Bridgeman, 1919; Executive Yuan, 1935; FO, 1919b, 1920g; IAOA, 1924b; Ottewill, 
1919), often whilst publicly prohibiting production (FO, 1920d, 1920e, 1920k) to avoid 
condemnation by anti-opium lobbyists and public sentiment (Yongming, 1999, see 
IAOA, 1922b; League of Nations, 1930; Meyer and Parssinen, 1998; Slack, 2000). By 
1923, many civil provincial governments were recording opium taxes in their official 
treasury records (reproduced in IAOA, 1924a) and punishing unlicensed producers and 
merchants.  The national military were also implicated in the distribution of opiates 
throughout China (Buckley, 1931; Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953; IAOA, 1923; Mulls, 
1923) and into Burma and Indochina (IAOA, 1924a) in cooperation with organised 
crime groups (see Martin, 1996).  
To ensure that opium was the only cost-effective crop many warlord imposed 
extortionately high land taxes (Buckley, 1931; IAOA, 1924b; Madancy, 2001; Talman, 
1919; Von-ko, 1935). More overt coercion included the fining or execution of farmers 
or village leaders refusing to produce opium (FO, 1919c; IAOA, 1920c, 1922b, 1922n, 
1924a). In some provinces food crops were eradicated to make way for opium (FO, 
                                                 
8
 One Fukien warlord financed an expansion of 10,000 soldiers through taxing opium 
production (FO, 1920m; IAOA, 1922). 
9
 Some extended advice on soil management and irrigation to improve yields (FO, 1920a). 
   
 98
1920n), facilitating famines in Kweichow and Shensi provinces between 1921 and 1923 
(IAOA, 1922b, 1924b) and food deficits in other provinces (Kiang, 1937; Rogers, 1919; 
Von-ko, 1935). This said, in some districts, opium was profitable and farmers chose to 
side with warlords and openly resist civil bans (Bianco, 2000). 
Not all provinces grew opium. Civil authorities continued to brutally suppress 
production in the provinces of Chefoo (FO, 1920f), Chungking (FO, 1920l) and Shansi 
(FO, 1920h). Around 1924/25, in response to overproduction - and subsequently 
reduced opium prices and increased food prices - some warlords ceased coercing 
farmers and facilitated crop substitution (Aspland, 1925).  
During the early/mid-1920s production averaged between 2,000 and 15,000tons (see 
FPA, 1924; Merrill, 1942; IAOA, 1924b) and accounted for anywhere between nine-
tenths (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953) and 50 percent of global production. Illicitly 
exported opium was seized in: Southeast (Gray, 1925) and East Asia; Australia; the 
Philippines and North America (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953). Due to high demand, as 
much was imported as exported (Aspland, 1925), including smuggled Indian 
(Wandering Naturist, 1922), Persian (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998) and Turkish opium 
(Martin, 1996). 
By 1928, the Kuomintang,10 who had partly unified China under their authority 
(Walker, 1991), were administering an opium monopoly (Baumler, 2000) which sold 
gradually decreasing quantities of opium to registered consumers (Dai, 1918). In 
response, the NAOA launched a forceful publicity campaign which denounced the 
monopoly as purely revenue enhancing. The campaign resulted (Slack, 2000) in the 
passing of the Opium Suppression Act (1928) which reiterated the punishments 
contained in the 1919 Criminal Code, whilst obliging all ‘Opium Suppression 
Bureaus’11 to liquidate their affairs and surrender their stock to the state. Provincial and 
district officials were ordered to eradicate crops and punish re-cultivation, village chiefs 
were ordered to prevent production and report unregulated production.  The Act was 
followed by a series of regulations which together allowed for the punishment of 
ineffective state officials and obliged magistrates to comply with the 1928 Act (COSC, 
1929).  
The 1928 and 1929 regulations were reportedly passed to prevent competition rather 
than promote prohibition (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998); unofficial monopolies continued 
(Phillips, 1932; Woodhouse, 1930; Slack, 2000) and the civil military were implicated 
                                                 
10
 Kuomingtang (KMT or Guomindang) translates as National Peoples Party (Spence, 1990). 
11
 Bureaus tended to be code for unofficial opium monopolies (IAOA, 1922d). 
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in morphine manufacturing (FO, 1930) and opiate trafficking (Buckley, 1932; Harding, 
1932; Martin, 1932; Mills, 1924). Strict prohibition was, however, enforced in areas 
where the Kuomintang were conducting anti-communist campaigns: ineffective 
magistrates were punished and farmers executed (Yongming, 1999). 
Throughout the 1920s, opium continued to be produced in warlord controlled areas 
(CGOSC, 1929) perpetuating conflicts between warlord factions (Woodhouse, 1930) 
and the central Government (Dai, 1928). The Kuomintang delegate to the Hague Opium 
Conference described suppression as a ‘farce’ and declared that 12,090tons 
(200,000piculs) were produced annually (Teh, 1931). Woodhouse (1930), who 
consideration Teh’s figure too conservative, dispatched a questionnaire to 
knowledgeable individuals on the opium situation, the findings suggested the continual 
compulsion of farmers by military and civil authorities to produce opium, that 
prohibition was enforced in just three provinces and that production had increased under 
Kuomintang protection. 
In short, by the end of the 1920s production continued unabated, interdiction was 
unenforced and the Kuomintang were either helpless (Buckley, 1931) or facilitating 
production and distribution. In 1930 the League of Nations (1930) singled China out as 
the primary source of illicit opium in East and Southeast Asia. Whilst Eisenlohr 
(1934:207) described China as ‘the most serious menace to any scheme of universal 
control, either of drug manufacture or of opium cultivation’. Yongming (2000b) reports 
that 1930 represents the peak of Chinese production. The data for 1930-39, presented in 
Figure 4:2, illustrates data surrendered to the League of Nations for state regulated 
opium production and thus fails to represent the true scale of production once areas 
outside of state control and diversion from the state monopoly are accounted for. 
Conversely, the data for 1930 presented by Yongming (2000b) may require a cautious 
approach as, being drawn from a Chinese language historical account of drug control 
published in Beijing in 1997, it may represent a distorted official version of events. This 
said, the data illustrated in Figure 4:2 does appear representative of the general trends 
established by qualitative evidence. 
In 1935 as much of China was unified under Kuomintang authority and most western 
warlords were integrated into the state opium monopoly the Six-Year Plan was initiated 
(Baumler, 2000; Slack, 2000) under the Enforcement Measures for the Suppression of 
Dangerous Drugs (1935, reproduced in Cadogan, 1935). The Measures provided for the 
gradual suppression of distribution and consumption by 1940 and production was 
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prohibition in all but eight provinces (discussed in, Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949b; Butler, 
1938; League of Nations, 1938).  
Under the Plan, farmers were licensed to produce gradually diminishing quantities 
for sale through the state monopoly to registered consumers. Opium merchants were 
taxed by the state whilst transiting the Yangtze River to the markets of Shanghai and 
Hubei (Baumler, 2000). Punishments for unauthorised production were reported as 
‘barbarous’ (Times, 1935b:17) and included the execution of at least 263 individuals in 
the first year (Times, 1935; also Moss, 1936). Unregulated crops were forcefully 
eradicated (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949b). Crop substitution was administered (see 
Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949b; League of Nations, 1939b) and by 1939 wheat was 
reported to be more profitable than opium in Hupeh and Kansu provinces (League of 
Nations, 1939b).  
Several foreign observers were initially dubious of the national and provincial 
commitment (Brenan, 1934, 1936; Mills, 1935). Some stronger warlords overtly 
resisted Kuomintang authority or clandestinely administered their own monopolies 
(Cadogan, 1935; Harding, 1935; Merrill, 1942) and large-scale diversion from the 
official monopoly was reported (Austin, 1936). During the first year of the Plan, the 
League of Nations (1936) declared China the principle global source of both raw opium 
and manufactured opiates (Bureau of Narcotics, 1936). Nonetheless, in 1937 President 
Kai-shek (1937:31) reported that the ‘cultivation of the opium poppy in the various 
provinces in the interior has long since been completely suppressed’ and was limited to 
a small number of districts in the ‘frontier provinces’. The statement was collaborated at 
the League of Nations by America and French Indochina (who reported significant 
reductions in smuggling from Yunnan Province). The FPA reported that decreasing 
production had inflated non-monopoly opium prices and forced consumers to seek 
treatment (Merrill, 1942). Success was, nevertheless, limited by conflict (Bulletin of 
Narcotics, 1949; Walker, 1991; Yongming, 1999).  
In 1937, Japan invaded and occupied the majority of central Chinese provinces. The 
Japanese military continued the Kuomintang ‘suppression through taxation’ policy 
(Reuter, 1940; Tuson, 1940) and facilitated production, which had practically ceased 
under the Plan (Merrill, 1942).12  
                                                 
12
 For more in-depth discussions on the opiate trade within Japanese controlled areas of China 
refer to: Brook (2000); Brook and Wakabayashi (2000); Friman (1996); Kobayashi (2000); 
Merrill (1942); Meyer and Parssinen (1998); Walker (1991). For complaints by China and 
foreign nations against Japan see: Dennis (1937); FO (1915c); League of Nations (1936, 1939). 
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In 1939, the Kuomintang reported to the League of Nations (1939) that after one last 
purge - in which 159,449ha of poppies were eradicated, four farmers were executed and 
25 imprisoned - almost all production, and illicit exports, had ceased in areas under their 
authority. The UK and Siam, however, complained that Yunnanese opium continued to 
be smuggled into Siam (League of Nations, 1939). The Kuomintang Interior Minister 
stated that production was limited to Yunnanese border areas (Kuo Min News Agency, 
1939), the statement was confirmed by the British FO (1939, 1939b). In 1940, the 
British Consulate to Yunnan declared the province ‘opium-free’ (Prideaux-Brune, 
1940). Conversely, the Consulate to Sichuan reported that the provinces illicit imports 
originated from the provinces of Sikang, Kweichow and Yunnan (Franklin, 1941). 
Nonetheless, both Consulates reported that scarcity had inflated retail-prices (Franklin, 
1941; Prideaux-Brune, 1940). 
When complete prohibition was enacted in 1941, 32,932 individuals were sentenced 
to life imprisonment or death. Production was limited to Japanese occupied territories 
and remote ‘frontier’ areas (Merrill, 1939) of Yunnan, Kweichow and Sikang provinces 
where violent opposition to eradication was common. By 1937, production had declined 
from the 1924 peak of 15,240mt to 890mt; a 94 percent reduction. The Kuomintang 
thus achieved the percentage change criteria of success but failed to reduce production 
below 20mt. While production likely fell further by 1939 accounts of the period are 
inconsistent, contradictory and lacking sufficient evidence to proclaim success. 
While the UK and US maintained that Chinese production remained low throughout 
the early-1940s (see Morlock 1944; FO, 1945). However, diminishing Kuomintang 
authority during the Sino-Japanese (1937-45) and Civil Wars (1945-49) resulted in a 
resurgence in production as semi-independent military officials compelled farmers to 
produce opium (Zhongli, 2001; also Barnett, 1963) to pay soldiers (Walker, 1991). In 
1944, the League of Nations reported that China produced 65.4 percent of the world’s 
illicit opium (Atzenwiler, 1944) and in 1947 the PCOB stated, ‘China may still be well 
at the head of the list of opium-producing countries’. The Kuomintang reported in 1947 
that it had eradicated 719,319ha in Sichuan alone, however, the League of Nations 
noted the likelihood of exaggeration (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949b:28). By 1949 
production had resumed at significant levels (Yongming, 2000b).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Ryan (2001) posits that US and Chinese allegations of Japanese involvement were based more 
on diplomatic self-interest than intelligence (also, Kinder and Walker, 1986).   
   
 102
Figure 4: 2. China: Opium production (1921-1949) 
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Source: adapted from, AOAI (1924); Atzenwiler (1944); Bulletin of Narcotics (1949); League 
of Nations (1939); Lu and Liang (2008); Slack (2000); Teh (1931); Su (1997, in Yongming, 
2000b). Missing values indicates missing data. Data for 1930 represents accounts for both licit 
(solid black)  and illicit (lined) production estimates.  
4.6. Intervention ([PR] China: 1949+) 
Opium consumption had been prohibited in areas under Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) authority from the early-1930s (Lowinger, 1977; Yongming, 2000b) and 
although opium production and export out of CCP controlled territory had sporadically 
been facilitated to raise revenue (Shuyun, 2006; Meyer and Parssinen, 1998; Yung-fa, 
1995) it was immediately banned when the CCP ejected the Kuomintang in 1949. By 
1952, the CCP had largely unified the country under their authority as the Peoples 
Republic of China (henceforth (PR) China).  
In 1950, the CCP promulgated the Decree Regarding Suppression of Opium and 
Narcotics (1950:n.p., reproduced in FO, 1950) which obliged: forced eradication in 
areas which had come under state authority; gradual reductions in areas inhabited by 
minority groups ‘in the light of the actual local circumstances’; complete prohibition on 
the distribution of opium and narcotics and that all offenders be ‘severely punished’. 
4.6.1. Development-Orientated Approaches 
Although not a DOA, the redistribution of land from landlords to peasants benefitted 
small farmers and motivated many to acquiesce to the cessation of production (see 
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Yongming, 2000a). This was especially true in ‘minority areas’13 where crop 
substitution and land reform were administered prior to law enforcement as a means of 
state extension (Yongming, 1999, 2001). CCP members were sent to minority areas to 
administer local projects (i.e. irrigation construction or malaria control) and would 
steadily spread propaganda to establish local support (Spence, 1990). 
A Chinese participant at a UNDP (1987) conference recounted how opium farmers 
were encouraged in the early-1950s to grow grains and cash crops by the CCP, who 
distributed improved seeds and modern technology. Foreign observers reported that 
food crops had replaced opium (Lowinger, 1977; Winnington, 1959, cited in Bruun et 
al., 1975).  
Precise information on crop substitution is, however, limited whilst that which is 
available appears somewhat inconsistent with Chinese agricultural planning. Between 
1952 and 1957, the collectivisation (see Annex 1:1) of farmland did improve 
agricultural productivity (Lin, 1990) which grew on average 4.6 percent per year (Yao, 
1999) and by 1956/57 food access had improved and rural consumption of grain was 
higher than in urban areas (Spence, 1990); although remaining below international 
definitions of subsistence (Fairbank, 1994). Much of the success was, however, 
attributable to private production which was banned in 1958. Between 1959 and 1961, 
Government ignorance of agriculture and mismanagement factored14 (Spence, 1990; 
Yao, 1999) in a famine which killed an estimated 18.48 (Yao, 1999) to 30 million 
people in rural areas (Lin and Yang, 2000).  
Prior to 1959 all farmers were obliged to meet government grain quota’s and all 
produce was sold to the state at a set price. The quota was calculated on the needs of the 
urban population and foreign exports. As many villages barely covered their quotas 
food shortages were common; shortages increased as the urban population grew (Lin 
and Yang, 2000).  
Additionally, in 1958 the state implemented the Great Leap Forward to modernise 
the state. As the development of heavy industry was an integral component of the plan 
the majority of farmers were ordered away from agriculture to support iron production 
(Smil, 1999). The remaining farmers were ordered to offset the diversion of resources 
by increasing the planting density of crops which was erroneously believed to increase 
                                                 
13
 Defined as ‘all ethnic groups that are not Han Chinese’. The majority of ‘minority 
nationalities’ lived in isolated mountainous areas which ‘were safe havens for … opium 
production’ (Yongming, 2001:19). 
14
 Lin (1990) rejected this as a cause but concedes that it did add to the severity of the famine. 
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yields (Yao, 1999) and there was insufficient labour to collect the negligible harvests 
(Fairbank, 1994). The policy failed to produce large-amounts of iron whilst creating a 
food shortage (Spence, 1990; Smil, 1999).  
Agricultural planning and management was ineffective during the period when the 
development of opium farming areas would have been administered. Thus, if 
developmental assistance was administered as an incentive for the cessation of opium 
production the experience of the Great Leap Forward suggests that the policy failed to 
have a positive impact on former opium farmers.   
4.6.2. Law enforcement approaches 
In 1951, 6,333 ‘drug offenders’ were arrested, however, insufficient central 
coordination and resources limited the campaigns efficiency and impact. Then in late-
1951/early-1952, the Three and Five Antis Campaigns (Annex 1:1) identified - through 
investigates into official corruption - a number of large-scale traffickers. Building on the 
information the Central Ministry of Public Security coordinated bureaucratic and 
criminal justice institutions in a nationwide intelligence gathering campaign 
(Yongming, 1999, 2000a, 2001). 
In August 1952, there was a nationwide wave of arrests, followed by extensive 
propaganda campaigns15 and three more waves of arrests. The arrests ceased in October 
1952 to allow the judiciary to catch-up; 369,705 individuals had been targeted of which 
82,056 (22 percent) were arrested (34,775 were imprisoned or executed; 2,138 were 
imprisoned in labour camps; 6,843 were placed under surveillance; and 4,337 were 
‘uncategorized’) (Yongming, 1999, 2000a; also Chang, 2004). All opium poppies were 
forcefully eradicated (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998; Spence, 1990). 
Offenders were tried and punished during mass rallies (Meyer and Parssinen, 1998). 
In total 800 (Chang, 2004) to 880 individuals were publically executed. Before the 
campaign the CCP had specified what percentage of those prosecuted where to be 
executed; enough to remove high-level traffickers, especially those deemed counter-
revolutionaries, and prevent lower-level offenders from future transgression (Lowinger, 
1977; Meyer and Parssinen, 1998). Rubinstein (1973:61) witnessed:  
 
                                                 
15
 It followed a recognizable path (see, Paulès, 2008) by proclaiming that foreign and (under 
Communism) class enemies exploited China and that opium limited national advancement 
whilst impoverishing and corrupting consumers (Lowinger, 1977; Rubinstein, 1973; Zhongli, 
2001).  
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a policy of highly selective, strictly enforced, drastic punitive 
measures for major offenders on the one hand, and on the other hand 
amnesty and government support for victims and cooperative petty 
offender.  
 
Jones (2006:180, also Lu and Miethe, 2007) reports that during the ‘Maoist era’ 
(1949-76) crime in general was ‘virtually non-existent’ with the mid-1950s/mid-1960s 
perceived as a ‘golden age’ of safety and order. During this period punishments 
included: execution; forced labour; and administrative sanctions (i.e. forced resettlement 
or bans on accessing social goods) (Wu, 1988). While execution was imposed by courts, 
some forced labour and administrative sanctions could be imposed by civil associations 
and the police (Jones, 2006), who possessed ‘virtually unlimited power in investigation, 
detaining, prosecuting and convicting criminal suspects’ and commonly punished extra-
judicially (Lu and Miethe, 2007:47). 
However, the severity of law enforcement dovetailed the level of authority possessed 
by the CCP in an area, and law enforcement was sequenced after state extension in 
minority areas. This is illustrated with an example of the Liangshan Yi Autonomous 
Prefecture (Sichuan Province) where 50-80 percent of households farmed opium. In the 
Han Chinese areas, suppression was conducted in synergy with the national campaign: 
opium was forcefully eradicated, 26 individuals were executed and over 300 were 
imprisoned. As ethnic Yi areas were unaffected by suppression some opium was 
smuggled into Han areas. CCP officials initially projected propaganda and appealed to 
local leaders for the cessation of illicit exports. Then, in mid-1954, the CCP began 
interdicting Yi opium in Han areas and extending substitute crops, and by 1955, 
1,072ha had been ‘voluntarily’ uprooted. However, subsequent forced eradication was 
discontinued after five months of violent resistance. In 1956, the CCP administered 
‘democratic reforms’ in the Prefecture, which included land distribution and the freeing 
of slaves. The reforms were popular, and anti-reformists were suppressed by the 
Chinese military and ethnic Yi supportive of reform, and by late-1957 all ethnic Yi 
areas were under CCP authority; prohibition was immediately enforced. As landlords, 
the major facilitators of production, had been removed during the reforms and farmers 
did not want to jeopardise their newly acquired land or freedom by growing an illegal 
crop, production slumped. Then in 1958/59, counter-narcotic and counter-revolutionary 
interventions were conducted in parallel: 3,000 were arrested and forced eradication 
conducted (Yongming, 1999, 2001). 
   
 106
Zhongli (2001:183-184) recounts first-hand experience of suppression in Yanhe 
county (Guizhou Province). In 1950, prohibition was declared one of the Provinces 
primary goals. All local government and military employees were ordered to forcefully 
eradicate crops and ‘punish opium sellers’. Propaganda on the dangers of opium was 
communicated whilst CCP members, soldiers and leaders of civil organisation surveyed 
farmland. Farmers were encouraged to uproot their own crops and 
producers/manufacturers ordered to hand in equipment. After a year sub-county’s and 
villages signed bonds agreeing to the voluntarily cessation of production; the 
agreements were monitored by civil associations.  
Social control 
Communism made people dependent on the state. In urban areas, necessities were 
rationed and housing, health care and education was distributed through places of work. 
In rural areas land redistribution and collectivisation tied farmers to communal land 
(Fairbank, 1994; Lu and Miethe, 2007). There was minimal freedom of travel or choice 
of employment (Wu, 1988). In short, China was a ‘police state’ with ‘unquestioned 
control over the populace in villages’ (Fairbank, 1994:353/368).  
Civil institutions – such as a residents’ group - were established in cities and rural 
villages (Wu, 1988) and, alongside official coercive state institutions, ‘contributed to 
the formation of a social control network that could encompass every aspect of an 
individual’s life’ and was strong enough to ‘break connections even between family 
members’ (Yongming, 1999:110; see Dikötter, 2003; Spence, 1990). Fear of being a 
target for CCP criticism ‘meant that everyone needed to be seen to participate’ and the 
state possessed ‘a gaze far more “panoptical” than anything designed by Bentham’. 
(Jones, 2006:182/183).16 
For example, during the 1950s there were protests in the countryside against 
unreasonable state procurement. While some protestors were imprisoned or executed 
the CCP’s primary means of control was the inducement of communal leaders, often 
through promises of political advancement, (Lin and Yang, 2000) who pressurised 
farmers’ acquiescence. CCP members emerged as the new elite, reminiscent of the 
magistrates and governors of the Imperial Republican regimes. They coerced the 
population to meet state set targets and competed to report to the centre their personal 
success (Fairbank, 1994). 
                                                 
16
 For a personal account of the pervasiveness of the state see Ye (1997). 
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4.7. Success? 
It is widely acknowledged that production had ceased by 1953 (Lee, 1995) in areas 
under state authority; minority areas lagged until the late-1950s (Yongming, 2000a) 
after which production was minimal, sporadic (Lee, 1995) and limited to remote areas 
of Yunnan (FCO, 1972; US Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1973; Yang, 1993). 
Production decreased from 25,250mt in 1949 to close to zero by the late-1950s/early-
1960s; conforming to the outcome measure of success. 
Throughout the 1950s, the US charged the CCP with facilitating opium production 
for foreign black markets. The claims - which were based upon information obtained 
from the Kuomintang Government in exile (Government of Taiwan) (for Taiwanese and 
US criticism see Times, 1952) - were retracted in 1967 (see Ryan, 2001; Walker and 
Kinder, 1986). In 1971, the US reported that production was limited to legitimate needs 
(Lowinger, 1977).  
4.8. Rival explanations of success 
An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as 
such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how success was realised. 
Yongming (2000b) maintains that central to success was the CCP’s: authority over a 
unified China; effective utilisation of propaganda to mobilise the majority of citizens 
against opium (also Rubenstein, 1973; Lee, 1995); and extensive and intrusive social 
control (Yongming, 2000b).  
For Lowinger (1977) the primary factor was that propaganda and social control had 
reduced the domestic demand for opium; depressing farmgate prices. This is supported 
by Dikötter and colleagues (2002) suggestion that opium had fallen out of fashion after 
the introduction of penicillin and decades of propaganda. For example, in 1940/41, two 
British diplomats had reported that opium smoking had become unfashionable and 
‘shameful’ (Prideaux-Brune, 1940:1; Franklin, 1941; see Paulès, 2008). Additionally, 
the sealing of the borders had removed access to foreign markets (Meyer and Parssinen, 
1998).  
Rubenstein (1973:61) maintains that success was dependent on the punitive measures 
enacted against traffickers and the ‘amnesty and government support for victims and 
cooperative petty offenders’; including farmers. However, the CCP’s poor record of 
agri-management suggests that ‘government support’ for opium farmers was minimal 
and any crop substitution was likely interrupted by the Great Leap Forward.  
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It is possible that the state was more repressive than reported by Lowinger, 
Rubenstein and accounts based upon official Chinese documents. While the state may 
have executed ‘just’ 800-880 individuals, extra-judicial deaths or other physical 
punishments may have been higher. Punishments for production may have also been 
categorised as crimes against the communal production of food crops, 
counterrevolutionary crimes or linked to the more repressive aspects of minority 
‘liberation’. The extent of use of administrative punishments for opium production has 
yet to be explored and may have included reduced food rations or resettlement.   
The available evidence would suggest that after the revolution a number of factors 
converged to create an environment conducive to prohibition. Social controls were 
established during a period of revolutionary zeal. Furthermore, many rural poor 
expressed a sense of indebtedness and loyalty to the CCP for: redistributing land; 
reducing violent conflict and warlord exploitation; freeing slaves; and general promises 
of improved livelihoods under socialism (see Annex 1:1). Once revolutionary zeal had 
faded, intrusive social control and the threat of violence had been established.  
Hence, risks were increased and rewards decreased through a combination of: initial 
support for CCP reforms; extensive social control; repressive punishments; and a 
depressed market, but only once the state possessed authority.  
4.9. Case summaries 
Imperial/Republican 
By the early-twentieth-century, China was the world’s largest source of opium. That 
opium was consumed by between 6.3 to 40 percent of the Chinese population was 
perceived as a threat to economic and military advancement; resulting in the re-
enactment of a ban on opium production and consumption in 1906. The target of being 
‘opium-free’ by 1916 was achieved in many provinces by 1911, however, regime 
change permitted a brief resurgence in production. Once the new Republican regime 
was established, the opium ban was resumed. In 1917, China was declared ‘clear of 
opium’ by a Joint British-Chinese Commission of Investigation, although, some British 
members attached reservations that officially supported clandestine production had 
increased from 1915. 
Interventions tended to be centred upon a highly repressive incarnation of law 
enforcement. Farmers were subjected to widespread and systematic: forced 
displacement; destruction of property; public torture; public humiliation; and public 
execution. Crops were forcefully eradicated and resistance was often brutally 
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suppressed by the military. While prohibition was intended to be gradual, the linkage of 
prohibition to career advancement quickened the pace of bans; this may have inflated 
the repressive nature of local officials. Few projects to develop alternative incomes were 
made available and as farmers received little reward for compliance, many prepared for 
a relaxation of the ban. 
Between 1906 and 1911, production had decreased by 89 percent and continued to 
decline until 1917. While the level of clandestine production from 1915 is unknown, 
accounts suggest that China achieved success around 1917. However, the interventions 
negative consequences were significant; the systematic abuse of farmers’ rights would 
today constitute a crime against humanity. 
Between 1916 and 1928, the state authority dissolved into warlord factions, many of 
whom facilitated opium production. While some farmers welcomed warlord support for 
opium farming, others were coerced into production through sanctions as repressive as 
those previously used to enforce prohibition. Throughout the 1920s/early-1930s, China 
regained its status as the world’s primary source of opium. 
In 1935 the Kuomintang, who had unified much of China, initiated the Six-Year 
Plan. Farmers were licensed in six provinces to produce gradually diminishing 
quantities of opium for sale to registered consumers. Repressive punishments for 
unauthorised production were administered alongside some crop substitution and by 
1937 production had been reduced by an excess of 90 percent, however, production 
remained 870mt above the 20mt limit. While this likely decreased further by 1939, 
accounts of the period are inconsistent and contradictory, consequently, there is 
insufficient evidence to declare success.  
(PR) China 
While production had been reduced by the Six-Year Plan, after 1937 the weakening of 
Kuomintang authority and the requirements of war resulted in warlord and Kuomintang 
commanders facilitating opium production to finance their militaries.  Consequently, in 
1947 the UN declared China the world’s largest source of illicit opium.  
By 1949, the Kuomintang had been replaced by the CPC who largely unified the 
country under their authority. The subsequent intervention differed depending on CPC 
authority. In areas under CCP authority, bans on production were enforced quickly and 
centred upon: public humiliation and executions; near constant surveillance; and 
‘administrative punishments’. Whereas, in minority areas the state sequenced bans after 
state extension and agricultural reform.  
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Furthermore, many rural poor expressed a sense of indebtedness and loyalty to the 
CCP for: redistributing land; reducing violent conflict and warlord exploitation; freeing 
slaves; and general promises of improved livelihoods under socialism. Additionally, 
decades of anti-opium propaganda had produced a perception of opium as backward and 
detrimental to individual and national health. 
This said, by the early-1960s, agricultural mismanagement - at considerable cost to 
human life - might have diluted revolutionary zeal. However, by this point China had 
developed a highly repressive, intrusive and hegemonic state. A combination of initial 
support for CCP reforms, extensive social control, repressive punishments, and a 
depressed market (repression, revolutionary zeal and propaganda had equally 
suppressed consumption) likely increased the risk and decreased the rewards for 
producing opium.  
China achieved success during the late-1950s/early-1960s. However, the intervention 
was highly repressive, violated individual rights and, there is minimal evidence of drug 
control improving the welfare of opium farmers.  
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5. Iran  
5.1. Background and context 
While opium was produced in Iran between the Tenth- (Neligan, 1927) and Twelfth-
Centuries, production was minimal (Seyf, 1984) and seldom exported. Then during the 
mid/late-nineteenth-century (Calabrese, 2007; McLaughlin, 1976; Raisdana and 
Nakhjavani, 2002; Matthee, 2005; Neligan, 1927), opium was promoted by the 
Government as a balance to European imports and to replace the diminishing cotton 
(Matthee, 2005; McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and silk trades (Kerimi, 2000; 
McLaughlin, 1976; Seyf, 1984). Furthermore, the large markets of China (McLaughlin 
and Quinn, 1974), Europe and India were opened to Iranian merchants (Raisdana and 
Nakhjavani, 2002) from 1850 onwards. 
During the early-1870s, to encourage the production of export crops (including 
opium) the state privatised significant tracks of farmland (Malek, 1991; Society of Arts, 
1875) and removed taxes (Matthee, 2005). Additionally, to encourage competitiveness 
in China the state assisted farmers in improving opium quality (Society of the Arts, 
1880). This said, state control of production and export was minimal (Rabino, 1903); 
there were no legal controls on production or distribution until the 1910 Law on 
Limiting Opium (Jazairi, 1335; Hansen, 2001; Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002) which 
was largely ignored (CNIC, 1972). 
By the 1870s, opium was grown in almost all provinces (Thomson, 1869). In the 
largest producing provinces (i.e. Yazd and Isfahan) opium was cultivated on all arable 
land (Society of the Arts, 1875) at the expense of food crops, which facilitated a famine 
between 1869 and 1872 (Neligan, 1927; Society of the Arts, 1875) in which one-tenth 
of the Iranian population died (Matthee, 2005). 
Consequently, production trebled between 1859 and 1861 (Matthee, 2005), doubled 
during the 1860s (Thomson, 1869) and - while production dipped in the mid-1970s due 
to famine (Seyth, 1984) - by the 1880s, opium was Iran’s leading source of export 
revenue (Hansen, 2001) and represented: 
 
one of the few lucrative export products for a country that had little to 
offer by way of commodities desired by the outside world (Matthee, 
2005:216).  
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While some opium was exported to British pharmaceuticals (Berridge and Edwards, 
1981) in the 1860s (Thompson, 1869) and 1870s an estimated five-sixths went to China 
(Society of Arts, 1880). To circumvent condemnation, by 1900, opium was transhipped 
to China through third-parties, such as Hong Kong (Seyf, 1984) and Baghdad (Rabino, 
1904), which allowed Iran to argue at the 1909 Shanghai Conference that it sold no 
opium to China (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) even though the significant majority 
continued to find its way to Chinese consumers (Matthee, 2005). There was also a 
significant clandestine export trade to Turkmenistan, Russia (Kerimi, 2000), Europe and 
India (Society of the Arts, 1880). In addition to foreign markets, domestic consumption 
increased alongside production (Calabrese, 2007; McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and by 
1884, 40 percent of all produce was consumed domestically (Malek, 1991) by Iran’s 
significant opium consuming population (see FO, 1894).1  
By 1912, Iran had replaced India as China’s primary source of imported opium 
(Eisenlohr, 1934). However, in the same year, Iran (reluctantly) signed the Hague 
Convention which obliged the cessation of exportation to any state prohibiting opium 
imports; which included China (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). In response, Iran 
ventured into new markets such as Singapore (Hanson, 2001). Nonetheless, World War 
One weakened Iran’s already meagre bureaucratic controls and prevented the 
implantation of export regulations (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974; also MacCormack et 
al., 1924).  
However, in 1918, the Government supported an increase in opium production to 
reinvigorate the declining agricultural sector (UNODC, n.d.). By 1920, Iran had 
captured 30 percent of the global pharmaceutical market (League of Nations, 1926) and 
opium was the third most important source of export revenue (Neligan, 1927). Opium 
was produced in 18 of 26 provinces; in some, a quarter of households were directly or 
indirectly reliant on the trade (MacCormack et al., 1924).  
In the 1920s the Government, assisted by a US financial mission (reported in, 
MacCormack et al., 1924; Millspaugh, 1926), formulated a national modernisation plan; 
opium revenue constituted an integral element. As the US mission estimated that prior 
to 1922, 80 percent of all opium produced had evaded taxation a tax collection system 
was thus established whereby farmers were obliged to deliver all opium to government 
warehouses for processing and sale to merchants, who paid taxes on storage, processing 
                                                 
1
 A western physician who resided in Iran between 1866-1881 observed that ‘nine out of ten 
aged Iranians’ consumed opium daily (Matthee, 2005:209). 
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and export. No limitations were placed on opium’s final destination (League of Nations, 
1926) or quantities produced (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). MacCormack and 
colleagues (1924) found that after initial opposition (martial law imposed in Isfahan and 
several protesting farmers killed) by 1923, two-thirds of all opium was being taxed. A 
League of Nations (1926) Commission of Inquiry collaborated these observations, with 
the caveat that tax collection remained minimal in many areas. Neligan (1927) 
suggested that the Iranian bureaucracy was too disorganised, inefficient and corrupt to 
control a monopoly. Additionally, the controls failed to prevent significant amounts of 
opium being illicitly exported to the Far East (League of Nations, 1925). 
Both the US financial mission and Commission of Inquiry expressed reservations 
over the prospect of reducing opium production through crop substitution due to: the 
geographical isolation of many opium-producing areas; the absence of a transport 
infrastructure and modern agricultural methods; and poor irrigation (Delano, 1927; 
MacCormack et al., 1924; Millspaugh, 1926; League of Nations, 1926). The 
Commission of Inquiry added that opium, which was produced in the poorest areas of 
Iran, was less profitable than many other crops while consumption and the lack of food 
production often intensified rural impoverishment (League of Nations, 1926).  
The Commission of Inquiry recommended the introduction of protectionist policies 
to invigorate traditional trades and exports (League of Nations, 1926) and that Iran be 
given three years to ‘put its house in order’ before suppressing production (Delano, 
1927:4). Iran retorted that the more developed opium producing nations should reduce 
their production first and while it had yet to establish the necessary body of law to 
control a legal trade (League of Nations, 1927) it began planning an ‘ambitious’ 
monopoly system (Eisenlohr, 1934:257). 
In 1928, under the Law of Government Monopoly of Opium,2 a state monopoly was 
mandated to: license farmers; monitored harvests (Hansen, 2001); and control all 
exports and domestic sales (to registered consumers) (UNODC, n.d.). While unlicensed 
possession, distribution, and import of opium were criminalised under the 1928 Penal 
Law Concerning Opium Smuggling, as the monopoly was prohibited from refusing 
licenses (CO, 1928) farmers convicted of illicit trading could continue to produce and 
sell opium. To prevent diversion the monopoly increased the set-price paid to farmers 
ten times; although farmers often received food vouchers or credit instead of payment 
(Hansen, 2001). While tax holidays and loans were presented to attract farmers away 
                                                 
2
 Also translated as: Law Pertaining to the Illegal Production and Distribution of Opium and 
Narcotics (Aliverdinia and Pridemore, 2008). 
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from opium, monopolisation significantly increased production and exports (Raisdana 
and Nakhjavani, 2002).  
While 10,000 people were arrested under the Penal Code during the late-1920s/early-
1930s the monopoly failed ‘to prevent competition from the illicit trade’; more Iranians 
consumed illicit than monopoly opium (Hansen, 2001:102) and Iran was reproached 
several times by the League of Nations (1925, 1930, 1939) for insufficient export 
controls and, consequently, supplying clandestine markets, especially in the Far Eastern. 
Iran was the world’s largest source of recreational and quasi-medicinal opium 
(Prideaux, 1927).  
To distance itself from being perceived as a source of illicit opium Iran banned the 
direct shipping to the Far East whilst permitting merchants to tranship through third 
parties.3 During the 1920s and 1930s, opium was sold to Macao, Russia or Japan, from 
where it was smuggled into China4 (see Brook and Wakabayashi, 2000; Booth, 1997; 
Eisenlohr, 1934; MacCormack et al., 1924; IAOA, 1922; League of Nations, 1925; 
Times, 1938); in 1925-26, an estimated 398mt was smuggled into China using this 
method (Neligan, 1927). Iranian monopoly opium was interdicted at the US border (US 
Bureau of Narcotics, 1936) while heroin and morphine, using Iranian opium and 
manufactured in the Japanese controlled territory of Manchuria, was seized in Canada, 
China and the US (League of Nations, 1936). 
To limit diversion, in 1936, the monopoly began procuring opium direct from the 
farmgate with money, rather than credit or food vouchers. While the reforms increased 
the amount of opium surrendered to the monopoly (suggesting a reduction in diversion) 
(Hansen, 2001) by the early-1940s, as World War Two (1939-1945) commenced, access 
to foreign markets was blocked (McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992). The improved 
procurement practices and later the War created an opium surplus which produced two 
outcomes. Firstly, due to protectionist policies, which limited imports of crops such as 
cotton and silk, agricultural crops used for manufacturing were in high-demand 
(Hansen, 2001). Thus, in 1936/37 ten provinces were prohibited from producing opium 
and encouraged to diversify (Cumberbatch, 1937; Hansen, 2001); a further 25 districts 
were prohibited in 1938 (Saleh, 1956). The second, more inauspicious outcome, was 
that the surplus opium flooded the domestic market; increasing both consumption 
(McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992) and concerns over the negative impact of 
consumption (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974).  
                                                 
3
 A practice which had been prohibited in India (Eisenlohr, 1934) 
4
 Some opium was subsequently transhipped to Indochina (Booth, 1997). 
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Due to concern for rising consumption and foreign condemnation, production and 
consumption were prohibited in 1946 (Moorehead, 1947). However, as foreign markets 
had been reopened with the ending of the War, a British diplomat observed that 
‘immense quantities’ of opium continued to be illicitly smuggled into the Far East (FO, 
1946:1) while an observer at a CND session reported that Iran was ‘continuing her age-
old policy of selling opium to all and sundry, no questions asked’ (Moorehead, 
1947:57). Furthermore, a UN report found that the monopoly exerted control over just 
23.7 percent of opium produced in Iran (Atzenwiler, 1944), while a joint UK-US report 
to the CND stated that Iran illicitly produced 1,500 tons ‘or more’ annually; the report 
stressed that illicit production did not include that which was diverted from monopoly 
regulated production (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949:9). In short, the declining production 
of the 1940s illustrated in Figure 5:2 are more likely due to receding government 
controls than decreasing yields (Hansen, 2001). 
Then in 1949, Iran was permitted under the Limitations Convention to produce 15 
percent of global supply (Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002). The reinstated monopoly 
continued the prohibition on domestic distributed of opium and the Council of Ministers 
prepared for complete prohibition (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). 
Licit and illicit exports soared after 1949 (see INCB, 1969) due to the removal of 
Iran’s primary competitor in Asia: China. For example, in 1953, 47 percent of all 
seizures in Singapore were of Iranian origin. Iran opium was also illicitly exported to 
Middle Eastern and European states, while domestic consumption remained significant 
with as much as 80 percent of some provinces consuming opium (McCoy, 2003). 
National prevalence rates of 7.89 percent (1,500,00) (Saleh, 1956) and 10.52 percent 
(2,000,000) were estimated (Wright, 1958). 
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Figure 5: 1. Iran: Licit opium exports (1859-1954) 
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Source: adapted from, MacCormack et al. (1924); Matthee (2005); Neligan (1927); PCOB 
(various years); Raisdana and Nakhjavani (2002); Seyf (1984). Note: missing values indicates 
missing data.  
 
Figure 5: 2. Iran: Licit opium production (1837-1979) 
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Source: adapted from, Bulletin of Narcotics (1949); INCB (various years); MacCormack et al. 
(1924); Matthee (2005); Neligan (1927); Pietschmann et al., (2009); PCOB (various years); 
Raisdana and Nakhjavani (2002). Note: missing values indicates missing data.  
 
5.1.1. Illicit production/diversion summary 
Prior to establishment in 1923 of a state monopoly, an estimated 80 percent of Iranian 
opium bypassed taxation and was thus illicitly traded; after 1923 two-thirds of 
production was brought under state control. Furthermore, the sale of state controlled 
opium to foreign black markets persisted. By the 1940s, the state had lost control of 
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production of which an estimate 76.4 percent bypassed taxation (i.e. was sold illicitly). 
While the methodological reasoning of these estimations are not evident in the absence 
of a definitive study the amount of opium diverted from Iran’s ‘licit’ production is here 
estimated using different diversion rate parameters: a ‘low’ of two-thirds and a ‘high’ of 
80 percent.   
Clearly, the diversion rate would have varied - the parameters are merely a 
simplifying assumption made here for illustrative purposes. For example, diversion after 
1936 may have been lower than two-thirds due to the restriction in regulated area. 
Conversely, in 1949, when Iran replaced China as Southeast Asia’s primary source of 
illicit opium, diversion may have climbed close to, or above, 80 percent. 
 
Figure 5: 3. Iran: Diverted and illicitly produced opium (1837-1993) 
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Source: diverted, Figure 5:2. Illicitly produced, NNICC (various years); RCMP (various years).  
Note: Missing values indicates missing data. For 1993 production value was calculated by 
multiplying the recorded area under cultivation from 1979 with a yield of 17kg/ha (established 
from the 1979 recorded area and production estimates). 
 
5.2. Intervention (Pahlavi: 1955-1979) 
In 1955, the Law Banning the Cultivation of Opium Poppy and Use of Opium (partially 
reprinted in Saleh, 1956) prohibited and criminalised the production of opium. 
Trafficking and processing raw opium could be punished with custodial sentences of 
between two years and life, while landowners facilitating production could receive 
between six months to one-year imprisonment (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). Under 
an Imperial Order, bureaucrats could be dismissed for failing to prevent opium 
cultivation in their sphere of influence (Radji, 1959). In 1959, sanctions were increased 
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to between 15 years and (for repeat offenders) life imprisonment for opium cultivation, 
and a maximum of three years imprisonment for failure of a state official to report 
cultivation (Radji, 1960; McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). Then, in response to an 
eightfold increase in heroin manufacturing between 1964 and 1966 (CENTO, 1966), the 
Law was amended to provide the death penalty for: opiate manufacturing or 
distribution, and possession of over 500grams of opium (UNODC, n.d.).  
5.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches 
The Iranian delegate to CENTO (1966) in 1966 declared that food crops had replaced 
opium on over 30,000ha. To support crop substitution the Agricultural Bank of Iran had 
offered former opium farmers 5-10 years credit and technical support - especially for 
irrigation (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974; Saleh, 1956). However, as state support 
largely failed to develop alternative livelihoods (UNODC, 2000; n.d.) the ban ‘created 
economic hardship’ for former opium producing areas (Turnbull, 1972:7). In response, 
many farmers migrated to secluded areas to continue clandestine production (UNODC, 
n.d.).  
5.2.2. Law enforcement approaches 
The military (McCoy, 2003) forcefully eradicated opium poppies (FO, 1961) with 
mechanical ploughs; in the 1955/56 growing season over 12,000ha were eradicated 
(Saleh, 1956). The UK and US funded and trained (Radji, 1959) police and gendarmerie 
‘severely’ enforced the law; many were motivated by a commission of 15 percent on the 
value of all seized goods (UNODC, n.d.:8). As communal punishments were 
administered after 1968 it is likely, they played some part in law enforcement 
campaigns (CNIC, 1972).  
5.2.3. Repeal 
While the ban had successfully suppressed illicit opium production/diversion, scarcity 
had created a black market for foreign opiates from Afghanistan and Turkey (Turnbull, 
1972; see Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; Wright, 1960) and violent conflicts between 
Iranian gendarmes and Afghan or Turkish traffickers was common (McDonald and 
Jahansoozi, 1992). The large-number of farmers, consumers and traffickers imprisoned 
placed great economic strain on the penal system and convicted families (McLaughlin 
and Quinn, 1974); many landlords and farmers who had lost incomes (and received no 
support for alternatives) lobbied the state for repeal (UNODC, 2000). The Shah was 
receptive. He was embarrassment by traffickers encroaching upon Iranian sovereignty 
(McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and concerned over the drain prohibition was having on 
scarce resources (UNODC, n.d.) and, the balance of payments (significant amounts of 
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gold migrated to pay for illicitly imported opiates) (Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; 
Murphy and Steele, 1971; Turnbull, 1972).  In 1967, the UN was informed that 
prohibition would be reinstated when Afghanistan and Turkey took appropriate 
measures (INCB, 1971; Turnbull, 1972). 
Consequently, in 1968 the Law on Limited Poppy Cultivation and Opium Export 
reinstated the opium monopoly (UNODC, n.d.). All opium produced in Iran was 
procured by the state for consumption by individuals registered as infirmed or elderly 
addicts;5 exportation remained banned (McLaughlin, 1976)6 and the number of farmers 
licensed was dependent on the amount of stocks necessary for internal consumption 
(INCB, 1972, 1976). 
The Ministry of Land Reform licensed farmers.7 Licenses designated a location and 
area of land and harvest was monitored, and collected, by the Ministry or Gendarmerie 
(McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974). McLaughlin (1976:743/745) observed that the 
‘program of opium cultivation and production seems to be efficient and tightly 
controlled’ and there ‘seems to be little opium leakage from point of harvesting through 
point of manufacture’. This was partly due to a high set-price (Holahan and Hennessey, 
1972): farmers were paid US$90-120/kilo, compared to US$10-15 paid by the Turkish 
Government and US$120-180/kilo on the Tehran black market.  
Any license violation could result in the withdrawal of the license and prosecution 
(McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974; Murphy and Steele, 1971; also CINC, 1972). Penalties 
for license violations included being chained to the walls of ‘unspeakable cells’ 
(Lamour and Lamberti, 1974:226) while possession of 2kg of opium or 10grams of 
heroin was punishable with death; by 1976, at least 200 individuals had been sentenced 
to death by biased military courts (McLaughlin, 1976). Furthermore, as licenses were 
assigned to cooperatives, excess cultivation resulted in the entire cooperatives opium 
being eradicated (CINC, 1972).  
                                                 
5
 The registration system was corrupt. As ineligible individuals were registered by to corrupt 
officials (INCB, 1976, 1977; McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992) between 1972-1975 the number 
of registered addicts grew by 57,000  (INCB, 1972, 1975). Others procured black market opium 
coupons (INCB, 1975; Moharreri, 1978) 
6
 Except for a small amount to Yugoslavia in 1974 (McLaughlin, 1976). 
7
 To prevent production in Baluchistan (where the Shah’s authority was less pronounced) 
infrastructural development projects contained conditionality clauses that no opium would be 
produced (Calabrese, 2007). 
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The unpredictability of monopoly licenses and the intrusion of gendarmes who 
billeted in villages during harvest reduced the attractiveness of opium as a cash crop and 
forced many opium farmers to seek alternative crops (Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; 
McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) 
5.2.4. Success? 
A foreign advisor to the Iranian Ministry of Health Iran reported in 1958 that the area 
under cultivation had been reduced from an estimated 20,000ha ‘to practically nil’ 
(Wright, 1958:10; also INCB, 1969). A position supported by the British Consulate 
(McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and observers from the US Fordham Law School who 
found:  
 
the ban did work, and worked well..[it]…demonstrates that the control 
of opium cultivation at the field site is a manageable objective of a 
law enforcement system (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974:520). 
 
The Iranian Minister of Health, declared that higher opium prices and lower 
availability had, by 1958, reduced the number of consumers by two-thirds8 and that Iran 
had become a net opium importer (Radji, 1959). Hence, the evidence suggests that by 
1958 Iran had reduced illicit opium production and diversion from licit sources by over 
90 percent to below 20mt.  
Resurgence of illicit production/diversion did not immediately follow the repeal of 
the ban did. While the INCB (1969:13) initially declared repeal a ‘sharp 
disappointment’, within two years their apprehension had lessened (INCB, 1971, 1972, 
1976) and they reported that  ‘the Board has so far received no indication of diversion to 
illegitimate purpose’ (INCB, 1973:24); a position echoed by the US ambassador 
(McCoy, 2003).  
However, in the early-1970s, Lamour and Lamberti (1974:233) interviewed farmers 
and found that low-quantities of opium were diverted from stores and fields (also CINC, 
1972); McLaughlin and Quinn (1974) estimated that five percent was diverted. 
Nonetheless, illicit production had begun to increase by the late-1970s (INCB, 1979; 
                                                 
8
 The number of consumers had decreased from an estimated 1.5 million in 1955 (INCB, 1969) 
to between 400,000 (McLaughlin and Quinn, 1974) and 350,000 (McCoy, 2003) by the end of 
prohibition. 
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UNODC, n.d.) to supply the growing number of illicit heroin manufacturers operating 
in Tehran and the north-west (INCB, 1975).  
5.3. Intervention ([IR] Iran: 1979+) 
In 1979, the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown and Iran became the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (henceforth (IR) Iran). To the dismay of many of the theological elite (Trebach, 
2002; McLaughlin, 2007) the instability of the revolutionary period and the dismantling 
of the Shah’s repressive drug control apparatus initially increased production and 
consumption9 (Dalvinda, et al., 1984; Falco, 1980; NNICC, 1980; McDonald and 
Jahansoozi, 1992; McCoy, 2003).  
In 1980, a propaganda campaign - blaming consumption on counterrevolutionaries 
and the west - was launched (McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992; Murphy, 1993b; 
Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002) to coincide with the enactment of the Bill on Severe 
Punishment of Perpetrators of Drug Offences and Protective Measures for Treatment 
and Employment of Addicts. The Bill prohibited all intoxicants10 and mandated that: all 
opium poppies be eradicated; opium farmers receive between three and 15 years 
imprisonment (rising to the death penalty for second offences); neighbouring farmers 
and village leaders failing to report production receive sentences commensurate with the 
tried farmer. 
After an initial seven month purge, in which between 176 (Ross, 1980; Trebach, 
2002) and 240 (NNICC, 1980) individuals were executed for disobeying the Bill, it was 
announced that 85-90 percent of the illicit narcotics trade had been suppressed and the 
Iranian ‘Mafia’ had been eliminated. While these claims may have been somewhat 
exaggerated, the price of opium in Tehran did increase fivefold (Ross, 1980); indicating 
significant scarcity of opiates. 
At this point there is a divergence of opinion. The Iranian Government (in Razzaghi, 
et. al., 2000; RCMP, 1988/9; UNODC, n.d.) and UNODC (2000; in Gouverneur, 2002) 
claimed that production ceased in 1980 and did not resume, while, in 1981, the INCB 
(1981) ceased reporting illicit Iranian production. Conversely, American (NNICC, 
1981, 1983, 1985-6; INCSR, 1995) and Canadian intelligence accounts (RCMP, 1983, 
1986/7-1988/9) reported that illicit production increased.  
                                                 
9
 Official sources suggested that close to five percent of the population were addicted to opium 
in 1979 (Spencer and Agahi, 1990). 
10
 After a six months grace period consumers were placed in ‘rehabilitation’ centres to detox 
before serving prison sentences (UNODC, n.d.).  
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The increase in production was reportedly a consequences of: political instability; the 
redeployment of resources to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) (Aliverdinia and Pridemore, 
2008; McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992; NNICC, 1983; Samii, 2003; Spencer and 
Agahi, 1990); the persecution of trained criminal justice personal employed under the 
Pahlavi dynasty (Babcock and Kotkin, 1980; NNICC, 1985/6); and the inability of the 
centre to control peripheral areas, especially the Kurdish and Baluch regions (Babcock 
and Kotkin, 1980; NNICC 1981, 1983, 1985/86; RCMP, 1983).  
The  NNICC (1985:75) reported that as there ‘was no narcotics control program in 
Iran; despite Iranian Government statements to the contrary’ in many cities a period of 
unofficial toleration of opium transpired (McCoy, 2003; Trebach, 2002). Conversely, 
Spencer and Agahi (1990:176) - whilst indicating that opium was produced in eastern 
Iran - claim that between 1979 and 1988 the criminal justice system’s treatment of 
consumers continued to be ‘strong to draconian’; including mass public executions for 
drug offences (AI, 1986).  
It is argued that by the early-1990s such repressive law enforcement had contained 
the level of supply at a high-level (McDonald and Jahansoozi, 1992; RCMP, 1983, 
1986/7, 1988/9). While, McCoy (2003) maintained that little opium was exported, a 
former DEA agent (cited in Babcock and Kotkin, 1980) and the RCMP (1986/7-1988/9) 
suggested that strict currency regulations and high European and US prices resulted in 
some Iranian produced opium being exported (while Iranian consumers imported the 
cheaper Afghan opium). 
In 1988, the Tehran Home Service (1988:n.p.) acknowledged the enforcement had 
been lax, and that resources had been diverted from drug control:  
 
As …. Iran enters a new stage in the aftermath of the war, it is 
essential that drugs officials embark on a purge of society to coincide 
with the reconstruction process. Most of the problems in the anti-drug 
campaign stemmed indirectly from issues related to the imposed war. 
Hence, most of the forces who should have been mobilised to combat 
the merchants of death had to be dispatched to the fronts out of sheer 
necessity.  
 
Additionally, an unpublished report commissioned for UNODC (n.d.:15) (by an 
unidentified author) maintained that opium production was eradicated by ‘the punitive 
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measures applied by the virtues of 1988 and 1997 Anti-Narcotic laws’; suggesting that 
opium was produced until at least 1988. 
In 1988, the Anti-Drug Law (1988) was passed to re-assert enforcement of 
prohibition. It obliged all Village Islamic Council members to report all production to 
the Islamic Revolutionary Committee Corps or Gendarmerie. The punishments for illicit 
cultivation were shown in Table 5:1. The Law represented a return to repressive 
measures (Golestan, 1989) and was followed in 1989 by the Val Adiyat Campaign11 
(Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989; also IRNA, 1989b) which commenced 
with: the public execution of 70 traffickers; the seizure and burning of opiates; and a 
conflict at the Iran-Afghan border in which 70 traffickers where killed (Koring, 1989).  
 
Table 5: 1. Iran: Punishments for cultivation under 1988 Anti-Drug Laws 
 Fine Lashes Custodial/execution 
First offence 1-10 million rials - - 
Second offence 5-50 million rials 3-70 - 
Third offence 10-100 million rials 1-70 2-5 years 
Fourth offence - - Execution 
 
5.3.1. Development-Orientated Approaches 
After 1979, crop substitution programs were administered after the imposition of bans. 
Farmers were given ‘incentive gifts’ for cultivating substitute grains, which the state 
procured at a fixed-price. Loans were made available for: agri-industrial development; 
irrigation construction; and procurement of agri-technology. While rural development 
funding reportedly increased throughout the mid-1980s (UNODC, n.d.:31) that national 
agricultural self-sufficiency and economic conditions worsened between 1981 and 1988 
(Keddie, 2006; see Annex 1:2) may suggest that support for former opium farmers 
could have been insufficient. 
5.3.2. Law enforcement approaches 
In 1980, Sadeq Khalkhali was mandated to enforce prohibition as head of the Anti-
Narcotics Campaign Office and chief-judge of the Anti-Narcotics Revolutionary 
Courts.12 During Khalkhali’s seven month tenure over 20,000 individuals were 
                                                 
11
 Almost 1,000 ‘drug offenders’ were arrested in pre-emptive campaigns (IRNA, 1988). 
12
 Revolutionary Courts tried crimes against Islam and political crimes (Murphy, 1993). The 
Courts were presided over by clerics and administered by pasdars (guards) appointed by the 
Khomeini (Abrahamian, 1999). 
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imprisoned – including forced labour (Tehran Home Service, 1989) - under the 1980 
Bill (NNICC, 1980, 1981) of which between 176 (Ross, 1980; Trebach, 2002) and 240 
(Auerbach, 1980; NNICC, 1980) were sentenced to death; they were often publically 
hanged as a warning (Abrahamian, 1999; Blanche, 1989). While the majority of those 
executed were traffickers the ‘frequency of his death sentences and the zealousness of 
his minions….probable had a chilling effect on many opium farmers’ (NNICC, 
1981:23). 
While the 1980 Bill declared that opium farmers be imprisoned for 3-15 years, in 
1981, the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor in Firozabad declared they be punished as 
counter-revolutionaries (BBC 1981): a crime often punished with death (Abrahamian, 
1999). The Prosecutor also mandated that village councils and gendarmerie be 
prosecuted for failure to suppress production (BBC, 1981). In Shiraz, all military and 
security forces were ordered to monitor compliance and report contraventions to the 
Islamic Revolutionary Courts, which punished opium production in accordance with an 
interpretation of Islamic law (BBC, 1982): Islamic law has been interpreted as allowing 
flogging for Sharb al-Khamr (intoxication) in several jurisdictions (Baderin, 2003), 
including for opium farmers in Pakistan (see Chapter 8). Furthermore, in 1981 flogging 
was designated an appropriate interrogation technique; torture in custody was common 
(Abrahamian, 1999). While opium poppies were forcefully eradicated (INCB, 1981) 
repressive law enforcement appears to have been the primary deterrence mechanism. 
After the initial seven-month purge, the interdiction of laboratories (INCB, 1982) and 
traffickers increased (INCB, 1985). Large-numbers continued to be sentenced to death13 
at trials conducted without representation or appeal (AI, 1986; Murphy, 1993); concepts 
deemed as a ‘Western absurdity’ (Abrahamian, 1999:125). 
During the late-1980s/1990s the Drug Control Headquarters publically executed as 
many as 500 traffickers a year; many bodies were left hanging as a warning (Raisdana 
and Nakhjavani, 2002). According to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs between 
1997 and 2007, over 10,000 traffickers were executed (cited in Aliverdinia and 
Pridemore, 2008). Additionally, forced resettlement and destruction of property was 
                                                 
13
 During a three-month period in 1983, 200 were executed. A further, 197 were executed in 
March/April of 1985 (AI, 1986). 
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undertaken in localities with large consuming populations or trafficking activity14 
(Raisdana and Nakhjavani, 2002).  
Social control 
Revolutionary zeal for some and fear (of Revolutionary zealots, vigilantes and the 
police) for others established an extensive and intrusive system of social control through 
civil society (see Annex 1:2). For example, in 1993, the majority of individuals in 
forced detoxification centres were informed on by families or neighbours, often through 
a public ‘hotline’ (Murphy, 1993). It is not an unreasonable to imagine that similarly 
intrusive surveillance would be placed upon opium farmers and distributors; especially 
as neighbouring farmers, community leaders and local bureaucrats could be punished 
for not preventing or reporting production (see UNODC, n.d.).  
5.4. Success? 
In 1995, the INCRS (1995) had reported how the Dublin Group had found that Iran had 
cultivated 3,500ha of opium in 1993; a figure denied by Iranian officials 
(Nissaramanesh et al., 2005). Then in 1996 the INCRS (1996:n.p.) reported that there: 
  
are no recent reports indicating that opium poppies are cultivated in 
Iran to a significant extent…. recent reports by the Dublin Group 
nations present in Iran lend credence to Iranian claims that poppy 
cultivation has been largely stamped out. 
 
The Dublin Group estimate was verified by two US satellite imagery surveys 
(Marcus, 1999) which suggested that Iran produced ‘negligible’ opium (INCRS, 1998, 
1999). Hence, in 1998 Iran was removed from the US list of ‘major’ illicit drug 
producing countries (INCRS, 1998).  
Conversely, UNODC (2000:142; see Razzaghi et al., 2000) has stated: 
 
No country has a more exemplary record…. The authorities in Tehran 
stamped out the domestic production of illicit opium after 
                                                 
14
 This was often as part of the extensive border defence infrastructure constructed between 
1980-2005, which included, in 2001, training and arming paramilitaries in border villages (see, 
Calabrese, 2007; Murphy, 1993b; INCRS, 2009; Samii, 2003; Samii and Recknagel, 1999).  
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1979…//..For more than 20 years, this has been maintained and today 
there is no opium poppy cultivation in Iran. 
 
Antonio Mazzitelli, a former Teheran representative of UNDCP, has stated that Iran 
suppressed illicit production within a year and a half of 1979 (Gouverneur, 2002); the 
INCB (1981) last reported illicit production in 1981.  
Nonetheless, potential bias was present in all accounts. While pre-1994 US reports 
have been criticised as overestimates designed to discredit Iran (Haq, 2000) the removal 
of Iran from the INCRS ‘majors’ list was equally criticised – by members of the US 
Senate - as a diplomatic gesture without ‘substantive grounds’ (Lippman, 1998). 
Conversely, (IR) Iran as endeavoured to portray the country as a strong Islamic state 
devoid of ‘western’ influences, such as drug use, (Aliverdinia and Pridemore, 2007) it 
may have avoided admissions of production. The UN, however, may have sought to 
avoid alienating Iran from their drug control regime. Furthermore, contrary to UNODC 
proclamations of success, a UNODC (n.d.) commissioned draft paper suggested that 
production continued until the 1990s.  
From the evidence presented above, the most likely scenario is that after the initial 
seven-month purge had cooled, resource reallocation and the existence of areas outside 
of state authority facilitated large-scale illicit production; Iran’s 1988 admission of the 
inadequacy of controls may equally have been an admission of large-scale illicit 
production. This said post-1988 Canadian/US production estimates appear excessive 
when accounting for the repressive nature of Val Adiyat and it appears feasible that 
production ceased between 1988 and 1993. The absence of Iran from UN and US 
reports since 1996 suggests that production declined from an estimated 300mt in 1980 
to below 20mt by 1996 (at the latest); a reduction of over 90 percent to below 20mt.  
5.5. Rival explanations of success  
An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as 
such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how success was realised. 
McLaughlin and Quinn (1974:519) posited that, from 1955, success was dependent on 
repressive law enforcement. Evidence suggests that there were few incentives to cease 
opium production until the state monopoly system was established in 1969; a system 
which continued to rely on repressive communal punishments. In many respects, the 
(IR) Iranian intervention was a continuation of Pahlavi policy, both were based upon: 
forced eradication; punitive law enforcement; community punishments; and extensive 
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and intrusive surveillance of opium farming communities. Additionally, the anticipatory 
effect of public executions of ‘drug offenders’ may have increased the perceived risk of 
production.  
The (IR) Iranian intervention is differentiated only by the incentives many rural 
Iranians perceived the Revolution as providing, such as: the redistribution of land; the 
removal of a reviled regime; and religious affiliation. However, once revolutionary zeal 
had faded, intrusive social control and the threat of brutal punishments appear to have 
presented an effective deterrence. While a report for UNODC (n.d.) declared that 
(IR)Iranian success was facilitated by crop substitution and infrastructural development 
after bans had been imposed, evidence suggests that support for the development of 
alternative livelihoods was minimal, especially as the intervention period was 
characterized by increasing rural impoverishment.  
5.6. Case summaries 
Large-scale opium production for export began during the mid-nineteenth-century and 
while the state promoted the trade, it provided few controls over production or export. 
Consequently, prior to 1923, an estimated 80 percent of all produce was untaxed whilst 
some of the remaining 20 percent was exported to countries which prohibited its import. 
In short, the state failed to prevent and may have facilitated the circulation of Iranian 
opium in domestic and foreign black markets.    
In 1923, an opium monopoly was created which, until the late-1930s, exerted control 
over an estimated two-thirds of production (i.e. it failed to prevent one-third from being 
diverted from state control). However, the events of World War Two weakened state 
control and consequently, diversion recommence at 80 percent; Iran remained a major 
source of opium to black markets'. 
Due to foreign pressure, and domestic concern over rising consumption, production 
was prohibited in 1955. The ban was brutally enforced and as there was insufficient 
economic support it further impoverished many former opium-farming communities. 
While opium production was successfully suppressed, domestic pressures facilitated the 
repeal of prohibition and the reinstatement of the monopoly system. The monopoly 
procured opium from licensed farmers for sale to registered consumers, however, while 
infringements were brutally punished, limited illicit production and diversion eventually 
resurfaced.  
In 1979, the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown and the drug control apparatus was 
dismantled. The subsequent increase in production and consumption dismayed the 
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theological elite and a highly repressive purge of ‘drug offenders’ resulted in many 
being imprisoned in forced labour camps, publicly executed or (likely) flogged. Loyalty 
to the Revolution and fear of persecution established a system of extensive and intrusive 
surveillance which was intensified by state-sanctioned vigilante groups. Opium poppies 
were forcefully eradicated and support for the development of alternative livelihoods 
remained minimal.  
While the Iranian Government and UNODC claim that production ended with the 
purge, it appears likely - considering the acknowledgement by the state owned Tehran 
Home Service - that production and consumption resumed in some areas due to 
redeployment of resources to the Iran-Iraq War and lack of authority over minority 
areas. In 1988 the War ended and the intervention recommenced extensive intrusive 
surveillance and brutality; the use torture may have been more widespread. While 
details of production are mired by potential bias and national self-interest, there is a 
general agreement that production ceased by 1996 at the latest. 
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6. Turkey 
6.1. Background and context 
The opium poppy has been cultivated in the Anatolian region of Turkey since 1900BC 
(Murphy and Steele, 1971) for food, medicine and animal feed (Brundage and Mitchell, 
1977); recreational consumption has remained rare (Akçasu, 1976). Opium may have 
been first exported to Asia in the eighth-century, however, production and export 
remained limited until the early-nineteenth-century (Chablis, 1977). In 1805, American 
merchants - barred from trading Indian opium - began illicitly exporting Turkish opium 
to China (Spain, 1975; Trocki, 1999) and by 1828 Turkish exports accounted for 10-11 
percent of the clandestine Chinese market. In 1828, the state monopolised production 
and distribution; the monopoly was mandated to procure all opium produced in Turkey 
for sale to private merchants, for export (Poroy, 1981). However, as the monopoly 
possessed insufficient resources: 
 
The sale of opium to unauthorised merchants by local officials was 
prevalent……. Contraband was everywhere and smuggling proved to 
be insurmountable in spite of numerous edicts and repeated orders. 
The size of the contraband is estimated to be about one-third of legal 
purchases (Poroy 1981:198, my italics).1 
 
In 1839, the British negotiated the end of the monopoly with the intention that British 
pharmaceutical companies procure opium directly from Turkish farmers. Consequently, 
the market for Turkish opium shifted from opium for smoking to opium for 
pharmaceutical preparation (Poroy, 1981) and between 1827 and 1900, Turkey supplied 
59 to 99 percent of all British opium imports (Berridge and Edwards, 1981) whilst 
continuing to export to prohibited markets (Spain, 1975). After 1858 Turkey gradually 
increased its shared of the newly licit Chinese market (Newman, 1989) and by 1905, 
alongside Iran, had became the primary source of smokable opium (Musto, 1987) and - 
through loosely regulated European pharmaceutical controls (see Block, 1989) - 
morphine  (Murn, 1914) in the Far East.  
                                                 
1
 A nuance Poroy neglects is that as the majority of ‘legal’ exports went to countries which 
prohibited imports (i.e. China and Siam) they were essentially contraband. 
   
 151
By the 1930s, Turkey had become the world’s primary source of opium to both the 
licit and quasi-licit pharmaceutical industry and accounted for 226mt of the 390mt 
global total (Eisenlohr, 1934; see Block, 1989). While opium was Turkeys fifth most 
important agricultural export, state control was limited and diversion remained high 
(Eisenlohr, 1934).  
Throughout the 1920s as European nations strengthened controls over their 
pharmaceutical industries, several companies relocated to Turkey to circumvent 
regulations and manufacture opiates for non-medical/scientific consumption2 (Block, 
1989; Eisenlohr, 1934; Times, 1931). The League of Nations (cited in Times, 1931:13; 
see League of Nations, 1936) reported that ‘no part of the [Turkish opiate] output…is 
applied for bona-fide medical and scientific purposes’. For example, in 1927 a Japanese 
company established a manufacturing laboratory in Istanbul to supply heroin to the 
Chinese black market. Turkish opium additionally supplied French pharmaceutical 
companies, which also illicitly exported opiates; in 1928, France imported three times 
the global medicinal requirement of opium from Turkey (Block, 1989; see Booth, 1996; 
Friman, 1996; Meyer and Parssinen, 2002). The increased demand from opiate 
manufacturers inflated Turkish opium production (Eisenlohr, 1934). 
After ratifying the International Opium Convention in 1933, Turkey enacted its first 
domestic drug control legislation (GoT, 1986; West, 1992): the Limitations Law 
(No.2253) (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1950). The Law mandated that the Council of 
Ministers' annually determine the number of provinces permissible to produce opium or 
grow poppies for seeds (for which opium extraction was prohibited) (Bulletin of 
Narcotics, 1950). Substitute crops - including the construction of sugar factories in 
poppy growing areas (League of Nations, 1938) - were encouraged in areas banned 
from production (League of Nations, 1936).  
While the majority of opiate manufacturers were closed under the Limitations Law 
(Block, 1989; Times, 1933) raw opium continued to be exported to markets which 
prohibited its import, including: Egypt; European; North American; the Far East 
(Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953); and Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam) (League 
of Nations, 1930). Contrary to the UNODCCP (2000:142) statement that ‘illicit 
cultivation emerged as a major problem only in the 1960s’ between 1931 and 1941, the 
League of Nations (1931) and UN Bulletin of Narcotics (1953) had declared Turkey one 
of the world’s three major sources of illicit opium.  
                                                 
2
 The 1925 and 1931 international treaties obliged states to prevent the sale of opiates for 
recreational use by regulating their pharmaceutical companies (Bayer and Ghodse, 1999). 
   
 152
In 1936, Turkey reported to the League of Nations (1938) that while significant tracts 
of land were cultivated with opium poppies the monopoly price had been deflated by 
decreased foreign demand and, consequentially, as farmers could not afford to hire 
labourers 75-80 percent of the crop remained un-harvested. As controls over production 
and trade remained nominal, it is not unconceivable that 75-80 percent was diverted to 
black markets, rather than wasted.  
While some domestic opiate manufacturing was reported in 1945 (CND, 1945) the 
majority of diverted opium was refined to morphine base in Lebanon and then 
converted to heroin in Italy (Kayaalp, n.d.; Murphy and Steele, 1970; Rottenberg, 
1968). By 1952, the tightening of Italian pharmaceutical controls displaced 
manufacturing to France, which continued to procure Turkish opium (see McCoy, 2003; 
Newsday, 1974; Ryan, 2001; Vaille and Bailleul, 1953). Then in 1955, after Iran 
banned opium production, black market demand for Turkish opium may have increased; 
inflating the level of diversion (Wishart, 1974). 
This said, nominal controls had been established to control diversion. In 1938, Law 
No.3491 established the TMO as a monopoly to buy, store and export agricultural 
produce - including opium (TMO-Alkasan 1989; see CND, 1945). Control was based 
upon the ‘opium declaration system’ whereby the Ministry of Agriculture calculated 
how much land would be required to yield a predetermined quantity and granted 
provinces permission to produce opium. Farmers in designated provinces informed their 
Muhtar (village leader) what they expected to yield in the following season. The 
expectations were relayed to the Ministry of Agriculture and farmers were expected to 
adhere to their own estimates (Akçasu, 1952; Murphy and Steele, 1971; also League of 
Nations, 1938). Monitoring was conducted by the Muhtar, who informed the TMO of 
any contravention (CINC, 1972).  
However, as farmers were insufficient regulated whilst remuneration was low and 
unreliable state the majority of farmers continued to sell to the black market (Akçasu, 
1952; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974). Any farmer residing in a designated province was 
permitted to produce opium without a license, they estimated their own yields and 
where legally free to possess and store opium (see Akçasu, 1952; Bulletin of Narcotics, 
1949; CND, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1951, 1955, 1957). Additionally, while TMO prices 
‘neither repaid [farmers] for their troubles and outlay nor gave them the profit they were 
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entitled to expect’ (League of Nations, 1938:45) procurement practices were inefficient, 
further reducing prices3 (Murphy and Steele, 1971).  
Additionally, in many border provinces where opium production was prohibited, 
opium poppy cultivation was permitted for the harvesting of seeds (Bulletin of 
Narcotics, 1950). Turkey conceded in 1968 that it was unable administer effective 
controls over farmers in border areas; suggesting that the state was unable to prevent 
farmers from extracting opium.  
Thus until the 1960s, control was limited to gradually (see Table 6:1) restricting 
permissible production areas to where the state possessed greatest authority (Akçasu, 
1952; Greenfield and Nanby, 1974; INCB, 1968, 1969, 1971) and away from areas with 
easy export access (i.e. border areas). According to the TMO the provincial restriction 
policy was ‘gradual and calculated’, and not unfavourable to opium farmers as bans 
were enacted in areas which produced the least opium or where conditions could 
support substitute crops (GoT, 1986:7) which were encouraged by agricultural 
extension workers (Murphy and Steele, 1971). While there is insufficient information 
on how bans were enforced, the repressive use of the military to dissolve Kurdish 
minorities (in border provinces) (Annex 1:3) may suggest the possibility of coercive 
suppression. 
 
Table 6: 1. Turkey: Provinces permitted to produce opium 
Date No. of provinces permitted to produce opium 
Pre-1933 62 (no limitation) 
1940 42 
By late-1940s 42 (banned in areas situated within 100km of national border) 
1961 35 
1962 25 
1964 16 
1968 11 (banned in all border provinces) 
1969 9 
1970 7 
Source: GoT (1986); also Bulletin of Narcotics (1950); League of Nations (1938); INCB 
(1968). Note: there are some discrepancies between the GoT data and that reported in the 
Bulletin of Narcotics (1950) and INCB (1971). 
 
                                                 
3
 As the TMO often stored opium for up to six weeks the moisture content was reduced, which 
reduced the weight and hence price (Murphy and Steele, 1971). 
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During the 1960s, to prevent diversion, the TMO: increased its prices by 66 percent; 
made it easier for farmers to deliver opium to monopoly agents; ensured all were paid 
with cash (many farmers had previously been paid with food coupons); radio and print 
media campaigns publicised penalties for non-compliance (CINC, 1972); and 
surveillance of opium farmers from planting to harvest was increased (Murphy and 
Steele, 1972) and by the late-1960s seizures of illicit opium had increased significantly 
(Robins, 2007). Additionally, in the late-1960s/early-1970s French and American 
interdiction of French heroin manufacturers and traffickers (see GOA, 1972, 1975; 
Times, 1970, 1971, 1972; Wigg, 1974) may have reduced demand for Turkish opium. 
These measures, and the contraction of provinces did improve the amount 
surrendered to the monopoly (Kayaalp, n.d.; Turnbull, 1972) and led the PCOB 
(1965:xxix) to note with ‘approval’ and ‘satisfaction’ that restrictions were a ‘step in the 
right direction’ (PCOB, 1966:xx). However, the ‘declaration system’ remained 
insufficient: 
 
Since yields varied from year to year, the farmer tended to understate 
expected yields for he was liable for prosecution if he did not deliver 
to the …[TMO]… the total amount of gum he had reported in his 
declaration. In general, little effort was made to question farmer 
declarations or to verify actual yield at harvest time. Thus, this system 
allowed for considerable opportunity for underreporting yields (CINC 
1972:A3) 
 
Furthermore, as possession remained legal farmers could store overproduced opium 
which could be sold as and when; diluting the states control over distribution (Murphy 
and Steele, 1971). To add to bureaucratic weaknesses, the coercive arms of the state 
tended to be inefficient, under resourced and lacked training in narcotics control 
(Murphy and Steele, 1971; Newsday, 1971). Additionally, provincial bans were limited 
to insignificant producers; a review of Turkish agriculture in the late-1940s failed to 
report opium production as important for any province outside of Amasya Province or 
Afyonkarahisar Sub-region (Erinc and Tucdilek, 1952) while during the 1960s, Afyon 
accounted for 80 percent of all opium produced in Turkey (GoT, 1986).  
The innovations of the 1960s may have reduced the level of diversion, however, it 
remained high and in 1966, Iran complained to CENTO that opium diverted from the 
Turkish monopoly supplied 25 percent of its black market (FO, 1966). The US, in 1961, 
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had also complained to CENTO that 70 percent of all heroin consumed in America was 
sourced from ‘Middle Eastern’, primarily Turkish, opium fields and French heroin 
laboratories. While the Turkish delegate replied that controls were stringent, the 
accusation was not refuted (FO, 1961) and by the mid-1960s, the US estimate had 
increased to 80 percent (Economist, 1974; Musto, 1987; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974). 
Both the Government of Turkey (GoT, 1986) and French authorities expressed their 
dissatisfaction at the 80 percent estimate. While 80 percent was seen as an overestimate 
by several knowledgeable individuals, it is acknowledged that Turkey was the 
predominant source of opium for heroin destined for the US (McCoy, 2003; Murphy 
and Steele, 1971; Rottenberg, 1968).4   
During the mid/late-1960s, there was no agreement between US sources of the level 
of diversion. The DEA (1995) estimated that one-third was diverted; the US Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) (cited in Holahan and Henningen, 1972) 
estimated two-thirds; the CINC (1972, see Table 6:2) estimated that diversion decreased 
from 69.5 to 26 percent; while a US ambassador to Turkey reported 25 percent (Epstein, 
1977). While Newsday (1974) concluded - from interviews and fieldwork in Turkey - 
that two-thirds was likely, other journalists reported five (Munir, 1970, cited in Robins, 
2007) and ten percent by the late-1960s/early-1970s (Howe, 1980). While the two-third 
estimate is the one most often cited (Kayaalp, n.d.; West, 1992) Robin (2007:fn14) 
suggests that it was ‘bandied around’ so much that it became ‘conventional wisdom 
through repetition, without being established on any firm foundation’  
 
Table 6: 2. Turkey: CINC diversion estimates 
 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Percentage diverted 69.5 52.3 46.5 58 26 
Estimated diverted (mt) 205 137 110 80 49 
Source: adapted from CINC (1972). Note: CINC acknowledges often-large error margins. 
 
BNDD estimates were established through comparing the expected and actual yields 
(Epstein, 1977; Holahan and Henningen, 1972). Between 1961 and 1972 on average the 
world’s largest source of licit opium (India) produced 12kg more per hectare than 
Turkey. This can be partly explained by topography, soil, the poppy variety cultivated 
(Bulletin of Narcotics, 1950) or extraction methods (Holahan and Henningen, 1972), 
                                                 
4
 Epstein (1977:89) proclaimed the 80 percent estimate as a ‘journalistic “fact”’ to legitimise the 
targeting of Turkey, rather than producers that were more significant’. The argument however 
neglects US pressure on Thailand (see, Chapter 7:1).  
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however, significant diversion was likely another significant factor (Brundage and 
Mitchell, 1977; Wishart, 1974).  
The INCB (1971:13) summarised the 1960s by stating:  
  
Frequent appearance in the illicit traffic of opium, or opium 
derivatives, known or presumed to have originated from Turkey has 
made this country a focus of international concern for a number of 
years. Counter-measures have not been lacking, yet the stream of such 
substances has persisted and has caused much disquiet…. 
 
Turkey itself proclaimed to the INCB (1974:13) that regardless of increasingly stringent 
restrictions placed on the trade ‘substantial quantities’ of opium were entering the 
global illicit market in the late-1960s. 
 
6.1.1. Illicit production/diversion summary 
Reports to the League of Nations indicate that between 75 and 80 percent of all produce 
was diverted in 1936. This conjecture may not be unreasonable if compared to similar 
diversion rates recorded at the time in Iran, which possessed a more sophisticated 
control mechanism (see Chapter, 5:2:3). The 1936 estimate can be placed with the 
estimates presented in the mid/late-1960s to produce three different diversion rate 
parameters: a high (80 percent); middle (66 percent); and a low (25 percent) as 
expressed in Figure 6:1.  
Diversion appears high (80 percent) from at least 1936 (peaking after the 1955 
Iranian prohibition) to the 1960s when the imposition of more stringent controls make 
two-thirds (66 percent) appear more appropriate. By the early-1970s the low-parameter 
(25 percent) appears feasible, while this may have been as low as five percent by the 
early-1970s, the findings of Newsday suggest that two-thirds were diverted until 
prohibition was enacted. 
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Figure 6: 1. Turkey: Diverted opium (1907-1972) 
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Sources: adapted from, Bulletin of Narcotics (1949, 1950); CINC (1972); Grey (1925); INCB 
(various years); League of Nations (1941, cited in Block, 1989); PCOB (various years). Note: 
missing values indicates missing data.  
6.2. The ban 
Throughout the late-1960s, the US aggressively lobbied Turkey to prohibit opium 
production. Turkey refused on the basis that, as the seven remaining areas were 
economically dependent on opium, it would create a humanitarian crisis (Spain, 1975). 
While Turkey responded by improving some mechanisms of controls (see above), US 
threats to withhold aid (Kamminga, 2007) resulted in the passing of the 1971 Opium 
Licensing and Control Law. The Law: demanded that all opium farmers be licensed; 
barred farmers with a criminal record from obtaining a license (CINC, 1972); and 
criminalised the possession of unlicensed opium (GOA, 1972). 
In late-1971, the civilian government was overthrown in a military coup. The new 
regime, under Decree No.7/2654, banned all production from June 1972 (Kamminga, 
2007; Robins, 2007).5 The ban was funded by US$35 million in US aid, broken-down 
into: US$15 million to compensate the state for loss of export revenue; US$15 million 
to compensate farmers; and US$5 million for crop substitution (Spain, 1975). A further 
US$300,000 was agreed to procure the final opium crop and US$400,000 to pay the 
wages of American advisors to crop substitution projects (GOA, 1975).  
Additionally, the US began to research substitute crops in the seven most important 
opium-producing regions (US Information Service, 1971) and a five-year plan was 
                                                 
5
 While US pressure is often cited as the primary reason for prohibition, as insurgent forces had 
become involved in trafficking during the late-1960s (Anatolia News Agency, 1999; West, 
1992) suppression may have been perceived by the military as possessing counterinsurgency 
elements. 
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formulated. The Plan centred primarily upon improving wheat yields to release land for 
other crops (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977), secondary objectives included: improving 
the agricultural and transport infrastructure; extending modern agricultural practices; 
improving livestock husbandry (INCB, 1973); and the establishment of a dairy 
processing plant in one major producing province (Kayaalp, n.d.).  
While there was no violent opposition to the ban many villager hid poppy seeds in 
anticipation of repeal (Newsday, 1974). This said, a US Senator reported that ‘the 
Turkish Army played a key role in its enforcement’ (Hatch, 1984:2) which may indicate 
that some coercive means were needed to enforce the ban. 
6.2.1. Repeal  
While opium exports were relatively unimportant to the national economy (opium 
accounted for just 0.5 percent of national revenue) (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977) the 
ban was estimated to have cost Turkey US$400 million (West, 1992). Furthermore, for 
many farmers, who lived close to the poverty line, opium represented a significant 
percentage of their annual income. Additionally, the ban removed traditionally 
consumed opium poppy by-products (oil, animal-feed, fuel) and while farmers were 
compensated many by-product industries were not (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977; see 
Greenfield and Nanby, 1974; Spain, 1975).  
Furthermore, crop substitution failed to deliver alternative incomes. The unstable 
military regime was unable to effectively administer crop substitution projects 
(Brundage and Mitchell, 1977; GOA, 1975) which, as they were lacking baseline 
agricultural research, introduced crops unsuited to the soil and weather conditions (GoT, 
1986; also Time, 1974; West, 1992) while marketing of new crops were often limited 
by insufficient transport (Newsday, 1974). Consequently, many farmers migrated to 
urban areas (Klose, 1981), which created ‘a potentially dangerous social resentment…. 
among the people affected by the ban’ (GoT, 1986:9).  
In addition to impoverishing farmers, a perception of national subservience to US 
interests (Robins, 2007; Zürcher, 1998) made the repeal of prohibition an issue of 
national pride (Fyjis-Walker, 1974; Warren-Ghosh, 1974; see Sarell, 1970). A situation 
further aggravated by the US and INCB who, driven by American pharmaceuticals’ 
anxiety over reduced opium supplies, approached India to increase production (GOA, 
1975; Spain, 1975) and briefly planned to produce opium in the US (Economist, 1974).  
Thus, while the ban was hailed as a success by the UN (INCB, 1972, 1973, 1974) 
and US (GOA, 1975), extensive opposition was expressed throughout the national 
media (Warren-Ghosh, 1974; Spain, 1975) and political parties (Brundage and Mitchell, 
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1977; Fyjis-Walker, 1974). Consequently, in 1974, the new government - partially 
elected on a pro-opium platform (Robins, 2007) - informed the US that they would 
repeal the ban (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977) and began cultivating poppy seeds in state 
farms to prevent them from going stale (FCO, 1974; Warren-Ghosh, 1974). 
6.3. Post-ban 
In July 1974, the ban on cultivation was lifted in seven provinces by Decree No.7522. 
As the Decree prohibited the extraction of opium, the ban on production remained. A 
monopoly system was established whereby farmers were licensed to produce poppy 
straw which was manufactured into morphine (see GoT, 1986; Warren-Gash, 1975b; 
UNFDAC, 1975; also Decree No.7/8522; Decree No.7/9204).6  Initially, 100,000 
farmers were licensed (GOA, 1975) to cultivate poppies over 20,000ha (UNFDAC, 
1975).  
While a INCB study tour concluded that the ‘Mission was well impressed with the 
scope and variety of the several control measures which have been propounded’, doubts 
were expressed over the ability of the TMO to prevent diversion, due to insufficient 
resources (Greenfield, 1974:n.p.; Greenfield and Nanby, 1974). Accordingly, to assist 
Turkey the UN: part funded the construction of a poppy straw processing plant (Bayer, 
1983; Kamminga, 2007); lobbied pharmaceutical companies to ensure the procurement 
of Turkish morphine (FCO, 1974b); and trained and equipped the TMO and 
gendarmerie. Additionally, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
provided financial advice and, to lessen dependence on opium, funded crop substitution 
projects in two opium-producing provinces (Kayaalp, n.d.; UNFDAC, 1975).  
The US, arguing that repeal contravened the 1971 agreement (GOA, 1975; Spain, 
1975), ceased narcotics associated aid (Robins, 2007) and lobbied states to coerce 
Turkey to reinstate the ban (FCO, 1974). However, reports by the UN, and US media, 
                                                 
6 The INCB (1974) had initially lobbied for poppy straw production. Turkey declared their 
interest if economically viable (Kirca, 1974; see, FCO, 1974c) and, financially and technically 
supported by the UN (Kamminga, 2007). 
The production of opium from poppy straw is significantly different from that of incising poppy 
pods. In the system introduced in Turkey in the 1970s, the poppy plant is cultivated in the same 
manner as elsewhere - whether India or Afghanistan - however, at harvest the farmer is 
prohibited from incising the poppy pods to collect the opium gum within, instead, farmers cut 
and crush the poppies. The crushed poppies represent the poppy straw which is then sold to the 
state. Using expensive technology that is not generally available, the morphine is extracted 
(Mansfield, 2001; see, Bayer 1983).  
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on the effectiveness of control gradually softened objections (Robbins, 2007) and by 
late-1975 the hawkish DEA (FCO, 1974d) acknowledged that controls were 
‘remarkable effective’ (Warren-Gash, 1975c:n.p.; also Howe, 1980), while the US 
President formally expressed his satisfaction to the Turkish PM expressing (Warren-
Gash, 1975). Then in 1981, the US passed the 18/20 Rule which obliges that 80 percent 
of all imports to the US must have originated in either Turkey or India (West, 1992). 
Between 1980 and 2009, Turkey remained a major source of opium for the 
pharmaceutical industry (Figure 6:2). 
 
Figure 6: 2. Turkey: Share of global licit opium production in morphine equivalent (1980-2009) 
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Source: adapted from INCB (various years). 
6.3.1. Licit controls 
After 1974, the opium monopoly continued to be administered by the TMO. Prior to 
harvest the Council of Ministers annually instructed: the amount of land to be 
cultivated; in which provinces and districts; and the number of licenses to be 
administered (Mansfield, 2001). Farmers were then permitted to apply to the TMO for a 
license (GoT, 1988; Kayaalp, n.d.) detailing: the size and location of farmland; the type 
of seed to be used; and the irrigation source. Licences could only be held by farmers, 
over 18 years of age, and without a criminal record. Successful applicants were 
guaranteed by the Muhtar (Mansfield, 2001) who were made accountable for diversion; 
this created a considerable social restraint on farmers. 
During cultivation, teams of agricultural experts (Ajans) inspected licensed farmers 
(a minimum of six times), formulated an expected yield, and administered agricultural 
advices. To prevent corruption all inspections results were signed-off by the Ajans, the 
licensee and Muhtar and any, excess cultivation was verified by a second team of Ajans 
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(Mansfield, 2001; TMO-Alkasan, 1989). The ground inspections were supported by 
aerial surveys of all licensed areas (Greenfield and Nanby, 1975; GoT, 1988, 1986b; 
Turkish Embassy, London, 1975; Turkish National News, 1981; Kayaalp, n.d.).  
When the opium gum could be extracted, the TMO and Gendarmerie increased their 
surveillance (UNFDAC, 1986) and placed undercover agents in areas where diversion 
was suspected (Greenfield and Nanby, 1975; GoT, 1986b). The licensee was permitted 
to harvest the crop (i.e. crush the poppies) once the Ajans confirmed that no pods had 
been lanced. Once harvested, farmers delivered the straw to the Ajans for weighing. If 
the surrendered straw was significantly above or below the Ajans initial yield estimation 
the farmer was referred to court (see GoT, 1988; Mansfield, 2001; UNFDAC, 1986). 
All crops cultivated in excess of the license agreement were eradicated and the 
farmer banned from obtaining a license in the future (Decree No.7/9204; GoT, 1986) 
and hence the loss of an important income. Excess cultivation or other license 
contraventions could be punished with between one and five years imprisonment (Law 
No.3298); with the potential torture and inhumane conditions associated with the 
Turkish penal system (see Annex 1). Furthermore, communal punishments placed a 
social restraint on farmers; entire community’s crops could be eradicated for the excess 
production of one farmer (ECOSOC, 1996, in Farrell, 1998; Riley, 1993) while the 
Muhtar could be heavily fined for failing to prevent or report diversion (Law No.3298). 
During the first year, 205 farmers who cultivated more than their license permitted 
(GoT, 1986b) had their crops forcefully eradicated, were punished with a maximum of 
six years imprisonment and were barred from obtaining future licenses (UNFDAC, 
1975).  
6.4. Success? 
Since 1974,  the US (DEA, 1995; NNICC, 1981, 1988; INCRS, 1996-2007), UN 
(UNODCCP, 2000; INCB, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982), and Interpol (1988) have 
reported how effective controls have limited diversion to practically nil, while a British 
FCO commissioned report found: 
 
... incidences of excess cultivation are certainly low….. For instance, 
at the Bolvadin Ajans it was reported that there had been no cases of 
excess cultivation for at least nine years (Mansfield, 2001:20). 
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While small amounts of opium were reportedly illicitly produced in the early-1980s 
(NNICC, 1980, 1981) the practice remained minimal. Success may be best indicated by 
the Iranian (McCoy, 2003) and US heroin shortages which followed the opium ban (see 
Agar and Reisinger, 2002; GOA, 1975, 1979; Reuter, 1985; Spain, 1975; Wilson, 
1990). In summary, depending on the diversion parameter, production declined from a 
peak of 123mt (25 percent) and 392mt (80 percent) in 1931 to practically nil by 1974; a 
reduction of over 90 percent to below 20mt.  
6.5. Rival explanations of success  
An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as 
such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how success was realised. 
There is limited prior analysis of how the pre-1972 provincial reductions were achieved. 
It appears that there was some crop substitution and while repressive law enforcement 
approaches cannot be ruled out neither can they be verified. However, as opium poppy 
was not a major crop in many of the provinces, opposition may have been minimal. 
While several analysts have partly attributed post-1972 success to the production of 
poppy straw (as opposed to raw opium) (Bayer, 1983; Kayaalp, n.d.; Mansfield, 2001; 
West, 1992), the prevention of diversion for both methods of opium extraction require 
extensive controls. For example, opium straw farmers must be prevented from incising 
the opium pods to extract opium. Therefore, Reuter (1985:92) posited that Turkish 
success was dependent on the presence of a strong central government which ‘could 
enforce laws without risk of revolt’, whereas deeper investigation by Mansfield 
(2001:19) suggested that prevention centred upon extensive surveillance, social controls 
and ‘sufficiently harsh’ deterrence.  
The analysis above suggests that success centred upon the ability of the state to 
administer stringent regulations, which placed farmers under prolonged and extensive 
surveillance. Furthermore, farmers were deterred from diversion through the 
administration of individual and community disincentives of eradication, de-licensing 
(and associated loss of income), and imprisonment (and the associated torture and 
inhumane conditions).7 The punishment of village heads or entire villages for not 
                                                 
7
 As there is some evidence that the military was used to enforce the 1972 ban, it is possible 
that law enforcement was more coercive than is often reported. There are reports of the Turkish 
gendarmerie and military violently repressing political opposition and abusing those convicted 
or accused of crimes. This said, that opium farmers constituted a significant voting block may 
have diluted potential repression, and few foreign accounts of the intervention (which received 
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preventing or reporting transgressions may have represented an important additional 
source of surveillance and social control.  
6.6. Case summary 
Industrial production commenced in the early-nineteenth-century to supply the Chinese 
black market. Throughout the mid/late-nineteenth-century, Turkey was a major 
producer of raw opium for the European pharmaceutical industry and, prepared opium 
to the Far East and foreign black markets. By 1905 Turkey, was the major source of 
opium to Asia (including China) and Europe’s quasi-licit heroin manufacturers. During 
the 1940s, European pharmaceuticals were regulated to prevent quasi-licit heroin 
manufacturing; Turkey adapted and became the largest producer of raw opium to illicit 
heroin manufacturers. 
Between 1931 and 1941, Turkey was one of the world’s three largest sources of 
illicit opium (alongside China and Iran), primarily because - as suggested by the League 
of Nations in 1938 - 75-80 percent of all opium produced in Turkey was diverted from 
state control. From the 1940s, the primary preventive measure was the limitation of 
production to where the state possessed optimum authority and away from areas with 
easy access to foreign borders. However, as bans were administered in the lowest 
yielding provinces, and many permitted the cultivation of opium poppies for seeds 
(whilst banning the extraction of opium), the impact on national production was 
minimal. There is scant information on how bans were administered, while there is 
some evidence of crop substitution the coercive use of the military can be neither 
verified or ruled out. This period is a blind-spot in the history of Turkish and 
international drug control.  
This said, as production remained within areas which produced the majority of 
Turkish opium, the high-levels of diversion are attributable to the laissez-faire controls 
exerted by an inefficient state monopoly. While some innovations during the 1960s are 
likely to have reduced the level of diversions, control remained inadequate. Illustrative 
of the problems of estimating diversion rates, during the 1960s four US institutions 
produced two different diversion rate estimates. American estimates were used 
alongside estimates from the League of Nations in 1938 to establish three diversion 
                                                                                                                                               
substantial foreign political and media attention) detail abuse. Thus, while repressive law 
enforcement cannot be ruled out, the systematic violation of opium farmers’ rights appears 
unlikely.  
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parameters: a high of 80 percent; a middle of 66 percent; and a low of 25 percent. 
Fluctuation within these three parameters appears to follow the subsequent trend: 
diversion appears high (80 percent) from at least 1936 (peaking after the 1955 Iranian 
prohibition) to the 1960s when the imposition of more stringent controls make two-
thirds (66 percent) appear more appropriate. By the early-1970s the low-parameter (25 
percent) appears feasible. 
In 1972, the newly established military regime banned opium production. After the 
ban, an inefficiently administered crop substitution programme was established in some 
farming communities. The impoverishment of Turkish farmers, coupled with public 
perceptions of subservience to US interests, led a democratically elected government to 
repeal the ban in 1974.  
With the support of the UN, a poppy straw production and manufacturing system 
was established under a state monopoly; minimal opium was diverted after 1972. While 
poppy straw is more difficult to divert, success centred upon the administration of a 
highly effective control system which placed farmers under prolonged and extensive 
surveillance whilst providing ‘sufficiently harsh’ individual and community 
disincentives. That the village head or entire village could be punished for not 
preventing or reporting transgressions may have represented an important additional 
source of surveillance and social control.  
Since 1974, minimal amounts of opium have been either diverted or illicitly 
cultivated, hence, Turkey conforms to the outcome measurement of success: an excess 
of 90 percent reduction which brings the potential production below 20mt. Furthermore, 
the Turkish intervention appears to have positively impacted opium-farming 
communities.  
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7. Thailand 
7.1. Background and context 
Opium was likely introduced to Siam (Thailand after 1939) in the thirteenth-century and 
first prohibited in the fourteenth-century. Prohibition was partly repealed in 1851 to 
allow Chinese immigrants to consume state distributed opium (Jinawat, 2001; see 
Renard, 1999). While the monopoly was supplied primarily from India (League of 
Nations, 1930) and Iran (Bangkok Times, 1935), there was limited procurement from 
Thai highlanders1 (Renard, 2001; see Culas, 2000). Due to high monopoly prices many 
consumers procured black market opium (League of Nations, 1930) supplied from 
Burma (Renard, 2001) and, lesser amounts, from China (Malcolm, 1929) and the Thai 
highlands (Culas, 2003; Culas and Michaud, 1997). This said, highland production 
remained a garden enterprise (Renard (2010). 
Prohibition on consumption was reinstated in 1921 under Opium Act B.E.2472 
(1929-30) which provided a fine and/or six months imprisonment for unauthorised 
production (League of Nations, 1930). Under the Act opium dens were closed (Times, 
1959) and crops forcefully eradicated, forcing many farmers to migrate to Laos (Culas, 
2000) or violently resist suppression (League of Nations, 1930).  
Prohibition was short-lived and in 1932 – after a military coup - taxed opium dens 
were reopened (League of Nations, 1937). However, failure to concurrently regulate 
production stimulated trafficking from Yunnan and Burma and 23 percent of all opium 
sales, between 1935 and 1940, were from ‘seized’ opium (McCoy, 2003); state officials 
would unofficially order opium from Burma, which was interdicted at the border. The 
interdicted opium was sold to the state monopoly and the Burmese official was paid a 
‘reward’ for their ‘information’ (FO, 1936).2  
Then in 1938, the Thai Opium Department licensed 600 farmers in Chiang Rai 
Province (Crosby, 1938; League of Nations, 1937).3 As documents were lost in World 
War Two the amount produced is unknown (Renard, 1999), yet British FO records 
                                                 
1
 ‘Highlander’ or chao khao (hill people) make up around one percent of the Thai population 
and resided in Northern provinces (Kesmanee, 1994; see essays in McCaskill and Kampe, 
1999). 
2
 In 1939, Siam complained to the League of Nations (1939) of the futility of prohibition when 
opium was trafficked from Burma and Yunnan.  
3
 This was partly to integrate and ‘civilise’ highlanders (Renard 1999).  
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indicate production was limited and could ‘support a fraction’ of Siam’s consumers 
(Crosby, 1938b:n.p.).  
Then in 1949, in response to criticism of the monopoly at the UN, the Royal Thai 
Government (RTG) officially banned production (CND, 1953, 1956; Kesmanee, 1994), 
although unofficial toleration persisted until 1959 (and beyond in many areas) 
(Kesmanee, 1994). In 1949, the RTG reported to the UN that whilst reliable production 
estimates were difficult to ascertain, large-scale illicit export to the lowlands persisted 
and, while some crops were being eradicated the inaccessibility of the highlands made 
suppression ineffective (CND, 1949).  
While globally Thailand was not a major source in the 1940s (Morlock, 1944) 
external events in the 1950s transformed production levels. Between 1949 and 1955 
Southeast Asian production had increased in response to the removal three major 
sources of illicit or quasi-illicit opium – China, Iran and India - (Crooker, 1986; Jinawat, 
2001; McCoy, 2003; Renard, 2001; Stevenson, 1953; Wishart, 1974) and supplied 
approximately 50 percent of total illicit global production by the late-1950s (McCoy 
2003).  
The RTG may have authorised highland production to replace foreign suppliers 
(Chandola, 1976) as, while production was prohibited, between 1947 and 1957 
narcotics related corruption was high, ‘even for Thai standards’ (McCoy, 2003:187). It 
is well established that high-level state and military officials unofficially protected and 
taxed opium farmers, whilst protecting, and distributing opium for, the anti-communist 
Kuomintang4 and other anti-Communist insurgent/trafficking groups (Holiday, 1957; 
Gibson, 1966; McCoy, 2003).  
However, in 1959 - due to fear of increasing domestic consumption (Jinawat, 2001) 
and obligations under international law – the monopoly ceased trading; the Harmful 
Habit-Forming Drugs Act (1959) prohibited all non-medical/scientific production, 
consumption and distribution5 (see Saihoo, 1963; Times, 1959). While prohibition was 
comprehensively enforced throughout Thailand (McCoy 2003) to ensure stability in the 
highlands and border areas, where the state possessed insufficient authority (Hinter, 
                                                 
4
 The exiled army of the former Chinese Government had sought refuge in Burma after 1949 
where they utilised the opium trade to raise revenue for unsuccessful counterrevolutionary 
operations (McCoy, 2003). 
5
 Opium smoking was prohibited by Proclamation No.37 (1960). The Harmful Habit-Forming 
Drugs Act (1961) extended the 1959 Act by prescribing life imprisonment or the death penalty 
for distribution or manufacture heroin. 
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1983; Thongtham, 1992), opium production was unofficially tolerated (Gibson, 1966; 
Hinter, 1983; McCoy, 2003; also, Geddes, 1970). Furthermore, the Thai military 
continued to support anti-Communist groups such as the Kuomintang who financed 
their activities through drug trafficking (Gibson, 1966; McCoy, 2003). Toleration 
significantly increased illicit opium production (see Figure 7:1).6 
State contact with the highlands had been low. The first highland development (non-
opium related) plan was launched in 1959 and unsuccessfully attempted to re-settle 
communities into new lowland villages (Chareonpanich, 1987; Gua, 1975). Prior to this, 
the Border Patrol Police (BPP) - formed in 1955 to enforce national law in the highlands 
– had sporadically constructed schools and distributed medicines or agricultural 
equipment (Renard, 2001) to build relationships between highlanders and the state (UN, 
1969). 
In 1960, the RTG acknowledged their lack of understating of highland peoples and 
requested UN assistance. A socio-economic survey of highland peoples was conducted 
in 1965/66, followed by a CND supported survey of the socio-economic needs of opium 
farmers (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1974; Chareonpanich, 1987; Jinawat, 2001). The survey 
found that opium was produced primarily as altitude and soil prevented the cultivation 
of many conventional crops, and, many highland farmers possessed expertise in its 
cultivation and had migrated to Thailand in search of land suitable for its production.7 
Nonetheless, the majority of farmers expressed a willingness to abandon production if a 
profitable crop were available (UN 1968, 1967). Mobile development (Nuechterlein, 
1967) and social welfare services were provided as a short-term solution 
(Chareonpanich, 1987; Jinawat, 2001).  
A five-year plan (1964-1969) to: reduce opium production; slow forest and 
watershed degradation; and integrate highland peoples through crop substitution largely 
failed due to insufficient resources, knowledge of highland peoples or experience in 
highland development (Renard, 2001). Additionally, during this period a small-scale 
insurgency was being fought in the highlands. To prevent opium revenue from reaching 
insurgent coffers, brutal forced eradication was conducted (Economist, 1969; Kanjan 
and Kaewchote, 2004).8 For example, in 1968 Miles (2007) witnessed the Thai military 
                                                 
6
 Geddes (1970) posits how RTG estimates for the 1960s tended to be conservative.  
7
 Culas (2000) describes how many tribes migrated around Southeast Asia in search of opium 
producing land (also, Kanjan and Kaewohotte, 2004; Culas and Michaud, 1997). 
8
 The ‘Red Meo Revolt’ (1967-1970) is illustrative of opium-insurgent links. RTG officials 
visited a Hmong village in Chiang Rai three times to collect bribes from opium farmers. On the 
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bombing a village and then planting mines in potential poppy fields before looting 
resources.   
Aware that eradication alienated highland peoples and inflated insurgents’ support-
bases (Chapman, 1974; McBeth 1984b) by 1968 some northern official (Economist, 
1969) and the BPP had began arguing that eradication was counterproductive (Marks, 
1973), and in the late-1960s/early-1970s a policy to integrate highland peoples into the 
state began. Opium suppression, perceived as counterproductive, became secondary to 
rural development - especially road construction (Lee, 1994) – and while highland 
development remained a minor issue (Renard 2001) until the mid-1970s (Dirksen, and 
Kampe, n.d.; Francis, 2004) by 1971, the Thai Royal Family, UN, and US had begun to 
fund crop substitution projects (Renard, 2010).9  
7.1.1. 1970s 
In 1973, coinciding with the US ‘War on Drugs’, the RTG announced narcotic and 
corruption suppression as a national priority,10 while the US began unilaterally 
interdicting traffickers (Train, 1973). Funding and training from the US (Kuzmarov, 
2008) strengthened Thai drug control capabilities (Hazlehurst, 1977; INCB, 1973) and, 
supported in operations by several European nations (Martin, 1977), opiate seizures 
increased from minimal levels in 1971 to 36mt in 1972 (GOA 1975); several traffickers 
and manufacturers were executed (Darling, 1978; Hazlehurst, 1977; Times, 1978). The 
US and Thai-European interventions facilitated a heroin shortage in Hong Kong (China 
Mail, 1973; South China Morning Post, 1973),11 significantly reduced US supplies and 
deflected Southeast Asian heroin from the US to European and Australian markets 
(McCoy, 2000). Production decreases in the mid-1970s (see Figure 7:1), however, were 
                                                                                                                                               
third visit, villagers attacked the provincial police, who responded by torching the village. 
Fearing the beginning of a major conflict, the military napalmed surrounding villages to force 
migration to accessible areas. In response, Hmong insurgents conducted terrorist attacks in the 
lowlands. The Thai military, aware of their limited skills in mountain combat, responded to the 
attacks by sub-contracting the Kuomintang, who killed 150 Hmong villagers (Chandola, 1976; 
Gua, 1975; McCoy, 2003).  
9
 Including a one-year compensated eradication campaign which destroyed 26mt (Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, 1973). 
10
 Until 1976, Thailand was almost completely reliant on US economic aid (FCO, 1976; 
Turnbull, 1973) and thus open to pressure. 
11
 The Government of Hong Kong complained that corruption had limited further reductions 
(Hong Kong Standard, 1973). 
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due to a prolonged drought preceded by heavy rains, rather than intentional 
interventions (Hughes, 1979; Kelly, 1981; NNICC, 1980; see Roth, 1974). It was during 
this period that the first RTG/UN development project began. 
In 1975, a British diplomat reported that while opium yields had been improved by 
greater access to modern agri-methods three barriers to eradication persisted. Firstly, the 
RTG refused to use law enforcement before substitute crops were identified. Secondly, 
individual police officers protected and profited from distribution.12 Thirdly, 
‘circumstantial evidence’ linked the military elite to insurgent groups (McBain, 1975, 
also, FCO, 1972; Hazlehurst, 1977; Hinter, 1983).  
During the early/mid-1970s dual drug policies had been operational: a prohibitionist 
civil government and facilitating military elite, however, in 1976, the civil government 
was removed in a coup which some suggest was engineered by the military, which 
feared the civil government’s anti-drug policies were a threat to alliances with 
insurgent/trafficking groups (McCoy, 2003).13 Nonetheless, the new military regime did 
pass legislation prohibiting possession of heroin precursor chemicals in border areas 
(Branigin, 1982) and imposed mandatory life sentences, or the death penalty, for serious 
drug offences. Aerial surveys were also first undertaken in northern Thailand (INCB, 
1979). However, by 1980 the poor weather conditions of the early-1970s had ceased: 
heroin laboratories were re-established (Kelly, 1981) and production resumed at a high-
level.  
7.1.2. 1980-1999 
By the late-1970s, the majority of insurgent bases had been destroyed and estimated 
Communist Party numbers had fallen from 12,000 to 2,000. Hence, the threat of 
eradication stimulating insurgent rural support had lessened (Lee, 1994) and all 
highland areas were opened to development and law enforcement (Renard, 2001). 
Additionally, high-level narcotics related corruption began to wane in 1980 when a new 
regime (McCoy, 2003) who perceived insurgent/trafficking groups as a security threat 
(Butler, 1982; Cima, 1985) came to power. The publication of stories of military 
complicity with traffickers/insurgents in the Thai media and the growing financial and 
political influence of banks and multinationals (the replacement of illegitimate with 
legitimate finance) essentially ended high-level facilitation of the trade (McCoy 2003), 
                                                 
12
 Gua (1975) reported that during the early-1970s the threat of prison was used to extract bribes 
from opium farmers. 
13
 Renard (2010) suggests that anti-drug policies were one of a convergence of multiple 
motivators, including opposition to the prime ministers conservative policies. 
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even if traffickers continued to be a corrupting factor in Thai politics throughout the 
1980s (Cima, 1985; RCMP, 1988). Consequently, by 1985, all insurgent/trafficking 
groups and heroin laboratories had been expelled from Thailand (Cima, 1985) and the 
BPP had increased their interdiction capacity along the Thai-Burmese border (Malarek, 
1989).  
In 1982, A Brief Account on Government Resolution Towards Problems of Hilltribe 
People and Opium Production, expressed DOA as the most appropriate method of 
opium suppression. This was followed by two opium suppression and highland 
development Masterplan’s (1983 and 1988). The objective of the first was to extend 
developmental support to 15 percent of the highland population (RCMP, 1988) and 
establish eight development projects in high-density opium farming areas. The objective 
of the second Masterplan was to improve coordination between the multiple Thai and 
foreign development agencies (Renard, 2001).  
While small amounts were eradicated in 1980 (NNICC, 1981) the official approach 
was to avoid confrontation (Branigin, 1982) and extend alternative livelihoods (Renard, 
2010). By 1983, alternatives to opium had secured many farmers adequate living 
standards. However, as many intercropped new crops with opium, production increased 
by 40 percent between 1981 and 1985 (Lee, 1994; also McBeth, 1984b). Consequently 
in 1983 eradication increased (Gammelgaard, 1987) in areas where: opium was 
cultivated on a large-scale; the village had received international or national support 
(Crooker, 1988); some alternative incomes had been established; the area was accessible 
(Renard, 2010). While many farmers responded by migrating opium crops away from 
the village and/or reducing plot size (to avoid detection and limit losses) (De Meer, 
1987), eradication did increase interest in, and cooperation with, development projects 
(Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.) and within a couple of years Thailand had became a net 
importer of opium (RCMP, 1986).   
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Figure 7: 1. Thailand: Illicit opium production (1923-2008) 
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Source: adapted from, Figure 7:1; Bulletin of Narcotics (1974); Der Meer (1989); Dirksen 
(1999); FCO (1972); Holahan and Henningen (1972); INCRS (various years); Magnussen et al. 
(1980); McCoy, 2003; NNICC (various years); ONCB (various years, cited in Der Meer, 1989; 
Renard, 2001); RCMP (various years); Train (1973); Renard (2001); UN/RTG (1985, cited in 
Der Meer, 1989); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC (2005, 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010). 
Note: missing values indicates missing data. grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of 
success. 
Figure 7: 2. Thailand: Area under opium poppy cultivation (1934-2008) 
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Source: adapted from, INCRS (various years); NNICC (various years); ONCB (various years, 
cited in Der Meer, 1989; Renard, 2001); RCMP (various years); Saengprasert (1987); UN 
(1962, cited in Renard, 2001); UN/RTG (1985, cited in Der Meer, 1989); UNODCCP (1999, 
2000, 2002); UNODC (2006, 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010). Note: missing values indicates missing 
data. Diagonal line indicates 26-year gap in data. 
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7.2. The intervention 
By the 1970s, a body of law had been established which prohibited and criminalised 
production, distribution and manufacture and provided the police sufficient power to 
eradicate crops and interdict trafficking (CNIC, 1972; see Harmful Habit-Forming 
Drugs Act, 1959, 1961). Then in 1959, the Narcotics Control Act (1979) provided 
sanctions for distribution, possession or production, ranging from one year to life 
imprisonment for 20grams of opium, to the death penalty for excess of 20grams. 
7.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches 
This section shall present an overview of the five primary development projects 
conducted from 1969.14 The particulars of the projects, summarised in Table 7:1, are: 
(1) Royal Northern Project (RNP) (1969-present) in all northern provinces; (2) Crop 
Replacement and Community Development Project (CRCDP) (1972-1979) in Chiang 
Rai and Chiang Mai Provinces; (3) Highland Agricultural Marketing and Production 
Project (HAMP) (1979-1984) in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai;15 Lamang; Mae Hong 
Son; and Tak Provinces; (4) Thai-German Highland Development Programme (TG-
HDP) (1981-1998) in Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son Provinces; (5) Doi Tung 
Development Project (DTDP) (1987-present) in Doi Tung (Chiang Rai Province). 
Renard (2001) divides Thai DOA into the three phases. During the first phase 
(early/mid-1970s), projects (i.e. CRCDP and RNP) focused primarily on researching 
and extending substitute crops. It was a period of ‘trial and error’ (Dirksen and Kampe, 
n.d.:5) whereby project workers identified: that several suitable crops possessed low 
market prices; unanticipated pests and diseases; the unavailability of credit for highland 
peoples; the poor transport infrastructure (Renard, 2001); and inadequate marketing 
opportunities. There were also internal conflicts within Thai (Dirksen, 1999) and UN 
funded projects, long-term planning was ineffective (GOA, 1975) and projects were 
extremely top-down (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.; Renard, 2001). However, the early-
projects built relationships and established a knowledgebase: 
 
officials learned about the hills and crops that could grow there. 
Opium growers, who mostly only knew lowland officials as soldiers 
                                                 
14
 A number of smaller projects are described in minimal details by: Renard (2001); 
Saengprasert (1987); Speranza (1987); Suriy (2002).  
15
 The Thai-Norwegian Church Aid Highland Development Project took over some HAMP 
villages when the project terminated (Renard, 1994). 
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or police who came to fight or arrest them, learned there were Thai 
officials with whom they could cooperate (Renard, 2001:80). 
 
Hence, by the second phase (late-1970s/1980s) project workers possessed a growing 
familiarity with the cultures of, and issues facing, highlanders and while projects 
remained top-down (Renard, 2001),16 the focus of projects was widened from crop 
substitution to more comprehensive approach’s targeted at local issues (Renard, 2001) 
which placed greater emphasis on social services (Lee, 1994; Renard, 2002). The 
culturally integration of succeeding generations into mainstream Thailand resulted in 
the extension of the education system into the highlands (Renard, 2001). During the 
late-1980s, the highland transport infrastructure was also greatly expanded by military, 
police, developmental projects and private individuals (Crooker and Martin, 1992). 
Research continued, for example, in 1980, Chiang Mai University began to collect, 
identify and document highland plant diseases in order to train farmers in their 
prevention (Black and Jonglaekha, 1989). Law enforcement began in the middle of this 
phase (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.).  
During phase three (1990s), influenced by shifts in development theory which 
emphasised the benefits of self-determination, projects increased the involvement of 
highland peoples in project implementation and planning (Renard, 2001). The 1992-
1996 and 1993-2001 Masterplan’s for Community Development, Environment and 
Narcotic Crops Control (Jinawat, 2001), supported by the Seventh Development Plan 
(1992–1996), coordinated all highland development into one national programme; 
further mainstreaming opium suppression into national highland development 
objectives (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.). Additionally, throughout the 1990s, rapid 
national economic growth accelerated the demand for highland produce and facilitated 
transport infrastructural development (Hau, 2002; Renard, 2001). Consequently, the 
highlands attracted much private development, including non-farm employment and 
tourism (Fox, 2009; Mansfield et al., 2006). 
The RNP was the first development-orientated project administered in Thailand. The 
project, initiated by King Bhumibol Adulyadej and managed by Prince Bhisatej Rajani 
                                                 
16
 An extensive critique of the lack of participation is offered by Kampe (1992) who reports that 
while all documents throughout the 1980s professed community participation in design and 
implementation, in practice this was seldom the case. Conversely, Renard (2010) recounted to 
the author that even during the early-1970s, projects were bottom-up when compared with Thai 
development practice of the time.  
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(Rojanasoonthon, 2001),17 set the primary objective of improving highland living 
standards; gradual opium suppression was a secondary objective. Initially the King was 
the primary donor, whilst university and government employees volunteered their time 
(Chareonpanich, 1987); however, shortly after inauguration several foreign states 
donated experts, agri-machinery and seeds (Royal Project Foundation, 1996; 
Thongtham, 2005). As knowledge of highland development was limited, research 
remained the priority during the first decade (Rojanasoonthon, 2001) and undertaken by 
Kasetsart University, Taiwan and America (Williamson, 2005; Pleumpamya, 2009) 
often in conjunction with CRCDP and later HAMP. The project, originally administered 
straight crop substitution, expanded significantly and adopted an alternative livelihoods 
approach which informed many later projects (Renard, 2010). 
In 2007, the RNP supported 142,667 people throughout 38 development centres 
(Jinawat, 2009). The standard of living is reported to have increased in all project areas: 
the average annual income in many villages increased from a pre-project average of 
4,000 baht (US$95) to 59,000 baht (US$1,500) in 2004 (Williamson, 2005). 
Furthermore, access to modern medicine and education increased significantly 
(Pleumpamya, 2009). Thongtham (1992) uses the village of Bah Khun Klang (Chiang 
Mai) as an example of success. By the late-1980s, extension workers had introduced a 
variety of crops, some of which earned the farmer 50 percent more than opium, whilst 
the villagers had gradually developed better houses, and built a temple and school. 
As the UN/ONCB administered CRCDP was managed by Prince Rajani the projects 
worked closely with RNP. The project operated in 30 villages with two primary 
objectives of suppressing opium and enhancing food production (Renard, 2001). To 
overcome the lack of Thai expertise in highland development, agricultural advisors were 
sent from Israel, the US and Taiwan (Smith, 1973) and there was a significant emphasis 
on research (Lee, 1994). The mid-term evaluation found that farmers could earn greater 
profits from substitute crops, and opium production had been reduced (Saengprasert 
1987); however, there was evidence of intercropping of licit crops with opium and using 
new techniques to improve opium yields (Hazlehurst, 1979).  
                                                 
17
 The Thai Royal Family was a key benefactor of DOA. Their involvement in several 
projects lessened bureaucratic barriers (Renard, 2001) and ‘opened doors’. For example, DTDP 
textiles received prime placements at fashion and trade shows, and the support of the press 
(Bendiksen, 2002), while local administrations built roads to precede Royal visits (Renard, 
2001). 
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The CRCDP followed by HAMP, which extended the project area to 51 (RTG, 1980) 
and later 64 villages (Saengprasert, 1987) and continued CRCDP’s research (Lee, 
1994). However, as the CRCDP staff had recognised that without a marketing division 
they would not be able to sell what farmers grew (Renard, 2010) there was a greater 
emphasis on marketing. While research and crop substitution achievements of CRCDP 
continued, opium cultivation increased in the project areas by 36 percent (it had only 
increased by one percent during CRCDP) (Lee, 1994) and between 1981 and 1985 the 
project area demonstrated one of the largest expansions of illicit production nationally 
(McBeth, 1984b). Nonetheless, while failing to reduce production, it illustrated that 
substitute crops could be profitable (Gammelgaard, 1987) and helped compile research 
on highland crops, culture and best practice (Suriya, 2002).  
In 1987, DTDP was initiated by The Princess Mother (Viravaidya, 2001) with the 
objectives of reducing: opium production; prostitution; environmental degradation; and 
illegal logging (Nardone, 2008). While a pre-project socio-economic survey found that 
opium was the only available cash crop (Viravaidya, 2001) opium production had 
ceased by 2001 (Viravaidya 2001, UNODC 2005) while between 1988 and 2003 the 
average household annual income increased from 5,000 Baht (US$163) to 35,000 Baht 
(US$1,144).18 Additionally access to healthcare improved (Mangat, 2003) and the 
number of project participants without an education shrank (UNODC, 2005). However, 
as the project was administered in a small target area and was more cash intensive than 
other projects it has proved difficult to replicate (Renard, 2010). 
TG-HDP has been described as a ‘broad and holistic’ rural development project 
which (Bendiksen, 2002:101) matured from narrow crop substitution to inform many 
later UN and RTG projects (Barrett and Palo, 1999). Throughout the life of the project, 
villagers diet improved (Dirksen, 1999), school enrolment increased from 25 to over 65 
percent (Dirksen, 2006) while infant mortality rates, infectious diseases (i.e., malaria 
and smallpox) and bacterial water-born infections were reduced (Dirksen, 2001). Many 
farmers tripled their income;19 between 1990 and 1998, in some areas, family income 
was raised from US$120 to US$1,000 and opium production was reduced significantly 
(Dirksen, 2006).  
                                                 
18
 The Baht to Dollar conversion uses the February 2011 exchange rate of 0.03271 US Dollar 
per Thai Baht (MSN, 2011). 
19
 One of the project areas (Wawee) is now Thailand’s principal source of coffee (Renard, 
2010). 
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7.2.2. Law enforcement approaches 
During the 1960s, opium suppression interventions were limited to repressive forced 
eradication and law enforcement in insurgent areas and included forced displacement 
and military assault (see Economist, 1969; Kanjan and Kaewchote, 2004; Miles, 2007). 
However, repressive interventions began to be perceived as counter-productive to 
counter-insurgency objectives (Campbell, 1983; Chapman, 1974; Economist, 1969; 
McBeth, 1984b) and from the inception of RNP (Renard, 2001; Pleumpamya, 2009; 
UNODC, 2007) and CRCDP (Lanir, 1973; Smith, 1973; UNFDAC, 1972) it was agreed 
that no crops would be eradicated, or farmers punished, until viable alternative incomes 
were available. CRCDP project staff decided that as a primary objective was getting a 
foothold into villages (Renard, 2010) coercion would damage project/community 
relationships (Renard, 2001). During the early stages of RNP, project staff 
communicated the illegality of opium to farmers, and whilst stressing to farmers that 
while they could be arrested, project staff were not involved in law enforcement; local 
police were requested to support this approach (Thongtham, 1992). Only once new 
crops began to show signs of profitability, did the RNP project negotiate agreements to 
cease production (Pleumpamya, 2009). Due to the realisation that coercion could be 
counter-productive and that opium farming was a product of poverty no opium was 
eradicated in Thailand until 1983. 
Nonetheless, in 1980, the Shan United Army, a trafficking/insurgent group operating 
out of Thailand, was closed down during a military operation. The Royal Thai Air 
Force, Rangers and BPP (Butler, 1982) arrested 180 (Kelly, 1982), killed 100, destroyed 
several heroin laboratories and pushed the group into Burma (Economist, 1982). 
Henceforth, Thai interdiction capacity along the Thai-Burmese border was increased 
(Malarek, 1989) and the military and police began to interdict major traffickers and 
laboratories (Cima, 1985); often through aerial bombing and military assault 
(Economist, 1992).  
While the official approach to producers remained the avoidance of confrontation20 
(Campbell, 1983; Branigin, 1982) in 1980, small amounts of opium were voluntarily 
eradicated (NNICC, 1981) through negotiations in 10 villages (Branigin, 1982). Tapp 
(1982) - who conducted field research within the RNP area – reported that eradication 
                                                 
20
 The Governor of Chiang Mai declared: ‘[I]t’s easy to stop people from growing opium….But 
what are you going to do with half a million mountain tribesmen?’ without an income 
(Campbell, 1983:n.p.). 
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was arbitrarily enforced, with many police officers seizing opium for personal 
consumption. However, the lack of supportive evidence may indicate that this 
represented low-level, rather than systematic, corruption.  
Then in 1983, the Royal Thai Army, BPP and ONCB (Yodmani, 1992) conducted 
their first forced eradication campaign in a Third Army development programme area 
(McBeth, 1984b).21 While the initial eradication was largely symbolic (Cima, 1986) and 
sought to raise awareness of opium’s illegality (Lee, 1994; RCMP, 1987), the following 
year the target group was expanded to areas which illicitly cultivated more than 160ha 
of opium (reduced to 48ha the following year) (De Meer, 1987) or had breeched 
agreements to limit production to local consumption (RCMP, 1986). The third year 
represented the commencement of large-scale eradication.  
In general, eradication campaigns began with aerial, satellite and/or ground surveys 
to establish the extent of cultivation (Aramrattana and Jinawat, 2006; Chotpimai, 1987; 
Lee, 1994; RCMP, 1986; ONCB, 2003; Pennington, 2001; Silp, 2007). The Third Army 
then collated information on: individual farmers; the geography of the area; and the 
activities of village leaders. The majority of eradication tended to be negotiated 
(Chotpimai, 1987; see RCMP, 1985), for example favourably treatment when applying 
for Thai citizenship as leverage (Renard 2001). If undertaken within DODCP areas, 
communities tended to be warned, sometimes years in advance22 of forced eradication 
as schedules of development/eradication were often negotiated with communities at the 
beginning of development projects (Lee, 1994).  
All eradication was conducted manually, using cutting tools or sticks - herbicides 
were not used – and tended to be humane (Lee, 1994). To avoid impoverishing farmers 
the Third Army supplied basic emergency relief (Chotpimai, 1987) after the first 
eradication (Crooker, 1988). Few farmers were arrested or punished for production 
(DEA, 1992) for as General Yodmani (the head of the ONCB during the late-1980s) 
declared law enforcement was an expensive ‘sign of failure’ (Economist 1992:61). 
                                                 
21
 In 1983, the Third Army promoted substitute crops in 49 villages (rising to 137 by 1987) with 
high-insurgent activity (Renard, 2001). The projects included: livestock promotion; the 
extension of modern agricultural techniques and new technology; the construction of irrigation 
and transport infrastructures; the establishment of pharmacies, medical centres and schools 
(Chotimai, 1987). 
22
 Farmers in the TG-HDP project area were given a four or five year grace period. In two 
villages where production was naturally declining eradication was not administered for eight 
years (Dirksen, 1999). 
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Conversely, observers reported eradication units as ‘heavy handed’ (Leithead, 2009; 
also Kesmanee, 1994). However, much like individual officers enforcing bans for 
personal gain when official policy banned eradication, ‘heavy handedness’ did not 
represent a systematic national or project-wide policy of abuse. 
INCRS has tended to report higher eradication figures than UNODC who, prior to 
1992, reported that the amount eradicated succeed the amount harvested in one year 
only. However, estimations converge from 1992 into a trend in which more opium is 
eradicated than harvested (see Figure 3:3). The average of UNODC/INCRS estimates 
(Figure 7:3) suggests that more opium was eradicated than harvested in all but four 
years and that on average 60 percent of all opium cultivated has been eradicated. 
Furthermore, in 1989, 1993 and 1996 the area under cultivation increased slightly 
(Figure 7:2), however, that the amount eradicated concurrently increased indicates 
Thailand’s capacity to respond to illicit production. 
 
Figure 7: 3. Thailand: Opium eradication/harvest ratio (1985-2007) 
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Source: adapted from, INCRS (various years); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC (2006, 
2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010). Note: data unavailable for 2004.
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Table 7: 1. Thailand: Summary of DODCP 
 Basic data 
Community 
involvement 
Roads 
(km) 
Irrigation / 
land levelling 
(ha) 
Electrification Agri-Training 
Modern Agri-
equipment 
New/ 
improved 
crops 
Handicraft/ 
alternative 
income 
RNP 
1) RPF, RTG; 2) RPF 
(since 1992) 
Top-down 
before 
1990s  
Yes Yes Yes Modern agri-
methods 
Yes Extensive1 N.E. 
CRCDP 
1) UN; 2) 
UNFDAC/ONCB 
Minimal None2 N.E. N.E. Modern agri-
methods3 
N.E. Seeds 
loaned 
Yes 
HAMP 
1) UN; 2) UN Minimal Minimal4 N.E. N.E. Yes N.E. 8 crops 
distributed 
Yes 
DTDP 
1) Mah Fah Luang ; 2) 
Mah Fah Luang 
N.E. Yes Yes Yes N.E. N.E. Food & 
cash crops 
Extensive5 
                                                 
1
 As roads and marketing infrastructure (i.e. cool storage vans) were improved the project promoted temperate flowers and vegetables (Bendiksen, 2002). 
2
 Imported ponies were bred as pack animals (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1974). 
3
 Approximately 35 villagers a year were instructed in agricultural and non-agricultural skills (i.e. Thai language, basic math, health promotion); the best students 
received extra (yet limited) training and employed as extension workers (see, Bulletin of Narcotics, 1974; Lanir, 1973; Williams, 1979). 
4
 As poorly built roads had to be closed during the rainy season transportation costs remained high (RTG, 1980). 
5
 Employment was established through: reforestation (Nardone, 2008; Viravaidya, 2001); handicraft factories (Bendiksen, 2002); and tourism (Viravaidya, 2001). 
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TG-
HDP 
1) GTZ/RTG;  
2) GTZ/ONCB 
Yes6 Yes N.E. N.E. Yes N.E. Cash & 
food crops 
Yes 
 
New/ 
improved 
livestock 
Marketing 
Safe 
drinking 
water 
Health 
care 
Education Livestock health/ efficiency Research Sequencing 
RNP 
Yes 
 
Extensive7 Yes Yes  Free primary 
education and 
scholarships  
Husbandry, healthcare and 
nutrition training 
By mid-2000s  
>500 research 
projects 
conducted 
Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
CRCDP 
Imported 
livestock, 
fish 
Procured and 
sold produce. 
Inefficient8 
No evidence Yes Some schools 
built 
Vaccinations, livestock 
management, animal health 
training 
Yes No eradication 
                                                 
6
 Self-determination was established (Chatham-Good, 2003) through Community Development Coordinators which were established to: liaise between the RTG, 
project staff and communities; communicate community needs and; initiate and plan local activities (Dirksen, 1999). 
7
 Limited marketing began in 1976 (Bendiksen, 2002) with the establishment of canning factories and, wine and preserve manufacturing (for ease of transportation) 
(Bendiksen, 2002; Thongtham, 1992). In 1981, RNP began to sell farmers produce for them and later established the Doi Kham brand to assist marketing (Fox, 
2009; Pleumpamya, 2009; Williamson, 2005). Produce was sold to supermarkets, retailers, hotels and through RNP owned shops (Bendiksen, 2002; Boonyakiat, 
2002). The project additionally provided market information to farmers wishing to sell their own crops and manipulated demand for new crops (Bendiksen, 2002). 
Coffee represents an example of the linkages between research, extension and marketing. In 1969, coffee was first introduced some farmers as an alternative cash 
crop, however, the contraction of a virus that year discouraged farmers. Research identified a more robust coffee which was introduced to farmers through 
demonstration plots. Then, to aid marketing the RTG banned the import of processed coffee (Thongtham, 1992).  
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HAMP 
N.E. Procured and 
sold produce.9 
N.E. Yes  37 village 
schools built 
N.E. Yes No eradication 
DTDP 
N.E. Extensive10 Yes Yes Schools built, 
scholarships 
N.E. Pre-project 
survey 
Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
TG-
HDP 
N.E. Some, mostly 
by private 
companies 
Yes Yes Free primary 
education 
Livestock efficiency training N.E. Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
Notes: basic data codes: 1) primary financers; 2) primary executing agency; 3) cost in millions. ‘Yes’ denotes an action unspecified in the literature. ‘N.E.’ denotes 
no evidence. Sources: RTP: Boonyakiat (2002); Chareonpanich (1987); Hau (2002); Fox (2009); Jinawat (2009); Jones (1982a); Krailerg (2004); Pleumpamya 
(2009); Renard (2001); Rojanasoonthon (2001); RPF (1996); RPF (n.d.); Thongtham (2005); Vogt (2004); Williamson, (2005). CRCDP: Bendiksen (2002); Bulletin 
of Narcotics (1974); Hazlehurst (1979); Lanir (1973); Lee (1994); McBeth (1984); Nepote (1976); Saengprasert (1987); Smith (1973); Williams (1979).  HAMP: 
Bendiksen (2002); Lee (1994); McBeth (1984a); Renard (1994); RTG (1980); Suriya (2002). DTDP: Bendiksen (2002); Doi Tung (2010); Mangat (2003); Nardone 
(2008); UNODC (2005b, 2008b); Viravaidya (2001). TG-HDP: Bendiksen (2002); Chanthanom-Good (2003); Dirksen (1999, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2010); Piyarom 
(1987); Suvarnasara (1987). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
8
 While clients included Thai International Airways (Williams, 1979) and Nestlé (Bendiksen, 2002) the lack of efficient transport infrastructure limited marketing; 
some crops had to be helicopter to market at great expense (Lee, 1994). 
9
 Canning factories were established and wines and preserves manufactured to ease transportation. Produce was sold through a Thai marketing and distribution 
company which secured contracts in Thai and foreign markets (Suriya, 2002). Major clients (i.e. Nestlé) eventually bypassed the project to procure directly from the 
farmers (Bendiksen, 2002) which represented the achievement of a project objective (i.e. the establishment of a sustainable market) (Renard, 2010). 
10
 All produce was marketed through outlets or direct to clients (Viravaidya, 2001). In 2010, several foundation outlets and 22 coffee shops sold handicrafts, drinks 
and food produced by the project (Doi Tung, 2010).  
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7.3. Success? 
In 1984, one year after the beginning of the eradication campaign and three years after 
the military interdiction of major traffickers/manufacturers, the area under cultivation 
sharply decreased. However, that the trend was less dramatic for production - there were 
small spikes in 1989, 1993 and 1996 (Figures 7:1, 7:2) - would support reports of 
adaptive responses, including improvements in yield from increased access to agri-
technology and more efficient agricultural methods (INCRS, 1998; ONCB, 1990).  
The US INCRS (1999) removed Thailand from its major drug producers list in 1999, 
while UNODC (2009) declared Thailand ‘poppy-free’ in 2002. As production fell 
below 20mt to 9.33mt- representing a 95 percent reduction from the 1970 peak of 
200mt - in 1994 Thailand met the outcome measurement of success employed in this 
study in that year. Production continued to decline and in 2010 (the last recorded data 
available) produced 5mt; representing a 98 percent reduction from 1970. The 
intervention has additionally improved the livelihoods of many highland opium farmers 
whilst adding to the stabilisation of Northern Thailand. A further illustration of success 
is that the RTG, Royal Foundation and Mae Fa Lung Foundation, are major donors and 
advisors to Burma and Afghanistan (see Doi Tung, 2010; INCRS, 2002, 2006, 2007; 
Leithhead, 2009).  
7.4. Rival explanations of success 
An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as 
such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how success was realised. 
Renard (2001:119) indicated the centrality of the ‘moral leadership’ of the Royal 
Family to success; they stimulated rural development whist instilling a sense of state 
affiliation in formerly alienated highlanders. Several commentators (Falco, 1996; Lee, 
1994; Renard, 2001), note how the intervention was built upon a foundation of 
sustained national and Northern Provincial economic growth from the early-1950s. As 
the majority of DODCP funding came from within Thailand (Dirksen and Kampe, n.d.) 
the growing economy represented not just an inflated consumer market for highland 
goods but also provided the Thai government and NGO’s with sufficient resources for 
long-term projects. 
Renard (2001) continues that a key factor for individual DODCP success was that 
AD projects - rather than narrow crop substation - provided farmers with sufficient 
alternative incomes. Renard’s proposition is supported by Kunstadter (2000) who, in a 
survey of 144 villages, found that 67.6 percent of villages which had ceased production 
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between 1979 and 1988 had accessed a DODCP. Furthermore, improved road access 
and the extension of village health stations were found to be statistically significant 
factors for the cessation of production.  
Kesmanee (1994:674), however, posited that the incentives provided by AD projects,  
especially the linking of highland farmers to lowland markets, was coupled with the 
‘harsh treatment of the highland people by the Third Army’. While ‘harsh treatment’ is 
undefined by Kesmanee, Renard (2001) has suggested that effective law enforcement 
did compliment the establishment of alternative incomes. This is supported by the 
findings that 96.6 percent of 144 villages perceived the imposition of the ban was the 
primary motivator for the cessation of opium production (Kunstadter, 2000). This said, 
law enforcement does not necessarily signify ‘harsh treatment’. Rather the available 
evidence suggests that law enforcement tended to be humane, the abuse of farmers’ 
human rights the exception rather than the rule, and that the intervention was 
economically beneficial to many farmers.  
Lee (1994) posited that the attractiveness of alternative incomes was driven by 
concurrent improvements in the profitability of legitimate incomes and deflated Thai 
farmgate price (brought about through increased Burmese production). Average Thai 
farmgate prices decreased from approximately US$2,200 (55,000 baht) to US$160 
(4,000 baht) per 1.6 kilogram (or 1.0 joi) between the late-1970s and 1989 (Dirksen, 
1999). However, between 1989 and 2005 the farmgate price increased by US$1,060 
(see Figure 7:4) whilst production declined. The price of opium was just one of several 
factors motivating farmers to accept/oppose suppression. Highland farmers were aware 
that increasing population density and traditional forms of farming had reduced the 
sustainability of highland agriculture and thus actively sought alternative incomes 
(Crooker, 1988; Dirksen, 1999). Additionally, many desired the benefits of Thai 
citizenship and social welfare provisions (i.e. education and healthcare) provided by 
development projects and improved links to the lowlands (Dirksen, 1999). Hence, 
acquiescing to opium suppression was perceived by many farmers as within their best-
interest, especially as the risk of eradication became more viable.  It appears that the 
moratoriums on eradication until alternative livelihoods were established permitted the 
state to capitalise on highland peoples' awareness of the un-sustainability of opium 
production. 
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Figure 7: 4. Thailand: farmgate price in US$/Kg compared with production (1986-2008) 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
US
$/K
g
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
M
et
ric
 
to
nn
e
Farmgate price Production
 
Source: UNODCCP (1999); UNODC (2006, 2007, 008b, 2009, 2010). 
 
Essentially the Thai intervention is one of state extension through a development-
orientated projects, national rural development and during the 1990s private investment 
facilitated by sustained economic growth and political stability. Nationally law 
enforcement (primarily negotiated eradication) was sequenced after state extension and 
the resolution of violent conflict. While the impact of crop substitution projects on 
farmers livelihoods may have been somewhat shallow, they were as significant to state 
extension as later AD projects as they helped to build positive relationships. This said, 
that the risk of eradication has averaged 60 percent since 1985 suggests that a high-risk 
environment was established. Hence, the evidence suggests that the key factors of Thai 
success were the establishment of state authority in formerly isolated areas and the 
extension of incentives to farmers, followed thereafter by the creation of a high-risk 
environment.  
7.5. Case summary 
Opium production in Thailand remained a cottage industry until the 1950s when, in 
response to the removal of Chinese, Indian and Iranian opium from the global market, 
production increased throughout Southeast Asia to supply roughly half of global supply 
by the late-1950s. While production was officially prohibited in 1959, during this period 
the Thai military forged links with anti-Communist insurgent groups engaged in opiate 
distribution, whilst state employees protected and taxed opium farmers. Hence, a 
combination of weak authority and counter-insurgency policy objectives facilitated an 
increase in production; peaking in 1970 at 200mt.  
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In 1965-66, the Thai intervention began with a socio-economic survey of highland 
opium farmers, which found that farmers were willing to cease opium production in 
exchange for alternative incomes. During the 1960s, the military employed repressive 
law enforcement techniques against producers in areas with high Communist insurgent 
activity. However, by 1968 a perception that coercion was counterproductive to 
counterinsurgency objectives emerged and the state administered limited development 
aid and began constructing roads to expose the highlands. Additionally, in 1969, the 
King initiated a highland development and research project with the primary objective 
of improving the welfare of highland opium farmers; a joint RTG-UN administered 
project followed in 1971. The two early projects established a foundation of: knowledge 
of highland issues and agriculture; best practice in administrating highland 
development; and relationships of mutual trust between the state and isolated highland 
peoples. 
In 1973, dual drug policies were operating: the civilian government prohibited opium 
and, with America and Europe, administered an extensive and effective interdiction 
campaign whilst the Thai military continued to clandestinely facilitate the production 
and distribution. Nonetheless, by the late-1970s the insurgent threat had receded, 
rendering client insurgent/trafficking groups not only obsolete but a threat to security. 
Hence, the new civilian government pushed the groups from Thai territory whilst 
severing links between high-level state employees and the illicit opiate trade. 
A number of development projects were administered throughout the 1970s/1980s 
that brought modern agriculture, market access and social services to highlands 
communities. The projects grew in sophistication from narrow crop substitution to what 
is now termed alternative livelihood. 
Law enforcement strategies were not used until 1983. Law enforcement centred upon 
sequencing eradication once farmers had access to alternative livelihoods; arrest and 
punishment of farmers remained minimal throughout the intervention. In several 
DODCP’s, a contract was negotiated between highland communities and the project 
scheduling when eradication would be undertaken. Prior to eradication, incentives for 
the voluntary cessation of production were offered, however, if the contract was broken 
(i.e. farmers continued to produce opium), then crops were forcefully eradicated through 
manual means and between 1986 and 2008, 60 percent of all opium cultivated had been 
eradicated. Farmers received basic relief from the state after their crops had been 
eradicated for the first time. While eradication tended to be humane, some individual 
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brutality from eradication teams may have presented. This said, campaigns against 
traffickers and manufacturers were aggressive; including aerial and artillery assaults.  
The evidence suggests that the key factors of Thai success were the establishment of 
state authority in formerly isolated areas, the extension of incentives to farmers, 
followed by the creation of a high-risk environment. 
In 1994, production fell below 20mt to 9.33mt; representing a 95 percent reduction 
from the 1970 peak of 200mt and hence achieved success in 1994. Production continued 
to decline and in 2003 (the last recorded data available) produced 2mt; representing a 99 
percent reduction from 1970. The intervention has additionally improved the livelihoods 
of many ex-opium farmers whilst adding to the stabilisation of Northern Thailand.  
References 
Academic 
Barrett, M. and de Palo, M. (1999). 'Community-Based Intervention to Reduce Demand 
for Drugs in Northern Thai Tribal Villages', Substance Use and Misuse, Vol. 
34(13),1837-1879. 
Black, R. and Jonglaekha, N. (1989). ‘Plant Diseases and Other Aspects of Plant 
Protection in Northern Thailand with Special Reference to Highland Development 
Programmes’. International Journal of Pest Management, Vol. 35(3),  pp. 289-296. 
Bowornwathana, B. (2000). ‘Thailand in 1999: A Royal Jubilee, Economic Recovery, 
and Political Reform’. Asian Survey, Vol. 40(1), pp. 87-97.  
Bunbongkarn, S. (1993). ‘Thailand in 1992: In Search of a Democratic Order’. Asian 
Survey, Vol. 33(2), pp. 218-223.  
Chandola, H. (1976). ‘The Politics of Opium’. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
11(23), pp. 832-833. 
Crooker, R. (1988). ‘Forces of Change in the Thailand Opium Zone’. The Geographical 
Review, Vol. 78(3), pp. 241-256. 
Crooker, R. and Martin, R. (1992). ‘Accessibility and Illicit Drug Crop Production: 
Lessons from Northern Thailand’. Journal of Rural Studies, Vol. 8(4), pp. 423-429. 
Culas, C. and Michaud, J. (1997). ‘A Contribution to the Study of Hmong (Miao) 
Migrations and History’. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 153 (2), 
pp. 211-243. 
Darling, F.C. (1967). ‘Thailand: Stability and Escalation’. Asian Survey, Vol. 8(2), pp. 
120-126. 
   
 194
Darling, F.C. (1978). ‘Thailand in 1977: The Search for Stability and Progress’. Asian 
Survey, Vol. 18(2), pp. 153-163. 
Dirksen, H. (1999). ‘Solving Problems of Opium Production in Thailand: Lessons 
Learned from the Thai-German Highland Development Program’. In McCaskill, D. 
and Kampe, K. (Eds.). Development or Domestication? Indigenous Peoples of 
Southeast Asia. Washington: University of Washington Press. 
Falco, M. (1996). ‘U.S. Drug Policy: Addicted to Failure’. Foreign Policy,  No.102, pp. 
120-133. 
Francis, P. (2004). ‘Where There is Thunder There Should be Rain: Ethnic Minorities 
and Highland Development in Northern Thailand’. Mountain Research and 
Development, Vol. 24(2), pp. 119-123. 
Geddes, W. R. (1970). ‘Opium and the Miao: A Study in Ecological Adjustment’. 
Oceania, Vol. 41(1), pp 1-15. 
Gua, B. (1975). ‘Opium, Bombs and Trees: The Future of H’mong Tribesmen in 
Northern Thailand’. Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 5(1), pp. 70-81. 
Hinton, P. (1983). ‘Why the Karen Do Not Grow Opium: Competition and 
Contradiction in the Highlands of North Thailand’. Ethnology, Vol. 22:1. pp.1-17. 
Holahan, J. and Henningen, P. (1972). ‘The Economics of Heroin’. In The Ford 
Foundation. (Ed.). Dealing with Heroin: A Report to the Ford Foundation. London: 
Praeger Publishers. 
Kampe, K. (1992). ‘Development, Bureaucracy and Life on the Margins’. Pacific 
Viewpoint, Vol. 33(2), pp. 159-164. 
Kammerer, C.A. (1988). ‘Of Labels and Laws: Thailand's Resettlement and 
Repatriation Policies’. Cultural Survival, Vol. 12(4), pp. 7-12 
Kesmanee, C. (1994). ‘Dubious Development Concepts in the Thai Highlands: The 
Chao Khao in Transition’. Law & Society Review, Vol. 28(3), pp. 678-690. 
King, D.E. (1997). ‘Thailand in 1996: Economic Slowdown Clouds Year’. Asian 
Survey, Vol. 37(2), pp. 160-166.  
Kunstadter, P. (2000). ‘Changing Patterns of Economics Among Hmong in Northern 
Thailand 1960-1990’. In Michaud, J. (Ed.). Turbulent Times and Enduring Peoples: 
Mountain Minorities in the South-East Asian Massif. Surrey: Curzon Press. 
Kuzmarov, J. (2008). ‘From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency: Vietnam and the 
International War on Drugs’. The Journal of Policy History, Vol. 20(3), pp. 343-378. 
Marks, T. (1973). ‘The Meo Hill Tribe Problem in North Thailand’. Asian Survey, Vol. 
13(10), pp. 929-944. 
   
 195
McCaskill, D. and Kampe, K. (1999). Development or Domestication? Indigenous 
Peoples of Southeast Asia. Washington: University of Washington Press. 
McCoy, A. (2003). The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. 
Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books. 
Montesano, M.J. (2001). ‘Thailand in 2001: Learning to Live with Thaksin?’ Asian 
Survey, Vol. 42(1), pp. 90-99.  
Niksch, L.A. (1989). ‘Thailand in 1988: The Economic Surge’. Asian Survey, Vol. 
29(2), pp. 165-173.  
Nuechterlein, D.E. (1967). ‘Thailand: Another Vietnam?’. Asian Survey, Vol. 7(2), pp. 
126-130. 
Prasirksuk, K. (2009). ‘Thailand in 2008: the Crises Continues’. Asian Survey, Vol. 
49(1), pp. 174–184. 
Prasirksuk, K. (2010). ‘Thailand in 2009: Coloured by Turbulence’. Asian Survey, Vol. 
50(1), pp. 203-210. 
Punyaratabandhu-Bhakdi, S. (1984). ‘Thailand in 1983: Democracy, Thai Style’. Asian 
Survey, Vol. 24(2), pp. 187-194.  
Renard, R. (1994). ‘The Monk, the Hmong, the Forest, the Cabbage, Fire and Water: 
Incongruities in Northern Thailand Opium Replacement’. Law & Society Review, 
Vol. 28(3), pp. 657-664. 
Renard, R. (1999). ‘The Making of the Problem: Narcotics in Mainland Southeast 
Asia’. In McCaskill, D. and Kampe, K. (Eds.). Development or Domestication? 
Indigenous Peoples of Southeast Asia. Washington: University of Washington Press. 
Renard, R. (2001). Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000: A Thirty Year Journey. 
Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.  
Snitwongse, K. (1995). ‘Thailand in 1994: The Trials of Transition’. Asian Survey, Vol. 
35(2), pp. 194-200.  
Tapp, N. (1982). ‘How to Stop Opium Farming?’. RAIN, No. 48, pp. 11-12. 
Thongtham, C.N. (1992). ‘Fruitful Harvest from Alternative Crop’s’. In Smith, M. and 
Thongtham, C.N. (Eds.). Why People Grow Drugs. London: Panos Publications Ltd. 
Vongchak, T., Kawichai, S., Sherman, S., Celentano, D.D., Sirisanthana, L.C., 
Wiboonnatakul, K., Srirak, N., Jittiwutikarn, J. and Aramrattana, A. (2005). ‘The 
influence of Thailand’s 2003 “War on Drugs” Policy on Self-Reported Drug Use 
Among Injection Drug Users in Chiang Mai, Thailand’. International Journal of 
Drug Policy. Vol. 16, pp. 115–121. 
   
 196
Wishart, D. (1974). ‘The Opium Poppy: The Forbidden Crop’. Journal of Geography, 
Vol. 73(1) 14-25. 
Intergovernmental organisation 
Bendiksen, L. (2002). ‘Marketing - The Bottleneck of Opium Eradication?’. 
Experiences from East Asia in Marketing Alternative Development Products. Opium 
Farming and Poverty as Market Failures: Experiences in the Mekong Region on 
Marketing and Micro-Credit for Alternative Development. Regional Seminar on 
Alternative Development: Sharing Experiences and Good Practices on Micro-credit, 
Revolving Funds and Marketing Held in Luang Prabang, Lao PDR 12-16 March. 
Bangkok: Thammada Press. 
Boonyakiat, D. (2002). ‘The Royal Project Foundation: Agricultural Credits and 
Marketing’. Experiences from East Asia in Marketing Alternative Development 
Products. Opium Farming and Poverty as Market Failures: Experiences in the 
Mekong Region on Marketing and Micro-Credit for Alternative Development. 
Regional Seminar on Alternative Development: Sharing Experiences and Good 
Practices on Micro-credit, Revolving Funds and Marketing Held in Luang Prabang, 
Lao PDR 12-16 March. Bangkok: Thammada Press. 
Bulletin of Narcotics. (1974). ‘Excerpts from Progress Report No. 1 Submitted by the 
Division of Narcotic Drugs for the Period September 1972-June 1973’. Bulletin of 
Narcotics, pp. 43-65. 
Chareonpanich, C. (1987). ‘Integration of Crop Replacement Projects in National Rural 
Development Plan in Thailand’. Regional Seminar on Replacement of Opium Poppy 
Cultivation December 14-19 1987. Chiang Mai; UNDP. 
Chanthanom-Good, S. (2003). ‘Engendering Alternative Development: Emerging 
Strategies for Sustainable Practices in Southeast Asia’. Emerging Gender Strategies 
for Alternative Development.  Regional Seminar on Alternative Development: 
Information Networking and Sharing Good Practices on Gender and Development, 
Chiang Mai, 29-31 October. Bangkok: UNODC. 
Chotpimai, Y. (1987). ‘Third Army Area Narcotics Crops Cultivation Control 
Programme’. Regional Seminar on replacement of Opium Poppy Cultivation 
December 14-19 1987. Chiang Mai; UNDP. 
CND. (1949). Summary of Annual Reports of Governments. New York: CND. 
CND. (1953). Summary of Annual Reports of Governments. New York: CND. 
   
 197
CND. (1956). Summary of Annual Reports of Governments Relating to Opium and 
Other Narcotic Drugs. Geneva: CND. 
De Meer, C. (1987). ‘Problems and Progress in Crop Replacement in Burma, Pakistan 
and Thailand, 1972-1987; A Review’. Regional Seminar on replacement of Opium 
Poppy Cultivation December 14-19 1987. Chiang Mai; UNDP. 
Dirksen, H. (2001). ‘Thai-German Highland Development Program (TG-HDP) in 
Northern Thailand’. Alternative Development: Sharing Good Practices Facing 
Common Problems. Regional Seminar on Alternative Development for Illicit Crop 
Eradication Policies, Strategies and Actions 16-19 July 2001. Myanmar: UNDCP.  
Dirksen, H. (2002). ‘Some Lessons from Northern Thailand: With Special Reference to 
the Thai-German Highland Development Programme’. Experiences from East Asia in 
Marketing Alternative Development Products. Opium Farming and Poverty as 
Market Failures: Experiences in the Mekong Region on Marketing and Micro-Credit 
for Alternative Development. Regional Seminar on Alternative Development: Sharing 
Experiences and Good Practices on Micro-credit, Revolving Funds and Marketing 
Held in Luang Prabang, Lao PDR 12-16 March. Bangkok: Thammada Press. 
Gammelgaard, J. (1987). ‘UNFDAC’s Role in Support of Crop Replacment 
Programmes in Asia’. Regional Seminar on replacement of Opium Poppy Cultivation 
December 14-19 1987. Chiang Mai; UNDP. 
Hau, A. M. (2002). ‘Marketing of Horticultural Crops Produced in Mountainous 
Regions of Northern Thailand’. Experiences from East Asia in Marketing Alternative 
Development Products. Opium Farming and Poverty as Market Failures: 
Experiences in the Mekong Region on Marketing and Micro-Credit for Alternative 
Development. Regional Seminar on Alternative Development: Sharing Experiences 
and Good Practices on Micro-credit, Revolving Funds and Marketing Held in Luang 
Prabang, Lao PDR 12-16 March. Bangkok: Thammada Press. 
Jinawat, P. (2001). ‘Thailand Country Paper’. Alternative Development: Sharing Good 
Practices Facing Common Problems. Regional Seminar on Alternative Development 
for Illicit Crop Eradication Policies, Strategies and Actions 16-19 July 2001. 
Myanmar: UNDCP. 
League of Nations. (1937). Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs: Annual 
Reports by Governments for 1937 Concerning Prepared Opium: Siam. League of 
Nations, C.441(a)M.284(a). In FO 371/23581. 
Mangat, M. (2003). ‘Vision Extends from the Hills of Thailand to the Mountains of 
Afghanistan: Sharing Good Practices’. Eastern Horizons. September, pp. 21-23. 
   
 198
Nepote, J. (1976). ‘In the Golden Triangle with a Handful of Dollars’. Bulletin on 
Narcotics. Vol. 28(1), pp. 1-8. 
Pleumpamya, S. (2009). ‘The Royal Project Foundation: Towards Sustainable Highland 
Development’. Sustaining Opium Reduction in Southeast Asia: Sharing Experiences 
on Alternative Development and Beyond. Regional Seminar: Global Partnership on 
Alternative Development (GLOI44). 15-17 December. Chiang Mai, Thailand. 
Vientiane: UNODC. 
Piyarom, V. (1987). ‘The Thai-German Highland Development Programme Extension 
Approach Toward Crop Replacement’. Regional Seminar on replacement of Opium 
Poppy Cultivation December 14-19 1987. Chiang Mai; UNDP. 
Rojanasoonthon, S. (2001). ‘Royal Project Foundation’. Alternative Development: 
Sharing Good Practices Facing Common Problems. Regional Seminar on Alternative 
Development for Illicit Crop Eradication Policies, Strategies and Actions 16-19 July 
2001. Myanmar: UNDCP. 
Saihoo, P. (1963). ‘The hill Tribes of Northern Thailand and the Opium Problem’. 
Bulletin of Narcotics, Vol. 15.  
Saengprasert, S. (1987). ‘Opium Poppy Substitution in Thailand’. Regional Seminar on 
replacement of Opium Poppy Cultivation December 14-19 1987. Chiang Mai; UNDP. 
Suvarnasara, C. (1987). ‘Roles of Education for Replacement of Opium Cultivation’. 
Regional Seminar on replacement of Opium Poppy Cultivation December 14-19 
1987. Chiang Mai; UNDP. 
Suriya, P. (2002). ‘Some Experiences from the Thai/UN Pilot Projects’. Experiences 
from East Asia in Marketing Alternative Development Products. Opium Farming and 
Poverty as Market Failures: Experiences in the Mekong Region on Marketing and 
Micro-Credit for Alternative Development. Regional Seminar on Alternative 
Development: Sharing Experiences and Good Practices on Micro-credit, Revolving 
Funds and Marketing Held in Luang Prabang, Lao PDR 12-16 March. Bangkok: 
Thammada Press. 
UN. (1968). ‘The Hill tribes of Thailand and the Place of Opium in their Socio-
Economic Setting: Report of the United Nations Survey Team on the Economic and 
Social Needs of the Opium-Producing Areas in Thailand. Bulletin of Narcotics, Vol. 
20(3), pp. 7-18. 
UN. (1969). ‘The Opium-Producing Hill Tribes of Northern Thailand: 
Recommendations Made by the U.N. Survey Team’. Bulletin of Narcotics. Vol. 
21(1), pp.1-20. 
   
 199
UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control. (1972). Project of Crop Replacement and 
Community Development in the Highlands of Northern Thailand. Programme for 
Drug Abuse Control in Thailand, THA/72/001-007 and 011/A/39/01. British National 
Archives, Kew London: FCO 15/1651. 
UNODCCP. (1999). Global Illicit Drug Trends. Austria: UNODC. 
UNODCCP. (2000). World Drug Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
UNODCCP. (2002). Global Illicit Drug Trends. Austria: UNODC. 
UNODC. (2005). Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation: A Final 
Synthesis Report. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
UNODC. (2005b). ‘Sustainable Alternative Development Beyond Reforestation’. 
Eastern Horizons, Summer/Autumn, pp. 8-10. 
UNODC. (2006). Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Golden Triangle. (Consulted 18 May 
2008). www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html 
UNODC. (2007). Thailand Opium Survey: Opium Poppy Cultivation in South East 
Asia: Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand. (Consulted 18 May 2008). 
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html 
UNODC. (2008). Doi Tung: Thinking Outside the Box. (Consulted 12 May 2008) 
www.unodc.org/.../doi-tung-thinking-outside-the-box.html 
UNODC. (2008b). Opium Poppy Cultivation in Southeast Asia. (Consulted 18 July 
2008). (Consulted 18 May 2008). www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html 
UNODC. (2009). Opium Poppy Cultivation in Southeast Asia. (Consulted 18 May 
2008). www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html 
UNODC. (2010). Opium Poppy Cultivation in South-East Asia: Lao PDR, Myanmar. 
(Consulted 18 May 2008). www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html 
Viravaidya, M. (2001). ‘The Role of Non-Agricultural Development in the Doi Tung 
Development Project’. Alternative Development: Sharing Good Practices Facing 
Common Problems. Regional Seminar on Alternative Development for Illicit Crop 
Eradication Policies, Strategies and Actions 16-19 July 2001. Myanmar: UNDCP. 
Williams, I.M.G. (1979). ‘UN/Thai Programme for Drug Abuse Control in Thailand - A 
Report on Phase I: February 1972-June 1979’. Bulletin on Narcotics. Vol. 31(2), pp. 
1-44. 
Williamson, M. (2005). ‘The History, Operations and Achievements of the Royal 
Project’. Eastern Horizons – Summer/Autumn 2005, pp. 10-11. 
Yodmani, C. (1992). ‘Law Enforcement Approaches and Measures used in Countering 
Illicit Drug Problems in Thailand’. Bulletin of Narcotics, pp. 23-27. 
   
 200
Media 
Bangkok Times. (1935). Extract from Bangkok Times of 13th April, 1935. British 
National Archives, Kew London:CO825/24/8. 
Campbell, C. (1983). ‘Thais Hesitate to Wreck Opium Fields of Tribes’. New York 
Times, 20 February. 
China Mail. (1973). ‘Drug Blockade: Addicts Turn to Methadone’. China Mail, 1 
October, 1973. British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 40/463. 
BBC. (2010). Timeline: Thailand. (Consulted 08 July 2008). 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/southeast_asia/country_profiles/1155813.stm 
Economist. (1969). ‘Thailand: The Other Rebellions’. The Economist, 29 March. 
Economist. (1982). ‘Narcotics: Better than Gold’. The Economist, 13 February. 
Economist. (1992). ‘Thailand: The General Prefers Passion Fruit’. The Economist, 18 
January. 
Hazlehurst, P. (1977). ‘Opium Growers Cash in on Coffee’. The Times, 18 May. 
Hong Kong Standard. (1973). ‘Thai’s Lag in War on Drugs’. Hong Kong Standard, 1 
October 1973. British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 40/463. 
Kelly, N. (1981). ‘Bombs May be Used to Destroy this Years Big Opium Harvest’. The 
Times, 26 February.  
Kelly, N. (1982). ‘Less Heroin this Year? Thai Army Attacks Opium Kingpin’. 
Christian Science Monitor, 28 January. 
Krailerg, N. (2004). ‘Success Story of Former Poppy Sowers who now Reap Big 
Rewards’. Chiang Mai Mail, 13 November. 
Leithead, A. (2009). ‘Secret of Thai Success in Opium War. BBC News, 19 February. 
McBeth, J. (1984a). ‘Where Poppies Once Stood: The Anti-Opium Crop-Substitution 
Programme is Being Extended Further into the Countryside of the Northern 
Provinces’. Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 March. 
McBeth, J. (1984b). ‘The Opium Laws: The Government Considers a New Narcotic-
Eradication Drive but Financing Countries want Enforcement Guarantees’. Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 29 March. 
Nardone, S. (2008). ‘From Opium to Arabica’. Bangkok Post, 15 June. 
Silp, S. (2007). ‘Thai Army Finds Opium Fields Ready to Harvest in North Thailand’. 
The Irrawaddy. 10 September. 
South China Morning Post. (1973). ‘Drug Supply Squeeze Hits Addicts’. South China 
Morning Post, 1 September. British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 40/463. 
Times. (1959). ‘Siam Closes the Opium Dens’. The Times, 1 July. 
   
 201
Times. (1978). ‘Thailand may Execute Chinese Heroin Dealers’. The Times, 24 April. 
Voght, M. (2004). ‘Peaches, Pears and Plums Preferable to Poppies’. Chiang Mai Mail, 
22 May. 
National government  
Germany  
Dirksen, H. (2006). 18 years of the Thai -German Highland Development Program - 
Has it Been a Success Story?. (Consulted 15 May 2008). 
www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-dirksen-02.pdf 
Dirksen, H and Kampe, K. (n.d.). Development in a Drugs Environment: 
Mainstreaming – a Strategic Approach to Alternative Development. Unpublished 
draft: FOA, EU and GTZ.  
Mansfield, D., Berg, C. and Bartelt, N. (2006). Development in a Drugs Environment: A 
Strategic Approach to ‘Alternative Development’. (Consulted 15 May 2008). 
www.davidmansfield.org/.../Alternative_Development/.../strategic_approach.pdf 
Italy 
Speranza, G. (1987). ‘Thailand: Changing Crops to Defeat Drugs’. Cooperazione: 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Issue, 63/4, pp. 10-12. 
Thailand 
Doi Tung. (2010).  (Consulted 12 April 2010). http://www.doitung.org  
Harmful Habit-Forming Drugs Act. (1959). (Consulted 15 May 2008). 
http://www.unodc.org/doc/enl/1960-118.pdf   
Harmful Habit-Forming Drugs Act. (1961). (Consulted 15 May 2008). 
http://www.unodc.org/doc/enl/1962-19.pdf   
Lanir, I. (1973). Chang Khian Highland Development and Training Station. The Royal 
Government of Thailand and UNDPAC. Rome: UNFAO. 
Narcotics Control Act, B.E.2519. (1976). (Consulted 15 May 2008). 
http://www.unodc.org/doc/enl/1977-34.pdf   
Narcotics Act, B.E.2522. (1979). (Consulted 15 May 2008). 
http://www.unodc.org/doc/enl/1980-64.pdf   
Roth, A. (1974). Project for Crop Replacement and Community Development: 
Economic Survey Report on Eight Project Villages. Chiang Mai: Royal Government 
of Thailand and UNPDAC. 
   
 202
Royal Project Foundation. (1996). (Consulted 15 May 2008). 
http://www.royalprojectthailand.com/general/english/index.html 
RTG. (1980). Activity Report on Thai/ UN Highland Agricultural Marketing and 
Production Project (HAMP) (1980-1982). Royal Thai Government and UN. 
ONCB. (1990). Statistical Report on Narcotics Control in Thailand 1989. ISSN 0851-
9245. 
ONCB. (2003). Opium Cultivation and Eradication Report for Thailand: 2002-2003. 
(Consulted 20 May 2008). http://en.oncb.go.th/file/about_bg.html 
United Kingdom 
Baird, H.A. (1939). ‘To British Consulate, Chiang Mai, Siam. 6th March, 1939’. In M.F. 
Chapman. (1974). Thailand: First Impressions. British National Archives, Kew 
London: FCO 15/1976. 
Chapman, C.F. (1974). Thailand: First Impressions. British National Archives, Kew 
London: FCO 15/1976. 
Crosby. (1938). to British Legation, Bangkok. British National Archives, Kew London: 
CO825/24/8. 
Crosby. (1938b). to Viscount Halifax. British National Archives, Kew London: 
CO825/24/8. 
Cole, D.L. (1975). Thailand, 1975. British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 
15/2192. 
FO. (1936). Political: Far Eastern Opium. British National Archives, Kew London: FO 
371/20296. 
FCO. (1972). Secretariat for Home Affairs, Hong Kong. (1972). The problem of 
Narcotic Drugs in Hong Kong, Paper Two: International consideration. British 
National Archives, Kew London: FCO 40-360 
FCO. (1973). The Political Situation in Turkey. British National Archives, Kew 
London: FCO 15/1785. 
FCO. (1975). Agricultural Reform and Development in Thailand. British National 
Archives, Kew London: FCO 15/2107. 
FCO. (1976). Thailand, 1975. British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 15/2192. 
Gibson, D.J. (1966). The Narcotics Trade in North Thailand. British National Archives, 
Kew London: FO 371/186181. 
Holiday, L.G. (1957). Her Majesty’s Ambassador’s Visit to Northern Laos. January 8th 
1957. British National Archives, Kew London: FO 371/137058. 
   
 203
Mare, A. (1972). Thailand: Annual Review. British National Archives, Kew London: 
FCO 15/1631. 
Malcolm, A.R. (1929) ‘Copy of Notes Handed to the Opium Commission by Mr. A.R. 
Malcolm, on 7th December, 1929’. In CO. (1930). Situation in Siam. British National 
Archives, Kew London: CO. 825/6/10. 
McBain, M. (1975). The Economic and Politics of Heroin in the Golden Triangle. 
British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 15/2037. 
Pritchard, N. (1970). Reports on Political Situation of Thailand. British National 
Archives, Kew London: FCO 15/1296. 
Sharland, J. (1978). Internal Political Situation in Thailand. British National Archives, 
Kew London: FCO 15/1978. 
Smith, L.B.  (193). to Jones, J.L. (British Embassy, Bangkok):. Narcotics – The 
UNFDAC. 31st May, 1973. British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 40/462 
Stevenson, L. (1953). Notes on Opium Dealing. British National Archives, Kew 
London: FO 371/106920. 
Thammasak, S. (1974). Premier’s Appeal for Peaceful Debate on the Constitution. 
British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 15/1978. 
Train, C.J. (1973). Anglo/American/Hong Kong Discussions About Drug Trafficking in 
the Far East and Hong Kong. Hong Kong, 4-9th June 1973. British National 
Archives, Kew London: FCO 40/463. 
Turnbull, J.H. (1972). Opium Narcotics: A World Survey of the Illicit Traffic. The Royal 
Military College of Science Department of Chemistry and Metallurgy: Technical 
Report AC/R/5. British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 40/462. 
Watts, W.J. (1970). Country Assessment Sheet for Thailand. British National Archives, 
Kew London: FCO 15/1298. 
United States of America 
Cima, R. (1986). Narcotics and the Police and Military of South and Southeast Asia. 
Washington: Library of Congress. 
Committee on International Narcotics Control. (1972). World Opium Survey 1972. 
Washington: US Government Printing Office. 
GOA. (1975). If The United States Is To Develop An Effective International Narcotics 
Control Program, Much More Must Be Done. Report to Congress: B-175425 
GOA. (1988). Drug Control:  U.S. Supported Efforts in Burma, Pakistan, and Thailand. 
Report to Congress: B-225282 
   
 204
Lee, R. (1994). ‘Controlling Production of Opiates: The Case of Thailand’. The 
Economics of the Narcotics Industry Conference. Washington DC: US Department of 
State. 
Morlock, G.A. (1944). ‘Limitation on the Production of Opium’. Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol. 6(285), pp. 723-727. British National Archives, Kew London: FO 
371/50647 
US Committee on Foreign Affairs. (1973). The U.S. Heroin Problem and Southeast 
Asia. US Government Printing Office: Washington. British National Archives, Kew 
London: FCO 40.461. 
NGO  
Aramrattana, A. and Jinawat, P. (2006). ‘Law Enforcement and Crop Substitution in the 
Golden Triangle’. Development Bulletin, 68. Sydney: Development Studies Network, 
Australian National University. 
Barclays Bank. (1976). Thailand. In British National Archives, Kew London: FCO 
15/2200. 
Fox, J. (2009). ‘Crossing Borders, Changing Landscapes: Land Use Dynamics in the 
Golden Triangle’. Asia Pacific Issues, No. 92. 
Kanjan, C. and Kaewchote, J. (2004). Communities for Watershed Protection. Asia 
Forest Network. (Consulted 20 July 2010). www.asiaforestnetwrok.org.  
Miles, D. (2007). The Violent Suppression of Opium Cultivation, New Mandola. 
(Consulted 20 July 2009). 
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2009/05/05/doug-miles-on-the-violent-
supression-of-opium-cultivation/ 
MSN. (2011). Currency Converter. (Consulted 15 February 2011).  
http://investing.money.msn.com/investments/currency-exchange-
rates/?symbol=%2fTHBUS  
Potulski, N. (1991). Alternative Crops for Drug-Growing Areas in Asia (Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Nepal, Thailand). London: ODA and International Centre for 
Underutilized Crops. 
Personal communications 
Dirksen, H. (2010). Personal communication via email, 12 January 2010. 
Renard, R. (2010). Personal communication via email, 19 June 2010. 
 
   
 205
8. Pakistan 
8.1. Background and context 
Before partition in 1947, opium production was prohibited in the territories constituting 
present day Pakistan. While there was some production in the Tribal1 and Merged2 
Areas of NWFP3 to meet the demand of domestic consumers (Qayyum, 1993; Qureshi, 
1982) the scarcity of reports of resistance to prohibition may signify the unimportance 
of opium as a cash crop (see Haq, 1996; McCoy, 2003).  
After partition, India inherited all major opium producing regions and agreed to 
export opium to Pakistan (Magnussen et al., 1980).4 However, in 1955 India prohibited 
exports intended for non-medical/scientific consumption; including Pakistan (Hardesty, 
1992) whose state monopoly sold opium for quasi-medical and recreational purposes 
(Wright, 1954).  
However, Pakistan inherited India’s administrative and judicial opium control system 
(Windle, 2011) and immediately licensed farmers to cultivate 0.25ha of opium poppy 
(CND, 1947) for the production of seeds. Then between 1949 and 1951 small 
experimental farms were unsuccessfully (Wright, 1954) established under Government 
license and supervision (CND, 1950, 1951, 1953).  
In 1950, After 1955, the Lahore Opium Factory was constructed and, under the 
Opium Act of 1857, farmers were licensed in the Punjab Province to produce opium. 
                                                 
1
 At partition, the legally autonomous Tribal Agencies became administered as FATA (Qayyum, 
1993). Under the Constitution (Murphy, 1983) while FATA is legally part of Pakistan, federal 
laws are only applicable if ordered by the President and must be administered by tribal Jirga’s; 
a Pashtun customary dispute resolution mechanisms (Wardak, 2006). In ‘Protected Areas’ of 
FATA, Political Agents have authority to administer or reject Jirga decisions whilst in ‘Non-
Protected Areas’ the state has no authority over Jirga decisions (GoP, 2009). Political Agents 
are essentially diplomats (Embree, 1977) between the GoP and individual tribes who: 
coordinate development projects; have authority over state administered areas (i.e. roads and 
state buildings); and can administer force if national interests are threatened (Crises Group, 
2006). 
2
 Merged Areas posses some tribal autonomy whilst being subject to a greater width of 
federal legislation than FATA Agencies (Murphy, 1983; Qayyum, 1993).  
3
 As of 2010 renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. 
4
 Opium was also illicitly imported from Afghanistan (CND, 1947, 1950, 1951). 
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This turned out to be ineffective and the license was transferred to three Settled Areas5 
of NWFP: Peshawar, Mardan and Islamabad (Khan, 1982). Individual farmers were 
licensed to cultivate a specified plot of land (CND, 1956, 1964) under the 
administration and monitoring of a village Lambadar (representative) (Asad and Harris, 
2003). The Excise Department of the Frontier Province collected, processed and 
eventually redistributed the opium to licensed vends (Hasnain 1982; Khan and Wadal, 
1977).  
That yields were initially very low (Haq, 2000) suggests a likely combination of 
inefficient, under-resourced and inexperienced farmers, and high-levels of diversion 
(Asad and Harris, 2003). Diverted and illicitly produced opium was sold to licensed 
vends to supplemented their licit stocks  (Haq, 2000; INCB, 1977; Khan, 1982; Murphy, 
1983; UNODCCP, 2000) or neighbouring states, predominantly Iran (Murphy, 1983; 
UN, 1966). As demand increased during the 1960s diverted and illicit production in un-
licensed areas increased (INCB, 1971; Khan, 1991). 
To conform to international law the 1967 Dangerous Drugs Rules updated colonial 
legislation to provide for a gradual restriction of consumption to those with medical 
prescriptions, and for a short time the licit trade was ‘reasonably well controlled’ 
(INCB, 1976:13). However, controls on licensed vends and production (Qayyum, 1993) 
were relaxed in 19716 to a point whereby a British diplomat exclaimed there is ‘no 
organisation and no control’ (Train, 1974:n.p.); the German GTZ (Magnussen et al., 
1980), USAID (Khan, 1991) and, in weaker language, the INCB (1976) expressed 
similar concerns. Increased availability inflated demand for monopoly opium, which 
consecutively increased illicit production and diversion (Haq, 2000; Khan, 1991; 
UNODC, n.d.). One positive enterprise during this period was the inauguration, in 1976, 
of the first UN-Government of Pakistan (GoP) crop substitution project in Buner 
District (NWFP), nonetheless, the project remained somewhat disconnected from 
national policies (Magnussen et al., 1980). 
In the early-1970s Europe and North America’s primary source of illicit heroin had 
been removed through the suppression of French and Iranian heroin manufacturing. 
European traffickers looked to Pakistan as an alternative source (see Ansari et al., 1982; 
Burkhari and Haq, 2008; Haq, 1996; 2000; Hardetly, 1992; Khan, 1991; Murphy, 1983) 
and in 1974/75 the first morphine and heroin laboratories appeared in NWFP and 
                                                 
5
 Settled Areas were Districts of NWFP obliged to conform to the full scope of Pakistan law 
(Qayyum, 1993). 
6
 This may have been motivated by revenue collection for the India-Pakistan War (Haq, 2000). 
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Baluchistan Provinces (Ansari et al., 1982; Choudhry and Bierke, 1977; Hardestly, 
1992; INCB, 1975; 1980; Lodhi, 1994 PNCB, 1975).7 Illicit production and diversion 
consequently increased. 
 
Figure 8: 1. Pakistan: Licit opium production (1947-1979) 
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Source: adapted from INCB (various years); PCOB (various years). 
 
8.1.1. 1979 
Events in 1979 reduced Pakistan’s illicit production whilst increasing its importance as 
a exporter and manufacturer of illicit opiates. The Enforcement of Hadd Order (1979)8 
(henceforth the Order) prohibited non-medical/scientific opium consumption and 
possession - ending the state monopoly. The ban on possession was interpreted as 
applying to production; which was unmentioned by the Order (INCB, 1979). In 1980, 
the NWFP provincial government banned production (Murphy, 1983; Khan, 1991) in 
Settled and Merged Districts (Qureshi, 1982; see INCB, 1979) and in 1979/80, amid a 
period of martial law, the Order was enforced through a surge in: ‘demonstrative’ 
arrests; eradication of crops; the imposition of fines; and ‘constant surveillance’ of 
opium producing areas (Magnussen et al., 1980:29; Khan, 1991). Opium production 
                                                 
7
 Pakistani heroin was first seized in Western Europe in 1976 (INCB, 1977). 
8
 Haq (2000) maintains that the Order was a response to rising opiate consumption and an 
attempt to encourage Islamic conservative support. While the Order was one of a number of 
series of laws passed to formally criminalise Hudud crimes (Talbot, 2009) - crimes that threaten 
the existence of Islam (Baderin, 2003) - it coincided with the expiration of the ‘grace period’ 
allowed under the Single Convention for quasi-medicinal consumption and thus Pakistan was 
conforming to its international obligations.   
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ceased in Settled Areas of NWFP (Khan, 1991) – where state authority was extensive - 
indicated by an opium ‘drought’ rural Punjab (Kurin, 1985). Illicit production continued 
in one-third of Merged Districts (Magnussen et al., 1980; see Ansari et al., 1982; 
Gillett, 2002) and, in Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber Agencies (UNODC, n.d.) where 
the Order was not applied until 1983 (Haq, 2000; USAID, 1984). Merged Districts and 
Tribal Areas were geographically isolated areas and state authority was weak. 
A one-year, a spike in production in 1979 created a surplus (INCB, 1980; USAID, 
1984) which deflated the farmgate price of opium (Magnussen et al., 1980; Murphy, 
1983; Qureshi, 1982); the risk to farmers had increased whilst rewards concomitantly 
decreased. The surplus also increased the number of heroin manufacturers (Bukhari and 
Haq, 2008; Qureshi, 1993). 
Also in 1979, opium production and heroin manufacturing increased in neighbouring 
Afghanistan as a consequence of the Soviet invasion. Eventually, US and Pakistan 
security forces would provide political protection to Pak-Afghan insurgents connected 
to production, manufacturing or distribution9 (see Haq, 1996, 2000; Lifschultz, 1992; 
McCoy, 2003; Rupert and Coll 1990; Sen, 1992).  
The massive refugee migration from Afghanistan and Iran (Asad and Harris, 2003; 
Haq, 2000; Sadeque, 1992; Qayyum, 1993) supplemented growing domestic opiate 
consumption (Khan, 1991) whilst European and North American demand was growing 
(USAID, 1984; Zahid, 1987). 
These converging factors inflated heroin manufacture across Pakistan (Haq, 2000; 
Lodhi, 1994; Qureshi, 1993) and by the late-1970s/early-1980s Pak-Afghan heroin had 
captured substantial shares of the Indian, European, US and Iranian markets (McCoy, 
2003; Murphy, 1983; also Kline, 1982; Parry, 1985) leading the RCMP (1984:19) to 
report:  
 
Pakistan is considered to be the key country in the narcotics trade in 
Southwest Asia; as a producer of opium, a refiner of heroin and a 
transhipment area for narcotics produced in the other SWA countries.  
                                                 
9
 Pakistan’s importance as a exporter of Pak-Afghan opiates increased as Iranian Revolution and 
Iran-Iraq War closed a major smuggling route to Europe (Britto, 1987; Kline, 1982; Murphy, 
1983). 
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8.1.2. 1985-2000 
Opium production declined from 1979 until 1985, when farmgate prices improved 
(GoP, 1983a; UNODC, n.d.). The US GOA (1988) accounted the increase to the 
autonomous legal status of Tribal Agencies10  where much production had been 
displaced by the enforcement of the Order and development projects in Buner and 
Malakand during the late-1970s (see Farrell, 1998; Hardetly, 1992; RCMP, 1989; 
Sercombe, 1995). Tribal Agencies possessed inhospitable terrain and violent resistance 
common (Chandran, 1998; Haq, 1996; Haqqani, 1986; UNODC, n.d.).11 PNCB 
authority in the Agencies was minimal (Chandran, 1998; Murphy, 1983; Ansari et al., 
1982), for example, they could not execute arrest warrants against traffickers 
(Anderson, 1993) and negotiations with tribal leaders were often required before 
interdiction, arrests or forced eradication could be undertaken (Haq, 2000; Kamm, 
1988b). An observer reported ‘there is no police force. There are no courts. There is no 
taxation. No weapon is illegal’ (Galster, 1995, cited in McCoy, 2003:473). Others 
emphasised the removal of martial law in 1985 as a contributing factor (Searsight, 1986; 
Weisman, 1986).  
The initial response to enlarged production was increased eradication in areas where 
crop substitution had been administered (Radio Pakistan, 1998; RCMP, 1988). 
However, after violent confrontations in Gadoon-Amazai, in 1987, the GoP decided 
upon a ‘more cautious’ approach (Mansfield and Pain, 2006:4) and eradication was 
subsequently limited to areas which had received sufficient development assistance 
(GOA, 1988).  
Furthermore, as the GoP was aware that the 1979 intervention had impoverished 
many farmers and was understandable unpopular, in 1983 (Qureshi, 1987) with the UN 
(UNDCP, 1993) the Special Development and Enforcement Plan for Opium Producing 
Areas of Pakistan (SDEP) was inaugurated (GoP, 1983) as the first national intervention 
centred upon a DOA (Qureshi, 1987). While SDEP was primarily a drug control Plan 
(Mahmood, 2010) it was mainstreamed into national socio-economic development 
policy (GoP, 1983).  
                                                 
10
 The 1930 Dangerous Drugs Act and Hadd Order were not extended to Tribal Agencies until 
1983 (USAID, 1984). 
11
 Violent opposition was not confined to rural areas. In 1985, 160 people were killed during a 
riot in Karachi which was reportedly engineered by traffickers to prevent the police from raiding 
their premises (Economist, 1986; Goldenberg, 1986). 
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Additionally, throughout the 1980s/early-1990s major impediments suppression 
included large-scale corruption (Anderson and Khan, 1994; Anderson and Moore, 1993; 
Auerbach, 1995; Burns, 1995; Chandran, 1998; Haq, 1996; Sen, 1992), the political 
protection of client insurgents operating in Afghanistan (Lifschultz, 1992; McCoy, 
2003) and ‘official indifference and incompetence’ (Cima, 1986:7) at all levels of 
provincial and federal government. For example, it was not until 1988 that the first 
heroin laboratory owner was prosecuted (Randall, 1988). Qayyum (1993:12) 
summarises: 
 
The personnel of the [PNCB] became increasingly corrupt and 
inefficient and in quite a few instances they became helpers of 
traffickers….. Before 1990 the action against such corrupt and 
inefficient personal was inadequate and sporadic.  
 
Law enforcement, often involving elements of military assault12 (Bearak, 2000; 
Qureshi, 1993) against manufacturers had begun in 1984 (Cima, 1986) with the 
interdiction of 43 laboratories13 and 248 arrests in Peshawar (Claiborne, 1984). The 
NWFP campaign against manufacturing continued until 1987 when, after 105 
laboratories had been destroyed, manufacturers were displaced to refugee camps in 
NWFP. The refugee camps were raided in 1988 (Qureshi, 1993) which displaced 
manufacturing to FATA (INCB, 1994) and Baluchistan (RCMP, 1988, 1989). However, 
due to the limitations described above, in 1985 Pakistan accounted for 80 percent of all 
heroin seized in the UK (Parry, 1985) and by the early-1990s, Pak-Afghan heroin 
accounted for 75 percent of European, Arabian and African markets and 25 percent of 
the US market14 (INCB, 1994).  
Then in 1988, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ended and the US, without the 
need to accommodate client insurgents, declared a ‘war on drugs’ in Afghanistan 
(Behera, 2001; McCoy, 2003). The US, alongside Britain, France, Iran, and Saudi 
Arabia pressured Pakistan’s compliance (see Laurent et al., 1996; UNODC, n.d.); which 
                                                 
12
 In 1985, between 500-3,500 Khyber Rifles, supported by artillery closed Khyber Agency 
for a month in an assaulted against a ‘heroin kingpin’ (see, Cima, 1986; RCMP, 1986).  
13
 The definition of a laboratory was vaguely applied; of the 43 interdictions no precursor 
chemicals, heroin or opium were destroyed (Willis 1983).  
14
 The Pak-Afghan share of the US market had declined from 64 percent in 1980 (Murphy, 
1983) to 30 percent in 1983 (Economist, 1986). 
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reflected a growing concern amongst the political and religious elites over high-levels of 
narcotics-related corruption and domestic heroin consumption (McCoy, 2003). 
Consequently, Pakistan attempted to disengage from the trade. From 1990 anti-
corruption measures were undertaken in the drug-control apparatus (Qayyum 1993), 
greater restrictions were placed on the autonomy of NWFP and FATA, and measures 
were taken to limit the power of the ISI; the Pakistan secret service which had been 
especially compliant in the trade (Behera, 2001; McCoy, 2003). Additionally, in 1994, 
the PNCB was disbanded for inefficiency (DEA, 1995). The UK and US funded and 
trained PNCB (Murphy, 1983; Parry, 1985) were inadequately resourced with 
inefficient personnel (Choudhry and Bierke, 1977; Magnussen, 1980; NCB, 1975; 
Qayyum, 1993). For example, in 1994: they possessed World War Two rifles but lacked 
ammunition; just seven of 29 vehicles were operational; and petrol money was often 
unavailable (Anderson and Moore, 1993). While its predecessor, the US funded Anti-
Narcotics Task Force, was better trained and resourced (Mahmood, 2010) it continued 
to be hampered by inadequate resources throughout the 1990s (INCRS, 1997, 2000). 
By 1993, opiate manufacturing had been limited to Tirah and Khyber Agencies 
(INCB, 1993). Then in 1995, a series of ‘unprecedented antidrug’ operations were 
conducted: the leaders of three major trafficking organisations were extradited to the US 
(Rohde, 1995:13) and seven major trafficking organisations had their assets frozen 
(Burns, 1995). By 1997, the public burnings of opiates had become common (McCoy, 
2003) and, due to increased law enforcement, manufacturing had ceased (INCB, 1998; 
INCSR, 1997). Forced and negotiated eradication increased significantly after heroin 
manufacturing had been suppressed and a policy objective of being declared ‘poppy-
free’ was established (Mahmood, 2009). 
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Figure 8: 2. Pakistan: Illicit opium production (1947-2009) 
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Source: adapted from, Magnussen et al. (1980); NNICC (various years); INCSR (various 
years); PNCB (various years, cited in Der Meer, 1989); RCMP (various years); UNFDAC 
(1990, cited in Khan, 1991); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC. (2005, 2010). Note: 
grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of success. Missing values indicates missing 
data.  
 
Figure 8: 3. Pakistan: Area under cultivation (1976-2009) 
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Sources: adapted from: Der Meer (1987); INCRS (various years); Khan (1991); NNICC 
(various years); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC. (2005, 2010); Qayyum (1993). Note: 
missing values indicates missing data. Pre-1976 data unavailable. 
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8.2. The Intervention 
Before 1979 Pakistan’s inadequate and often contradictory drug control laws (Malik, 
1982; Qayyum, 1993) were based upon nineteenth-century British colonial legislation 
and designed to regulate licensed production, rather than prevent illicit production (see 
Hasnain, 1982; Malik, 1982). The more stringent 1979 Enforcement of Hadd Order 
(1979), defined, and provided sanctions for opiate manufacturing and distribution of a 
maximum of five years imprisonment and 30 ‘stripes’ (lashes). While production or 
cultivation were not prohibited under the Order possession of 1kg of opium was 
punishable with between two years and life imprisonment, and 30 ‘stripes’ which could 
be interpreted as prohibiting production (INCB, 1979). Furthermore, unlicensed 
cultivation continued to be prohibited under the 1930 Dangerous Drugs Act which 
provided the death penalty (Qayyum, 1993). In 1983 the Hadd Order (Amended) 
increased punishments for opiate manufacturing and distribution to between two years 
and life imprisonment, a maximum 30 ‘stripes’ and a fine (Haq, 2000; USAID, 1984).  
Opium poppy cultivation was officially criminalised by Ordinance No.XLVII (1995). 
The Ordinance which provided a fine and a maximum of seven years imprisonment for 
illicit cultivation and the death penalty for possession of 100g of heroin. The Ordinance 
became law in 1997 (Mahmood, 2010) and was extended to FATA and Merged Areas 
in 1998 (Mahmood, 2009). 
8.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches 
This section shall present an overview of the five primary development projects 
conducted from 1976. The particulars of the projects, summarised in Table 8:1, are: (1) 
Buner Development Project (BDP) (1976-1987) in NWFP; (2) Malakand Development 
Project (MDP) (1982-1990) in NWFP; (3) Gadoon-Amazai Area Development project 
(GAAD) (1983-1992) in NWFP;15 (4) Dir District Development Project (DDDP) (1985-
2002) a Merged Area of NWFP; (5) Kaka Dhal Development Project (KDDP) (1988-
1993) a Merged Area FATA. 
In 1976, the first DODCP was inaugurated by the GoP and UNFDAC in Buner. The 
source of 30 percent of Pakistan production (Qureshi, 1982) a UN aerial survey 
(Boylan, 1978) estimated that Buner produced an average of 150mt, over 4,047-
6,070ha, during the early 1970s (Khan, 1991). Prior to commencement, the PNCB 
(1975:88) conducted a topographic and socio-economic survey which found that opium 
                                                 
15
 Later renamed the Northwest Frontier Area Development Project (USAID, 1994). 
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production ‘barely meets the minimum requirements of the community’ and, while an 
average 35.89 percent of family income was derived from opium, farmers would accept 
alternatives incomes.16 The survey concluded that, regardless of opium suppression, 
economic development was a necessity as it was one of the poorest and underdeveloped 
areas of Pakistan (Queshi, 1982) with a significant annual food deficit (Boner, 1991). 
By 1985, wheat was six times more profitable than opium and yields had increased by 
100 percent (Queshi, 1982, 1987). By 1987, significant tracts of tobacco, sugarcane and 
fruit trees were showing profitability (Potulski, 1991) and between 1972 and 1990, per-
capita income had increased from US$60 to US$160 (Boner 1991); farmers were 
generally better-off (Der Meer, 1989; Nathan-Berger, 1992; Queshi, 1987) and certainly 
no worse off (Mahmood, 2009). While Buner was declared opium free in 1982 
(USAID, 1998) Farrell (1998) found that the reduction no more pronounced, and more 
expensive, than other bans administered after 1979. 
As BDP was a discrete crop substitution project (i.e. not mainstreamed into national 
or regional development plans) its national reach was limited (Der Meer, 1987; 
Magnussen et al., 1980).  Furthermore, the GoP was aware that the 1979 intervention 
had impoverished many farmers and was understandable unpopular. In response to 
criticism of Buner and the 1979 intervention, the GoP began to develop a national 
intervention centred upon a DOA (Qureshi, 1987) and in 1983, the UN supported 
(UNDCP, 1993), Special Development and Enforcement Plan for Opium Producing 
Areas of Pakistan (SDEP) (GoP, 1983) was launched. While the primary objective of 
SDEP remained opium suppression (Mahmood, 2010) by creating a Special 
Development Unit to coordinate and monitor all DODCP’s (GoP, 1983; USAID, 1994), 
drug control was mainstreamed into provincial rural development projects; particularly 
the Special Development Plan for Tribal Areas - a general development plan to improve 
the physical infrastructure of remote areas (Khan, 1991). 
During the 1970s Malakand had produced an average of 30-35mt over 3,000-4,789ha 
(see UNODC, n.d.; Qureshi, 1987), this had been reduced by the 1979 intervention to 
8,150kg over 445ha (GOA, 1988). On hearing, that Buner had received assistance 
farmers in Malakand District lobbied for compensation for loss of earnings (Qureshi, 
1982). In response, USAID negotiated development assistance in exchange for the 
complete cessation of production (Qureshi, 1982; UNODC, n.d.). The MDP declared 
                                                 
16
 Forty-seven percent reported that they would resist eradication and would prefer suicide to the 
loss of opium profits (PNCB, 1975).  
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the District was declared poppy free in 1985 (Khan, 1991; Mahmood, 2009) and 
reported an ‘enhanced quality of life’ (GOA, 1988:20). 
In 1983, Gadoon-Amazai was highly impoverished, imported 80 percent of its food 
(USAID, 1994) and produced 50 percent of Pakistan’s opium (Mahmood, 2009). 
GAAD, which began in 1984, reduced food imports to 15 percent (USAID, 1994), 
brought ‘the local economy…. significantly closer to the mainstream of the Pakistan 
economy’ than it had been in 1983 (Odell, 1991:2) and established crops which netted 
double the profit than could be secured from opium (Khan, 1987). Gadoon-Amazai was 
declared opium free in 1988 (Mahmood, 2009; UNODC, n.d.).  
Suppression in Buner displaced production to Dir District (Mahmood, 2010) which 
had begun commercial opium production in 1980 (Qureshi, 1987). The DDDP was the 
first project undertaken under the SDEP with a stated objective to:  
 
provide sufficient development benefits to persuade the majority of 
farmers to end their cultivation…and to allow the enforcement of the 
poppy ban on those who persist, with minimal use of coercion (GoP, 
1983b). 
 
Pre-project research found that farming in Dir was relatively efficient; private 
development projects operated by the Pakistan Tobacco Company had already provided 
farmers with sufficient irrigation and fairly sophisticated crop varieties (HTSL, 
1984:21). Nonetheless, during the life of DDDP Dir became the third wealthiest district 
in NFWP; prior to initiation, 50 percent of the population had lived below the poverty 
line (UNODCCP, 2000; also Gillett, 2001). Furthermore, licit crops were more 
profitable than opium (Segare, 1998) and social welfare provisions had improved 
(Mansfield et al., 2006). While illicit production initially increased between 1985 and 
1991 from 41.6mt to 70.4mt - increased at five times the national average during phase 
one (Farrell, 1998) - Dir was declared poppy-free in 1997 (UNODC, n.d.). 
Suppression in Gadoon-Amazai (USAID, 1994) and Buner (Mahmood, 2009) 
displaced production to Kaka Dhal (USAID, 1994); a decidedly underdeveloped Tribal 
Agency (GoP, 1983b). While the USAID (1994) end of project evaluation offered no 
indication of success in terms of either suppression or development, Mahmood (2009) 
reported the area as poppy free by 1995. However, in 2006, Kaka Dhal was Pakistan’s 
second largest source of opium (INCSR, 2006). This resurgence was partly attributable 
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to the inability of the state to enforce prohibition due to increased insurgent activity, this 
said, production remained significantly lower than pre-1995 (Mahmood, 2010). 
Under SDEP, projects were undertaken in Chitral (GoP, 1983a), FATA (Bajaur and 
Mohmand) (GoP, 1983c) and Mansehra (GoP, 1983d). The FATA Project began in 
1989 – at which point the two Agencies produced approximately 80 percent of 
Pakistan’s opium - and focussed primarily on building infrastructure to facilitate crop 
eradication. Some irrigation, crop distribution and drinking water projects were 
undertaken. The majority of funding came from the US and by 2001, it was reported 
that both Agencies were ‘effectively’ poppy-free (UNODC, n.d.). However, in 2003, 
several communities continued to oppose eradication (McDonald, 2003). 
8.2.2. Law enforcement approaches 
In 1979/80, licit and illicit opium production was suppressed in Settle and some Merged 
Districts of NWFP. The intervention centred upon a law enforcement approach (Khan, 
1991) which included: forced eradication; the financial punishment of farmers; and 
extensive surveillance of opium farming communities (Magnussen et al., 1980).17 The 
sudden removal of an important cash crop without recourse to support for alternative 
incomes economically harmed many farmers (Murphy, 1983) forcing negative coping 
strategies such as, the sale of livestock and migration for labour (Sajidin and Qureshi, 
1982; Qureshi, 1982).  
Depending on the terrain and the possibility of violent confrontation (Keyser et al., 
1993), eradication was mostly undertaken by mechanical ploughing (Qureshi, 1987; see 
Zahid, 1987) or beating with sticks (Mahmood, 2010),18 this said, more often than not, 
crops were voluntarily eradicated after negotiations with tribal leaders (Kamm, 1988b). 
As of 1987, herbicides were sprayed (Asad and Harris, 2003; Economist, 1986; Kamm, 
1988; Khan, 1991; NNICC, 1988; Qureshi, 1993) from US-supplied aircraft, flown by 
                                                 
17
 Depending on the subdivision, between 86-100 percent of opium farmers who responded to a 
survey in Gilgit (Northern Area) proclaimed they had ceased production in 1979 in response to 
the Order. Furthermore, many respondents expressed anxiety that the questionnaire could be 
used against them by the state; indicating not only a limitation of the findings, but potentially 
the repressive nature of enforcement in the Northern Areas (Sajidin and Qureshi, 1982). This 
said, as authoritarian military administration had been the norm since partition (ICG, 2007) 
Gilgit may have represented an extreme example of suppression. 
18
 One journalist reported the ‘bombardment’ of villages with heavy artillery (Girardet, 1989). 
As even the more critical accounts of the intervention fail to mention military artillery attacks 
on opium farmers, this may represent an isolated event or a misconception of aerial fumigation. 
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the Pakistani airforce (Sadeque, 1992) and supported by ground troops. While the US 
were critical of Pakistan for insufficient use of aerial eradication (GOA, 1988) the mid-
term evaluation of DDDP criticized the strategy as counterproductive (Mahmood, 2009) 
especially for the approaches impact on Gadoon-Amazai (Mahmood, 2010). Several 
incidents of violent protests against aerial eradication were recorded in the late-
1980s/late-1990s (Assad and Harris, 2003; Chouvy, 2009), most notable, farmers in 
Gadoon-Amazai attacked planes and escorting helicopters with mounted anti-aircraft 
guns (Haq, 2000). 
While the Hadd Order was enacted three years into the life of BDP, ‘no rigorous 
enforcement of the poppy ban had to be carried out during the life of the project’. 
Throughout the life of the project, the consent of local elites was negotiated so that, in 
exchange for development, farmers would gradually cease production. During the 
project local criminal justice resources were improved in anticipation of eventual 
eradication (UNODC, n.d.:12) and in the latter stages, after advanced warnings (Khan, 
1982), forceful eradication of opium which had been intercropped with project 
supported crops was administered (Nathan-Berger, 1992; UNODC, n.d.). Farmers found 
cultivating opium after BDP had ended were prosecuted (Mahmood, 2009).  
In the USAID administered projects (i.e. MDP and GAAD) communities, signed 
conditionality clauses specify the prompt cessation of opium production in exchange for 
developmental assistance (GOA, 1988; Williams and Rudel, 1988; Qureshi, 1982).19 
Forced eradication - some of which was aerially administered (Keyser et al., 1993) - 
was conducted in both projects (Williams and Rudel, 1988). In Gadoon-Amazai in 1986 
(three years after project inception): 8-26 people were killed; 100-120 were arrests; 150 
were injured; and a military helicopter was destroyed during a clash between 4,500 and 
10,000 Pakistani soldiers/paramilitaries and 20,000 to 0,000 tribal militia20 (while 
                                                 
19
 All USAID administered development projects, whether concerned with opium suppression 
or not, contained clauses that finances would be withdrawn if any opium were found growing in 
the project area (GOA, 1988; USAID, 1994). For example, a project in Bajaur Agency was 
suspended when villagers refused to cease opium production (William and Rudel, 1988). 
20
 The PNCB maintained that resistance was facilitated by landowners and corrupt politicians 
connected to the trade (Goldenberg, 1986; also Haqqani, 1986). Assad and Harris (2003), 
conversely, claimed that the impetus to the conflict was a perception by farmers that funding 
was being stolen by project officials and politicians, and that eradication was being used against 
political opponents (also Searsight, 1986).  
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specifics differ see Assad and Harris, 2003; Brodie, 1986; Cima, 1986; Haq, 2000; 
Goldenberg, 1987; New York Times, 1986; Keyser et al., 1993; RCMP, 1987; USAID, 
1994). How the conflict ended and project summed is contested. The end-of-project 
USAID report indicated that the project had to ‘buy its way back in’ (Keyser et al., 
1993:x), possible by compensation (Der Meer, 1989); the Karachi Home Service (1986) 
similarly noted how opium was voluntary eradicated after negotiation. Conversely, 
Khan (1991:126) reported a more effectively planned and ‘much more massive drive’ 
was undertaken whereby all opium was eradicated ‘to the last leaf’ which increased 
production risks. However, after the conflict the GoP decided that a ‘more cautious’ 
approach was required (Mansfield and Pain, 2006:4) and eradication was subsequently 
limited to areas which had received development assistance (GOA, 1988).  
In all SDEP projects (i.e. Chitral, FATA and DDDP, and BDP from 1983) law 
enforcement/eradication followed developmental progress (Boner, 1991). For example, 
farmers in FATA were given a six year grace period (Pakistan Television, 1995). 
Throughout SDEP projects the GoP decided each September where to prohibit 
cultivation. Political Agents met tribal leaders and farmers to inform them: of the 
enforcement schedule; that their crops would be eradicated; of the alternative income 
opportunities available; and that they could be prosecuted, whilst highlighting the 
economic risks eradication and prosecution posed. These were reiterated in meetings in 
November and January (see Boner, 1991; Qureshi, 1987; Zahid, 1987; Williams and 
Rudel, 1988).  
Prior to the village meetings, military troops were deployed to advertise the 
commitment and willingness to use force. The PNCB and local officials then surveyed 
project areas and identified crops were eradicated; an aerial surveillance identified 
unseen fields (Qureshi, 1987). Any re-cultivation or resistance to eradication was 
‘severely dealt with by the law enforcement agencies’ (Zahid, 1987:105); which may 
indicate the high-levels of torture in police custody (see Annex 1:5) and Hadd 
                                                                                                                                               
Mansfield (2004:171) notes how, due to an over-reliance on the Pakistan media, Asad and 
Harris’s research often took a ‘conspiratorial tone’. However, as Asad (a Pashtun) met and 
interviewed several NWFP opium farmers he may have developed an insight into the corruption 
of development work which non-Pashtun’s could not. Conversely, as farmers may have 
expected more than they received they may have exaggerated perception of corruption. This 
said, the theft of resources claim is supported by an investigation into ‘ghost’ schools and health 
centres in the late-1990s (see, Talbot, 2009). That money was displaced is feasible, to what 
extent would depend largely on the monitoring mechanisms of foreign partners. 
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punishments (i.e. flogging and execution). Conversely, Mahmood (2010) and Rodley 
(1996) have reported that Hadd punishments were seldom, if ever, used and leniency 
was more common. For example, in Bajaur farmers imprisoned for re-cultivation were 
released after promising to cease opium farming (INCSR, 1996). Having to negotiate 
with tribal leaders before arresting a farmer may itself have blocked arrests (Kamm, 
1988b), although if tribes punished farmers themselves to conform to agreements or 
secure economic assistance the punishment could range from a fine to the death 
sentence (although more positively customary despite resolution tends to re-integrate 
the offender back into society) (for the Pashtun Jirga see Wardak, 2006). 
During the first phase of DDDP farmers signed contracts agreeing to a scheduled 
reduction whereby if opium was identified after agreed objectives had been met the GoP 
could eradicate (Mansfield and Pain, 2006; UNODC, n.d.). However, development 
assistance was opposed in several areas controlled by heavily armed tribes who 
maintained that federal laws did not apply (Gillett, 2001; Mahmood, 2009). As the 
reluctant tribes were major opium farmers (USAID, 1994) production increased at five 
times the national average during phase one (Farrell, 1998). However, developmental 
achievements softened opposition and after negotiations with community elites, the 
project extended throughout Dir (Gillett, 2001; Mahmood, 2010). Once development 
had been initiated in the second phase, officials emphasised that aid would be 
withdrawn if opium continued to be produced (UNODC, n.d.).  
However, in 1998 it was found that community leaders were encouraging cultivation 
to attract aid (Mansfield and Pain, 2006). Farmers were ordered to stay inside their 
homes whilst crops were eradicated. As a threat (Mahmood, 2010) 3,000 Frontier Corps 
were stationed in the vicinity. While aggressive opposition to eradication was reported, 
with some shots being fired (learning from the Gadoon-Amazai experience) troops did 
not return fire: a peaceful ‘show of force’ had been ordered (Gillett, 2001:278). As the 
two resisting tribes were held in great regard by neighboring tribes, once they 
succumbed many other tribes conceded (UNODC, n.d.).  
UNODC has tended to report significantly higher eradication figures than INCRS, 
however, both illustrate a general trend of minimal eradication until around 1995/96 
followed by an increased, peaking in 2000/2001 at between 70 and 90 percent (Figure 
8:5). Eradication decreased after 2004 due to re-deployment of resources to counter-
insurgency operations (Windle, 2009). The average of UNODC/INCRS estimates 
(Figure 8:4) suggests that more opium was harvested than eradicated in 13 out of seven 
years, and that on average Pakistan has eradicated 20.25 percent of all opium harvested 
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between 1987-2009; the risk increased between 1996 and 2001 to a 70 percent average. 
Nonetheless, the poor eradication record has primarily been isolated to areas where the 
GoP possesses insufficient authority (i.e. Khyber Agency) and almost 100 percent of 
opium cultivated in Dir District, Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies (INCSR, 2003) and 
Baluchistan have been eradicated (INCSR, 2004).  
 
Figure 8: 4. Pakistan: Opium eradication/harvest ratio (1987-2007) 
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Sources: average adapted from: INCSR (various years); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); 
UNODC. (2005, 2010). Note: no data for 2002, 2008. 
 
 
Figure 8: 5. Pakistan: INCRS/UNODC eradication/harvest data (1987-2008) 
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Source: INCSR (various years); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); UNODC. (2005, 2010). 
 Table 8: 1. Pakistan: Summary of DODCP 
 Basic data 
Community 
involvement 
Roads (km) 
Irrigation / 
land levelling 
(ha) 
Electrification 
Agri-
Training 
Modern 
agri-
equipment 
New/ 
improved 
crops 
Handicraft/ 
alternative 
income 
Buner 
1) UNFDAC, GoP;  
2) UN 
Top-down 93  464 / 578 N.E. Yes To rent Cash 
crops 
introduced 
N.E. 
MDP 
1) USAID; 2) USAID N.E. 24.14 Yes / N.E. 19 villages Yes Yes Cash 
crops 
introduced 
N.E. 
DDDP 
1) International coalition; 2) 
UN, GoP 
VDC manage 
project1 
439 (& 25 
bridges) 
10,100 / 6,700 49 villages Yes Yes Cash / 
food crops 
introduced 
N.E. 
GAAD 1) USAID, GoP;   VDC manage 116 36% increase 52 villages Yes2 N.E. Cash Industrial 
                                                 
1
 Composed of tribal elites in the first phase. There was greater popular participation in the second phase (UNODC, 2001). 
2
 There was a significant investment in off-farm training, especially construction (Williams and Rudel, 1988). 
   
 222
2) USAID, GoP projects (in final 
two years) 
in arable land / 
N.E. 
crops & 
high-
yielding 
seeds 
introduced 
estate3 
Supported 
migration 
KDDP 
1) USAID; 2) USAID VDC manage 
projects 
14 10 irrigation 
channels 
N.E. Yes N.E. Improved 
cash crops 
introduced  
N.E. 
 
New/ 
improved 
livestock 
Marketing 
Safe drinking 
water 
Health care Education 
Livestock health/ 
efficiency 
Research Sequence 
Buner 
Imported 
poultry / 
livestock 
sold 
N.E. To 37,500 
households 
N.E. N.E. Vaccination programme Extensive Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
MDP N.E. N.E. 38 projects N.E. 20 schools Animal husbandry Feasibility Negotiated law 
                                                 
3
 An industrial estate and surrounding infrastructure was built (Mahmood, 2009). The government offered incentives to tenants, including: low-cost loans; a ten-year 
tax holiday; and a 50 percent power-subsidy. However, these were stopped following lobbying from rival business interests (USAID, 1994). As the estate attracted 
few investors, the majority of the machinery was transferred to Punjab and Sind (Assad and Harris, 2003), leaving many newly trained local people unemployed 
(Odell, 1991).  
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conducted built improved study enforcement preceded 
DOA 
DDDP 
Yes Minimal4 14,600 
households 
Basic healthcare  N.E. N.E. Extensive Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
GAAD 
N.E. N.E. To 72,000 
people 
Basic healthcare  142 schools 
built 
Veterinary dispensary Feasibility 
study 
Negotiated law 
enforcement preceded 
DOA. Forced 
eradication after 3 years 
KDDP 
Poultry 
sold (all 
died 
from 
disease) 
N.E. N.E. Basic health 
promotion 
Existing 
schools 
resourced 
Improved veterinary  
services 
N.E. Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
Notes: basic data codes: 1) primary financers; 2) primary executing agency. ‘Yes’ denotes an action unspecified in the literature, i.e. modern agricultural equipment was made 
available in MDP, what was available or how it was distributed was not made apparent. ‘N.E.’ denotes no evidence. Sources: BDP: Asad and Harris (2003); Boner (1991); Boylan 
(1978); HTSL (1984); Der Meer (1987); Khan (1991); Mahmood (2009); Murphy (1983); PNCB (1975); Potulski (1991); UNODC (n.d.); USAID (1994); Queshi (1982). MDP: 
GOA (1988); Khan (1991); UNODC (n.d.); Queshi (1982). DDDP: GoP (1983b); HTSL (1984); Gillett (2001); Guardian (1989); UNODC (n.d./b); UNODC (2000); UNODC (n.d.); 
USAID (1994); Queshi (1982). GAAD: Nathan-Berger (1992); Odell (1991); Khan, 1987; Keyser et al. (1993); USAID (1994); Williams and Rudel (1988). KDDP: Khan (1991); 
Keyser et al. (1993); Nathan-Berger (1992); USAID (1994).
                                                 
4
 While the GoP (1983b) planned to support farmers with market research and feasibility studies on the establishing food manufacturing facilities, HTSL (1984) 
found that marketing was remained limited to farmers selling crops at the farmgate. 
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8.3. Success? 
In 2001, Pakistan was declared ‘poppy-free’ by UNODC (2008) while INCSR 
(2001:VII-23) acknowledged that ‘Pakistan has essentially achieved its ambitious 
goal…of eliminating opium production by the year 2000’. Between 1999 and 2003 
Pakistan produced below 20mt of opium. The decline from the 1979 peak of 753.75mt 
to 9.5mt in 2000 represents a 99 percent reduction. The decline from the 1979 peak to 
44mt in 2009 (the most recent harvest) represents a 94 percent reduction.  Hence, while 
Pakistan resumed production above 20mt shortly after achieving success, it continued to 
conform to the 90 percent reduction criteria. The intervention has additionally improved 
the livelihoods of many former opium farmers. 
In 2003, a resurgence in illicit production was witnessed in Pakistan. While the state 
has been able to limit the damage of this resurgence by eradicating as much as 77 
percent of all opium poppies cultivated (UNODC, 2008) in 2008 virtually none of the 
1,729 hectares cultivated in FATA were eradicated due to the redeployment of troops 
and tribal militia to anti-militant operations (US State Department, 2010). Furthermore, 
traditional resistance by tribal leaders to law enforcement has increased in parallel to 
military operations in Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and:  
 
… it has become almost impossible for the administration of tribal 
areas to engage in punitive action against illegal growers. There seems 
an anarchical situation in our tribal territories. The local tribal 
population has cleverly exploited this situation and thus an increase in 
poppy growing (Fasihuddin, 2010: 119). 
 
That Pakistan has been able to contain a low level of production to one area – 
Khyber Agency (INCRS, 2006, 2008) - and prevent new production areas arising may 
represent a significant indicator of Pakistan’s efficiency and commitment. However, 
The current conflict for authority in NWFP and FATA between Islamist militants and 
the Pakistan state, coupled with high-levels of corruption and, low-levels of 
development and state authority in NWFP/FATA may result in a return to large-scale 
opium production and heroin manufacture (Windle, 2009).  
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8.4. Rival explanations of success  
An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as 
such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how success was realised. 
The extension of the state into formerly isolated areas was central to the intervention 
(Mahmood, 2009; UNODC, n.d., 2008). Several development practitioners (Gillett, 
2001; Mahmood, 2009; UNODC, n.d.) have posited that all aspects of state extension, 
law enforcement and development centred upon negotiations with tribal and district 
elites for access to formerly isolated, autonomous, areas; including the non-
confrontational use of the military (in later DODCP’s) to enforce agreed eradication 
schedules. For Mahmood (2009) the most successful projects were those which allowed 
an initial period of toleration in which development was administered without being 
linked to immediate law enforcement. Taking a wider perspective, UNODC (n.d.) 
posited that reductions were limited until official support for production had ceased.  
Essentially the Pakistan intervention is one of state extension through the 
administration of DODCP’s, mainstreamed with provincial development projects after 
1984. However, a mix of sequences and strategies were used in Pakistan, ranging from 
the enforcement of conditionality clauses specifying eradication within the first year of 
a development project, to eradication in areas which had achieved agreed development 
objectives. Centrally, all eradication, interdiction and law enforcement was negotiated 
with tribal or district leaders, which may be reflected in the low risk of eradication 
between 1987 and 2009 - farmers either ceased production voluntarily or local elites 
eradicated crops in agreement with the state. There is a possibility that police brutality 
and torture may have added another element of risk, however, it appears that few opium 
farmers were prosecuted. 
Thus, while law enforcement played a significant role, eradication would have been 
much more costly, in terms of resources and violent opposition, without the extension of 
alternative incomes or social welfare as leverage in negotiations and as a means of state 
extension. Furthermore, non-negotiated forced eradication resulted in violent opposition 
in 1987, if it had continued it could have destabilised an already weak regime. Thus, the 
evidence suggests that the key components of success in Pakistan were the negotiation 
of all aspects of drug control with local elites and the extension of incentives followed 
or preceded by the creation of a high-risk environment. 
More critically, Farrell (1998) suggests that much of the reduction may have been 
attributable to increased Afghan production deflating Pakistan farmgate prices. Windle 
(2009) found a statistically significant negative correlation between Pakistan and 
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Afghan opium production between 1979 and 2007; suggesting that as opium production 
decreased in Pakistan it increased in Afghanistan. However, Windle illustrates how the 
national intervention reduced Pakistani opium farmers’ competitiveness in relation to 
their Afghan neighbours. Thus, as demand for Pakistani opium decreased local elites 
may have perceived rural development as in their best interest and acquiesced to 
negotiated bans. 
8.5. Case summary 
Between 1955 and 1979 Pakistan licensed farmers in Settled Districts of NWFP to 
produce opium for the state monopoly; the monopoly was poorly controlled and many 
vendors illicitly sold opium diverted from licit farms or clandestinely produced in 
NWFP. During the 1960s, state regulation broke-down further; increasing both 
consumption and illicit and licit production.  
In 1976, the first – isolated and localised – crop substitution project was administered 
in Buner. In 1979/80, the first national intervention was undertaken in areas where the 
state exercised sufficient authority. The intervention was founded upon law enforcement 
and  as there was insufficient crop substitution, the campaign further impoverished 
many former-opium farmers. Production was displaced to Merged Districts and Tribal 
Agencies where state authority was minimal.  
From the early-1980s a number of DODCP’s were administered. While the projects 
differed in substance, crop substitution and, the construction of transport and 
agricultural infrastructure remained significant objectives in all projects. However, no 
project marketed produce for farmers. Parts of FATA and NWFP were (and still are) 
legally autonomous and shielded by inhospitable mountainous terrain (from a counter-
militancy perspective see Tellis, 2008). Hence, a major positive outcome was that 
infrastructural development opened many formally isolated tribes to the state. The most 
successful projects allowed: farmers to transport goods to national markets; individuals 
to search for employment outside of their locality; the state to enforce prohibition.  
A mixture of strategies in terms of sequencing is apparent. American administered 
projects (MDP, GAAD) made negotiated eradication a condition for development aid; 
whereas BDP and SDEP projects allowed farmers to develop alternative incomes before 
enacting coercive mechanisms. Communities were often warned in advance when 
eradication would occur. Forced eradication was undertaken by paramilitaries and in 
remote areas was conducted through the aerial application of herbicides. All eradication 
and development was based upon negotiation with tribal leaders; including the threat of 
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military force. Additionally, law enforcement was also undertaken against opium 
farmers who re-cultivated after eradication or in Buner once the project had ended. This 
said, farmers appear to have been leniently dealt with by the Pakistani criminal justice 
system.  
Using the definition of success as an excess of 90 percent reduction which brings the 
potential production below 20mt, Pakistan can be considered to have achieved success 
from 1999 to 2003, after which production increased to just above the minimal level. 
Pakistan continues to conform to the percentage change criterion. 
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9. Viet Nam and Laos 
9.1. Context and background 
While opium was present in Laos and Viet Nam during the seventeenth-century 
(Nguyen, 2008) production and consumption increased during the nineteenth-century 
alongside migrations of ethnic groups from China (see Culas, 2000; Culas and Michaud, 
1997; Geddes, 1970; Michaud, 1997; Rapin et al., 2003). By 1880, French explorers in 
Laos and Viet Nam reported opium as being produced in significant quantities (Culas, 
2000).   
The French, after colonising Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam), established 
a state monopoly selling imported opium (McCoy, 2003). While the production or 
consumption of non-monopoly opium was prohibited, to avoid conflict, the highland 
peoples of Laos and North Viet Nam were permitted to produce opium for their own 
consumption. Nevertheless, as controls on highland farmers were inadequate, surplus 
opium was smuggled to the lowlands where it competed with the colonial monopoly. In 
1905, to prevent competition from highland opium, the colonial Government attempted 
to procure all North Vietnamese opium. However, the low price proffered by the 
monopoly failed to garner cooperation forcing, in 1918, the monopoly to increase the 
set-price sufficiently to attract Laotian and Vietnamese highland farmers’ compliance.  
While the increased monopoly price initially decreased smuggling to the lowland 
markets, it quickly became common practice to adulterate highland opium with 
imported (inferior) Burmese opium to free better quality Vietnamese and Laotian opium 
for the lowland black market; in 1925 domestic procurement ceased (Rapin et al., 
2003). While sufficient to provoke the monopoly, in global terms illicit Indochinese 
production remained small throughout the 1930s (League of Nations, 1938). 
In response to the severing of supply lines from India, Iran and Turkey during World 
War Two (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949; UNODC, 2005), the colonial monopoly began 
promoting highland production by concurrently increasing highland land-taxes and 
monopoly prices (Stuart-Fox, 1997). However, insufficient controls over highland 
farmers (Dommen, 1971) meant that farmers who had previously grown only for local 
consumption enlarged their production in response to growing demand from both the 
regulated and black markets (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949; UNODC, 2005). While 
Indochinese production grew (Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 1952) on a global scale 
it remained relatively small (Morlock, 1944).  
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In 1946, the French officially prohibited opium consumption and production 
(McCoy, 2003). Nevertheless, due to fear of violent opposition and a lack of state 
authority, highland Hmong and Dao peoples remained exempt from prohibition (CND, 
1952). While the monopoly officially closed in 1950 (CND, 1950) the French 
intelligence agencies operated an unofficial monopoly to finance covert operations. To 
maintain Hmong loyalty during the first Indochina War, opium was procured from the 
highlands and sold throughout Indochina; the surplus was exported by organised crime 
groups to foreign black markets (McCoy, 2003). 
In North Viet Nam, the Vietminh - who were ideologically opposed to opium1 
(Westermeyer, 1982) - prohibited consumption and ordered the gradual suppression of 
highland production. While little information is available on the extent of Vietminh 
involvement it appears that as hostilities intensified Vietminh opposition decreased 
(Rapin et al., 2003). There was some production in highland areas (CND, 1953, 1954) 
outside of Vietminh authority (CND, 1950), however Laos continued to produce the 
more significant quantities (CND, 1952) and in 1953 the Vietminh invaded the four 
Laotian provinces which together accounted for 70 percent of Indochinese production 
(Joy, 1953). That the occupation persisted just long enough to harvest opium (Wekkin, 
1982)2 may suggest that North Viet Nam possessed insufficient opium for either profit 
or medicine.  
Increasing Laotian production during the 1950s was encouraged by external events 
(Wishart, 1974) including the cessation of Indian exports for non-medical/scientific 
consumption in 1955 (Hardesty, 1992) and successful opium bans in China and Iran. By 
the end of the 1950s, Southeast Asia supplied approximately 50 percent of total illicit 
global production (McCoy 2003). 
9.1.1. Laos: 1959-1975 
The direct or indirect, intentionally or unintentional, facilitation of the opiate trade by 
actors of the Second Indochina War significantly inflated Laotian production (see 
Feingold, 1970; Hazlehurst, 1977; Holiday, 1957; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; McCoy, 
1992, 2000, 2003; Westermeyer, 1982, 2004) until at least 1968 when many highlanders 
were displaced from their farmland by intensifying hostilities. While such disruptions 
reduced production in some areas (McCoy, 2003; Westermeyer, 1978) Laotian opium 
                                                 
1
 The Vietminh Declaration of Independence (1945:n.p.) stated that the French had ‘forced us to 
use opium’. 
2
 A practice adopted by the Pathet Lao and Royal Lao Government during the Second Indochina 
War (see, Feingold, 1970). 
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continued to supply (Feingold, 1970; Murphy and Steele, 1971) licit (Lamour and 
Lamberti, 1974) and illicit domestic opium consumers (FCO, 1972) and Southeast 
Asian manufacturers of heroin destined (INCB, 1969; McCoy, 1992) for the swelling 
demands of US soldiers stationed in Viet Nam (US State Department, 1973; McCoy, 
1992).  
Then in 1971, under pressure from the US (Kuzmarov, 2008), opium smoking was 
prohibited (Westermeyer, 1982). Repressive measures were taken against consumers 
and some distributors in urban areas (CCINC, 1972; McCoy, 2003). However, whilst 
production was officially restricted to older highlanders for their own consumption (US 
Information Service, 1971b; also INCB, 1971; 1996; Shipler, 1974) the police tended to 
be ambivalent in areas where they possessed authority while much of the country 
remained a ‘no-mans-land’ under neither The Royal Lao Government nor Pathet Lao 
authority (Westermeyer, 1982). The US improved Laotian interdiction capabilities 
(Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1973) and part funded crop substitution (INCB, 1973) 
and resettlement projects. Modelled on the CRCDP in Thailand, substitute crops were 
extended and farmers taught modern agricultural methods (GOA, 1975; see INCB, 
1976). The projects were hampered by resistance to resettlement and, as crops were 
eradicated through aerial herbicides and bombs ‘served as another source of both 
anxiety and peril’ (Kuzmarov, 2008:362). Consequently, there was some large-scale 
violent resistance (New York Times, 1972; Stuart-Fox, 1997).  
Then in 1973, the US military exited Viet Nam, the subsequent accumulation of 
stocks dovetailed the establishment of a gap in the market due to the removal of 
Turkish/French opiates. The farmgate price increased and Southeast Asian opium 
production and heroin manufacture increased for export to the US and, after DEA and 
Thai interdiction in the early-1970s, to the European and Australian markets (McCoy, 
1992). Westermeyer (1982:274) posits that during this period production shifted from 
‘essentially a cottage industry  ...//... to a large industrial complex’. 
9.1.2. Viet Nam: 1954+ 
In the late-1960s/early-1970s US troops stationed in Viet Nam represented a major 
market; it is estimated that as much as 10 (Murphy and Steele, 1971) to 35 percent of all 
US troops had consumed heroin (Robins et al., 1998). The Vietnamese market was 
supplied from opium produced in Burma, Laos and Thailand; minimal amounts were 
produced in North or South Viet Nam (INCB, 1974; Murphy and Steele, 1971). The 
Government of South Viet Nam claimed that illicit production had ceased in 1955 (UN, 
1966) after an extensive forced eradication campaign (Nguyen, 2008) and (presumably 
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to conform to the US ‘war on drugs’) arrested 1,500 ‘traffickers’ (US Information 
Service, 1971; see INCB, 1971, 1972). 
 In 1971, a US Provost Marshal reported that the Vietminh had regulated some 
farmers to produce opium for medicinal purpose, of which little was diverted (McCoy, 
2003). Nonetheless, the Vietminh did not possess the resources to support the 
establishment of alternative incomes for highland opium farmers. Hence, to avoid 
alienating highland peoples and destabilising border regions a certain amount of 
production was unofficially tolerated in some areas whilst effectively enforced in others 
(Rapin et al., 2003).  
In 1975, Viet Nam was unified as the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (Finklestein, 
1987; McWilliams, 1987). The US Congress (Cima, 1986) and the Chinese state 
controlled media (BBC, 1982; Thomson, 1988; Yu, 1983) charged the Government with 
supporting the production and export of opium for non-medical/scientific purposes to 
cover extensive national debts (the conflict and poor economic management had 
devastated the economy, see Annex 1:8). While the evidence to support these claims 
remains limited to one (alleged) 1982 official Government of Viet Nam (GoV) 
document, alternative evidence suggests that between 1975 (Boonwaat, 2001) and the 
early-1980s the state procured highland opium for domestic and foreign pharmaceutical 
(i.e. licit) consumption. However, the practice appears to have ceased in 1985 (Rapin et 
al., 2003) after which farmers sold their opium on black market (Boonwaat, 2001).  
The extent of production remains unclear. The US Congress declared Viet Nam a 
‘secondary’ source of illicit opium alongside Afghanistan and Laos (Cima, 1986); to 
qualify ‘secondary’ Afghanistan produced 160 metric tonnes in 1984 and 450 metric 
tonnes in 1985: Laos produced 97 metric tonnes in 1985 and 32 metric tonnes in 1984. 
UNODC (2005:8) have stated that ‘production was systemized, and cultivation 
continued to be widespread…. until the early-1990s’ and included Vietnamese data in 
the World Drug Report from 1986 (see Figure 9:1). Conversely, between 1977 and 1993 
neither Canadian (RCMP, 1981-1992) nor US (DEA, 1992; NNICC, 1977-1993) annual 
global production reports mentioned Viet Nam as a source. While Viet Nam was a 
closed society and thus data may have been unavailable to Canadian or US agencies, 
both reports included the equally introverted Laos in their analyses. In short, there is 
insufficient and contradictory evidence to the extent of illicit opium production. 
However, we know that by the 1990s production was sufficiently high to concern the 
Vietnamese Government.  
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Figure 9: 1. Viet Nam: Illicit opium production (1986-2008) 
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Source, adapted INCRS (various years); Rapin et al. (2003); UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2002); 
UNODC (various years). Note: grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of success. 
Missing values indicates missing data.  
 
Figure 9: 2. Viet Nam: Area Illicitly cultivated (1951-2008) 
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Sources: adapted from, CND (various years); INCRS (various years); UNODCCP (1999); 
UNODC (2010b). Note: diagonal line indicates missing data. Missing values indicates missing 
data.  
9.1.3. Laos: 1975+ 
In 1976 Resolution No.3 encouraged all farmers to grow industrial crops; including 
opium. Highland farmers ‘resumed opium production, with full official sanction’ and 
the state attempted to procure all opium (Lee, 1982:209; also Wekkin, 1982) under a 
state monopoly (Boonwaat, 2006; Stuart-Fox, 1986) for domestic and foreign 
pharmaceutical (i.e. licit) consumption (RCMP, 1987; US State Department, 1988). 
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Official encouragement was reiterated in 1986 under Resolution No.7, which declared 
opium one of the countries most important exports (Cima, 1986).  
While information on Laotian illicit production/diversion during the late-1970s is 
unreliable (INCB, 1977; NNICC, 1980) the US State Department (1988:325) reported 
that after 1975 illicit production ‘declined steeply’ and then increased after Resolution 
No.7 (Cima, 1986); possible resulting from decreasing Thai production (see RCMP, 
1988; US State Department, 1988). The post-1975 ‘steep decline’ may have been less 
pronounced than acknowledged as the low monopoly price paid3 likely resulted in 
large-scale diversion and/or illicit production (Lee, 1982). This appears particularly 
feasible if accounts are followed of Laotian military and civil authorities facilitating 
diversion, illicit production and trafficking during the 1970s (Hazlehurst, 1977), 1980s 
(US State Department, 1988; Wayne, 1988; McCoy, 2003) and early-1990s (DEA, 
1992).  
In 1987, a visit by the INCB signalled a return to cooperation with the international 
drug control regime. The following year the first Lao-UN development project 
commenced, then in 1992/93 a joint Laos-UNDP socio-economic survey found that 
opium was grown by 32 percent of villages in 58 of 69 provinces. The findings formed 
the basis of the first national Masterplan (Seger, 1996) - the Comprehensive Drug 
Control Program (1994-2000) (Cohen, 2004; Thomas, 2004) was founded upon a 
‘gradual approach’ which emphasised ‘community-based’ development (Boonwaat, 
2004; Chansina and Raza, 2001) with an objective of reducing production to below 
70mt by 2000 (INCRS, 1996). Opium farming continued to be unofficially tolerated 
(Epprecht, 2000) with farmers permitted to grow small plots for local consumption 
(Kramer et al., 2009). In 1998, nominal interdiction of manufacturers and traffickers 
was undertaken (INCSR, 1999).  
In 2000, Laotian policy shifted with Decree No.14 which ordered the complete 
cessation of production by 2006 (Cohen, 2004), subsequently reduced to 2005 by the 
Communist Party Congress (INCRS, 2002; UNODC, 2005). Opium farmers were 
informed that 2001 would be the last year that production would be tolerated (Lyttleton, 
2004) whilst provincial governors where threatened with dismissal if reductions were 
insufficient (INCRS, 2003).  
The post-2000 approach became known as the ‘accelerated rural development 
programme’ (GoL, 2006; see Phetsavan, 2002; UNODC, 2006) and theoretically 
                                                 
3
 An average yield of 8k per family earned a minimum profit of 3,200kip; a 100kg bag of rice 
cost 3,000kip (Lee, 1982). 
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identified production as a poverty issue by acknowledging that over two-thirds of the 
poorest villages and seven of the ten poorest districts produced opium (Boonwaat, 
2004). However, operational polices prioritised opium suppression over poverty 
reduction (Thomas, 2004).  
The shift in policy is attributed by some commentators to pressure exerted by 
America, China, the UN and Viet Nam (Andersson et al., 2006; Cohen, 2008; Kramer et 
al., 2009). However, equally significant were domestic concerns over increasing opium 
consumption (Lyttleton et al., 2004) and a perception of production and swidden 
agriculture as a barrier to achieving (Boonwaat, 2004; Lyttleton, 2004) the objective of 
rising above the classification of Least Developed Nation status by 2020 (UNCCA, 
2006).  
Figure 9: 3. Laos: Illicit opium production (1978-2009) 
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Source: adapted from DEA (1991); FCO (1972); Feingold (1970); Holahan and Henningen 
(1972); INCRS (various years); Joy (1953); Magnussen et al. (1980); McCoy (2003); NNICC 
(various years); RCMP (various years); Segar (1996); Train (1973); UNDCP (1993); 
UNODCCP (1999, 2000, 2000b, 2002); UNODC (2005, 2006b, 2010, 2010b); Wekkin (1982). 
Note: grey line represents 20mt outcome measurement of success. Missing values indicates 
missing data. 1975-1978 data unavailable. 
   
 244
 
Figure 9: 4. Laos: Illicit area under cultivation (1986-2010) 
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Sources: adapted from, Chansina and Raza (2001); CND (1953); INCRS (various years); 
Soulinethone (2002); US State Department (1988); UNODC (various years). Note: diagonal line 
indicates missing data. Missing values indicates missing data.  
9.2. Intervention (Viet Nam) 
During the early-1990s, the GoV became concerned over increasing opiate 
consumption4  (Rapin et al., 2003) and prohibited opium production and consumption 
under Article 61 of the 1992 Constitution. This was followed in 1993 with Decree 
06/CP which set the provisions for eradication and DAO (Boonwaat, 2001; Vogel and 
Boonwaat, 2001). Production and possession were first criminalised in a 1997 
amendment to the 1985 Criminal Code (Nguyen, 2008) which established the death 
penalty for possession of more than 100g heroin or 5kg of opium (Associate Press, 
2001; FIDH, 2010). While punishments for production were purposefully left vague to 
allow local authorities (Torode, 1997) leniency towards impoverished farmers (Agence 
France Presse, 1997) however as possession of opium was a capital offence the 1985 
Criminal Code could be interpreted as permitting the execution of opium farmers who 
produced - and hence possess - excess of 5kg. This said, convention required that 
criminal liability only be imposed if the farmer re-cultivated after administrative 
sanctions (i.e. warnings, alternative income support or a fine) had been imposed. As 
                                                 
4
 In 1989 a Foreign Trade Office was created to attract investment in infrastructure and oil and 
petrol exploration contracts signed with European companies (Cima, 1989). Thus, a dovetailing 
motivator may have been the improvement of foreign relations. 
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administrative sanction records are removed after one year, farmers are free to re-
cultivate the following year without the threat of incarceration (Nguyen, 2008). 
In 2000, the Law on Preventing and Combating Narcotic Drugs (2000) was passed. 
The Law placed a duty on all individuals, civil and public organisations to notify the 
state of production. The Law obliged the state to ‘help local people effectively reorient 
their production systems’ (Article 8) after eradication, and mandates the military with 
organising ‘activities aimed at preventing and combating narcotic drugs’ (Article 11). 
9.2.1. Development-Orientated Approaches 
During the early-1990s Programme 06 was developed to extend crop substitution to 
communes which agreed to cease opium production. In 1996, the Ky Son Project (Nghe 
An Province) was administered. The Project followed best practice developed in 
Thailand and Pakistan (Boonwaat, 2001:130; UNODC, 2009, see UNDCP, 2001). In 
1994 Ky Son was one of Viet Nam’s poorest districts and the largest source of opium 
(Yamada and Dung, 2005). Prior to project initiation crop substitution and negotiated 
eradication had been administered, however, lack of operational experience had limited 
the previous projects effectiveness, and reduced farmers trust in ability of the state to 
administer alternative livelihoods. While many farmers initially re-cultivated or were 
displaced to Laos (Vogel and Boonwaat, 2001) and China (Zhongguo Xinwen She, 
1995) the project eventually reduced the harvested area from 2,800ha in 1993 to 98.5ha 
in 1997. Production ceased completely by 1999 (Rerkasem, 2002). While the project 
improved the quality of life and food security of many families (Vogel and Boonwaat, 
2001) by the end of the first phase, the district continued to be one of Viet Nam’s 
poorest areas (UNODC, 2009). 
Nationally, before 1998, communes that pledged to cease production received 
developmental aid and/or gradually decreasing compensation (Boonwaat, 2001). All 
development projects contained conditionality clauses (Rapin et al., 2003), for example, 
in Khao Khoang: farmers were taught new skills;, fruit trees were imported; a fishpond 
was built; and irrigation infrastructures was improved. Nonetheless, as profits from new 
crops were significantly less than received from opium many households were unable to 
feed themselves for parts of the year (Poffenberger et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, non-opium farmers began cultivating opium to attract aid (Brown et al., 
2005; Rapin et al., 2003). In response, in 1998, support targeted solely on opium 
farmers was abandoned and aid was administered on a ‘case-by-case’ basis dependent 
on the national poverty reduction campaign, rather than on a communes opium 
production (Rapin et al., 2003). 
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Thus, opium suppression was mainstreamed into national highland development in 
the 1998 Programme for Socio-Economic Development of Communes in Especially 
Difficult Circumstances in Mountainous and Remote Areas. The Programmes objective 
was to develop the 1,000 most underdeveloped communes, which included major 
production areas. Each commune was provided with an annual budget of roughly 
US$28,500 to manage one or two urgent projects (i.e. electrical supplies, transport or 
agricultural infrastructures) (Boonwaat, 2001; see Rapin et al., 2003). The projects 
remained very top-down (Freedom House, 2006) and some involved resettling villages 
into the lowlands (Viet Nam News Agency, 2007). The state additionally improved 
credit access (Chinnanon, 2002), trained farmers in new agricultural techniques and 
promoted: new or more efficient cash crops and animal breeds; handicraft industries; 
and tourism (Tuan, 2001, 2002). Thus, the Government indirectly contributed to 
alternative development (UNODC, 2003). 
Nonetheless, the expenditure per capita on development was lower in opium 
producing areas than the national average (Baulch et al., 2002; Rapin et al., 2003, 
UNODC, 2005) and the lack of alternatives and strict bans reduced many households 
annual income (Baulch et al., 2002; Michaud and Turner, 2000); in general highlanders 
remained the most impoverished of Vietnamese people (see Annex 1:8). The boom in 
highland tourism ‘provided an unexpected opportunity for extra income’; as the GoV 
expanded the transport infrastructure to accommodate the new influx of tourists the 
highland peoples began to sell traditional handicrafts and local produce. Tourism, in 
some areas, became the primary substitute for opium (Michaud and Turner, 2000:91). 
 
 
Table 9: 1. Viet Nam: Summary of Ky Son Project 
Basic data 1) UN; 2) UNOPS, GoV; 3) US$5 million 
Community involvement 
Theoretically high (planning & 
implementing). Mid-term review critical of 
lack of participation 
Roads (mk) 43 
Irrigation/land levelling (ha) Extensive 
Electrification Yes 
Agri-training Yes 
Modern agri-equipment N.E. 
New/improved crops Yes 
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Handicraft/alternative 
income 
Yes5 
New/improved livestock Yes 
Marketing Yes, insufficient impact6 
Safe drinking water N.E. 
Heath care Yes 
Education Yes 
Livestock health/efficiency Vaccinations & improved animal feed 
Research Pre-project survey 
Sequence 
Negotiated eradication before alternatives 
established 
Notes: basic data codes: 1) primary financers; 2) primary executing agency; 3) cost in millions. 
‘Yes’ denotes an action unspecified in the literature. ‘N.E.’ = no evidence. Source: Bendiksen 
(2002); Boonwaat (2001); Chanthanom-Good (2005); Rerkasem (2002); Thai Press Reports 
(2006); Yamada and Dung (2005); UNDCP (2001); UNODC (2003, 2007, 2009); Vogel and 
Boonwaat (2001). 
9.2.2. Law enforcement approaches 
 Since, 1992 the ‘government policy is to eradicate opium poppy cultivation as soon as 
possible’ (Boonwaat, 2001:129) and has centred upon ‘eradication programs, not AD 
interventions’ (Brown et al., 2005:9). Large-scale negotiated eradication began in 1992 
(INCB, 1993). As a large state presence existed in the most isolated areas (UNODC, 
2005) before the cultivated period surveillance was increased (Rapin et al., 2003) from 
already high levels (Avery, 1993; HRW, 1992) and ‘prevention’ campaigns were 
initiated (Rapin et al., 2003). Prevention included: ‘stern threats’ (Brown et al., 
2005:12); propaganda campaigns (see INCRS, 2001; Voice of Viet Nam, 1994); and 
state guarantees to administer crop substitution projects or compensation once opium 
production ceased (Boonwaat, 2001).   
                                                 
5
 The NGO Craft Link provided material and sold produce from their outlets in Hanoi 
(Bendiksen, 2002). 
6
 Commune Marketing Groups and Task Forces were established to assist with marketing. The 
Task Force - composed of representatives of civil and government organisations - directed 
marketing activities within the district. The Marketing Groups educated farmers on marketing, 
distributed market information and liaised between merchants and farmers. However, high-
transport costs and low market-access limited the impact of marketing support (Bendiksen, 
2002). 
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Arrest and prosecution was reserved for systematic re-cultivation (Chapon, 1992; 
Rapin et al., 2003). However, farmers were ‘administratively’ punished (Kim, 1994; 
Viet Nam News Agency, 2002); ‘administrative detention’ is a punishment used for a 
variety of crimes. It consists of increased surveillance and orders to reside (possible 
under house arrest) and work in a specified area (HRW, 1992; US State Department, 
1999). Under the 2005 Penal Code opium production can be punished with 3-6 years 
administrative detention.  
Public execution of traffickers was used extensively (AI, 2003); between 1994 and 
1999, 95 people were executed and 66 received life sentences (Viet Nam Economic 
Times, 1999; see Soloman, 1996; Viet Nam News Agency, 1995).7 This may have had 
an anticipatory effect on farmers.  
In opposition to the Governments claim that few farmers were punished, between 
1992 and 2000 there were several reports indicating how widespread abuse (Human 
Rights Watch, 2003) of highland peoples by the Vietnamese criminal justice system, 
including: police brutality; torture and forced confessions; prison conditions which 
threaten the health of prisoners; the use of shackles (see Human Rights Watch, 1993, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2005; US State Department, 1999).  
Conversely, there are accounts of the military forcing eradication (Associate Press, 
2001; Independent, 2001) as early as 1992 (Chapon, 1992; Kiem, 1994). During the Ky 
Son project eradication was undertaken so quickly and efficiently by the Border Army 
Force that it was ‘difficult for the project to…. fill the needs and demands created 
among the former opium growers’ (Vogel and Boonwaat, 2001:132). Additionally, in 
several areas crops were eradicated before establishing alternative incomes (UNODC, 
2005c). Instances of violent resistance have been reported (UNHCR, 2004); these may 
have been in response to more repressive forms of law enforcement. Since 1992, in only 
two years have less than 20 percent of poppies cultivated been eradicated (Figure 9:5). 
 
                                                 
7
 Between 1997-2001, 335 were executed for ‘drug offences’ while 285 received life sentences 
(INCRS, 2003) 
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Figure 9: 5. Viet Nam: Opium eradication/harvest ratio (1992-2008) 
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Sources: adapted from UNODCCP (1999; 2000); UNODC (2010b). Note: missing values 
indicates missing data.  
9.3. Success? 
Since 2000, Viet Nam has been classified as ‘other Asian countries’ in UNODCCP 
(1999-2002) and UNODC (2003-2010) statistical tables.  Until 2005, the INCRS (2000-
2005) designated Viet Nam a ‘major drug-producing nation’, however, this was based 
upon data collected in 2000 and disputed by UNODC (2005). The decline from the 
1990 peak of 90mt to 2mt in 1992 represents a 99 percent reduction. The intervention 
appears to have negatively impacted many former opium farmers. 
 
9.4. Rival explanations of success  
An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as 
such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how success was realised. 
Success in Viet Nam has been attributed to the ‘active government enforcement’ of an 
opium ban (Yamada and Dung, 2005:14; also UNODC, 2005). Rapin et al. (2003) 
posited success to the centrality of negotiated eradication, extensive surveillance and the 
inclusion of conditionality clauses in non-opium rural development projects; in other 
words, the mainstreaming of drug control with rural development.    
However, national success was achieved before the Ky Son project was initiated or 
DOA’s were mainstreamed into national rural development policies. Furthermore, 
development projects appear to have had little success in alleviating poverty during the 
intervention period and may have worsened former opium farmers living conditions; as 
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Michaud and Turner (2000) suggested tourism for many farmers was the only viable 
substitute. 
It would appear that Vietnamese success was dependent upon a strong state presence 
in opium producing areas. While the extent of forced eradication remains unclear, 
unequal and coercive negotiations involving the promise of aid and ‘stern threats’ 
appear central. The anticipatory effects of the execution of traffickers may have added 
leverage to negotiations.  
9.5. Intervention (Laos)  
In 1990, the first formal, published, drug control law was enacted (Lee, 1982; Stuart-
Fox, 1986).8 Article 135 of the Penal Code prohibited the possession or distribution of 
narcotic drugs (Chansina and Raza, 2001). The INCB (1994) found the Article deficient 
for failure to prohibit production this was rectified by a 1996 amendment (INCRS, 
1996; Lyttleton et al., 2004) and in 2001 opium was first criminalised by an amendment 
of Article 135 which provided a maximum life sentence for possession or production of 
over 5kg of heroin (Chansina and Raza, 2001:21; INCRS, 2005).9  
9.5.1. Development-Orientated Approaches 
This section shall present an overview of the six primary development projects 
conducted from 1989. The particulars of the projects, summarised in Table 9:1, are: (1) 
Palavek Alternative Development Project (PADP) (1989-1996) in Xaisonboun, Hom 
District, Vientiane; (2) Houaphan Crop Substitution Project (HCSP) (1989-1999) in 
Houaphan Province; (3) Xieng Khouang Highland Development Programme (XKHDP) 
(1992-1999) in Xieng Khouang Province; (4) Nonghet Alternative Development Project 
Programme (NADPP) (1992-2002) in Nonghet District, Xieng Khouang Province; (5) 
Long Alternative Development Project (LADP) (1993-2004) in Long District, Luang 
Namtha Province; (6) Shifting Cultivation Stabilization Pilot Project (SCSPP) (1997-
2000) in Houaphan Province.10 
While the UN had intermittently administered small-scale crop substitution projects 
during the 1970s (Seger, 1996; UNDCP, 1993) and early-1980s (INCB, 1981) prior to 
                                                 
8
 As the Communist criminal justice system had been arbitrary and impromptu, documented 
laws had been minimal (Stuart-Fox, 1986). 
9
 The death penalty for trafficking or manufacturing was introduced in 2005 (INCRS, 2002) and 
in 2006-07, 28 were sentenced to death (IA, 2006, 2007). 
10
 For discussion on smaller projects see Bouphakham (2001); Cohen and Littlejohn (2002); 
Domeij-Gaul and Richter (2006); Foppes and Phommasane (2006); Kuhlmann (2001). 
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1988 highland development had been limited (Fox, 1997); partly due to the insurgency 
(Fox, 2008). While the first Laos-UN development project, initiated in 1989, may 
represent a shift in Laotian development policy ‘the actual contribution of drug control 
to development ..[remained]... limited’ throughout the early-1990s (Seger, 1996:46).  
Before 2000, development projects were based on the alternative development model 
established in Thailand (Anderson et al., 2006). Following the experience of Thailand 
the 1994 and 2001 Masterplan’s emphasised treatment of addiction and improved 
medical services to remove the rural opium consumption (Boonwaat, 2004; 
Soulinethone, 2002) facilitating production (INCRS, 2006). However, Laos diverged 
from the model by allowing private companies to establish plantations, by resettling 
large-numbers of opium farmers and placing less emphasis on marketing of licit crops 
(Bendiksen, 2002).  
The objectives of PADP, the first project run in Laos (UNODC, 1997), were state 
extension and opium suppression. In 1989, there were no usable roads or medicine 
dispensaries, whilst markets, schools and clean drinking water were scarce (UNDTCD, 
1991). At project termination the area had become food secure and was a net rice 
exporter (UNODCCP, 2002) and indicators of health had improved (UNODCCP, 2000), 
for example, incidence of malaria had decreased by 40 percent (UNGASS, 1998). 
Infrastructural developments had reduced the journey time to market from three days to 
three hours whilst a number of new crops proved to be 300 times more profitable than 
opium (UNODCCP, 2000). Opium production declined from 3.5mt in 1989 to under 
100kg by 1996 (UNODCCP, 2000). 
The primary emphasis of HCSP was on basic infrastructural development 
(Kurukulasuriya, 2001) including the building of two hydroelectric/irrigation dams 
(INCSR, 1998) and lowland irrigation to promote resettlement to the lowlands (Laing, 
1992).  However, roads had to be rebuilt in 2003; the poor construction was attributed to 
corruption and mismanagement within the project (Lang, 2004). Additionally, 
production increased during the project’s life (Wai, 2009) and in 2003, Houaphan 
remained one of the poorest and largest opium producing provinces (Boonwaat, 2004).  
The objective of NADPP was state extension and opium suppression (Sirivong, 
2001). Part of the project was funded by a private Laotian company that provided 
technical support, seeds and tractors, and procured all crops at a fixed price 
(Soulinethone, 2002). The overall area under cultivation reduced from 332ha to 149.5ha 
throughout the life of the project (Sirivong, 2001). Whilst several crops were worth 
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double that of opium (Bendiksen, 2002), limited the impact of new/improved 
crops/livestock (Thion, 2002).  
While LADP made little impact on opium production (Lyttleton et al., 2004) 
significant improvements in health, education and market access were reported (Cohen, 
2009). Market access and resettlement were facilitated by the building of a major road 
linking Long District to China, Muang Sing and Xiengkok Provinces (Lyttleton et al., 
2004). 
The primary objective of SCSPP was to improve income and reduce watershed 
degradation; opium suppression was a secondary objective. Nonetheless, by 2005 no 
opium was harvested in the project area.  Additionally, the average per capita household 
income increased by 909,000kip and living conditions improved through the extension 
of social welfare and transport infrastructures. However, insufficient market access or 
support for marketing limited the impact of new/improved crops/livestock (ADB, 
2005). 
Chinese Green Anti-Drug Project 
In 1995, China established the Green Anti-Drug Project whereby 300 million Yuan 
(US$43.95 million) and 3,000 agricultural experts were initially assigned to assist 
Laotian (and Burmese) opium farmers. China guaranteed to procure all former opium 
farmers produce (Xinhua News Agency, 2002) and, in 2002, to attract private agri-
companies to establish plantations import duties and related value-added taxes were 
dropped on economic crops produced by private Chinese companies operating in opium 
producing areas (Xinhua News Agency, 2007; see Hu, 2006).11  
In 2008, 40 privately own Chinese companies operated in northern Laos with the 
stated objective of opium reduction (Cohen, 2009). The companies procured large 
tracks of land and established plantations (notably rubber, watermelon and sugar) which 
either employed (Bendiksen, 2002; Mann, 2009) or sub-contracted local farmers 
(Kramer et al., 2009).  
                                                 
11
 An estimated 15 percent of Laotian arable land is rented to agri-companies from multiple 
countries; many are exploitative (MacKinnon, 2008). However, China is the only state to have 
supported foreign investment as drug control. 
The project was temporarily suspended in 2010 for a Chinese Government impact assessment 
(TNI, 2010).   
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By 2007, a reported 66,667ha of substitute crops had been supported in Laos, 
Burma/Myanmar and Viet Nam (Xinhua News Agency, 2007).12 A Chinese newspaper 
has reported that rice yields increased four times, and cropping systems, agricultural 
technology and living standards all improved (Xinhua News Agency, 2002). While:  
 
… enterprises have built simple roads at a length of over 3000 km, 18 
bridges, 500 kg water canals, 30 pools, 13 sanitary offices, 22 schools, 
6 substations and 12 processing plants (Jie, 2009:33). 
 
While the Chinese Government requires that all subsidised companies work towards 
developing opium-producing areas, in practice many companies negatively impact 
opium-producing areas (TNI, 2010). Several accounts maintain that Chinese economic 
interests have hi-jacked drug control and establish unsustainable agri-industries which 
exploit farmers (Cohen, 2009; Tanguay, 2010; TNI, 2010) whilst ignoring best practice 
developed by (over) 30 years of research and experience (Kramer et al., 2009). Some of 
the primary concerns are that weak Laotian legislation and large-scale corruption allow 
plantations to avoid taxes (Cohen, 2009) and regulations protecting environmental and 
workers rights (Kramer et al., 2009; Mann, 2009). For example, uneducated farmers are 
often insufficiently remunerated (Jelsma and Kramer, 2008) while others have been 
coerced to sell their land rights (TNI, 2010). 
Further, the private companies profits migrate from the project area (Cohen, 2009; 
Lyttleton et al., 2004) whilst many are short-term projects designed to make a quick 
profit (He, 2006). Furthermore, private companies have aggressively competed with the 
marketing of NGO or state promoted alternative crops (Kramer et al., 2009). Tellingly, 
some provincial officials partnered with such companies have blocked NGO’s lobbying 
for more stringent regulations or campaigns to raise awareness of workers rights 
(Cohen, 2009). The effect on opium production appears to be limited as the majority of 
plantations are established at lower elevations, close to roads, rather than in high-
production areas (Tanguay, 2010). 
Resettlement 
In 1994 a policy to resettle 60 percent of highlanders by 2000 (Anderson et al., 2006) 
into new or existing lowland villages commenced. The objectives were to reduce opium 
                                                 
12
 The number is likely an underestimate due to inadequate monitoring (Cohen, 2009). 
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production, swidden agriculture and poverty, whilst extending the state (Baird and 
Shoemaker, 2007). While resettlement is officially voluntary: 
 
The terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ fail to adequately describe the 
decision-making process or local context … almost all of what is 
classified as voluntary resettlement in Laos is, in reality, not villager-
initiated. Despite claims that there is no involuntary resettlement in 
Laos, it often takes place after a number of escalating steps that are 
designed to fundamentally influence or coerce villagers to agree to the 
resettlement option (Baird and Shoemaker, 2005:15; see Dze, 2005). 
 
Some resettled to find work in lowland plantations (Fox, 2009) and by 2005, an 
estimated 65,000 resettled after (AI, 2005) the imposition of opium bans (Lyttleton et 
al., 2004; Pathan, 2003). More overtly, there have been reports of refusals to recognise 
village leaders (Bird, 2009), government services being discontinued (Baird and 
Shoemaker, 2005; Bird, 2009; Daviau, 2007) and ‘extreme violence’ in the form of 
military intimidation, physical force, and theft (Daviau, 2007:24; see AI, 2007, Lang, 
2004).  
A considerable number of negative outcomes have been attributed to resettlement. 
There have been conflicts (Daviau, 2007) over inadequate and overstretched social 
welfare, land and resources in new villages (US State Department, 2003) (i.e. safe 
drinking water, Bird, 2009; Khamin, 2000). Unsatisfactory agricultural conditions – 
including higher livestock mortality (Cohen, 2000; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004) - 
reduced food production (Cohen, 2008; Economist, 2005; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004) 
while there were reports of deteriorating human health conditions; most notably 
regarding increased malaria fatalities (Chouvy, 2005; Cohen, 2000, 2008; Economist, 
2004; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Fawthrop, 2005; Khamin, 2000).13  
Some of the negative outcomes are attributable to the inability of the state to 
effectively administer resettlement due to insufficient resources (US State Department, 
2004, 2006), personnel and knowledge of highland peoples (Baird and Shoemaker, 
2007). For example, while migrant’s health deteriorated in Muang Long there was a 
gradual improvement in Muang Sing; primarily due to GTZ funded health promotion 
                                                 
13
 Highlanders forced to migrate to the lowlands in the late-1970s complained of difficulty 
breathing and high-instances of malaria and other diseases for which they had built no tolerance 
(Wekkin, 1982). 
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(Lyttleton et al., 2004). Nonetheless, reductions in production were recorded in resettled 
communities (Cohen, 2000) prior to the post-2000 eradication campaigns due to 
improvements in state surveillance. 
DOA summary 
‘AD programmes and projects have made a visible impact [on farmers]… infrastructure, 
accessibility and…. economic opportunities’ (Chansina and Raza, 2001:23) whilst 
linked many formerly isolated villages to national markets and social welfare (and state 
criminal justice institution) (UNODC, 2008). In a UNODC (2005, 2006, 2006b) survey 
of 181 households, 36 percent of respondents reported positive economic outcomes. 
Female participants were the more positive as they had more time for other activities, 
could work closer to home, and reduced consumption raised male productivity and 
lessened domestic abuse.14   
Conversely, the northern highlands remained the most impoverished area of one of 
the worlds poorest nations (ADB, 2005; Boonwaat, 2006:54) and while several projects 
increased farmers’ incomes, economic development has tended to lag the national 
average (Chansina, 2009; UNODC, 2008). In several areas eradication inflated 
impoverishment (Andersson et al., 2006; Baird, 2005; Chouvy, 2005; Economist, 2009; 
Kramer et al., 2009) and ‘left many people without access to a major source of income 
and livelihood’ (WFP, 2007:21). Representative of the failure of development is the 
mass migrations of former opium farmers to the lowlands15 (Baird and Shoemaker, 
2005; Dze, 2005; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; UNODC, 2006) and that a quarter of 
households in former opium producing areas were forced to sell livestock (UNODC, 
2006). This underdevelopment, and lack of alternative incomes, led UNODC (2007, 
2008) to identify 1,100 villages - representing 416,000 people - as at risk of resuming 
production.  
9.5.2. Law enforcement approaches 
Before 2002, opium production was unofficially tolerated (Epprecht, 2000; Lyttleton, 
2003; Lyttleton and Cohen, 2003). This was due to the threat of violent opposition 
(DEA, 1992) and a policy that emphasised the sequencing of development before law 
enforcement (Sirivong, 2001). Generally, farmers were warned (Pathan, 2003) two to 
                                                 
14
 Similarly positive outcomes were reported in Cohen (2004), Cohen and Lyttleton (2002) and 
Epprecht (2000). 
15
 In Muang Sing Province, an eradication initiated migratory flow was blocked by officials 
apprehensive of depopulating an insecure border-area (Cohen, 2008). 
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three years in advance of eradication (Dze, 2005). For example, in NADPP, Village 
Development Committees signed contracts agreeing to a 50 percent reduction in 
production by project termination (i.e. within ten years) (Sirivong, 2001). While, in 
LADP, a schedule specifying a gradual reduction was agreed, and included a caveat that 
aid would be withdrawn if not adhered to (Cohen, 2004; Winter, 2001). However, in 
2000 Decree No.14 reversed the sequence by emphasising eradication before 
administering DODCP’s (Andersson et al., 2006; Baird and Shoemaker, 2007; Jelsma 
and Kramer, 2008).  
The Government denied using force (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007; Jelsma and 
Kramer, 2008) and claimed that eradication was voluntary (Boonwaat, 2006) until 2006. 
After which forced eradication commenced in areas without access to alternative 
development or where production reductions were perceived as too slow (INCRS, 
2010).  
Between 2001 and 2006 farmers signed contracts agreeing to cease production in 
exchange for developmental assistance (Boonwaat, 2006; Cohen, 2008; INCRS, 2006). 
Contract negotiations took place after local law enforcement, public health and other 
state officials ‘educated’ communities on: narcotics law; the effects of opium 
consumption; and development opportunities available (INCRS, 2006). Once contracts 
were agreed all poppy seeds were seized by the police (Cohen, 2008, 2009; Jelsma and 
Kramer, 2008; Lyttleton et al., 2004) and farmers or village officials ‘voluntarily’ 
eradicated their crops (INCRS, 2009).  
Conversely, ‘strong-arm eradication’ (Lyttleton et al., 2004:95) and ‘draconian’ 
measures were reported (Lang, 2004:n.p.). Negotiations were often one-side whilst 
‘education’ was synonymous with intimidation  (Lyttleton, 2004; Pathan, 2003) and 
included military exercises being conducted close to villages during negotiations 
(Lyttleton and Cohen, 2003; Lyttleton et al., 2004). Additionally, ‘voluntarily’ 
eradication was often ‘encouraged’ by armed soldiers (Dze, 2005; Jelsma and Kramer, 
2008).  
Furthermore, some farmers were threatened with imprisonment (Pathan 2003), 
placed in ‘re-education camps’ (Fox, 2009) – which may have incorporated subjection 
to cruel and inhumane conditions (Annex 1:9) – or fined for re-growing (‘voluntarily’) 
eradicated crops (Cohen, 2008; 2009; Fox, 2009; Lyttleton et al., 2004). Further, as aid 
was conditional on cessation of production village leaders ‘served as police surrogate’ 
and fined or ejected opium farmers from villages (Cohen in Thomas 2006:96). 
Disincentives may have been supported by extensive networks of secret police and civil 
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organisations with intrusive surveillance powers (Annex, 1:9). However, such 
mechanisms may have been lesser in small highland villages. 
A survey of SCSPP, by ADB (2005:165) suggested law enforcement and 
‘persuasion’ were the primary motivation for ending production. However, it may be of 
significance that SCSPP ended before Decree No.14. PADP similarly reduced 
production before the onset of the eradication campaign (Ackerman and Boonwaat, 
2005; Andersson et al., 2006; Boonwaat, 2004; UNODC, 2005b) - possible indicating 
unreported coercion.  
While forced eradication16 was conducted by civil organisations and the military 
before and after 2006 (Baird the Shoemaker, 2005, 2007; Cohen, 2006, 2008; Lang, 
2004) the eradication/harvest ratio remained low (an average of 6 percent was 
eradicated between 2003 and 2010). However, as the data reported to the INCRS and 
UNODC may have neglected coerced ‘voluntary’ eradication. 
 
Figure 9: 6. Laos: Opium eradication/harvest ratio (1995-2010) 
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Source: adapted from, INCRS (various years); UNODC (2005, 2008, 2009, 2010). Note: pre-
2003 data unavailable. 
                                                 
16
 Aerial fumigation was not used (INCSR, 2009). 
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Table 9: 2. Laos: Summary of DODCP 
 Basic data 
Community 
involvement 
Roads 
(km) 
Irrigation/ 
land levelling 
(ha) 
Electrification 
Agri-
Training 
Modern Agri-
equipment 
New/ 
improved 
crops 
Handicraft/ 
alternative 
income 
PADP 
 
1) UNDCP, GoL; 2) N.E. VDC manage 
project 
160 (3 
bridge)1 
N.E. N.E. Yes Yes Cash crops 
introduced 
Yes 
HCSP 
 
1) US; 2) N.E.; 3) N.E. 
 
VDC manage 
project 
N.E. 185 
(irrigation) 
To 487 
families  
N.E. N.E. Yes Yes 
XKHDP/ 
NADPP2 
 
1) UNDCP, Sweden, US; 
2) UNDCP, provincial 
Government 
VDC manage 
project 
58 
(NADPP). 
Inadequate 
(XKHDP) 
N.E. N.E. Yes Supplied by private 
companies 
Cash & 
food crops 
introduced 
Yes 
LADP 
 
1) UNDCP, NCA; 2) NCA VDC manage 
project 
20 N.E. N.E. Yes N.E. Food 
crops 
introduced 
Yes 
SCSPP 
 
1) US, UNDCP, GoL; 
2) Provincial Government 
 
 
VDC manage 
project 
117 85 (irrigation) N.E. Yes N.E. Yes Off-farm 
employment 
                                                 
1
 Maintenance was insufficient (UNODC, 2005b). 
2
 XKHDP and NADP were administered in close cooperation (Bendiksen, 2002; Sirivong, 2001). 
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New/ 
improved 
livestock 
Marketing 
Safe drinking 
water 
Health 
care 
Education 
Livestock health/ 
efficiency 
Research Sequencing 
PADP 
 
N.E. Limited Yes Basic 
healthcare  
Yes Yes Market research Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
HCSP 
 
Yes N.E. Yes Basic 
healthcare  
N.E. Yes N.E. Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
XKHDP/ 
NADPP 
 
Yes Limited to 
linking 
farmers to 
merchants 
N.E. N.E. Vocational & 
primary 
education 
Health, nutrition & 
veterinary care 
Year one devoted 
to research  
Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
LADP 
 
Yes Limited to 
linking 
farmers to 
merchants 
N.E. N.E. N.E. N.E. N.E. Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
SCSPP 
 
Imported 
livestock 
Limited Yes Basic 
healthcare  
N.E. Yes Market research Law enforcement 
followed DOA 
Notes: basic data codes: 1) primary financers; 2) primary executing agency; 3) cost in millions. ‘Yes’ = action unspecified in the literature. ‘N.E.’ = no evidence. 
Sources: PADP: Ackerman and Boonwaat (2005); Bendiksen, (2002); UNDTCD (1991); UNODCCP (2000), UNODC (2005b; 2006b). HCSP: INCRS (1998); KPL 
(2000); Kurukulasuriya (2001); Segar (1996). XKHDP / NADPP: Bendiksen (2002); Data et al. (2002); Segar (1996); Sirivong (2001); Thion (2002). LADP: 
Bendiksen (2002); Cohen (2004); Littlejohn et al. (2004); Winter (2001). SCSPP: ADB (2005); Kurukulasuriya (2001); Mahinda and Ladouangphanh (2002). 
 9.6. Success? 
In 2006 UNODC (2009) declared Laos ‘poppy-free’, while there was a brief increase in 
2010, production has remained limited to remote areas (INCRS, 2010) and local 
consumption (INCRS, 2008). The decline from the 1989 peak of 328mt to 14mt in 2006 
represents a 96 percent reduction. The decline from the 1989 peak to 18mt in 2010 (the 
most recent recorded harvest) represents a 95 percent reduction. The intervention 
appears to have negatively impacted many former opium farmers. 
9.7. Rival explanations of success  
An important aspect of process-tracing is the interaction with established theories, as 
such this section shall critically appraise rival explanations of how success was realised. 
The Government (GoL, 2006b:4) credit success with ‘widespread public advocacy and 
civic awareness campaigns’ supported by negotiated eradication. For UNODC (2006) a 
major factor was that during the ‘decades’ preceding the intervention the state extended 
its writ into the highlands and established conduits between highland farmers and, 
lowland and foreign markets. 
However, surveys by ADB (2005) and UNODC (2005) suggested that law 
enforcement was the primary motivation for ending production. While 50 percent of 
respondents to UNODC reported that they ceased production due to opium’s illegality, 
just three and two percent reported that they had ‘enough food’ or ‘enough cash’.1 Fifty 
percent of respondents in the ADB (2005:165) study reported that they would have 
continued producing opium ‘if they had not been told to stop… by law enforcers and 
government agents’; confirming ‘persuasion’ and law enforcement as the ‘key factors’ 
in their decision making process.  
Conversely, Boonwaat (2004; also Ackerman and Boonwaat, 2005; Andersson et al., 
2006; UNODC, 2005b) suggested that as PADP ended before 2001, development 
(rather than law enforcement) may have been the primary motivation for ending 
production in that project area. Brown and colleagues (2005:9) alternatively posited that 
as production also ‘dropped rapidly in areas without AD projects… There is little 
evidence that AD projects have influenced Lao farmers’; they did however concede that 
AD projects offered protection ‘against economic hardship’. 
                                                 
1
 The other most common answers where ‘never grown opium before’ (12 percent); ‘no addicts’ 
(11 percent); ‘other’ (7 percent); ‘no one else grows’ (6 percent); ‘no land/ space’ (4 percent); 
‘labour issues’ (3 percent); ‘afraid of relapse’ (2 percent). 
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Evidence does however suggest that development had less impact than law 
enforcement. The intervention after 2001 appeared to be dependent on unequal 
negotiations centred upon promises of aid and threats of military attack or arrest - tactics 
similarly utilised to great effect in resettling highland farmers. Coerced negotiations 
may have been supported by the existence of extensive surveillance.  
Kramer and Jelsma (2008) suggested that much of the reduction may have been 
attributable to increased Afghan and South American production pushing Southeast 
Asian opiates from their respective European and North American markets. Farmgate 
price increases (Figure 9:7) may have reduced Laotian competiveness, which in turn 
may have decreased foreign demand. However, the price increase was a consequence of 
the national intervention rather than increased Afghan production. Furthermore, the 
significant price increases from 2004 may be illustrative of the capabilities of the GoL 
to respond to threats of increased production. This said, decreased demand for Laotian 
opium may have reduced farmers’ confidence in opium as a cash crop and thus made 
alternatives (including resettlement or plantation wage-labour) more attractive: 
increased Afghan competition may have made acquiescence to suppression more 
attractive to farmers. 
 
Figure 9: 7. Afghanistan and Laos: Farmgate price of raw opium in US$ (1986-2009) 
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
US
$/k
g
Afghanistan Laos
 
Source: UNODCCP (1999, 2003); UNODC (2005, 2010b). 
9.8. Case summaries 
Viet Nam 
In 1975, the state began procuring highland opium for domestic and foreign medicinal 
purposes. While the level of diversion is unknown, it is believed that when state support 
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ceased around 1985, illicit production significantly increased. Concerned over rising 
domestic opium consumption, the government prohibited production in 1992. Top-
down crop substitution projects were established in the early-1990s. In 1996, a joint 
UN/GoV alternative development project was administered; the project appears to have 
had positive outcomes in terms of socio-economic development and opium control.  
State administered projects were centred upon compensation or development 
assistance containing conditionality clauses; farmers received assistance/compensation 
upon ceasing production. To prevent reverse conditionality drug control was later 
mainstreamed into national highland development programmes, aimed at assisting the 
poorest communes in Viet Nam. This said, in several areas the tourist industry 
represented the solitary alternative income for former opium farmers and, more 
generally, the highlands have lagged the lowlands in terms of developmental assistance.   
Since 1992, Vietnamese policy was to immediately eradicate crops. Negotiated 
eradication began in 1992 with extensive propaganda and development/compensation. 
Negotiations and propaganda were conducted by the military; this additionally 
increased surveillance within opium producing areas. While the existence of the military 
may have contained an element of implied coercion, there are reports of soldiers 
threatening farmers and forcing eradication before the establishment of alternative 
livelihoods. Furthermore, many reports of widespread human rights abuses at the hands 
of the police/military may indicate a more repressive intervention than is publically 
acknowledged.  
The evidence suggests that the key components of success in Viet Nam were the 
existence of a strong state presence, extensive surveillance, and the leverage possessed 
by the state in negotiating eradication. That the actual administration of development 
appears to have been insufficient may suggest that disincentives were the primary 
motivation for the cessation of opium production. The decline from the 1990 peak of 
90mt to 2mt in 1992 represents a 99 percent reduction. The intervention appears to have 
negatively impacted many former opium farmers. 
Laos 
While the Second Indochina War and US military consumption initially increased 
Laotian production, production decreased as the conflict intensified around 1968. This 
said, the country continued to be a relatively major source of illicit opium. In 1976, the 
state began procuring highland opium for domestic and foreign medicinal purposes. As 
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monopoly prices were low, there was potential for high-levels of diversion facilitated by 
Laotian military and civil authorities.   
In 1987, Laos resumed cooperation with the international drug control regime. A 
1994 Masterplan adopted a ‘gradual approach’ to opium production suppression that 
emphasised ‘community-based’ development, tolerated small-scale opium production, 
and sequenced eradication after the establishment of alternative livelihoods. While 
initially similar to best-practice developed in Thailand, significant departures included: 
the use of resettlement; the Green Anti-Drug Project; and insufficient emphasis on 
marketing substitute crops. Resettlement has been criticised for its negative impact on 
highlanders’ health and income. The Chinese Green Project has been equally 
condemned for facilitating the exploitation of farmers and ignoring best-practice. The 
lack of marketing and market access limited the success of some development projects. 
Others appear to have been limited by corruption and mismanagement. As such, PADP 
and LGDCP appear to be the only projects which presented positive outcomes in terms 
of alternative livelihoods and improved social welfare. 
In 2000, Laotian policy shifted to the ‘accelerated rural development programme’, 
which emphasised the sequencing of eradication and law enforcement before alternative 
livelihoods were established. While the GoL claimed that after 2001 farmers 
‘voluntarily’ eradicated their own crops in exchange for development assistance, there is 
ample evidence of coercion by the military; to paraphrase Baird and Shoemaker 
(2005:15) the ‘terms “voluntary” and “involuntary” fail to adequately describe the 
decision-making process’. Furthermore, the abusive nature of resettlement negotiations 
may suggest similar tactics were used against opium farmers. This is coupled with what 
the administration of fines and custodial sentences in prisons deemed cruel and 
inhumane. As such, military coercion (‘persuasion’) appears the primary motivator for 
the cessation of opium farming. 
In 2006 production fell below 20mt to 14mt; representing a 95 percent reduction 
from the 1989 peak of 328mt and hence success was achieved in 2006. The intervention 
appears to have negatively impacted many former opium farmers. 
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 Section III 
10. Synthesis and comparison 
The previous six chapters have produced in-depth and contextual narratives that trace 
the processes by which major opium-producing nations reduced illicit production or 
diversion by over 90 percent to below 20mt. This chapter is split into four sections. To 
build a foundation for cross-case comparison Section 10:1 synthesizes information 
presented in the six case chapters, specifically, the interventions’ positive and negative 
impacts, and contextual and operational factors that converged in each case. In Section 
10:2, production data from 1947 to 2008 is cautiously analysed to illustrate how 
developments in one state can influence outcomes in another. The findings suggest that 
since at least 1984, transnational production shifts can be best viewed as the 
consolidation of an Afghan monopoly, rather than the outcome of law enforcement led 
displacement.  
The synthesis builds the foundation for the cross-case comparison presented in 
Section 10:3. The comparison demonstrates how five factors were necessary for the 
outcome in all (or most) cases. A model representing the optimal relationships between 
the various factors is then proffered. These findings are supported in Section 10:4 by the 
semi-deviant case of Imperial/Republican China.  
10.1. Synthesis 
10.1.1. Outcome measures indicating success 
All nine cases achieved the primary outcome measurement of success (hereafter success 
or outcome) by reducing production or diversion by 90 percent to below 20mt. While 
Pakistan and Imperial/Republican China both resumed production above 20mt shortly 
after achieving success, Pakistan continued to conform to the 90 percent reduction 
criterion.  
This said, perceptions of success can be dependent on the choice of outcome 
measurement utilised. For example, if we look at Laos in terms of arable land under 
opium poppy cultivation it may appear less successful than in terms of metric tonnes; it 
certainly illustrates more clearly the magnitude of the task that confronted the GoL. The 
magnitude of the task can be illustrated by comparing the peak production years of 
Afghanistan (2007) and Laos (1989). As illustrated in Figures 10:1 and 10:2 opium was 
cultivated on 2.44 percent of Afghanistan’s arable land and 4.36 percent of Laos’s 
arable land.    
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This perspective may, however, also dilute Laotian claims of success. In 2007, 0.157 
percent of Laos’s arable land was cultivated with opium; this represents a percentage of 
arable land greater than was ever recorded in Thailand or Viet Nam, and similar to the 
1979 Pakistan peak of production. Thus, while Laos has realised the primary outcome, 
viewed from the perspective of percentage of arable land, opium may indicate the 
continued national importance of opium. This said, the decline between 1989 and 2007 
still represents a 93 percent reduction. 
 
Figure 10: 1. Major opium producers as percentage of arable land (5%) 
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Source: data presented in chapters 4-9. 
Figure 10: 2. Major opium producers as a percentage of arable land (0.5%) 
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Source: data presented in chapters 4-9. 
 
All cases achieved national success in terms of percentage change. The picture is less 
clear for: Pakistan, which produced excess of 20mt in 2007; and Laos, which cultivated 
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opium poppies over a significant percentage of its arable land in 2007. The inability of 
Imperial/Republican China to maintain an opium ban places a question mark over 
whether the case can be considered a success. As discussed in Section 10:4, the case is 
insightful for how it was achieved and why it was unable to maintain the outcome. 
10.1.2. Negative outcome measures 
This section shall synthesise some of the negative and positive outcomes reported in the 
individual case studies. These findings are summarised in Table 10:1 under the 
headings: Economic Harms, Political Harms and Human Rights Violations. 
  
Table 10: 1. Summary table: negative and positive outcome measures 
 Harms Human Rights Violations 
 Economic Political 
Extrajudicial 
Punishments 
Torture 
Freedom of 
Residence 
China 
(Imperial) 
NI Extensive 
NI  
MJP Extensive FR 
(PR) China 
Possibly 
NI 
PI MJP Extensive FR 
Iran 
(Pahlavi) 
NI Extensive 
NI 
MJP Extensive NR 
(IR) Iran 
Possibly 
NI 
NR MJP Extensive  FR 
Turkey 
PI PI (after 
1973) 
CP Possible. 
PPC 
NR 
Thailand 
PI PI (after 
1971) 
NR PPC NR 
Pakistan 
PI PI (after 
1985) 
NR PPC NR 
Laos 
NI Limited NI CP Possible. 
PPC 
FR 
Viet Nam 
NI NR NR Possible. 
PPC 
NR 
Note: torture includes cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. CP (Community Punishment); 
FR (Forced Relocation); NI (Negative Impact); PI (Positive Impact); Poor Prison Conditions 
(PPC); NR (None Reported); MJP (Minimal Judicial Process). 
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Interventions in Laos, Imperial/Republican China,1 Pahlavi Iran and Viet Nam 
further impoverished opium farmers. Positive economic effects were, however, reported 
in Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey.2 While the removal of an important cash crop may 
have added to rural poverty in (PR) China and (IR) Iran there are no reports of increased 
impoverishment in opium producing areas directly related to the intervention.  
It can be inferred from the experience of South American coca producers (see 
Chapter 3:3) that communities in Pakistan targeted for aerial eradication would have 
lost licit crops and livestock whilst suffering negative health effects. That such 
consequences were not reported may indicate either a gap in the available evidence 
from Pakistan or that South American complaints are an isolated phenomenon.  
Violent opposition to eradication was reported in Imperial/Republican China, (PR) 
China, Thailand and Pakistan. While Imperial/Republican China brutally suppressed 
resistance, (PR) China, Thailand and Pakistan diluted opposition through negotiating 
with local power-holders and the extension of developmental incentives. In Turkey, 
large-scale political, media and popular opposition to suppression resulted in the 
extension of poppy straw in 1974. Discontent with opium suppression was factored in 
the overthrow of the Imperial and possibly Republican Chinese regimes. Resentment 
may have similarly added to the unpopularity of the Pahlavi regime throughout rural 
Iran. 
Several of the interventions systematically violated the basic rights of opium farming 
communities. The public punishments administered in both Chinese and Iranian 
interventions amounted to inhumane and degrading treatment (see Nowak, 
2010:para.218). Torture was systematically applied during the Imperial/Republican 
Chinese and both Iranian interventions. While there are no reports of opium farmers 
being tortured in Turkey, Laos or Viet Nam, widespread use of torture within the 
criminal justice system means that such violations cannot be ruled out nor verified. 
Corporal punishment – a form of torture (see CCPR, 1992; Nowak, 2010) -for drug 
offences was applied in both Iranian interventions. While corporal punishment was 
prescribed by law in Pakistan it was seldom, if ever, applied (Mahmood, 2010; Rodley, 
                                                 
1
 Greater poverty appears to have been established through warlords’ demands for opium above 
food production after 1917. 
2
 Pre-1972 Turkish restrictions appear to have scarcely affected rural communities, as 
alternative livelihoods were already established and opium was not a major part of the rural 
economy. 
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1996). Prisons in all cases were of a standard that would subject farmers to cruel, 
inhumane and degrading conditions.3  
Judicial and extra-judicial punishments were indistinguishable in the criminal justice 
systems of all Chinese and Iranian cases. Community punishments in Turkey and Laos 
may be considered extra-judicial as populations were punished for the transgression of 
individual offenders.  
Forced relocation is a somewhat grey area. While all forms of forced displacement 
are prohibited by the ICCPR they may be administered to promote ‘general welfare’ 
(CESCR, 1997:Art.5/12). Thus, there may be a case for resettlement, which facilitates 
reductions in opium production, environmental degradation or improves the livelihoods 
of isolated peoples. Nevertheless, resettlement must not be used as punishment 
(CESCR, 1997:Art.5/12) and the resettled must benefit from, or at least not become 
disadvantaged by, the move (OCHCR, 2010). Resettlement pushed many Laotian 
farmers deeper into poverty and was used as an administrative punishment in (PR) 
China. The resettlement of villages along the (IR) Iranian border may be perceived as 
for the ‘general welfare’ - especially as villages were looted by returning traffickers - 
and would thus depend on the welfare programmes administered in Iran.  
Unsurprisingly, it is apparent that those interventions centred upon DOA (Thailand, 
Turkey and Pakistan) present the least negative impact and have positively impacted the 
target population and state interests.  
10.1.3. Contextual factors 
Chapter 3:3:3, introduced seven ‘contextual factors’ which, theorists have argued, when 
present provide the optimal environment for illicit opium production. The factors are: 
(1) low state authority; (2) geographical isolation; (3) rural impoverishment; (4) high 
levels of corruption; (5) political instability; (6) medium/high levels of violent conflict; 
(7) inefficient state institutions.  
This section shall synthesise the contextual factors that converged during the period 
in which success was realised. Information is synthesized from the case chapters and the 
in-depth chronologies (Annex 1:1-7) into a manageable form to facilitate in-depth cross-
                                                 
3
 Prison conditions violate human right norms if they deprive access: 
 
... to food, water, clothing, health care and a minimum of space, hygiene, 
privacy and security necessary for a humane and dignified existence (Nowak 
2010:para.30). 
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case comparison.  Table 10:2 presents a basic summary of the findings for illustrative 
purposes; it does not attempt to capture the complexity of the individual cases but rather 
to summarize specifics and illustrate trends to allow cross-case comparison.  
The evidence presented and clarified below suggests that all: (1) states possessed 
authority over opium producing areas; (2) states remained characterised by high levels 
of rural impoverishment; (3) states were characterised by high levels of corruption: 
however, the state/high level employees disengaged from the illicit trade; (4) former 
production areas remained geographically isolated. Of the nine states: five were 
politically stable; three possessed medium levels of violent conflict; and just one 
possessed effective state institutions. 
 
Table 10: 2. Summary table: Contextual factors present when success realised 
 
Rural 
authority 
Isolated 
areas 
Rural 
poverty 
Corruption 
State 
stability 
Violent 
conflict 
Effective 
Institution 
China Yes Yes Yes Yes No No - 
(PR) China Yes Yes Yes No Yes No - 
Iran Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
(IR) Iran Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1980s/yes 
1990s/no 
Yes No 
Turkey Yes No Yes Yes Fairly No No 
Thailand Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Pakistan Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Laos  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Viet Nam Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
 
All states possessed authority over opium producing areas. While the legally 
autonomous nature of NWFP and FATA makes Pakistan the exception in many 
respects, the mainstreaming of suppression with state extension objectives created 
temporary state authority in opium producing areas and represented increasing 
interconnectedness between the state and tribal areas. 
While all states possessed authority over opium producing areas, all former 
production areas remained geographically isolated. While there were often 
improvements to transport infrastructures, the Tribal Areas of Pakistan (see Asad and 
Harris, 2003; Hardestly, 1992) and highlands of Southeast Asia continued to be isolated 
through the existence of mountainous and/or dense forest terrain (see Bendiksen, 2002; 
Epprecht, 2000).  
   
 288
Additionally, high levels of rural impoverishment remained a characteristic of all 
states. While improvements in living factors were reported in Pakistan and Thailand, 
former opium producing areas remained below the national average for many poverty 
indicators. Laos, Pakistan and Viet Nam remained amongst the world’s least developed 
states.  
While high levels of official corruption remained a characteristic of all states,4 
linkages between the illicit trade and high level state employees or the state itself were 
largely disengaged. This may suggest high level political commitment to suppression 
more than corruption control. All states were committed to suppression for reasons of 
national self-interest, including: state extension in (PR) China, Pakistan, Thailand, (IR) 
Iran and Laos; ideology/theology in (PR) China and (IR) Iran; counter-insurgency in 
Thailand; rural development in Pakistan, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Laos; the 
establishment of export commodities such as poppy straw in Turkey, coffee in Thailand 
(Rosequist, 1994) and rubber in Laos; environmental protection in Thailand, Laos, and 
Viet Nam. All states (except Turkey) professed concern over domestic opium 
consumption.  
Five of the nine states were politically stable. The World Bank (Annex 2) ranked 
Laos as within the bottom half of states in terms of violence and political stability. Two 
leading experts on Laotian politics and society, however, maintained that the state was 
stable and that there was minimal threat of regime change (Forbes and Cutler, 2006; see 
Annex, 1:6). The stability of (IR) Iran appears to have been fairly strong throughout the 
1980s although receding somewhat during the mid-1990s. Large-scale political 
repression may have, however, diluted threats to the regime. This said, the World Bank 
(Annex 2) ranked (IR) Iran as within the bottom half of states in terms of violence and 
political stability, however, as was the case with Laos, this may be more indicative of 
violent conflict than political stability. 
Turkey had experienced a period of political instability in the late 1960s/early 1970s 
that resulted in the elected government being ejected in a peaceful military coup. While 
the subsequent military regime received significant public support because of the 
cessation of large-scale terrorism, martial law had to be imposed in many cities; 
indicative of continued instability. Pakistan in 1999 was ranked by the World Bank 
(Annex 2) as one of the worlds least stable states: its politics were characterised by 
military coup and political violence. Imperial China was highly unstable during the 
                                                 
4
 A caveat for Turkey may be that corruption was minimal within the organisation enforcing the 
intervention; the military. 
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beginning of the Imperial/Republican intervention: a Revolution eventually overthrew 
the monarchy and triggered the eventual dissolution of the Chinese state in 1917.  
There were medium/high levels of violent conflict in Pakistan, Laos, (IR) Iran, and 
Turkey. This said, violent conflict in Turkey was limited to urban areas and may not 
have impacted opium producing areas to a great extent. The conflict in Laos was not 
high enough to destabilise the state but was centred on opium producing areas.  
Thailand is the only government that can be considered to have possessed effective 
institutions.5 Pakistan in 1999 and Iran in 1996 are ranked just above the lowest quartile 
in terms of government efficiency by the World Bank. Laos in 2004 dipped in the 
World Bank government efficiency ratings into the lowest quartile; while the Turkish 
bureaucracy was reported as ‘inefficient’ (FCO, 1972:2). 
10.1.4. Interventions operational factors  
This section synthesizes ten ‘operational factors’ into a manageable form to facilitate 
cross-case comparison. The ten factors represent all approaches to DOA6 or law 
enforcement employed in individual interventions or identified in Chapter 3:3:2 and 
include: the provision of incentives to cease production centred upon DOA or other 
enticements;  surveillance; the provision of disincentives through the administration of 
repressive law enforcement, law enforcement, forced eradication, anticipatory effects 
and/or community punishments;  negotiations using DOA and/or coercion as leverage. 
Table 10:3 presents a basic summary of the findings for illustrative purposes. It does not 
attempt to capture the complexity of the individual cases but rather to recap specifics 
and illustrate trends. 
The evidence presented and clarified below suggest that all: (1) but two governments 
presented incentives with which opium farmers could perceive as being of some benefit; 
(2) governments possessed the capabilities to monitor opium farmers; (3) interventions 
administered law enforcement; (4) administered some forced eradication often as a 
secondary instrument to support efforts to persuade farmers or enforce negotiated 
contracts.  
                                                 
5
 This analysis excludes Imperial/Republican China, (PR) China and Pahlavi Iran as there is 
insufficient information to make a valid judgement. 
6
 Community punishment, coercive negotiation and non-DOA incentive represent previously 
unidentified factors extracted from the findings of the nine individual case studies. 
 Table 10: 3. Summary table: Principal operational factors 
 Incentives 
 
Surveillance 
 
Disincentives Negotiated 
eradication 
 
 
DOA Non-DOA incentives 
Law enforcement 
(systematic HR 
abuse) 
 
Law 
enforcement 
(no systematic 
HR abuse) 
 
Forced 
eradication 
Anticipatory 
effects 
Community 
punishments Coercive DOA 
Imp./Rep. 
China No No Yes Yes No Some 
Possible Yes No No 
(PR) China Some Yes Yes Yes No Some Yes No No Yes 
Pahlavi 
Iran No No Yes Yes No Some 
No Yes No No 
(IR) Iran No Yes Yes Yes Yes Some Yes Yes No No 
Turkey Yes No Yes No Yes Some No Yes No Yes 
Thailand Yes No Yes No Yes Some No No No Yes 
Pakistan Yes No Yes No Yes Some No Some No Yes 
Laos Yes No Yes No Yes Some Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Viet Nam Yes No Yes No Yes Some Yes No Yes Yes 
  Incentives: Seven of nine interventions offered farmers some form of incentive for 
the cessation of opium production, thus establishing a perception that suppression is 
within the farmers’ own self-interest. Thus decreasing the relative rewards of opium 
production. Incentives are most obviously present in interventions that administered 
DODCPs (Thailand; Pakistan; Laos; and Viet Nam) which agreed to extend social 
welfare provisions or improve agri-productivity and market access.1 Development also 
formed the basis of the post-1974 Turkish intervention whereby the Government 
assured farmers that if they ceased producing opium they would receive economic 
support and a stable licit industry.   
Non-DOA based incentives were administered in (PR) China and (IR) Iran. In both 
cases, interventions were conducted immediately after the removal of an unpopular 
regime. The revolutionary regimes received extensive rural support after redistributing 
land to the rural poor, prohibiting slavery, ending violent conflicts and/or punishing 
oppressive landlords. Additionally, many of the rural poor identified with the 
ideological or theological beliefs of the new regimes.  
 Surveillance: All interventions established extensive surveillance. This increased the 
risk of sanction whilst permitting governments to plan interventions through the 
provision of information on the location of production and cropping patterns. 
Surveillance may have taken the form of aerial photography, satellite surveillance, 
ground surveys or the more intrusive social controls produced by hegemonic regimes of 
(PR) China and (IR) Iran, and to lesser extents Laos and Viet Nam. DODCPs often 
facilitated surveillance by connecting the state to formerly isolated areas.  
Disincentives: All interventions administered one or more of the five approaches to 
law enforcement identified in this thesis. Law enforcement centred upon systematic and 
widespread violations of international human rights norms were administered in the four 
Chinese and Iranian interventions. While law enforcement in Thailand, Pakistan and 
Turkey tended to conform to international human rights norms there appears to have 
been widespread police/military brutality in Laos and possibly Viet Nam. Nonetheless, 
these two interventions were significantly less repressive than the Chinese and Iranian 
interventions.  
Community punishments were administered in five of the nine cases as a means of 
establishing social control. In Turkey and post-1968 Pahlavi Iran, transgressions by one 
                                                 
1
 For example, in Thailand, many opium farmers illustrated an awareness that increasing 
population levels had reduced the agricultural productivity of the highland eco-system and thus 
sought support for the establishment of alternatives. 
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farmer could result in the eradication of an entire village’s licit opium crop. 
Additionally, in Turkey, village representatives could be punished with economic 
sanctions. Similarly, local leaders in both Chinese cases could be rewarded or punished 
for success or failure in their sphere of influence. While DODCPs containing 
conditionality clauses represent a somewhat softer form of community punishment, in 
Laos this practice resulted in village leaders punishing farmers in order to retain 
funding.  
Attempts to create anticipatory effects were administered in three of the nine 
interventions through the public shaming, torture or execution of offenders. The three 
interventions intended to motivate the cessation of production through inflating the 
perception of risk without arresting large numbers of opium farmers. 
All law enforcement that arrested and/or punished farmers intended to force the 
‘voluntary’ eradication of crops. Forced eradication was used in all interventions, often 
as a secondary instrument to support efforts to persuade farmers or enforce negotiated 
contracts.  
Negotiation: Seven of nine interventions negotiated eradication.2 Six used DOA as 
leverage. For example, in Turkey farmers signed contracts agreeing that they would not 
produce opium - and that if they did, they could be punished by the state - in exchange 
for state support in the marketing of a profitable agricultural crop (poppy straw). The 
Pakistani, Thai and minority areas of (PR) Chinese interventions can, in many respects, 
be considered as drug control mainstreamed into national state extension. Whilst law 
enforcement played a significant role in the three interventions, developmental 
assistance was the primary leverage in negotiations to gain entry into formerly isolated 
areas; suppression would not have been possible without the leverage provided by 
DODCPs.  
While negotiations were the central feature of the Laotian and Vietnamese 
interventions, the term ‘negotiated’ insufficiently captures a process which is better 
defined as ‘coercive negotiation’ as they were unequal and overtly coercive. The 
primary leverages in negotiations were threats of administrative punishments, 
imprisonment, or military assault. The anticipatory effect of public punishment may 
                                                 
2
 This broad category encompasses a variety of sequences. In Pakistan’s MDP and GAAD 
projects the administration of aid was dependent upon the cessation of production. While in the 
majority of Thai, the remainder of Pakistani projects, and minority (PR)China interventions 
farmers agreed to cease production or allow eradication by the state only after alternative 
incomes had been established.  
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have been used in Viet Nam to strengthen the perception of risk and the state’s 
negotiating power.  
10.3. Cross-case comparisons 
Ragin (1989; Ragin and Rubenstein, 2009) shows how cross-case comparison can 
illustrate the necessary and sufficient factors which converge to produce success.3 A 
factor is necessary if it must be present for an outcome to occur. A factor is sufficient if 
it can by itself cause the outcome. Water is sufficient for a cup of water (discounting the 
cup and heat to boil the water). Water and tealeaves are necessary factors for a cup of 
tea. A comparison of the information presented in Sections 10:3-5 shall draw out any 
necessary/sufficient factors that present across individual case.  
No factor by itself is sufficient to cause the outcome (success). There are five 
necessary factors which converged in all (or most) cases: (1) Possession of a 
government which perceived suppression as in its best interest; (2) Possession of 
authority over potential opium producing areas; (3) Opium farmers must perceive some 
benefit from accepting state demands (i.e. the state must offer appropriate incentives); 
(4) Surveillance capabilities; (4) The administration of law enforcement against 
violations.  
Neither the Imperial/Republican Chinese or Pahlavi Iranian interventions provided 
farmers with incentives which would have helped the farmer perceive suppression as in 
their best interest. While this may present a strong argument against the inclusion of 
factors three as necessary, as is discussed in Section 10:7, the failure of the 
Imperial/Republican Chinese Governments to proffer incentives appears to have been a 
factor in both the inability to secure sustainable suppression and eventual state collapse. 
Thus, the case of Imperial/Republican China may support, rather than refute, the 
necessity of administering incentives; without which success may be somewhat shallow 
and unsustainable.4 
It could be argued that as all interventions conducted a limited amount of forced 
eradication the factor is necessary. Nevertheless, the inclusion of forced eradication is 
qualified with the caveat that it tended to be a secondary instrument within wider 
negotiation or law enforcement strategies intended to compel farmers to ‘voluntarily’ 
                                                 
3
 While Ragin (1987) uses the term ‘condition’, for consistency within the research design 
proffered by George and Bennett (2005) ‘factor’ shall be used throughout. 
4
 The Pahlavi Iranian intervention may be somewhat of a deviant case in this regard and may 
thus require greater investigation into farmers’ attitudes towards opium at the time. 
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eradicate their own crops. Importantly, both Pakistan and Thailand discontinued forced 
eradication as it was considered counterproductive to state extension and/or 
counterinsurgency objectives. Thus, forced eradication is included as one of a 
combination of law enforcement approaches to be drawn upon, depending on the 
context of intervention and once the necessary factors are present.  
All other factors are neither sufficient nor necessary. While they may have been 
characteristic of the intervention (such as coercive negotiation in Laos) their function 
was to facilitate or support the five necessary conditions that presented in all cases. This 
relationship is illustrated in Diagram 10:1. The remainder of this chapter further 
elucidates this relationship whilst returning to some important theoretical points 
established in Chapter 2:3.  
Political stability cannot be considered necessary as the national governments of six 
of the nine cases were unstable during the period when each individual case realised 
success. It does however appear supportive of political commitment: if a government 
committed to suppression is overthrown by an unsupportive regime then a necessary 
factor (political commitment) is removed, which was the case when the Chinese 
Republican regime fell. If the new regime shares the previous regime’s prohibitive 
sentiments, however, and maintains the intervention, it may continue; as was the case 
after coups d’état’s in Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey. Hence, instability may be 
perceived as problematic only if new regimes reject suppression as nationally 
advantageous or in instances of state collapse whereby state authority is completely 
dissolved. 
DOA may be necessary to prevent harmful consequences, however, as it was almost 
wholly absent from four (including non-minority [PR] Chinese) interventions it cannot 
be deemed necessary for success. Nonetheless, it can play several important supportive 
roles. Firstly, economic and social welfare incentives can provide leverage in state 
negotiations for access into areas alienated from, or hostile to, the state. Secondly, after 
initial entry projects can assist political capital building whilst physically connecting 
geographically isolated areas to the state machine through transport infrastructures, 
economic markets and social welfare institutions; establishing a level of dependency on 
the state that had previously been absent. Thirdly, DOA-based incentives may provide 
farmers with the perception that suppression is in their best interest. Lastly, as DOA-
incentives can be used as leverage in negotiating the cessation of opium production they 
can be supportive of law enforcement initiatives; especially if new crops reduce the 
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relative rewards of opium production and, consequently, increase the perceived risk of 
law enforcement. In short, DOA can provide farmers with something to lose.  
As DOA is a facilitator of necessary factors, project strategies should be dependent 
on an initial investigation into the potential effect the project will have upon the 
necessary factor(s) prioritised by national objectives. For example, crop substitution 
may be appropriate if sufficient state presence exists or as a means of initial contact 
with an isolated/hostile community. Alternatively,  where state authority is weak, the 
construction of schools and healthcare centres may be more important to state extension 
than the diversification of crops.  
Thus, DOA need not always be based upon deep conceptions of development as 
indicated by AL theorists, in fact many (but by no means all) of the DODCPs 
administered in Pakistan, and to an even greater extent Laos and Viet Nam were little 
more than crop substitution (i.e. absence of marketing, social welfare provision and 
eradication before alternative income generation). This said, the arguments for 
mainstreaming and identifying drivers of production presented by AL theorists (see 
Chapter 2:3:2) are important. Drug control must be mainstreamed into national or local 
policies in order to establish the five necessary conditions. The identification of drivers 
of production may illustrate what farmers in a specific area -  such as the village – 
would be willing to sacrifice in exchange. Thus, the state can plan what incentives will 
yield the greatest reward in a specific area.  
As the medium-term goal of opium suppression should be the establishment of the 
necessary factors, the use of improved infrastructures or agricultural knowledge by 
opium farmers/traffickers should be viewed as almost inconsequential, as long as the 
state is extending its authority or farmers are beginning to view some benefit to 
suppression. This argument may also be applied to ‘reverse conditionality’. That non-
opium farmers begin producing opium to attract state aid suggests that the state 
presence was initially insufficient and that the state or NGO is offering farmers 
something of value. Reverse conditionality may represent an important indicator that 
the policy is on track.  
Alternatively, if the necessary factors are already present then DOA may not be 
required. For example, in (PR) China DOA was essential in gaining access to minority 
areas. It represented a tool for building political capital and extending state authority 
and, once achieved, the state was free to repressively enforce the law. Nonetheless, in 
areas where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) already possessed authority law 
enforcement could be administered without recourse to DOA. 
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Likewise, while conflict resolution is not a necessary factor it may facilitate state 
authority and represent a strong incentive.5 For example, in (PR) China farmers 
expressed gratitude to the CCP for establishing (relative) peace; the cessation of 
production may have been perceived as favourable to experiences of conflict and 
exploitation by warlords and government soldiers. Thailand represents an example of 
where conflict resolution was required before the state could extend authority. 
Nevertheless, as both Laos and Turkey possessed authority over their opium producing 
areas they were able to conduct their interventions amongst periods of violent conflict. 
Another aspect connected to farmers’ perceptions of self-interest is that if a foreign 
or domestic market is deflated the rewards for opium production may be reduced. This 
may occure through domestic demand reduction - as it did in [PR] China - or the 
existence of a stronger competitor - as may have been the case in Laos, Pakistan and 
Thailand. While this may direct farmers’ acceptance of suppression, as it is the 
existence of the five necessary conditions which largely dictates the cost-effectiveness 
of production this is not in itself necessary, but may be facilitative.  
DOA-based or coerced negotiations for ‘voluntary’ eradication and the five law 
enforcement disincentives are not necessary factors; however, as they have all proved to 
have some utility each may be drawn upon depending upon the context of the 
intervention. This said, with the exception of using DOA as leverage in negotiating 
entry none should be used until the necessary conditions are sufficiently established.  
Contrary to the Feldafing Declaration (2002:art 4) these findings suggest that it is 
acceptable to include conditionality clauses in DOA negotiations as long as the five 
necessary factors are present; depending on the context in which they are applied. The 
model of relationships described above is illustrated in Diagram 10:1 and shall be 
placed in a practical context in Chapter 11:3. 
 
                                                 
5
 An assessment of Plan Columbia found that Columbian coca and opium farmers were willing 
to lose income in exchange for increased security (Younger and Walsh, 2009). 
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Diagram 10:1. The optimal relationship between principal factors 
 
Note: Solid lines represent the relationship between necessary factors. Dashed lines 
represent the relationship between faciliative and necessary factors.   
10.4. A semi-deviant case: Imperial/Republican China 
The case of Imperial/Republican China is illustrative for its inability to sustain 
production below 20mt. The intervention conformed to four of the five necessary 
factors yet failed to provide farmers with sufficient incentive. There is some evidence to 
suggest that the intervention weakened the Imperial regimes’ authority in opium 
producing areas. A similar resentment may have been felt for the Republican regime 
(see Chapter 4:4). This example illustrates how failure to offer incentive to ceasing 
production can weaken political capital6 (see Felbab-Brown, 2010) which can in turn 
negatively impact the foundation of a successful intervention – state authority.  
The breaking-up of the state into multiple warlord factions was the primary driver of 
un-sustainability. The government lost authority over the majority of its national 
                                                 
6
 Thoumi, 2005 discusses how insufficient political capital between the state and farmers was 
one factor influencing Columbia’s ‘competitive advantage’ in coca/opium production and 
trafficking. 
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territory and consequently the capacity to monitor opium farmers or enforce the law. As 
warlords became the principle centres of power in provinces and districts they 
essentially became the state by exerting authority over the majority of their territory - 
but they chose to facilitate and profit from production. Thus, the dissolution of the state 
strengthens the finding that interventions must be built upon a foundation of state 
authority and political commitment. Political commitment is ineffective without state 
authority; as is state authority without political commitment.  
A less dramatic increase in production was witnessed in Pakistan after 2003. This 
increase was primarily driven by the lack of state authority in areas where there was 
significant insurgent activity (Windle, 2009). This supports the findings that 
interventions must be built upon a foundation of state authority.  
10.5. Summary 
In this chapter, the individual case study findings were synthesised in order to conduct 
cross-case comparisons. The chapter began by recapitulating how all cases reduced 
opium production or diversion by an excess of 90 percent to below 20mt. It has shown 
how Pakistan and Imperial/Republican China both resumed production above 20mt 
shortly after realising success while, if percentage of arable land under opium 
cultivation is used as a measure, Laotian cultivation remains high; however, both 
Pakistan and Laos continued to conform to the 90 percent reduction criterion. The 
discussion on negative and positive effects unsurprisingly illustrated how interventions 
centred upon DOA presented the least negative impact.  
Previously identified ‘contextual’ and ‘operational’ factors were synthesised and 
collated with the discussion on displacement/competition to inform cross-case 
comparison. Five factors that presented in all (or most) cases were deemed necessary for 
the outcome measurement of success. These were: (1) All governments perceived 
suppression as in its best interest; (2) All possessed a strong state presence throughout 
opium producing areas; (3) All but two presented an incentive with which opium 
farmers could perceive some benefit; (4) All governments possessed the capabilities to 
monitor opium farmers; (5) All interventions administered law enforcement. All other 
factors that crossed more than one case are supportive or facilitative of the necessary 
factor. A model illustrating the optimal relationship between the factors suggests that as 
long as the five necessary factors are present the choice of approach will be context 
dependent. The primary objective when planning an approach must be to facilitate or 
support the establishment or maintenance of the five necessary factors. The failure of 
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Imperial/Republican China to sustain production below 20mt support’s these findings. 
The model shall be explored and further clarified by placing it in the practical context of 
contemporary Afghanistan in Chapter 11. 
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11. Policy Implications for Afghanistan 
In Chapter 10, five factors were identified as necessary for success, as they presented in 
all (or most) cases.  All other trans-case factors are supportive or facilitative of the 
necessary factors. These findings were presented as a model illustrating the optimal 
relationship which suggested that as long as the five necessary factors are present, the 
choice of approach would be context dependent. Hence, the primary objective when 
planning an approach must be to facilitate or support the establishment or maintenance 
of the five necessary factors. This chapter shall further clarify these findings by placing 
them in the practical context of Afghanistan. The chapter shall conclude by prescribing 
pragmatic policy recommendations.  
11.1. Background and context 
Afghanistan was a minor producer of opium until the mid-1950s (Paoli et al., 2009) 
when production levels are believed to have increased in response to the 1959 Iranian 
prohibition and prolonged drought in Southeast Asia (Felbab-Brown, 2010). There may 
have been a further increase in response to the Turkish prohibition in the early 1970s 
(INCB, 1973). Then from 1984, production increased and by 1994 Afghanistan was the 
world’s largest source of illicit opium.  
 
Figure 11: 1. Afghanistan: Opium production (1970-2007) 
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Source: adapted from: Holahan and Henningen (1972); Magnussen et al. (1980); NNICC 
(various years); NNICC (various years); INCSR (various years); RCMP (various years); 
UNODCCP (various years); UNODC (various years).  
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The primary factor for increased production appears to have been the decades of 
violent conflict following the 1978 coup d’état. The combined conflicts devastated the 
country’s agricultural resources and rural infrastructure (Allen, 2002; MCN, 2006; 
Potulski, 1991; Rubin and Guáqueta, 2009), and removed a third of all arable land; 
leaving opium as one of the few available cash crops (World Bank, 2005). This 
situation was magnified by many Mujahedeen warlords, and after 1996, the Taliban 
who facilitated and profited from opiate production, manufacturing and distribution (see 
Felbab-Brown, 2010; Goodhand, 2008; Goodson, 2002; McCoy, 2003; Paoli et al., 
2009; Ruben and Sherman, 2009).  
In 2001, the Taliban banned opium production and administered an intervention 
centred upon a highly repressive incarnation of law enforcement (Farrell and Thorne, 
2005; see Moore, 2002). The ban decreased the area under cultivation by 91 percent 
(UNDCP, 2001)1 and drove many landowners and farmers into debt (Jelsma, 2005; 
Jelsma and Kramer, 2005). This facilitated widespread popular resistance and weakened 
the Taliban’s authority (Felbab-Brown, 2010) and as rural infrastructures were further 
damaged during the 2001 conflict (MCN, 2006) production increased on a steep incline 
from then onwards. 
Driven by depressed opium prices, high wheat prices and improved security 
situations in some key production provinces (INCRS, 2010; UNODC, 2009; see Boone, 
2009; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Nordland and Shah, 2010) production declined between 
2008 and 2010 for the first time since 2000 (Figure 11:1); however, a number of factors 
may make the reduction somewhat superficial. Firstly, the destruction of almost a 
quarter of the 2010 crop by blight has inflated the farmgate price of opium by almost 50 
percent (Sengupta, 2010) whilst wheat prices declined by 43 percent (UNODC, 2010). 
Secondly, as shall be discussed in greater length in Section 11:3:1, there are many 
reservations concerning the sustainability of Governor-led eradication  (Mansfield, 
2010).  
11.2. Intervention 
Between 2001 and 2003 a policy of informal tolerance was adopted to prevent opium 
suppression from conflicting with counter-insurgency and state reconstruction. The 
strategy centred upon interdicting manufacturers and traffickers whilst administering 
                                                 
1
 The majority of the remainder was produced within territories outside of Taliban authority 
(Farrell and Thorne, 2005). 
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AD. Negotiated eradication was to be sequenced after the establishment of alternative 
incomes (Paoli et al., 2009; Jelsma and Kramer, 2005). In a policy shift in late 2004 
Afghan eradication teams begun forcefully eradicating opium poppies.2 Then after 
several Afghan eradication teams were violently resisted, America began encouraging 
and advising provincial and district governors to eradicate crops themselves (Blanchard, 
2009) or more often than not, to negotiate with local power-holders (i.e., warlords, 
strongmen or tribal leaders) to eradicate crops in their sphere of influence (Byrd, 2010; 
Mansfield, 2010). The ‘Good Performance Indicators’ scheme was established as an 
incentive to Governors to ban and eradicate crops. Under the scheme, Governors were 
rewarded with funding for development projects if their provinces were declared poppy-
free by UNODC, or presented significant reductions (Blanchard, 2009; INCRS, 2010).3 
In 2009 provincial counternarcotics infantry were made available to protect eradication 
teams (Blanchard, 2009). 
Governors and local power-holders have often suppressed production through law 
enforcement, forced eradication and threats of military attack. Many farmers received 
little or no developmental aid and were pushed deeper into poverty and debt. This 
consequently inflated perceptions of alienation from the national and provincial 
government whilst increasing the support-base of anti-governments groups (see 
Callimachi, 2009; Felbab-Brown, 2009, 2010; Mansfield and Pain, 2008; Mansfield, 
2009, 2010; Jelsma and Kramer, 2005; Pain and Kantor, 2010; Sajjan, 2009; Stockman, 
2005).  
In 2005, a British diplomat reported how the effectiveness of governor-led 
eradication was limited by the relationships many governors had with the illicit trade 
(Baldouf and Bowers, 2005). While some exploited bans to inflate the price of opium 
for which they collected revenue (Felbab-Brown, 2010) others extorted farmers or 
eradicated the crops of farmers connected to opponents (Byrd, 2010; Felbab-Brown, 
2010; Mansfield and Pain, 2006; Landay, 2007; Sajjan, 2009; World Bank, 2005).  
Such campaigns conflict with the policy communicated in the 2006 National Drug 
Control Strategy (NDCS). The NDCS concedes that as opium farming is often a 
survival mechanism the intervention should not be ‘eradication-led’. Nevertheless, a 
‘credible threat of eradication’ is required once alternative livelihoods have been 
                                                 
2
 The GoA consistently blocked US requests for aerial eradication (Blanchard, 2009; Felbab-
Brown, 2010; Kazem, 2005; O’Shea, 2007). 
3
 In 2010, the scheme was administered through the Afghan MCN and possessed a budget of 
US$2.2 million (Mansfield, 2010). 
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established in order to avoid impoverishing and alienating rural populations. It further 
specifies that drug control should be mainstreamed as an element in wider national and 
provincial state building strategies (MCN, 2006:19/20).  
As the Afghan intervention is reliant on foreign assistance, and the US is the primary 
source of income, much policy has been driven and motivated by US Congress (Rubin 
and Guáqueta, 2007) even when it conflicts with the NDCS. Between 2002 and 2008 
American resource allocation was heavily weighed towards law enforcement over AL 
(US Senate, 2009) and when DOA was administered it was often used as leverage in 
negotiations for quick eradication rather than as the long-term commitment addressing 
the drivers (i.e. lack of market, credit and land access) and facilitators (i.e. insecurity 
and corruption) of production (Mansfield and Pain, 2005; Mansfield, 2007) identified in 
the NDCS. For example, USAID ‘cash-for-work’ programmes, which employed 
potential opium farmers to undertake infrastructure construction (Felbab-Brown, 2010; 
Hafvenstein, 2007), contained conditionality clauses mandating farmers to cease opium 
production within a year (Blanchard, 2009; Wyler, 2009). 
Additionally, research by UNODC (2009) suggests that DOA in Afghanistan has 
been largely centred upon crop substitution. While 33 percent of 1,064 villages 
surveyed had received agricultural assistance, just one percent had received agricultural 
tools or support for improved irrigation; 47 percent had received improved 
seeds/samplings. 
Furthermore, the conditions present in Afghanistan make the NDCS more a ‘wish 
list’ than a policy. There are multiple centres of authority; including governors and 
power-holders actively opposed to suppression. Coordination between NGOs’ and 
Afghan institutions has been insufficient (Jelsma and Kramer, 2009; Rubin and 
Guáqueta, 2007; Ward et al., 2008; see Hafvenstein, 2007). Furthermore, many  
‘Afghan officials and local and international  contractors’ are corrupt, incompetent 
(Felbab-Brown, 2010:147) and under-resourced (INCRS, 2010). These limitations are 
inflated by the difficulties of administrating development amidst violent conflict 
(Felbab-Brown, 2010). 
In 2009 the new US ambassador to Afghanistan (RFE, 2009) and UNODC (Costa, 
2009) criticised the previous US-led intervention as a costly failure which alienated 
farmers. America declared that a new policy would prioritize large-scale and sustainable 
DODCPs, and the interdiction of high-level actors, above eradication (Blanchard, 2009; 
Wyler, 2009). While the US immediately sent dozens of extra agricultural experts to 
administered DODCPs (Gearan, 2009), the 2010 US State Departments INCRS (2010) 
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illustrate a greater level of continuity with the previous strategy than is officially 
expressed. 
 The INCRS (2010:103/106) states that AD (not AL) must be supported by 
‘measures to increase risk’. It then professes the success of governor-led eradication and 
the Good Performance Initiative for demonstrating to opium producers that suppression 
represents an ‘immediate and tangible positive benefit’ whilst compelling ‘farmers to 
self-eradicate or choose alternate crops’; sentiments echoed by UNODC (2010). The 
INCRS (2010:106) supports these conclusions with the example of the Governor of 
Helmand who reduced production through ‘public information, agricultural assistance 
and robust law enforcement’; he was rewarded with US$10million (INCRS, 2010:106).  
Additionally the US Senate (2009:12) - whilst defending the utility of aerial 
eradication - claimed that the US military would be: 
 
... in effect, sitting amidst the most fertile poppy fields and hoping to 
hold their ground and force the growers into marginal areas where it is 
harder to cultivate poppies and riskier to get the opium to 
market…//… and staying long enough to restore government services 
and promote alternatives to poppy production.  
 
The US Senate’s statement parallels, in many respects, the coerced negotiations 
administered in Laos and Viet Nam. The Governor-led eradication has more than a 
passing resemblance to the Imperial/Republican Chinese intervention where local 
governors – with dubious human rights credentials – were rewarded for suppression. 
11.3. Policy implications  
Chapter 10:6 identified five factors which presented across all or most cases and were 
thus found to be necessary for success. While there are inherent difficulties in 
transferring experiences across time and space, these findings can inform Afghan drug 
control policy. This section shall illustrate how – as of December 2010 - these five 
factors are absent from Afghanistan. It will then adapt the model expressed in Chapter 
10:6 to the Afghan context and prescribe options for a more effective and sustainable 
intervention. 
11.3.1. Context 
For many of the Afghan political elite the opium trade is rewarding. Many warlords 
appointed to legitimate political/bureaucratic positions after 2001 had previously 
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exerted authority over aspects of the opiate trade (Baldouf and Bowers, 2005; Paoli et 
al., 2009). While formal ties with overt, criminal activity were rejected in order to enter 
legitimate state institutions, several former warlords exploited their position by 
protecting ‘former’ contacts (Shaw, 2007; see Byrd, 2010; Felbab-Brown, 2010; 
Goodhand, 2008; Jones and Fair, 2009; Kreutzmann, 2007; Murray, 2007; Peters, 2009; 
US Senate, 2009; Sedra, 2006).  
A less iniquitous obstruction to the state (or political elite) from perceiving 
suppression as in their best interest may be the observation that a sharp decline in 
production would be economically and politically damaging (see Jelsma and Kramer, 
2005). Afghanistan is one of the least developed countries in the world. The 
Government of Afghanistan (GoA) have reported that 12 million individuals survive 
below the poverty line; UNDP have ranked it the fourth poorest country in the world in 
terms of food security (Danspeckgruber, 2009). In 2009, opium was produced by 12.9 
percent of the rural population (UNODC, 2009). It was estimated that a third of the 
national population relied upon opiate generated revenue (Ruben and Sherman, 2009) 
while a quarter of all economic activity was centred upon opium (Byrd, 2010). Opium 
has additionally stabilised the national economy by positively affecting Afghanistan’s 
balance of payments (Byrd and Jonglez, 2006). Others - echoing scholarly opinion 
(Felbab-Brown, 2010) – have expressed concern that suppression would strengthen the 
insurgency and alienate rural populations (Jones and Fair, 2009). While the trade 
represents a barrier to long-term economic growth and foreign investment (World Bank, 
2005; see Atkins, 1996; Thoumi, 1987) support for a policy which could remove the 
income of a third of the population, destabilise the economy and ignite anti-government 
feelings is understandably low. 
Afghanistan has ‘historically been characterized by a weak state in dynamic relations 
with a strong society’, resulting a series of complex relationships between the state and 
multiple ‘micro-societies’ based upon cultural, tribal or linguistic lines (Saikal, 
2009:65). While Kabul presently exerts fragile control over some of the national 
territory, parallel centres of authority exist throughout much of Afghanistan. Some 
southern and eastern areas are governed entirely by the Taliban (Paoli et al., 2009) or 
governance is limited by an insurgency which has increased in intensity every year 
since 2002 (Jones and Fair, 2009; Masadykov et al., 2010). 
Even in areas with a significant state presence, the GoA ‘has neither the capacity nor 
the legitimacy to mobilize capital or coercion’ (Goodhand, 2008:415). Most state 
institutions are corrupt, lacking in adequate resources and trained personnel, and 
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generally ineffective (Goodson, 2002; ISISC, 2007; Saikal, 2009). Since 2005, the 
weakness of the government, and high civilian casualties from the insurgency, have 
diminished popular support for Kabul and increased support for insurgent groups 
(Masadykov et al., 2010). 
The weakness in governance and lack of state authority is most conspicuous in the 
criminal justice system; 80/90 percent of Afghanis (ISISC, 2007) choose to use informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms, or even the Taliban, rather than the formal criminal 
justice system (Wardak, 2007, 2009) which is under-resourced, undertrained and 
inefficient. Evocative of the entire system, the police are corrupt, abusive and 
criminalised (Windle and Farrell, 2010; see Ghufran, 2007; Mukhopadhyay, 2009). This 
makes forced eradication ineffective and disproportionately administered on the poorest 
farmers (Mansfield, 2006; Rubin, 2007; see Kreutzmann, 2007). 
11.3.2. Model adaption 
Diagram 11: 1. Afghanistan: The optimal relationship between factors 
 
Note: Solid lines represent the relationship between necessary factors. Dashed lines 
represent the relationship between faciliative and necessary factors.   
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Section 11:3:1 illustrated the absence of the five necessary factors from Afghanistan. As 
previous experience suggests that these factors must be present for success, all 
interventions must be directed at meeting four medium/long-term objectives: (1) Extend 
the state into isolated and hostile areas; (2) Facilitate a sense of self-interest in the 
Afghan Government and political elite towards opium suppression; (3) Facilitate a 
perception that suppression benefits opium farmers; (4) Strengthen the Afghan 
Government’s capacity to monitor opium farmers and enforce the law. The remainder of 
this chapter shall proffer suggestions towards meeting these four primary objectives as 
illustrated in the adapted model expressed in Diagram 11:2. 
All strategies must facilitate the primary objectives; any that negate them must be 
discontinued. Analogously to (PR) China, Pakistan and Thailand, the Afghan 
intervention must be designed as opium suppression mainstreamed into state extension. 
From previous experiences, DOA and conflict resolution/limitation can be effective 
means of supporting state extension whilst providing incentives for farmers to accept 
opium bans. 
Cash/food-for-work programmes - often criticised by AL theorists (Byrd, 2010) - 
may benefit suppression if they can build political capital for the GoA and establish 
state presence in formerly isolated or hostile areas.4 This said, deeper DODCPs (i.e. AD 
or AL) might provide incentives unavailable in cash/food-for-work, such as healthcare, 
education and improved agricultural productivity. While the extension of state run 
social welfare and education can build political capital by establishing positive 
relationships between farmers and the state, cash/food-for-work or similar crop 
substitution projects may: inject capital into local economies; improve agricultural 
infrastructures (Blanchard, 2009; Hafvenstein, 2007); provide a steady income to 
farmers waiting for new crops with long maturation periods to yield results and provide 
entry to formerly isolate areas. DODCPs may be supported by marketing campaign’s 
informing farmers that the central objective of suppression is to improve their 
livelihoods (Ruben and Sherman, 2009) and that opium is against Islam: a technique 
used to great effect in several local interventions (Byrd, 2010). 
Improving security may be a pre-requisite for DODCPs. Poor security limits farmers 
ability to tend and market crops (Mansfield, 2010), while insurgents and power-holders 
have demanded bribes from development projects operating within their sphere of 
                                                 
4
 A major criticism is that the projects are unable to deliver long-term sustainable changes that 
many farmers expect (Byrd, 2010): however, this may represent a failure of communication 
rather than policy. 
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authority (Shelley and Husain, 2009) or attacked project workers perceived as 
threatening their authority (Hafvenstein, 2007).  
The establishment of a more secure Afghanistan may represent the definitive 
incentive for the cessation of opium production. One fieldworker reported the peoples 
‘of Helmand would trade almost anything for [security and peace and]… would follow 
anyone who could offer it’ (Hafvenstein, 2007:315): farmers in Columbia have reported 
similar sentiments (Younger and Walsh, 2009). Peace and security may represent 
conflict resolution/limitation or - as was the case in (PR) China and (IR) Iran - the 
cessation of exploitation and abuse at the hands of formal and informal power-holders 
(see Mukhopadhyay, 2009).  
Thus, reformation of the Afghan criminal justice system will not only establish 
capabilities to monitor farmers and enforce bans, but also provide farmers with a strong 
incentive. In this respect, human rights and corruption training will be central to reform 
whilst ensuring that subsequent negotiations and law enforcement do not reverse earlier 
state extension initiatives.  
The GoA must disengage from facilitating and profiting from opium production. 
How this is to be achieved is beyond the remit of this thesis; however, the perception 
that increasing opium consumption is damaging to national health and economy has 
been a major motivation in all nine cases analysed. The religious enmity towards opium 
(Byrd, 2010) and growing domestic consumption (UNODC, 2010) may naturally shift 
political elites’ attitudes towards opium production, especially as the Afghan economy 
begins to modernise.  
Unless the country is unified under a revolutionary government (such as the Taliban) 
this process will most likely take years and require ‘modest expectations… a strong and 
sustained commitment, and adequate resources’ (Byrd, 2010:302). More hawkish 
foreign donors – such as Russia (Agence France Presse, 2010/b) - may find this 
politically unattainable and lobby for increased law enforcement before the five 
necessary conditions have been established. Diagram 11:1 illustrates the erroneous path 
where law enforcement further alienates and impoverishes farming communities whilst 
facilitating conflict; consecutively decreasing state authority. As the loss of authority 
and political capital requires greater law enforcement to achieve the same outcome, a 
negative spiral is established which may be broken when DOA and conflict resolution 
are used to gain entry into the isolated and hostile areas. Consequently, time and 
resources would have been better spent on establishing the five necessary conditions. As 
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an analogy; while a roof may keep the rain out, it is not much use without walls to hold 
it up. 
 
Diagram 11: 2. Possible effect of premature law enforcement 
 
 
Note: Solid lines represent the relationship between necessary factors. Dashed lines 
represent the relationship between faciliative and necessary factors, and the potential 
impact of premature eradication or law enforcement.   
 
Centrally important is how to measure progress. The findings of this thesis support 
suggestions that traditional drug control measures (hectares, metric tonne or even price) 
may be inadequate measures (Mansfield and Pain, 2008; Kramer and Jelsma, 2009). 
Indicators need to be developed which measure change in terms of state extension, 
criminal justice efficiency and political elite, and farmers’ attitudes to opium 
production.  
Lastly, as Pain and Kantor (2010) have illustrated, Afghanistan is a complex country 
and interventions must be tailored to the unique provincial, district or village 
characteristics. Hence, interventions must investigate what incentives are best placed to 
motivate farmers in specific locations. In this way policies can be tailored to local 
contexts and requirements.  
   
 313
11.3.3. Power-holders 
All reductions in production in Afghanistan since 2001 have been as a result of bans 
enforced by district, provincial (Ruben and Sherman, 2009) and local power-holders 
(Mansfield, 2010). For, as Mukhopadhyay (2009:549) argues, all aspects of state 
building and opium suppression require negotiations with multiple formal and informal 
power-holders. This section shall discuss the problems such a situation presents. 
A case study of Balkh Province found that the realisation of ‘poppy-free’ status was 
centred upon the Governor’s perception of suppression as ‘in his best interests as a 
politician’. Furthermore, the Governor possessed not only the means to enforce the law 
and monitor opium production but also authority over the majority of ‘his’ territory 
(Mukhopadhyay, 2009:557). Additionally, many power-holders - through ethnic or 
religious affiliation – enjoy wide political support and have proved adept at 
administrating local economies (including the drugs trade) (MacGinty, 2010). Hence, 
they may be the most appropriate vehicle for administrating a form of Governor-led 
suppression. This is especially as, many in ‘private…… agree that drugs are harmful 
and that profiting from the trafficking is not praiseworthy’ (Ruben and Sherman, 
2009:42).  
An alternative consideration is the threat of further decreasing the authority of Kabul 
and inflating power-holders’ authority (Shelley and Husain, 2009), as Governor-led 
suppression reinforces local perceptions of Kabul’s inability to govern. Furthermore, the 
relationship between Kabul and Governors, and between Governors and local power-
holders is often unstable and reliant on negotiations (Mansfield, 2010). Many have 
sought the maintenance of insecurity for personal gain (MacGinty, 2010) and there are 
reports that opium bans have been administered to control prices (Felbab-Brown, 2010). 
Others have siphoned compensation intended for the farmer or funding for village 
development into their own pockets (Constable, 2002; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Shelly and 
Husain, 2009) or inequitable distributed resources from those which need them the most 
(Pain and Kantor, 2010). This said, Mukhopadhyay (2009) argues that the bargaining 
process may be part of a longer and more sustainable state building process.  
It is suggested here that the US reformulate its policy so that Governors (and 
consequently local power-holders) are rewarded for: the effective implementation of 
policy established in Kabul; allowing NGOs or state institutions administered projects 
into their territory; and/or eventually negotiating the cessation of production. Since 
development will include national social welfare provisions, this will extend the writ of 
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the state. Consequently, the extension of state authority will continue to be a central 
long-term objective.  
11.4. Recommendations 
This review of Afghanistan is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to illustrate a 
practical application of the thesis findings. It has argued that as the five necessary 
factors are absent from Afghanistan, interventions must initially be centred upon four 
objectives: (1) Extend the state into isolated and hostile areas; (2) Facilitate a sense of 
self-interest in the Afghan Government and political elite towards opium suppression; 
(3) Facilitate a perception that suppression benefits opium farmers; (4) Strengthen the 
Afghan Government’s capacity to monitor opium farmers and enforce the law.  
While it is beyond the remit of this thesis to undertake an extensive investigation into 
how these would best be achieved it can be posited that in the context of Afghanistan: 
(1) DOA and conflict resolution/improved security can be used to secure state authority 
and provide incentives;  (2) As the choice of DOA must be dependent on the local 
context and potential to facilitate the necessary conditions, narrow crop substitution 
must not be ruled out; (3) As the necessary conditions are long-term objectives, and will 
require provincial and national cooperation, opium suppression must be mainstreamed 
into provincial and national strategies. Isolated projects may be fine if they facilitate 
provincial/national objectives; (4) ‘Good Performance Initiatives’ must be reformulated 
and mainstreamed into a long-term policy designed to facilitate the five necessary 
conditions; (5) The strengthening of the Afghan criminal justice system must be a 
priority. The ANP must be made suitable for work, including human rights training, 
negotiating skills and corruption monitoring; (6) High-level state employees must 
disengage from the trade. 
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12. Conclusion 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to document, synthesize and 
compare the population of national cases of successful production/diversion suppression 
in the Middle Eastern/Asian ‘opium zone’. In doing so, the study has:  
 
(1) Catalogued cases of success for future reference;  
(2) Produced ‘lessons’ which may improve the effectiveness of interventions whilst 
reducing inadvertent negative outcomes;  
(3) Gone some way to reconcile the discrepancy between national and international 
effects of interventions at the source.  
 
The suggestions made in this thesis are not easily implemented. Planning and 
administration will require extensive time and resource commitments, including the 
employment of professional and knowledgeable individuals.  The narratives, synthesis 
and cross-case comparison will, it is hoped, inform those formulating policy to establish 
the most cost-effective and appropriate strategies and objectives. The study should also 
contribute to the somewhat scarce source country drug policy knowledge base. This 
concluding chapter shall present the major cross-case findings whilst providing some 
thoughts on how researchers could support, extend and challenge these findings. 
12.1. Major findings 
The documentation of cases of successful opium suppression represents a useful 
reference for practitioners and researchers. This is in itself an important contribution to 
the knowledge base of source country drug control. Aside from the descriptive 
outcomes, the synthesis and cross-case comparison suggest a number of findings. 
Outlined below, several of the key findings are consistent with scholarly convention, 
such as the centrality of state authority to preventive interventions. Other findings are 
more provocative. 
Most notably, the findings reject the pessimistic position that nothing works, by 
demonstrating how national level interventions can significantly reduce national 
production. While this study does not argue that national interventions have decreased 
international supplies, it may provide some indication as to how global production has 
been contained (as discussed in Chapter 2:4:3). The nine national interventions each 
prevented a significant quantity (i.e. several metric tonnes) of opium from circulating in 
the global market. Hence, as part of the portfolio of drug control, the nine interventions 
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helped maintain the unnaturally high prices and scarcity which contain global 
consumption.  
The cross-case comparison, presented in Chapter 10:3, suggests that five factors 
presented in all (or most) cases and could thus be deemed necessary for success. These 
were:  
 
(1) All governments perceived suppression as in its best interest;  
(2) All states possessed a strong presence throughout opium producing areas;  
(3) All but two states presented an incentive with which opium farmers could 
perceive some benefit;  
(4) All states possessed the capabilities to monitor opium farmers;  
(5) All interventions administered law enforcement.  
 
Additional factors that crossed more than one case were deemed supportive or 
facilitative of the necessary factors. A model illustrating the optimal relationship 
between the necessary and supportive factors was developed (see Chapter 10:3). The 
findings suggest that the primary objective when planning a national intervention must 
be to facilitate or support the establishment or maintenance of the five necessary factors.  
These findings were supported by the semi-deviant case of Imperial/Republican China, 
in which failure to sustain production below 20mt was attributable to the loss of state 
authority and lack of incentives for farmers to cease production. 
The exclusion of corruption controls and DOA from the five conditions may be 
somewhat provocative. It is, however, suggested that if the five necessary conditions are 
present in a country then DOA and corruption controls may not be required. This said, 
while the control of corruption may not be necessary, it may represent a shift from a 
facilitative political elite who perceive production/trafficking as personally/nationally 
advantageous to an elite which perceive suppression as in their best interest. Similarly, 
DOA may: facilitate the extension of the state into formerly isolated areas; provide 
incentives to the cessation of production; or support negotiated law enforcement.  
Policy implications for Afghanistan 
In Chapter 11, the case of contemporary Afghanistan was used to clarify further and 
explore the cross-case findings in a practical context. It was argued that as the five 
necessary factors are absent from Afghanistan, any intervention must initially centre 
upon four medium-term objectives:  
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(1) To extend the state into isolated and hostile areas;  
(2) To facilitate a sense of self-interest in the Afghan government and political elite 
towards opium suppression;  
(3) To facilitate a perception that suppression benefits opium farmers;  
(4) To strengthen the Afghan government’s capacity to monitor opium farmers and 
enforce the law.  
 
Analogously to (PR) China, Pakistan and Thailand, the Afghan intervention should 
be designed as state extension which contains an element of opium suppression. From 
previous experiences, DOA (including narrow crop substitution) and conflict 
resolution/limitation can be an effective means of supporting state extension whilst 
providing incentives for farmers to acquiesce to opium bans.  
Furthermore, premature law enforcement could create an erroneous path in which 
farmers are further impoverished and alienated. In turn, this may facilitate conflict and 
consecutively decrease state authority. As the loss of authority and political capital 
require greater law enforcement to achieve the same outcome, a negative spiral is 
established whereby the provision of incentives are required to gain entry into the (even 
further) isolated and hostile areas. Consequently, time and resources would have been 
better spent on establishing the five necessary conditions rather than undertaking 
policies counter-productive to their establishment. 
12.2. Future research  
The five necessary factors identified in Chapter 10:3 could form the foundation of 
assessment criteria to guide national or local interventions. In Afghanistan, the British 
developed a scheme which employed 23 variables to determine whether areas were 
appropriate for forced eradication (Rubin and Guáqueta, 2009). An extension of this 
study would be to develop surveys that could be administered by local bureaucrats in 
any area with a significant opium or coca producing population. The surveys would 
initially identify what could motivate farmers and farming communities to cease 
production; rather than surveying what motivates farmers to produce opium, such as 
those developed by David Mansfield (2007). During the course of an intervention, the 
surveys could chart farmers’ feelings towards the state, the intervention and opium as an 
agricultural crop.  At a national level, indicators could be compiled to measure the 
state’s progress towards the remaining necessary factors. Such analysis could inform 
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practitioners as to what approach would be most appropriate and cost-effective at a 
given time, whilst avoiding many inadvertent consequences. 
Goldstone (2008:51) notes how additional information on an existing or new case 
may ‘challenge the validity’ of findings ‘leading to their revision, modification or 
abandonment’. While this is true of any research, for comparative case studies 
additional information which alters the process of one case may necessitate revising the 
five factors identified as necessary for a successful national intervention. Similarly, the 
emergence of new cases of success could challenge, and possibly lead to a modification 
of these findings. It is hoped that this research shall be taken seriously enough that 
scholars and practitioners will engage in an iterative process which challenges (or better 
still confirms) the findings of this study. 
There are several avenues of research which could be undertaken to support or 
challenge the findings of the study. There was insufficient English language information 
available on the pre-1974 Turkish intervention (i.e. the restriction of small-producer 
provinces) and, to a lesser extent, on the Vietnamese intervention. Investigation into 
either of these cases would not only improve (support or challenge) the findings of this 
study but would by itself present a significant contribution to our understating of opium 
production, and source country drug control.  
An investigation of South American opium and coca production may represent a 
significant test of the validity of these findings. Could, for example, the lack of one or 
more of the five necessary factors account for Mexico’s inability to suppress opium 
production? Alternatively, does Mexico present a deviant case whereby production 
continues to thrive regardless of the existence of the five necessary factors? Similar 
questions could be asked of Columbia where, between 1998 and 2009, illicit production 
declined from 100mt to 9mt (UNODC, 2010). The Columbian intervention has centred 
primarily upon forced eradication (ICG, 2008; Mejia, 2010) whilst many drug 
producing areas remain outside of state authority because of the on-going violent 
conflict (Younger and Walsh, 2009), Thus, the Columbian case may challenge the 
findings of this study.  
Egypt and Lebanon were excluded as cases of success for failing to meet the 
definition of a major producing nation employed in this study (i.e. producing over 50mt 
annually for five years). In-depth investigation into how these two nations prevented 
production from taking hold – rather than suppressing an established and entrenched 
agricultural practice – could greatly add to the knowledge base of source country drug 
control. 
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12.3 Displacement and sustainability 
A likely criticism of this study will be that national success in one nation, say 
Afghanistan, will displace production elsewhere and impose substantial costs on the 
new host nation (Paoli et al., 2009; Reuter, 2010). Discounting the possibility that a 
country, such as Iraq, could develop a more competitive environment than Afghanistan 
and assuming a pure displacement effect (i.e. law enforcement pushes production from 
Afghanistan to Iraq) Afghanistan would still have achieved a national policy objective. 
While opium production may harm the new host(s), Afghanistan would have deflected 
production from where the government perceived it as most harmful to national self-
interest. To paraphrase Zimmer (1990:64): ‘displacement is of value to residents [of 
Afghanistan]…. who, for a long time, were bearing a disproportionate share of the 
burden’. Furthermore, if the intervention has positively impacted Afghanistan and 
opium farming communities through state extension, reduced violent conflict, improved 
social welfare or increased taxable agricultural exports, then a significant diffusion of 
benefits would have occurred. Another diffusion effect is that experiences gained in 
Afghanistan could be used to suppress production in the new host nation. Furthermore, 
the perception of self-interest may be quickened by the positive spiral established 
during the Afghan interventions, which demonstrated that not only is success possible 
but that significant economic aid and increased international recognition can also be 
achieved. 
This said, it is presently difficult to identify a more cost-effective country than 
Afghanistan. While Central Asian states or sub-Saharan Africa present conditions 
suitable for opium production (Paoli et al., 2009; Reuter, 2009) there is a risk of a 
depressed Afghan market motivating a return to production in any of the countries 
analysed in this study. As it would be imprudent to volunteer predictions, a number of 
pessimistic worst-case scenarios will be discussed. All illustrate the threat of complicity. 
The political elite’s perception of suppression as in their best interest is transient.1 
For example, the Governments of Pakistan or Iran could decide that permitting 
production would capture political capital from anti-government militant groups; the 
gains of national security could outweigh the gains of drug control as was the case in 
Laos during the Second Indochina War (McCoy, 2003). 
                                                 
1
 America’s attitude to source country drug control, as catalogued by McCoy (2003), represents 
one of the most manifest examples of the transient nature of national self-interest. 
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High farmgate prices and global recession since 2008 have increased production 
throughout Southeast Asia (UNODC, 2010b). (Ex-)opium producing areas of Laos 
(WFP, 2007), Pakistan (DFID, 2009; Nawaz et al., 2009) and Viet Nam (FCO, 2010) 
are amongst the poorest areas of three of the world’s poorest countries. Therefore, 
increased rewards may reduce the relative risks imposed by the state and the relative 
profitability of alternative incomes. For example, Laotian farmers who had been further 
impoverished by opium bans may decide to resume opium production. A forceful 
government response could provide an impetus to a reappearance of Hmong insurgency. 
This in turn could reduce state authority in opium producing areas. This would decrease 
the very foundation which permitted opium suppression and facilitate an environment 
whereby large-scale opium production is once again viable. The Laotian example 
represents a pessimistic worst-case scenario; however, it also illustrates the dangers of 
complicity. Once success has been realised, the state must ensure the maintenance of the 
five necessary conditions.   
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Annex 1. In-depth chronologies 
Annex 1:1. China 
 
17th 
Cent. 
European merchants begin exporting Indian 
and Turkish opium to China (Asthana, 1954; 
Watt, 1908) 
 
1729 
Distribution of opium prohibited (Brook and 
Wakabayashi, 2000) 
 1780 Importation of foreign opium prohibited 
 1796 Opium smoking prohibited (Wakeman, 1977) 
 
1799 
Domestic production prohibited (Yongming, 
1999)1 
 
1801 
Opium production reported in Yunnan 
(Bello, 2003) 
 1813 Prohibited on consumption reiterated (Bello, 
                                                 
1
 To free itself from blame whilst continuing to secure a profit (Newman, 1989) in 1799 the East India Trading Company  prohibited their employees from exporting 
opium to China. However, the Company began selling to private merchants who illicitly exported to China (Dixon, 1922; Wakeman, 1977; Walker, 1991). Foreign 
and domestic traffickers circumvented the ban through bribery or coercion (see Madancy, 2001; Macauely, 2009; Walker, 2007). 
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2003) 
 
1823 
First recorded law enforcement intervention 
against opium farmers in Yunnan, Sichuan and 
Guizhou Provinces (Bello, 2003) 
 
1834 
Indian opium production and illicit exports to 
China increase (Windle, 2011) 
‘Opium War’ begins after China seizes opium stored off Chinese coast and expels all 
British merchants (Farley, 1977) 
 
1839 
Opium shortage created (Spence, 1990) by 
brutal intervention against domestic consumers, 
producers and distributors (Bello, 2003; 
Wakeman, 1977) 
‘Opium War’ ends. Treaty of Nanking obliges China to: pay indemnity; cede Hong 
Kong to Britain; and open five ports to foreign merchants. No mention of opium 
(reprinted in Spence, 1990) 
1842 
 
Taiping Rebellion begins2 (Wakeman, 1977) 1851  
‘Second Opium War’. China seizes a British registered, Chinese owned, ship accused 
1856 
 
                                                 
2
 Initially a Chinese Christian sect who sought to replace the Emperor and spread Christianity throughout China, the rebels captured Nanking in 1853. Several 
smaller rebellions followed the Taiping: the Small Swords Society took Shanghai; Triads seized Amoy; Hmong groups revolted in Kweichow; and Panthay Muslims 
controlled a separatist state in Tali for 15 years. The combined conflicts reduced central government control and facilitated several large-scale famines (see Fairbank, 
1994; Wakeman, 1977) 
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of piracy. British and French forces occupy Canton and Tientsin (McCoy, 2003) 
Yunnan: Muslim Uprising (Grey, 2002) 1857  
‘Second Opium War’ ends after British/French occupy Tientsin and Peking. While 
peace treaty does not mention opium (Wakeman, 1977) China includes opium in a list of 
items to be subject to import tariff (Dixon, 1922; Yongming, 1999) 
1860 
Import legalisation increases imports; 
reducing prices and increasing availability 
(Windle, 2011) 
Renewed Muslim Uprising in Yunnan (Grey, 2002) 1863  
Taiping Rebellion ends (Wakeman, 1977) 
Xingjian Muslim Uprising begins (Grey, 2002) 1864 
Production legalised in Yunnan to fund 
counter-insurgency 
Hmong and Muslim insurgent groups defeated (Grey, 2002) 1871  
 1880 Prohibition on production repealed nationally 
Sino-Japanese War; China cedes Taiwan (Wakeman, 1977) 1894-
1895 
 
‘100 Days of Reform’. Modernisation programme is unpopular with conservatives in 
civil, military and political elite. Emperor removed by his aunty in bloodless coup. Many 
supporters of reform executed (Wakeman, 1977) 
1898 
 
Boxer Rebellion. Boxers (martial arts societies) invade Peking and attack foreigners. 
Defeated by coalition of foreign troops. China forced to apologise and pay reparation to 
coalition (Wakeman, 1977) 
1900-
1901 
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Revolutionary Alliance becomes fragmented after several failed coup attempts 
(Wakeman, 1977) 
1905 
 
 
1906 
Imperial Decree orders gradual reduction in 
opium production  
 
1908 
Anglo-Chinese Ten-Year Suppression 
Agreement  
Revolution. Violence in Wuhan military camp ignites uprisings by gentry and warlords 
throughout China. Empress abdicates and Republic of China founded (Wakeman, 1977). 1911-
1912 
Anglo-Chinese Opium Agreement establishes 
Joint Investigations 
Production resumes during Revolution 
 
1912 
Sun Yat-sen reiterates prohibition and orders 
suppression 
After KMT party sweep first national election, President Shikai has head of KMT 
assassinated. Southern warlords, angered at being left out of provincial governments, join 
KMT in failed coup; KMT banned (Spence, 1990; Walker, 1991) 
1913 
Half of all provinces declared opium-free by 
Joint Investigations 
President Shikai coerces Parliament to formerly elect him President (Wakeman, 1977) 1914  
Yunnan warlords declares independence after Shikai proclaims himself Emperor of 
China; other provinces follow (Spence, 1990) 1915 
Some British Joint Investigation members 
report suspicion that official compliance is 
facilitating increased production 
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‘Warlords era’ begins after Shikai abdicates in response to uprisings (Wakeman, 1977)3 1916  
 
1917 
All provinces declared ‘free of opium’ by 
Joint Investigations 
Many warlords and state officials begin 
facilitating or ordering farmers to produce 
opium  
KMT military occupy Guangzhou Provinces (Fairbank, 1994) 1925  
Northern Expedition. KMT and CCP armies defeat several warlords to bring majority 
of Southern China under KMT authority (Spence, 1990) 
1926 
 
China partially unified under KMT, who are internationally recognised as government. 
To extend authority into rural areas the KMT begin programme of telephone, telegraph 
1928 
 
                                                 
3
 As warlords fought over Beijing ‘the presidency and the Parliament became the playthings of the militarists’. The warlords who ‘now controlled much of China, 
had a wide variety of backgrounds and maintained their power in different ways’ many had been part of the national military, others were provincial or district 
governors whilst some were: 
 
simply thugs….. Some dominated whole provinces and financed their armies with local taxes collected by their own bureaucracies; others 
controlled only a handful of towns and got their money from “transit taxes” collected at gunpoint or through confiscation. Some warlords were 
deeply loyal to the idea of a legitimate republic…., others believed Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang represented China’s legitimate 
government..//.. Many… were capable of ferocities and erratic cruelty… but many others were educated men who tried to instil in their troops 
their own vision of morality (Spence, 1990:288-9). 
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and road construction. To subvert local authorities central administrations were 
established with authority over all military, police, customs and transport. However, little 
was done to rejuvenate rural economies or improve poor agricultural practices (Fairbank, 
1994) 
 
1928/ 
1929 
KMT begin taxing opium transportation 
through the Yangtze River 
KMT prohibit production and distribution; 
many autonomous warlords ignore ban 
 
1930 
League of Nations declare China the primary 
source of illicit opium in East and Southeast 
Asia. 
Long March. KMT extend their authority as they pursue the CCP over 6,000 miles 
(Fairbank, 1994) 
1934 
China  ‘the most serious menace to any 
scheme of universal control’ (Eisenlohr, 
1934:207) 
Majority of warlords integrated into KMT 
opium monopoly 
KMT form civilian government in Sichuan Province. Taxes centralised, roads built and 
two-fifths of provincial military demobbed and retrained for civilian occupations. Some 
warlord resistance (Spence, 1990) 
1935 
Six-Year Plan commences 
Second Sino-Japanese War: Nanjing and Shanghai fall. CCP gradually extend authority 1937 KMT declare opium production has ceased in 
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in rural areas (Fairbank, 1994) all but frontier provinces 
Japanese facilitate opium production in areas 
under their authority 
KMT retreat to Chongqing where they form alliances with Sichuan, Yunnan and 
Guangxi warlords (Fairbank, 1994) 
1938 
 
 
1939/ 
1940 
KMT report that almost all production has 
ceased in areas under their authority. While 
reports from British diplomats and KMT differ 
all point to significant reductions 
 
1941 
Complete prohibition established. Production 
limited to frontier and areas under Japanese 
authority 
 
1944 
League of Nations report that China produce 
65.4 percent of global illicit supply 
Second Sino-Japanese War ends. ‘Civil War’ between KMT and CCP commences; 
KMT military are incompetent and unpopular. KMT popularity diminishes after 
imposition of unequal taxation on agricultural crops and massive inflation push many 
rural peoples further into poverty. Additionally, many resent the KMT for using 
surrendered Japanese soldiers to fight the CCP and are tired of decades of near constant 
conflict (Fairbank, 1994) 
1945 
Semi-independent warlords and military 
commanders facilitate resumption in opium 
production 
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CCP unify China under Communist rule; People’s Republic of China established 
(Gittings, 2006). The CCP receives much rural support (Fairbank, 1994)4 
1949 
 
Commencement of land redistribution to peasants and punishment of landlords 
(Gittings, 2006) 
1950 
Decree Regarding Suppression of Opium and 
Narcotics obliges forced eradication 
Three-Antis Campaign targets corruption, waste and bureaucracy in government. Five-
Antis Campaign targets capitalist class’s. Almost ever employer is brought to trial and all 
private companies nationalised (Fairbank, 1994; Gittings, 2006) 
1951 
Initial campaign against ‘drug offenders’ 
 1952 82,056 ‘drug offenders’ arrested. Forced 
                                                 
4
 In central-south China an estimated 60 percent of the population benefitted from land reforms (Spence, 1990). As Fairbank (1994:348) notes:  
 
Here was a conquering army of country boys who were strictly self-disciplined, polite, and helpful, at the opposite pole from the looting and 
raping warlord and troops and even departing Nationalists. Here was a dedicated government that really cleaned things up – not only the drains 
and streets but also the beggars, prostitutes and petty criminals, all of whom were rounded up for reconditioning. Here was a new China one 
could be proud of, one that controlled inflation, abolished foreign privileges, stamped out opium smoking and corruption generally, and brought 
the citizenry into a multitude of sociable activities to repair public works, spread literacy, control disease, ..…//… Only later did they see that the 
Promised Land was based on systematic control and manipulation. Gradually the CCP organisation would penetrate the society, set model roles 
of conduct, prescribe thought, and suppress individual deviations. 
 
In rural areas, once the military had taken control, the CCP recruited local activists who became the new elite. They held authority over populations through ‘public 
trials, mass accusations, and executions’ (Fairbank, 1994:350/353). 
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eradication conducted 
First experiments with ‘mutual-aid teams’ (partial communalised rural farms) (Spence, 
1990). Five-Year Plan stresses heavy industry above agriculture, however, it was ‘felt to 
be on the whole a great success’ as national income grew by 8.9% and agricultural output 
increased by 3.8% (Fairbank, 1994:358) 
1953 
Han Chinese areas Opium-Free 
Agricultural cooperatives established (Gittings, 2006)5 1955  
Anti-rightist campaign stifles bureaucratic efficiency as 300,000-700,000 skilled 
workers are exiled to the countryside; intelligence and innovation is punished (Fairbank, 
1994) 
1957 
 
Great Leap Forward.  Agricultural communes replace cooperatives (Gittings, 2006).6  
Rural Chinese were mobilised into ‘round the clock labour’ to construct new: roads; 
irrigation; factories; cities; and steel. While the immediate results were ‘chaotic and 
uneconomic’ in the midterm it extended small-scale industry to the countryside (Fairbank, 
1994:371), improved rural infrastructures and increased the productivity of formerly 
infertile areas. More negatively it inflated official corruption (Spence, 1990). Red Guards 
1958-
1961 
 
                                                 
5
 By 1955 almost all farms were part of communes (averaging 10,000 farmers) which pooled all resources. Individuals were remunerated on their ‘subsistence needs 
and only partly on the work performed’ (Lin, 1990:1234) 
6
 During communalism grain was rationed on subsistence needs, however, the CCP definition of subsistence was significantly lower than was set by international 
relief organisations (Fairbank, 1994) 
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(students aged between 9-18) terrorise all considered as bourgeois or in opposition to 
Mao. Mostly uneducated youths replace trained bureaucrats (Fairbank, 1994) 
End of Great Leap Forward. Communes scaled down (Gittings, 2006) 1961  
Four Cleanups Campaign against CCP members who exploit workers (i.e. nepotism or 
corruption). Work teams force confessions from CCP members (Fairbank, 1994) 
1964 
 
Many Red Guards resettled in countryside as punishment (Fairbank, 1994) 1968  
1960s-1970s 
Many had become dissatisfied over the violence of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1968) and reduced agricultural productivity. While road 
construction, communications, education and agricultural modernisation had improved agricultural productivity development had ‘lacked behind hopes 
and expectations’ (Fairbank, 1994:405). 
All un-cited information from Chapter 4.  
 
Annex 1:2. Iran 
 5 Cent.  
BC 
Evidence of opium consumption (Raisdana 
and Nakhjavani, 2002) 
 10 / 11 
Cent. 
Opium first produced  (Neligan, 1927) 
 
1729 
Opium consumption and production 
prohibited (Matthee, 2005) 
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1796 
Prohibition on opium renewed (Matthee, 
2005) 
 1853 Opium first exported on significant scale 
 1858 China legalizes opium imports 
Silk-worm destroys silk industry. Textile manufacturing reduced by lower-cost British 
and Russian imports 
1860 
 
Large-scale conversion of land from food crops to opium contributes to famine 1869-
1872 
 
 
1870s 
Iranian Government privatise farmland for 
opium production 
State administration is inefficient and few taxes are collected Mid-
1800s 
 
New Constitution limits absolutist powers of rulers and creates Majles (Parliament), 
which must approve all important decisions. Equality before law and freedom of press and 
assembly established 
Foreign powers divide Iran into three spheres of authority: Russian (northern/Central, 
including Tehran), British (southeast) and neutral (remainder). Iran is not consulted or 
informed of agreement 
1907 
China begins gradual prohibition 
 
Oil discovered in southwest  1908  
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Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now BP) formed 
Increased tribal disorders in many provinces, revolutionary forces capture Isfahan and 
descend on Tehran forcing the abdication of Shah who is replaced by son   
Taxes collection remains minimal 
1909 
 
 
1910 
Law on Limiting Opium regulates and taxes 
opium consumption. Professes prohibition of 
non-medical use within seven years 
Quasi-military gendarmerie established  
Majles refuses Russian demands that Iran not engage foreign advice without Russian or 
British consent. Majles dissolved after Russia threatens military attack (Keddie, 2006). 
Iran is a ‘empire struggling to survive’ (Ansari, 2006:8) 
1911 
 
World War One: regardless of neutrality Iran becomes a battlefield. Food shortages 
created after farmland and irrigation are devastated whilst farmers are forced to produce 
food and build infrastructures for belligerent forces (Britain and Russia). Central authority 
lost in many areas 
1914 
 
One-quarter of northern population killed by famine related to: devastated rural 
infrastructure; reduced crop area; reduced harvests; and food needs of British/Russian 
troops during War 
1918-
1919 
 
Negotiations for Anglo-Iranian Treaty which would make Iran a British protectorate. 
UK supplies advisors to Government, arms military, and develops transportation and 
1919 
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communications infrastructures. Opponents of draft treaty jailed or exiled by Government 
New government suspends Treaty and British troops leave Iran  1920  
Military coup: Backed by the British, Reza Khan seizes power and attempts to centralize 
tax collection and modernize army 
1921 
 
Millspaugh (US delegate) signs contract with government ceding full control of Iranian 
budget and financial administration. New agricultural monopolies and taxes created; 
military collect taxes  
1922 
Millspaugh reforms opium control/ tax 
system 
Reza Khan becomes PM and exiles weakened Shah. This ignites several southern 
rebellions  
 
1923 
Reforms have reduced diversion from 80 
percent to one-third 
Southern rebellions violently suppressed 
1924 
To limit illicit transhipment, opium imports 
prohibited 
Majles vote Reza Khan ruler. Modernization of bureaucrat, military and 
communications begins. 
 
1925 
Public opium consumption criminalised 
League of Nations expresses displeasure at 
poor export controls and existence of Iranian 
opium in illicit market 
Reza Khan crowned Reza Shah Pahlavi and exercises ‘despotic controls and 
suppression’ over opponents; many are exiled or executed.  Majles while several tribes are 
forcefully re-settled. All resistance is ‘cruelly suppressed’ (Kiddie, 2006:88) 
Iran continues to be agricultural underdeveloped and lacking organization, irrigation and 
1926 
Commission of Inquiry promotes 
protectionist polices to support substitute crop 
promotion 
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transport, however, police and military are well organised, highly efficient and ‘compare 
favourable with police forces in other countries’ (Millspaugh, 1926:10) 
Oil production increases from pre-World War One level of 80,800 tons to 4,556,00 tons 
Millspaugh resigns after disagreements with Reza Shah  
1927 
 
 
1928 
State monopoly created. Licenses farmers; 
no restriction on licenses. Support for 
substitute cops offered 
Law on Punishment of Opium Traffickers 
criminalises unlicensed possession and 
distribution 
Many poorer farmers lose land to landlords after law requiring registration of land 
ownership is enforced 
1929 
Monopoly unable to procure harvest and 
offers credit 
Tax’s from sugar and tea used to extend rail infrastructure. Civil service and military 
strengthened 1930 
League of Nations expresses displeasure at 
poor export and production controls and 
existence of Iranian opium in illicit markets 
 
1933 
Monopoly reorganised; 20 percent of shares 
sold to private merchants 
Shah’s modernisation produces results: electricity extended to almost all major cities; 
manufacturing plants were establishes (mostly textile and agricultural processing); airline 
service created, telephone and radio communications expanded; road surface increased ten 
Mid-
1930s 
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times since 1925; journey from southern ports to Tehran reduced from 2 months to 2/3 
weeks. However, lack of transport remains prevents development in many areas   
Agriculture received little investment during modernisation and thus remained backward 
which ‘encouraged low productivity’. All farmland owned by around 2-5 percent of 
population, mostly Majles and the military; Shah the biggest landowner. ‘Peasants were 
often hungry, diseased and malnourished’ (Keddie, 2006:97) 
 
1936 
Monopoly begins buying from farmgate and 
paying in cash. To reinvigorate other 
agricultural industries ten provinces are 
prohibited from cultivating poppies 
‘Landlordism and declining rural standards were the weakest point of Reza Shah’s 
modernisation’. Agricultural loans offered to improve poor land and agricultural schools 
established, however labour is so cheap that landlords refused to invest in modernisation. 
(Keddie, 2006:97) 
1937 
A further seven provinces are prohibited 
from cultivating opium 
 
1938 
A further 25 districts are prohibited from 
cultivating opium 
League of Nations declares Iran as no longer 
a major exporter of opium 
Allies with Germany in World War Two. Invaded and occupied by America, Britain and 
Russia (Ansari, 2006). Modernization drive ends and Shah abdicates in favor Mohammad 
1941 
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Reza 
Car and van ownership increases from 600 (1928) to 25,000 (1942) 
Millspaugh returns and reports that government is more corrupt; Majles a instrument of 
the rich. Poor harvest causes famine and riots in Tehran. Many tribes rearmed and began to 
reassert independence 
1942 
 
Millspaugh introduces (sparsely enforced) income tax and promotes free trade. Majles 
moves to take control of Iranian oil from foreign interests 
World War Two has devastated railways and seaport infrastructures. Cost of internal 
transport of freight rises five times whilst widespread corruption in customs administration 
almost completely deregulates foreign trade 
1943 
 
Massive inflation related to spending by foreign military stationed in Iran 1944 76.3 percent of all opium unaccounted for 
British and Russian forces end occupation (Ansari, 2006) 
Azerbaijan and Kurdish separatist movements ‘brutally’ suppressed 
Iranian farmers amongst the poorest in the world due to: landlord exploitation; 
unproductive agri-practices and poor seeds; and state monopolies buying below market 
price. As access to machinery increased many landlords evicted farmers, thus increasing 
rural unemployment. Law requiring landlords to give farmers 15 percent of their harvest 
share receives minimal compliance 
1946 
Official production ceases 
 
1949 
UN quota system introduced giving Iran a 
15 percent of global market. Production 
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recommences, although domestic distribution 
prohibited 
China prohibits opium and Iran becomes 
largest source of illicit opium in Southeast 
Asia 
No city has a modern water system and per capita consumption of electricity and cement 
was ‘well below’ Egypt or Turkey 
Pre-1950 
 
US support agri-development program (including construction of irrigation dam and 
manufacturing plants), however, rural reform remains insufficient 
1952 
 
British and US intelligence services supports coup that overthrows PM and strengthens 
Shah, who becomes increasingly dictatorial 
1953 
 
Iran takes control of 50 percent of its oil industry and makes profit from oil for first 
time. Profits used to fund rural-modernization drive, however, mismanagement, inter-
ministerial conflicts and corruption reduce efficiency of development 
Disparity between rich and poor continues to grow 
1954 
 
Shah dismisses and does not replace elected PM 
1955 
Law Banning the Cultivation of Opium 
Poppy and Use of Opium criminalises 
production. Forced eradication commences 
Shah’s secret police (SAVAK) begin infiltrating political opponents and with ‘jail, 
torture, or even death as the possible stakes, it is not suppressing that even underground or 
1957 
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exile oppositional groups were decimated … or that ... people were increasingly hesitant 
about discussing politics’ (Keddie, 2006:134) 
Three new oil agreements permit Iran control over 75% of profits  
 
1958 
Iran declares area under cultivation is 
practically nil; statement supported by foreign 
observers 
 1959 Punishments for illicit production increased 
Late-1950s economic boom beginning to slow  
Shah ejects elected Majles politicians and appoints his own PM. Open opposition to 
Shah emerges 
1960 
 
Farmer’s interaction with the state limited to monopoly procurement agents, tax 
collectors or military recruiters  
Pre-1961 
 
PM and Shah dissolve Majles  1961  
Beginning of period of economic growth and internal stability (through political 
repression) (Ansari, 2006), for example, military kill excess of 100 protesting against 
arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini (for preaching against Shah) 
 ‘White Revolution’: Rural land reform and modernization. While state subsidies 
modern agri-machinery inadequate agricultural education results in farmers procuring 
1963 
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unsuitable, or inappropriately using, machines. Ineffective administration, limited 
extension services or agri-education, limit impact of land reform on poorer farmers7 
Status of Forces Convention (which protects US citizen’s immunity from prosecution) 
causes discontent amongst Iranian nationalists. Ayatollah Khomeini exiled for preaching 
against Shah (Ansari, 2006) 
1964 
 
 
1968 
Prohibition rescinded and farmers regulated 
by state monopoly. All opium produced for 
domestic consumption 
SAVAK repression increases against opposition; increase in number of political 
prisoners.  
Commercial farms established. Farmers ‘persuaded’ to turn their land over to large-
corporations and paid a wage,8 however, increased use of machinery creates mass 
unemployment. Focus of farms on exports lowered food production and created a reliance 
on foreign imports9  
Late-
1960s 
 
US begins supplying Iran with enriched uranium. France begins supply five nuclear 1974 Heroin manufactured in Tehran on an 
                                                 
7
 Rey (1966:34) reported that ‘agricultural output is limited by exploitative social structures, ancient techniques and the natural poverty of much of the country’. 
8
 Even before the establishment of commercial farms few peasants owned productive land. The majority was owned by landlords whereby farmers paid landlords 
four fifths of the crop as rent (Rey, 1966). 
9
 Commercial farms were dismantled after 1978, which may suggest they were unpopular and unprofitable (Keddie, 2006). 
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power plants. Canada and UK agree to train Iranian nuclear scientists (Ansari, 2006) industrial scale 
Widespread opposition to the Shah. Many ‘saw as bad everything the regime said was 
good’ (Keddie, 2006:229). The powerful clergy are alienated. Riots, strikes and mass 
demonstrations lead to the deaths of 70 protestors in Qom and 500-900 protestors in 
Tehran. The imposition of martial law10 increases protests and strike action. Many soldiers 
refuse to fire into crowds and actively support protests 
1978 
 
Islamic Revolution: Khomeini returns from exile. Anti-Shah militants open prisons and, 
attack police and military bases throughout Iran; hundreds die. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran is proclaimed following a referendum signed by 98 percent of the population. Some 
ethnic groups and leftist militants oppose new regime: all are violently defeated 
Many rural poor are loyal to the Revolutionary Government for: subsiding housing and 
food; promoting education and health in villages; confiscating and redistributing property 
and land of former elite.11 Many cultural identified with conservative clergy, opposed 
consumption patterns of ‘westernised’ rich and abhorred former regime (Keddie, 
2006:256) 
Shari’a law codified. Judiciary controlled by Khomeinists. Purge of non-Khomeini 
military and bureaucracy begins. New Constitution mandates that Khomeini: has divine 
1979 
Production and consumption increase as 
Shah’s repressive drug control mechanisms are 
dismantled 
                                                 
10
 Public meetings of 3 or more people banned, universities and media closed. 
11
 Foundation of the Disposed confiscated all companies, property, agricultural land and factories linked to previous regime 
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authority and is answerable only to God; controls the army, and can disqualify Presidential 
candidates. Guardian Council (appointed by Khomeini) can reject Majles legislation if 
perceived to be incompatible with Islam or Constitution 
Iran-Iraq war begins 
Cultural Revolution: Vigilante groups suppress ‘non-Islamic’ ideals (i.e. music, western 
films, rights of women). Many universities closed and intellectuals dismissed or executed 
(Keddie, 2006). ‘Rehabilitation Centres’ created for prostitutes, where they received 
religious ‘re-education’ before being given to a suitable husband: those not ‘rehabilitated’ 
are publically flogged (Malarek, 1980) 
Khomeinists take complete control of all institutions except Presidency. One-third of all 
enterprises and labor force nationalized and economic slumps (rampant inflation, reduced 
price of oil and money shortages)  
Centre is unable to exert authority over peripheral areas, especially the Kurdish and 
Baluch regions (Babcock and Kotkin, 1980) 
1980 
Bill prohibits all intoxicants and mandates: 
forced eradication; prison sentences for 
farmers; communal punishments. 176-240 
executed and 20,00 imprisoned for drug 
offences in seven weeks 
Iran and UN declare country opium-free 
Western trained lawyers replaced by Shari’a and religious scholars. Clerical 
interrogators (who are also prosecution and judge) authorized to give indefinite series of 
74 lashes until they obtain ‘honest answers’; which can be used as evidence in court. 
1981 
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Clerics also administer prisons where they torture prisoners into making public 
‘confessions’12 (Abrahamian, 1999:139) 
Following failed coup, 2,665 are executed in six months (Keddie, 2006); a further 50 
Kurdish, Baluch and Turkmen separatists are also executed (Abrahamian, 1999). Between 
January 1980 and June 1981 at least 906 people were executed for (non-
counterrevolutions) ‘crimes’ (i.e. prostitution, drug possession). Methods of executions 
included: public stoning; shooting; and hanging (Bakhash, 1986)  
Khomeini and followers gradual increase their authority; often violently disposing of 
opponents. However, as several centres of power existed Iran never became a dictatorship, 
including the elected  president and parliament alongside the authoritarian clergy  
1983 
 
Prison conditions improve slightly after clergy agree to Majles and UN inspections 
(Abrahamian, 1999) 
1984 
 
Excess of 12,500 ‘counterrevolutions’ killed through execution, conflict or torture 
(Abrahamian, 1999) 
1981-
1985 
 
                                                 
12
 Other forms of torture included: the crushing of fingers; deprivation of sleep; breaking limbs; cigarette burns; submission in water; threats to family; insertion of 
sharp objects under finger-nails; participating in mock and actual executions. Flogging the soles of the feet was the most prevalent as it was ‘officially’ sanctioned by 
an interpretation of Shari’a. Cells were overcrowded; some contained 35 people in a room built for 15. Suicide and psychosis were common (Abrahamian, 
1999:139/169-73).  
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Ceasefire with Iraq. War caused huge infrastructural damage, including loss of oil 
refineries. Per capita incomes dropped by 40 percent during War while agricultural self-
sufficiency and unemployed were ‘worse than ever’ (Keddie, 2006:264) 
Five Year economic plan stresses privatization, modernisation of agricultural and 
infrastructural development. While productivity gradually improves (Keddie, 2006) the 
elite begin exploiting natural resources for personal gain, while large-scale corruption and 
poor long-term planning become obstacles to the development of a modern economy 
(Ansari, 2006) 
1988 
Tehran Home Service and Anti-Drug Law 
signify resumption of anti-drugs campaign 
Khomeini dies leaving ‘Iran with a relatively strong government but with huge 
economic, social, and international problems’ (Keddie, 2006:262) 
1989 
Val Adiyat campaign 
 
Country is characterized by a ‘pall of intolerance and fear’, including: torture and forced 
confessions; extrajudicial assassination of political opponents; indefinite pre-trial 
incarceration; corporal punishment, mutilation, sexual abuse and psychological torture of 
political prisoners and drug traffickers (HRW, 2000:n.p.; also AI, 1986). 
1980s 
 
Workers riot in several large cities in opposition to increased oil prices and declining 
living standards; all are brutally repressed (Keddie, 2006) by military and vigilante groups 
(HRW, 1993) 
HRW (1993) reports that Iran has one of the worst human rights records in Middle East. 
Published execution statistics are likely conservative. True figure is much likely, 
especially in Kurdish and Baluch regions. Citizens are arbitrarily detained and prison 
1992 
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conditions are inhumane (HRW, 1994) 
Increased conflict with Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and two smaller separatist 
groups displaces at least 10,000 individuals (HRW, 1994) 
1993 
 
Eleven die and 500 seriously injured in riots in opposition to increasing. Majles 
demands that military to shoot to kill (HRW, 1996) 
Several Kurdish leaders extra-judicially executed. Increased shelling of villages forces 
displacement of Kurdish civilians (HRW, 1995) 
1994 
 
US impose oil and trade sanctions over Iran’s alleged sponsorship of terrorism, nuclear 
ambitions and hostility to Israel 
Protests continue against increasing poverty; many suppressed by vigilant groups. 
Violence between state and Kurdish separatists continues (HRW, 1996) 
1995 
 
 
1996 
Canada and US cease reporting Iranian 
production  
Violent suppression of political opponents, protestors and minorities continue (HRW, 
2000) 
1997 
 
Protests violently suppressed by vigilantes and police. Use of corporal punishment 
(especially flogging) and public execution increases. Prison conditions remain poor and 
violate human rights standards (HRW, 2002). 
2001 
 
All un-cited information from Keddie (2006) or Chapter 5. 
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Annex 1:3. Turkey 
 1900 
BC 
Opium first cultivated in Anatolia 
 1805 Opium first exported to China 
 1828 State monopolises opium production 
 
1839 
UK force end of opium monopoly system. 
Export to British pharmaceuticals begins. 
 
1858 
China legalises opium imports - Turkish share 
of Chinese market increases 
 1905 Turkey is primary sources of opium to China 
Treaty of Lausanne declares Turkey a sovereign state and provides much former 
territory independence.13 Assembly declares Turkey a Republic and passes new 
constitution.  
Ten years of near constant violent conflict have left Turkey ‘depopulated, impoverished 
and in ruins to a degree almost unparalleled in modern history’. Devastated rural 
infrastructure facilitated famine and the population of Anatolia, hardest hit by conflict, had 
declined by 20 percent (Zürcher, 1998:172). 
1923 
 
                                                 
13
 Treaty provided Armenia, Kurdistan, Palestine and Syria independence from Turkey 
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Kurdish uprising in Diyarbakir: One-third of Kurdish-Anatolia occupied by insurgent 
forces (Robins, 1993) protesting against the banning of the Kurdish language and forceful 
resettlement. The uprising ended within a year after many leaders were executed and 
20,000 were forcefully resettled. Small insurgencies continued throughout the late-
1920s/1930s 
1925 
 
Abolition of tithe system and other reforms increase agricultural productivity by 90% 1923-
1926 
 
Economy effected by world economic crises and drought 1929-30  
 
1920s 
Opiate manufacturing for non-medical 
consumption established  
Kurdish revolt violently suppressed by military (Robins, 1993) 
1930 
Turkey is worlds primary source of licit and 
quasi-licit opium. High levels of diversion 
Turkey officially declared a one-party state. Law allows government to close any 
newspaper which contradicts government policy 
1931 
 
 
1933 
First national drug control laws close opiate 
manufacturers. Council of Ministers designate 
provinces permitted to produce opium. Begins 
crop substitution  
Kurdish uprising in Dersim (Tunceli) (Zürcher, 1998) suppressed by military. Kurdish 
violence remains minimal until the late-1970s (Robins, 1993). 
1937 
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1938 
TMO created. Regulations on production 
remain minimal 
 
World War Two: Turkey agrees to support France and UK against acts of aggression in 
Mediterranean in exchange for £16 million loan and £25 million in military credit. Good 
economic growth of the 1930s dropped sharply during World War Two, Turkey does not 
recover until 1950s  
1939 
 
 
1940 
Council of Ministers cut permitted opium 
producers to 42 
Signs treaty of friendship with Germany whilst remaining neutral 1941  
 1931-
1941 
Turkey one of worlds three largest producers 
of illicit opium 
Joins UN and declares war on Germany and Japan, although takes no military action.  
Land Distribution Law: 99.75% of landownership consists of small farms of less than 
125 acres; many own 6-12 acres and survive below the poverty line. Law distributed to 
poor farmers: unused state land; reclaimed land; land without clear ownership; and land 
expropriated from those owning excess of 125 acres  
1945 
 
Democratic elections; massive vote-rigging and corruption  1946  
Four-fifths of workforce are employed in agriculture and 90% of exports are 
agricultural. However, agricultural methods are primitive and productivity is low (Erinc 
1940s 
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and Tucdilek, 1993) 
The state, including tax-collection and criminal justice institutions, had ‘became more 
effective and visible’, in rural areas; this provoked significant discontent (Zürcher, 
1998:216) 
 
Late-
1940s 
Turkish-Italian opiates main source of US 
heroin 
All districts close to borders prohibited from 
producing opium 
First free and fair elections (Gunter, 1989). New Government emphasis rural 
development as central to economic growth  
1950 
 
Joins NATO 1952  
Period of economic growth supported by increased agricultural production and 
liberalization of trade policies (Cecen et al., 1994).14  Rural living conditions unaffected by 
economic growth. For example, while electricity production had increased ten fold 
between 1923-43, in 1953 just 0.025 percent of 40,000 villages possessed electricity 
1947-
1953 
 
                                                 
14
 Cheap credit was provided to farmers and the TMO paid artificially high prices for agricultural produce. Rural development resulted in: an increase in the number 
of tractors operating from 1,750 (1948) to over 30,000 (1952); an increase in arable land from 14.5 million (1948) to 22.5 million (1956) hectares; construction of 
5,400km of hard-surfaced roads; a 102,000 increases in imported cars and trucks. Additionally, excellent weather condition yielded good harvests which added to a 
national growth rate of 11-13 percent (Zürcher, 1998:235). 
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As agricultural practices failed to improve and rural tax collection remained minimal by 
1954, the agri-boom was over and economic growth fell from 14% to 4% 
1954 
 
 
1955 
Iranian opium ban may have motivated 
increased diversion  
State control of media increases; political meetings prohibited except during election 
campaigns  
1956 
 
Receive $359million in aid from IMF 1958  
Riots in Istanbul and Ankara universities suppressed by military. Army coup removes 
elected – although oppressive (Gunter, 1989) - government15 to ‘prevent fratricide’ 
(Zürcher, 1998:252) 
1960 
 
Constitution accepted by referendum and includes full bill of civil liberties. Checks and 
balances established by creating dual house legislative and allowing independent judiciary 
(including constitutional court) full media and academic freedom. However, new 
Government is unstable and three coalition’s are formed in year (Karpat, 1964) 
1961 
Council of Ministers cut permitted producers 
to 35 
US declare that 70% of its illicit heroin 
sourced from Turkey. Turkey does not refute 
allegation 
 
1962 
Council of Ministers cut permitted producers 
to 25 
Military colonel executed for failed coup (Karpat, 1964) 1963  
                                                 
15
 Fifteen politicians were executed and 31 sentenced to life imprisonment 
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Becomes associate member of European Community  
1964 
Council of Ministers cut permitted producers 
to 16 
 
1966 
Iran declare that 25% of its illicit opium 
sourced from Turkey 
 Mid-
1960s 
US declare that 60% of its illicit heroin 
sourced from Turkey 
‘Sluggish’ economic growth, especially in agriculture (Cecen et al., 1994) 1955- 
1965 
 
Left-wing and right-wing, militants begin campaigns which include: violent protests; 
bombings; kidnappings; and robberies 
1968 
Council of Ministers cut permitted producers 
to 11. Production prohibited in border provinces 
 
1969 
Council of Ministers cut permitted producers 
to 9 
Between 1963-68 economy growth averages 6.4 percent and ‘per capita national 
income… is relatively high’ (FCO, 1969:3) resulting in income increase averaging 20 
percent (Zürcher, 1998). Largest growths in manufacturing and construction; agriculture 
grew by just 1.9 percent. Agricultural practices remain ‘backward’ in Anatolia and Eastern 
Turkey whilst developing at a ‘satisfactory rate’ in coastal areas. Large-scale irrigation 
projects have begun to rectify insufficient irrigation (FCO, 1969:1) 
1960s 
TMO procurement policy improved to prevent 
diversion 
Armenian terrorism emerged in the 1970s. The Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberating of Armenia attacked Turkish diplomats and civilians in foreign countries. It was 
Early-
1970s 
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partly funded by revenue from illicit drugs trafficking 
Demirel resigns from cabinet in February and returns in March with small majority, this 
adds to political instability. As student and trade union protests become more frequent, 
marshal law is passed in Istanbul  (Sarell, 1970) 
The state continues to be reliant on foreign aid (especially World Bank, Germany, UK 
and Japan). Reliance on US is reduced as Turkey moves closer to Europe (Sorrell, 1970). 
1970 
Council of Ministers cut permitted producers 
to seven 
Political violence increases. Military demand that a new government be formed to ‘end 
the anarchy’. Demirel resigns and is replace by military with Erim (Zürcher, 1998:273), 
hence, new government accountable more to the military than the public (Robbins, 2007) 
Martial law declared in 11 provinces (including all large cities) and military arrest 5,000 
suspected terrorist and non-violent left-wingers. Widespread reports of torture (Sayari and 
Hoffman, 1991; Sorrell, 1971) 
Economy prospers due to good harvest and remittance from Turkish workers abroad 
(Sorrell, 1971) 
1971 
Opium farmers licensed. Unregulated 
possession criminalised 
Constitution altered to limit civil liberties, press, academic and constitutional courts 
freedom 
Central Government ‘reaches down into Turkish society’ and, while bureaucracy is 
inefficient and slow, the local army, police and gendarmerie ‘enjoy wide authority’ (FCO, 
1972:2) 
1972 
Opium ban. Turkey receives US$15million in 
aid. Crop substitution begins 
Opium-free 
Ecevit elected to coalition government by rural votes (FCO, 1972). Urban terrorism 1973  
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resumes (Sayari and Hoffman, 1991) and rising unemployment facilitates large-scale 
economic migration to Europe 
Invades northern Cyprus, US imposes trade embargo 
1974 
Ban is repealed due to public pressure and 
seven provinces permitted to produce opium 
straw. INCB impressed with controls 
Good harvest adds to continued improvements in rural conditions. Overall economic 
growth of 7-9%, although unemployment increased (Lane, 1975) 
‘Turkish political life continues to contain a traditional element of violence’. However, 
violence does not threaten stability. Corruption, while widespread in society and politics, is 
minimal in military due to intense patriotism (Fullerton, 1975:3) 
1975 
US admit controls are ‘remarkable effective’ 
Urban terrorism continues to increase (Sayari and Hoffman, 1991) 
Period of economic growth ends as oil crises drives Turkey into deep recession (Cecen 
et al., 1994) 
1976 
 
Balance of payments in ‘acute crises’ (Dodson, 1977:3) and unemployment at 15 
percent; rural areas are hardest hit due to poor harvest (FCO, 1977).  
Terrorist attacks kill 230 (Gunter, 1989) 
1977 
 
US trade embargo lifted. Kurdish Workers Party established and ‘Grey Wolves’ kill 100 
individuals: martial law in 13, later extended to 20, provinces 
1978 
 
Urban terrorism escalates bringing ‘Turkey to the brink of large-scale social strife…. the 
work of a staggering number of terrorist organizations that included, in addition to the 
1979 
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Marxists, the ultra-rightists and the Kurdish separatists’ (Sayari and Hoffman, 1991:10). 
Between 1,200-1,500 were killed by militants who seize control of entire urban areas 
(Gunter, 1989).  
Turkey is characterised by ‘an escalating tide of anarchy and terrorism…. and a sinking 
economy that saw crippling shortages of important consumer items, raging inflation, and 
rising unemployment’ (Gunter, 1989:65). Terrorist attacks resulted in the death of 4,500 
between 1976-1980 (Sayari and Hoffman, 1991) 
Late-
1970s 
 
Military coup establishes the tenth governments since 1971 (the second imposed by the 
military) (Gunter, 1989). Martial law is imposed and repressive military campaign against 
Kurdish population begins (Robins, 1993) 
1980 
 
Military arrests 122,600 militants and leftist supporters; torture is widespread. However, 
terrorist attacks decline by 90% 
1981 
18/20 Rule established 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) launches insurgency in southeast 1984  
HRW (1989) reports that police torture 50 percent of civil criminals and 90 percent of 
political prisoners: those involved in crime expect to be tortured (Gunter, 1989) 
1989 
 
While south-east has always been the poorest part of Turkey with little social welfare 
and significantly lower per capita income the situation was aggravated in the 1980s when 
economic boom bypassed rural Anatolia; especially the Kurdish south-east. During the 
1990s: per capita income was less than half of national average; unemployment was 
double the national average; and only 18 percent of children receive a basic education 
1980s 
1990s 
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(Robbins, 1993). Torture, nationally widespread, was more pronounced in southeast 
(HRW, 1990) 
HWR (1992:n.p.) report a further deterioration of human rights: ‘more people died in 
detention under suspicious circumstances... more people were shot and killed by security 
forces in raids on houses, attacks on demonstrations and other suspicious circumstances. 
Torture continued to be rampant’ 
1991 
 
All un-cited information from Zürcher (1998) or Chapter 6. 
Annex 1:4. Thailand 
 1282 Opium introduced to Siam 
 1360 Opium consumption and trade prohibited  
 1851 Opium smoking legalised for Chinese migrants 
 
1908 
Opium monopoly established (supplied by 
India) 
 1921 Opium consumption prohibited 
 
1929 
Opium production criminalised. Forced 
eradication 
 
1932 
Opium monopoly resumes distribution; 
production remains prohibited 
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 1938 Chiang Rai opium farmers licensed 
Siam renamed Thailand (BBC, 2010) 1939  
Military coup (BBC, 2010). 
1947 
All opium production prohibited (highland 
production tolerated) 
 1949 All opium production licenses revoked 
Highland’s remain almost completely outside of Thai administration (Kammerer, 1988) 
 
Pre-
1950s 
 
BPP begin operating in Northern highlands to counter potential Communist infiltration 
(Marks, 1973); includes extending Thai education (Kammerer, 1988) 
1955 
 
Good economic progress promotes political stability. Communist insurgency increases 
with 30 people a month being assassinated on average (Darling, 1967) 
1956-7 
 
Programme to resettle highland peoples is unpopular as new villages are under-
developed (Marks, 1973; Kemmere, 1988) 1959 
Production, trade and consumption prohibited 
(highland production tolerated). End of semi-
official state support 
Highland development included in National Master Plan for Economic Development 
(1961-1965) (Jinawat, 2001). Small-scale highland development administered through 
‘Mobile Development Stations’ (Nuechterlein, 1967) 
1960 
 
Communists begin extensive highland recruiting programme (Marks, 1973) 1963  
 1964 Five-Year Plan emphasizes crop substitution 
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Survey of highland socio-economic conditions conducted (Chareonpanich, 1987) 1965  
On average one person a day is assassinated by Thai Communists (Darling, 1967). In the 
first major conflicts between Thai forces and highland Communists the Thai military use 
artillery and napalm to destroy villages: decimating the highland economies. Plans are 
formulated to resettle 55,000 highlanders (Gua, 1975; Marks, 1975). More extensive rural 
development programme begins with extension of new/improved crops and advise from 
agricultural experts (Neuchterein, 1967). 
Thailand is in a good position to deal with the insurgent threat as it has: been unified 
under a strong government who have posses authority throughout the state for eight years; 
increased the number of police and military stationed in the Northeast; a average economic 
growth of 7%; and the ‘most experienced and efficient civil service in Southeast Asia’. 
With the exception of northern highlands transport, social services and education 
development are the priority  (Neuchterein, 1967:126) 
Corruption is high and represents a ‘modest threat’ to stability (Darling, 1967:123) 
1967 
 
At least 100 highland villages attacked with artillery and napalm (Kammerer,1988). 
Resettlement continues (Gua, 1975) 
1969 
Royal Project commences 
 
1960s 
Forced eradication centred upon military 
attacks and forced resettlement. However, 
increasingly perceived  as counterproductive 
Country is ‘stable and united’. Economy is healthy and has been ‘booming for ten years’ Late- Policy of highland integration begins. Road 
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There is no famine or ‘grinding poverty’ and ‘by and large the masses are well fed’. 
However, corruption ‘is a national past time’ and police are ‘petty tyrants’ (Pritchard, 
1970:3; also FCO, 1973; Watts, 1970). There is considerable investment in large-
infrastructural developments (i.e. roads and electricity)  (Watts, 1970), including the first 
road built through the highlands (Kammerer, 1988). 
While the majority of opium farmers ‘appear to have more than enough to eat’, the 
average highlander income is significantly below the national average (UN, 1969:10) 
1960s construction is an early priority 
Field-Marshal Thanon (PM) declares marshal law, abolishes Cabinet, Parliament and 
Constitution (Mare, 1972) 
1971 
Doi Suthep crop substitution research centre 
established (Kuzmarov, 2008) 
Corruption is high ‘even for Tai standards’. Economy and security situation deteriorate; 
(Mare, 1972:2): 60 Thai military are killed and 200 injuries in insurgency (Marks, 1973) 1972 
CRCDP commences 
Hundreds killed during aerial bombing of highland Hmong villages (Gua, 1975). 
Highlanders lack modern medicine and medical care which, coupled with malnutrition and 
poor sanitation, ‘create an almost constant environment of disease and death’ (Roth, 
1974:6) 
Coup ‘by popular protest’ (Chapman, 1974:n.p.) removes military Government. Free 
elections elect new government (BBC, 2010) who enacts policies against official 
corruption; which reduces the crime rate by one-third by 1976 (Darling, 1978) 
1973 
US ‘War on Drugs’ ignites interdiction 
campaign 
Rural protests over lack of developmental assistance and corruption force agricultural 
reforms (FCO, 1975) including improved access to: superior fertiliser; bank credit; 
1974 
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increased minimum prices; and land redistribution to tenants if landlord is unable to 
develop land. The area under cultivation and yield increase. Agricultural methods had 
previously been primitive and stagnated productivity (Barclays Bank, 1976). 
Highland insurgency continues, however, government is committed to containing 
insurgency through rural development rather than conflict (Cole, 1975) Early/mid 
1970s 
Increased access to modern agricultural 
techniques increases opium yields. Local police 
and national military facilitate production  
 
Mid-
1970s 
Opium yields fall due to adverse weather 
conditions 
Highland development becomes national 
objective 
Communist insurgent number annually increase by 4 percent to 9,000. Insurgency is 
‘small but a nuisance’ (Darling, 1978:153). 
1977 
 
Military action against insurgents is now limited to defending roads against attack 
(Sharland, 1978) 
1978 
 
 
1979 
HAMP commences 
First aerial surveys of opium cultivation 
 Late-
1970s 
All highland areas are open to DOA and law 
enforcement 
 
1980 
Minimal voluntary eradication. Military attack 
Shan United Army 
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Improved weather conditions increase yields 
and increase heroin manufacturing 
 1981 TG-HDP commences 
 
1982 
DOA designated most appropriate means of 
opium suppression 
Mass defections have reduced the Communist Party threat  while the economy 
performed well ‘compared to rest of world economies’ (Punyaratabandhu-Bhukdi, 
1984:191) 
1983 
Forced and negotiated eradication increase 
Third Army development projects commences 
 
1985 
TNCA-HDP begins 
All major trafficking groups/ manufacturers 
have been expelled from Thailand 
Economy very good. Strong expansion in nearly every sector, including agriculture, 
although tourism and manufacturing are strongest sectors. There is extensive foreign 
private investment. (Niksch, 1989) 
1988 
 
Thailand is only net exporter of agricultural produce in Asia (Potulski, 1991) Late-
1980s 
 
Road density in Northern Highlands at 0.122km/sq.feet against national average of 
0.146km/sq.feet. This represents the opening of the highlands (Lee, 1994) 
Early-
1990s 
 
HRW (1993-1999) reports of abuses are limited to treatment of refugees – there is no 1990s  
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evidence of the systematic abuse of highland peoples 
Corruption is low within the ONCB, Narcotics Suppression Bureau and Third Army 
(INCRS, 1993, 2001) 
National economic growth accelerates demand for highland produce and improves 
transport infrastructure (Hau, 2002; Renard, 2001). Highland attract significant private 
development, especially for tourism (Fox, 2009) 
Military coup (17th since 1932) overthrows democratically elected Government (HRW, 
1993) 
1991 
 
One-hundred die or disappear as military suppress protest against coup. Military resign 
and elections are held (Bunbongkarn, 1993) 
1992 
 
Economic growth continues to improve. While electrics and industrial materials are the 
largest growing export good, 60 percent work in agriculture where growth is lowest. In 
short, the gap between rich and poor has widened (Snitwongse, 1995) 
1994 Opium-free 
Government resigns over allegations of corruption. Elections are criticised for large-
scale vote buying). Economic growth slows (King, 1997) 
1996 
 
Thai politics remains highly corrupt: public funds are diverted or contracts sold in order 
to finance vote buying (Bowornwathana, 2000) 
1997 
 
Economic recovery begins (Bowornwathana, 2000) 1999  
Extensive vote-buying during national elections (Montesano, 2001). 2000  
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 2002 Declared Poppy Free by UN 
‘War on Drugs’ (methamphetamine not opium) results in massive human rights abuses 
(see Vongchak et al., 2005). 
2003 
Declassified by UNODC as ‘other Asian 
countries’ 
All un-cited information from Chapter 7. 
Annex 1:5. Pakistan 
British fail to subjugate tribes of NWFP/FATA and enter into series of treaties agreeing 
to tribal autonomy in exchange for loyalty to British Empire (Embree, 1977; Keppel, 1911) 
>1849 
 
 
Pre-1947 
Consumers supplied from Afghanistan and 
India. Minimal NWFP/FATA production  
India/Pakistan partitioned. Hundreds of thousands die in widespread communal 
violence, millions made homeless 
1947 
Small-scale licit opium poppy cultivation 
 1949 Experimental opium farms established 
Following assassination of PM ‘national politics entered a chaotic period during which 
the bureaucrats were increasingly transformed from the states servants to its masters’ 
(Talbot, 2009:139) 
1951 
 
Governor-General dismisses PM and Constitutional Assembly and imposes martial law  1953/4  
 
1955 
End of Indian opium supply 
Opium monopoly established. Farmers 
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licensed  
 1956 Licit production begins in NWFP 
Military removes President. Coup resulted from growing industrial unrest fuelled by 
inflation the militaries desire to maintain marshal law, which was due to be repelled 
1958 
 
Martial law repelled 1960  
Second Indo-Pak War over Kashmir 1965  
 
1967 
Dangerous Drugs (Import, Export and 
transhipment) Rules passed 
Students, lawyers and organised labour - supported by former foreign minister Bhutto - 
stage violent protest; hundreds die in clashes with police (ICG, 2008). Bhutto arrested for 
assassination attempt on President in Peshawar 
1968 
 
Violence increases in some Eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh) towns. President 
releases Bhutto, removes three year state of emergency and resigns after inviting Army 
Chief of Staff to be President. Fundamental Rights imposed in 1963 Constitution are 
suspended, civil courts are barred from challenging military courts and civil cabinet 
becomes subservient to military 
1969 
 
Since 1958, ‘rapid strides’ made in manufacturing. While economic growth averaged 5.5 
percent annually, as wealth was situated in the hands of the minority, prices rises 
(especially manufactured goods and food)  increased the number of impoverished people 
1960s 
Foreign and domestic demand inflates illicit 
production and diversion from regulated 
production 
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from 8.65 to 9.33 million (Talbot, 2009:171) 
First national elections based on universal suffrage. Martial law remains 1970  
Attempts by East Pakistan to secede lead to civil war. India intervenes on side of East 
Pakistan which eventually realises independence as Bangladesh. Conflict forces President 
to step down and severally diminishes military resources 
1971 
Monopoly control loosened  
Basic industries (i.e. metal production, motor vehicles and agri-machinery, cement and 
public utilities) and education are nationalised  
1972 
 
Tribal uprising in Baluchistan is violently suppressed by 80,000 troops; 9,000 die in 
conflict. PM claims military ‘overrode’ his plans in order to ‘spread their tentacles 
throughout Baluchistan’ (Talbot, 2009:226) 
1973 
PNCB formed. 
 
US arms embargo lifted while dependence on Chinese arms increases. Arms race with 
India creates budget deficit and reduces resources for social goods 
1975 
First heroin and morphine laboratories 
reported 
Baluchistan tribal insurrection ends 
Major programme of electrification and transport infrastructural development begins 1976 
Buner project commences 
Riots erupt over allegations of vote-rigging (which had been part of all previous 
elections) and result in imposition of martial law in Karachi and Lahore, followed by 
bloodless military coup 
Agri-manufacturing is denationalised 
1977 
 
Pakistan becomes US ally after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Iranian Revolution 
Political parties and meetings banned. Torture of political opponents is widespread 
1979 
Peak of production creates opium surplus  
Hadd Ordinance: NWFP ban enforced through 
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(Gustafson and Richter, 1980) 
Shari’a laws (Hadd Ordinances) prohibit adultery, theft, false witness and intoxication16 
whilst imposing punishments including death by stoning and flogging 
extensive surveillance, eradication and law 
enforcement. Production ceases in settled areas 
Domestic consumption increases 
Economy doing well. Highest ever recorded grain output 1980  
Thousands of political opponents arrested; many are flogged. Civil courts are banned 
from reviewing decisions of military courts, which are described as ‘rough but efficient’ 
(Weinbaum and Cohen, 1983:126) 
Under the Special Development Plan for Tribal Areas physical infrastructures are 
extended to remote areas (Khan, 1991) 
1982 
Buner Opium-Free 
MDP commences 
Imposition of Hadd Ordinances factors in sectarian violence in Sind resulting in: 1,999 
arrests; 189 deaths; and 126 injuries. 
1983 
SDEP commences and mainstreams DOA 
projects with general rural development 
GAAD commences 
Hadd Order (Amended) increases punishments 
for manufacture and distribution 
State narcotics laws extended to FATA 
 1984 Campaign against heroin refiners begins 
Martial law and ban on political parties lifted 1985 DDP commences 
                                                 
16
 The Hadd Ordinances did not deter crime, if ‘anything they encouraged the brutalisation of society’ (Talbot, 2009:277). As of 1988 no Hadd punishment was 
officially sentenced as Supreme or Federal Courts tended to overturn Shari’a courts (Kennedy, 1988). 
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 Minimal forced eradication campaign in 
NWFP  
Malakand Opium-Free 
Violent conflicts in Pashtun areas of Karachi may have been orchestrated by drug 
traffickers and land developers. There are extensive protests in NWFP and Baluchistan 
over: Kalabagh dam; Baluch resentment against Pashtun settlers; Afghan refugees in 
NWHP;17 and the right to produce opium. The military suppress all disturbances (Hollen, 
1987; Talbot, 2009) 
A survey found that: a literacy level in rural areas of 20 percent; less than 30 percent 
have access to clean drinking water or health facilities; incidence of malnutrition are high 
(Williams and Rudel, 1988) 
1986 
Two military officers are arrested for heroin 
trafficking; both escaped from jail 
 
1987 
Forced eradication increases. Violent 
resistance shifts sequencing policy. Aerial 
eradication first used 
Gadoon-Amazai Opium-Free 
Interdiction shifts heroin laboratories from 
NWFP to FATA 
                                                 
17
 Since 1973 four million Afghan refugees had entered Pakistan (Cheema, 1988)  
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Soviet Union leave Afghanistan. Since 1979 excess of 4,000 were killed in Pakistan by 
terrorist attacks engineered by Soviet/Afghan secret services. The use of the ISI in the 
Afghan conflict ‘destabilised Pakistan’s fragile democracy through its unchecked 
interventions, unaccounted for funds and.. rivalry with other intelligence-gathering 
agencies’ (Talbot, 2009:269). 
1988 
Increased external pressure on Pakistan to 
control opiates trade. Government begins 
disengaging from the trade 
KDAD commences 
 
Whilst inspiring to be an Islamic ‘ideological state’ the government is  ‘authoritarian’ 
(Talbot, 2009:245) and the police, who are subservient to the military, are used primarily 
to suppress political opposition (ICG, 2008) 
Pashtun and Baloch political opposition to the centre was ‘muted during the Zia era’. 
Cooperation was gained through releasing 9,000 Baloch prisoners while Pashtun’s were 
brought into the political elite (through military involvement). Pashtun NWFP/FATA areas 
received ‘considerable economic development’ (Talbot, 2009:252) 
1977-
1988 
 
Governor of NWFP is arrested for murder and suspected of drug trafficking (Ali, 1989) 
Government attempts to exert civilian control over ISI, however, replacement of leaders 
is boycotted by ISI  
1989 
FATA Development Project commences 
Throughout-1980s a ‘Kalashnikov culture’ emerged in major cities, fuelled by imports 
of modern weaponry and drugs from the Afghan frontier (Talbot, 2009:41) 
1980s 
 
1990s economic crises, founded upon structural weaknesses, including: weak tax-base; 
low savings rates; lack of export diversification; underdevelopment of human capital; and 
low agricultural productivity. 
1990s 
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PM dismissed by President on incompetence and corruption charges. Mass vote-rigging 
in national elections 
Pressler Amendment: US suspends aid worth US$564 million in protest at nuclear 
ambitions (counter-narcotics aid continues) 
1990 
 
Economic liberalisation programme commences; privatisation process is limited by 
corruption  
Hundreds are arrested, some are tortured, in campaign against opposition political party. 
The rape of a friend of the opposition leader sparks mass protests: police baton charged 
protestors 
1991 
 
Pak-US relations at all time low. Pakistan is placed on list of potential terrorist state for 
six months and trade sanctions are imposed. Pakistan begins crackdown on Islamist 
militant groups; including client groups in Afghanistan 
1992 
 
President and PM resign under pressure from military. Newly elected government 
projects international image of assisting West in campaigns against drugs and terrorism 
Crime rate is high; 3,300 murders and 4,500 abductions is reported in Punjab alone 
HRW (1993) report that torture and death in police custody occurred throughout 
Pakistan; many officers tortured individuals to extract bribes 
1993 
 
Militant groups demand imposition of Shari’a law in Mardan (NWFP). Frontier Corps 
suppress armed Islamist insurrection before enacting Shari’a. Reports surface that drug 
traffickers facilitated the insurrection. A conflict between political parties in Karachi laves 
1994 
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500 dead 
Torture in police custody is endemic and includes the crushing of testicles and sexual 
abuse (HRW, 1995) 
Transparency International rank Pakistan the second most corrupt state on earth 
Police and quasi-military Rangers indiscriminately shoot into crowds as violence 
increases in Karachi. Protestors are arbitrarily arrested and detained, many are tortured 
(HRW, 1996) 
1995 
Law enforcement against manufacturers 
increases 
Ordinance No.XLVII prohibits cultivation 
Violence between students in Upper Kurram Valley leaves 100 dead  
PM dismissed by President on corruption charges. Opponent (and brother) of new PM is 
assassinated; the police officer who witnessed the shooting commits suicide a week later 
1996 
 
Violence in Karachi leaves 400 dead (HRW, 1998). 1997 End of heroin manufacturing in Pakistan  
‘Grandiose’ infrastructural developments exuberate foreign debt crisis and deepen 
recession (Talbot, 2009:309) 
1997-
1999 
 
Pakistan conducts nuclear tests whilst incidence of poverty and economic inequality 
increase 
Torture in police custody is endemic. Widespread rioting after the death of a 14 year-old 
in police custody in  Mansehra (NWFP) leaves 100 injured (HRW, 2000) 
1998 
Dir Opium-Free 
Ordinance No.XLVII extended to NWFP 
Former PM convicted of corruption while current PM is overthrown by military coup 
Excess of 1,000 killed during clash with India in Kargil (Indian-held Kashmir) 
4,000 ‘ghost schools’ and numerous ‘ghost health-centres’ costing the state Rs.1.4 
1999 Opium-free 
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billion annually are identified by a survey into official corruption 
Torture in police custody and prisons is endemic. In NWFP the beating of a 13 year old 
prisoner for complaining of sexual abuse ignites rioting: 20 children are injured (HRW, 
2000) 
Parliament dissolved by bloodless military coup 
Afghan invasion: US lifts sanctions imposed after Pakistan’s nuclear tests and Canada 
and Europe provide financial aid (Talbot, 2009). Taliban and Al Qaeda take refuge in 
NWFP and FATA (ICG, 2006). Protests against Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan 
ignite protests in Baluchistan (HRW, 2002). President bans two Islamic militant groups 
and takes steps to curb religious extremism 
2001 
Declared ‘Poppy free’ by UNODC 
Unconstitutional and possible corrupt (HRW, 2003) referendum keeps President in 
power 
National military stationed in FATA for first time since partition to reduce authority of 
Political Agent’s (Nawaz et al., 2009) 
2002 
 
Sectarian violence in Karachi leaves 17 dead and 40 injured. Attempt to assassinate PM 
fails 
Military operations against Taliban begin in Waziristan (ICG, 2006) 
2004 
 
Dozen are killed in a suicide bomb targeting the former PM, who is later assassinated 
Intensified conflict with far-right Islamist militants in NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan. 
Violence in Swat displaces 4,500 (Tellis, 2008) 
2007 
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Parliamentary elections. President resigns after coalition government launch 
impeachment proceedings 
2008 
Insurgency limits capacity to eradicate opium 
poppies 
‘Swat Taliban’ seize control of Buner (Dawn, 2009) and displaces 1.7 million 
(Rummery and Caux, 2009) 
2009 
 
‘Pakistan can be best typified as a populous, rapidly growing middle income country in which agriculture [whilst remaining important] is losing its 
predominance... However, social welfare had lagged behind economic growth, bringing with it marked rural-urban and general disparities’ (Talbot, 
2009:23). 
All un-cited information from Talbot (2009) or Chapter 8. 
Annex 1:6. Laos 
First Hmong migrations from China 1820-40  
Becomes French protectorate 1893  
 1899 Opium monopoly established 
 1905 Monopoly procure domestic opium. 
 
1907 
Monopoly increase opium procurement 
drive 
 1908  
 
1914 
Uprising in Northern Laos in response to 
French interdiction of illicitly imported 
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Chinese opium 
 
1918-25 
Unsuccessful endeavour by monopoly to 
control highland production 
 
1938 
Inability of foreign suppliers to reach 
monopoly stimulates domestic production. 
State has minimal control over production 
French reoccupation of newly independent Laos prompts first Indochina War 
1946 
Opium consumption and production 
prohibited. Unofficial toleration of highland 
opium 
Gains ‘independence’ as part of French Union 1949 Opium production prohibited in China 
 
1950 
Monopoly closed. French intelligence 
agencies operate unofficial monopoly supplied 
from highlands 
Viet Nam invades Laos 1953  
First Indochina War ends with Laos gaining full independence as a monarchy. Civil war 
breaks between monarchists and Pathet Lao 
1954 
 
 
1955 
Opium production prohibited in Iran. 
India ceases exporting opium for non-
medical/scientific purpose. 
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Lowland government neglects highland peoples and are ignorant of highland cultures. 
Northern Laos possess less than 50 miles of dirt-surfaced road (Holiday, 1957) 
1957 
 
Attempted military coup forces governments resignation and prompts Second Indochina 
War 
1959 
First report of significant opium production 
Political violence follows attempted assassination of Foreign Minister 1962/63  
Attempted military coup. Pathet Lao take Plain of Jars and US begin aerial bombing 
campaign against Pathet Lao 
1964 
 
Conflict between police and military over control of drugs, gambling, prostitution and 
gold smuggling forces Royal Lao military general into exile. Generals divide control of 
illicit activities amongst themselves 
1965 
First heroin laboratories discovered 
Lao Air Force bomb Lao Army headquarters in dispute over control of opium trade 1966  
US bombing of Laos internally displaces 20,000 and forces many to take refuge in caves 
and forests 
1968 
Displacement of opium farmers by military 
bombardment reduces production 
British FO report states: ‘Laos is poorest and most backward of the former French 
Indochina states – French left little infrastructure, communications are poor, education 
system rudimentary, and administration inefficient’ (Rai, 1970)  
1960s 
 
 
1971 
Consumption prohibited. Unofficial 
toleration of highland production continues 
amidst limited resettlement and crop 
substitution projects and forced eradication 
  381
Cease fire ends Second Indochina War. Coalition government formed with Lao Peoples 
Revolutionary Party (formerly Pathet Lao). 
 
1973 
Opium production prohibited in Turkey. 
Increased opium production for export to 
US and later Australia and Europe. 
During War over two million tonne of bombs are dropped by the US on Laos; damaging 
or destroying 3,500 villages and killing 200,000. A quarter of all Laotians are internally 
displaced 
1959-
1973 
 
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic formed. Royal Lao Army instructed not to resist 
invasion by Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party. King abdicates whilst migration of Royal 
Lao politicians, military leaders, many Hmong peoples, and the most educated reduces 
government efficiency.18 Most of countries wealth also migrates 
Purges: Between 10-20,000 individuals perceived as opponents to the regime are 
imprisoned in re-education/forced labour camps (Brown and Zasloff, 1980) 
1975 
 
Transport, oil and distribution of goods nationalised. All people must attend public 
meetings to hear propaganda19 while controls on movement are imposed 
1976 
Resolution No. 3: Farmers sanctioned to 
produce opium for sale to monopoly 
Government appeals to UN to help with 100,000ton rice shortfall 
Hmong uprising: After insurgents attack highland outposts, the Government and 
1977 
 
                                                 
18
 An estimated 10 percent of the population of Laos eventually migrated due to ‘insecurity and fear… discrimination, or  to escape deteriorating living standards’ 
(Stuart-Fox, 2006:168). 
19
 Meetings were unpopular as people feared being singled out for ‘failing to endorse the new policies with sufficient enthusiasm’ (Stuart-Fox, 1997:173). 
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Vietnamese troops kill hundreds ‘perhaps thousands’ through artillery, airstrikes (Stuart-
Fox, 1997:177) and possible chemical weapons (Brown and Zasloff, 1980; Lee, 2000) 
Military attack Hmong villages opposing forced resettlement (Brown and Zasloff, 1979)  1978  
In response to collapse of rice production (due to collectivisation of farmland) (ADB, 
2005) more liberal agricultural economic policy are enacted. Free market in non-
commercial agricultural crops are permitted and low agricultural taxes are introduced. The 
state rice monopoly set-price is increased to near market value (Stuart-Fox, 1997). The 
military are mandated with agricultural and infrastructural development whilst possessing 
rights to exploit timber reserves and some farmland; this develops system of nepotism 
(Stuart-Fox, 2006) 
1979 
 
Hmong insurgents remain active but present little threat to stability (Bedlington, 1982) 
Government is ‘weak in both leadership and infrastructure’. Mismanagement, corruption 
and closing of Thai-Laos border have weakened economy. Agriculture remains 
unproductive (Bedlington, 1981:102) and exports (coffee and opium to socialist states and 
timber and electricity to Thailand) amount to less than value of imports. While dependent 
on foreign aid the lack of skilled personal and inefficient bureaucracy results in ineffective 
spending of aid  
1980 
 
Insurgents attack development projects and government installations, killing one World 
Bank employee. Vietnamese troops are used in counter-insurgency efforts 
1984 
 
The highlands are wholly ignored by development work and is thus less-developed than Mid-  
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the lowlands where: the average income (US$98 per annum) and rice yields are amongst 
the lowest in the world; industrial output is significantly below the average for a ‘least-
developed country’; the transport infrastructure is insufficient. Taxation revenue is limited 
by the large black market (Stuart-Fox, 1997; see Thayer, 1984). 
1980s 
First nationwide census is possible after country is unified under one administration 
(Donmen, 1986) 
1985 
Resolution No. 7: Opium declared a 
primary commodity 
New Economic Mechanisms: Principles of market economy introduced by Government  1986  
Drought and decrease in electricity production brings economic downturn 
Second Five-Year Plan targets improving productivity of cash crops: 10% of 
government spending goes to agri-development and one-fifth to infrastructural 
development (Joiner, 1988) 
1987 
INCB visit 
 
Decentralisation of economy; state farm-land is distributed to families for private use. 
Laos opens-up or strengthens diplomatic ties with western nations 
1988 
 
Receives loan from ADB (2005) for rural development 1989 PADP and HCSP commence 
Relationships with China and Thailand improve 
1990 
Penal Code Article 135 prohibits possession 
of opium 
Agricultural reform remains the basis of the Third Five-Year Plan, however, Laos 
exhibits 40,000mt rice deficit. US firm, Hunt Oil, begin exploration for oil in South Laos 
(Gunn, 1991). However, foreign investors are limited by lack of transport and 
communications infrastructure. There are few usable roads (the provincial capital of 
1991 
US Anti-Narcotics Committee begin 
building 51km road through Houaphan 
province 
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Phongsaly is unreachable by road), no railway and air-travel is ‘an adventure’ (Johnson, 
1992:85, 1993). It lacks an educated workforce and the insurgency threatens economic 
growth. It is the ‘most backward of the centrally planned states’ (Gunn, 1991:93) 
Protests by 1,500 highlanders lead to 40 deaths (Gunn, 1991) 
Australia builds bridge across Mekong into Thailand (Johnson, 1992) and ADB (2005) 
provide loan for rural development 
1992 
GoL/UNDP socio-economic survey 
XKHDP and NADPP commence 
Study finds that the northern provinces are the poorest and the GDP of the three poorest 
(Phongsaly, Luang Namtha and Houaphan) is 60% lower than national average. In 
Phongsaly/Luang Namtha indicators included: infant mortality of 94/119 per 1,000; 
3.1/8.5% electricity use;  0.4 /5.1% had access to safe drinking water (Bourdet, 1998) 
1993 
LADP begins 
Heads of companies constructing roads and irrigation projects sentenced to long 
sentences for corruption and bribery (Donmen, 1995) 
1994 
Comprehensive Drug Control Program for 
Lao PDR specifies gradual approach 
Penal Code amended to prohibit opium 
production 
Resettlement begins 
‘Structural adjustment’, supported by ADB, IMF, World Bank, and UN provides 
increased revenue collection and more effective monetary policy (ADB, 2005) 
1990-94 
 
Urban wealth has increased as the rural economy has stagnated due to low agricultural 
productivity 
From the mid-1980s 35-45% of capital expenditure goes to road building; which remain 
Mid-
1990s 
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basic (Bourdet, 1996) 
Political commitment to economic liberalisation weakens and structural change slows 
(ADB, 2005). 
1995 
Green Anti-Drug Project commences 
US lifts aid embargo (Bourdet, 2001) 
Security forces have abused detainees and suspects: police arbitrarily arrest and detain 
suspects’ whilst intrusive surveillance is the norm. Prison conditions are below 
international standards (US State Department, 1999) 
1999 
 
From early-1990s percentage of people living in poverty decreased from 24% to 12% in 
Vientiane and from 58% to 53% in northern provinces; in Oudomaxy and Houaphan three 
out of four people live in poverty. The economic reforms introduced in the 1990s widened 
the poverty gap between the central and northern provinces (Bourdetm, 2001) 
1990s 
 
The GoL invests ‘heavily and imprudently’ in large-scale irrigation systems, the cost of 
which is increased by inflation (ADB, 2005:7) rates of 128% (Bourdet, 2001) 
1997-
1999 
 
Political situation is unstable after a series of bombings in capital (Bourdet, 2001, 2002) 
and a number of small-scale attacks on travellers in North/North-Central. In response, 
police burn highland villages, and beat villagers. In general, in urban and rural areas 
militia, workplace and neighbourhood committees conduct intrusive surveillance for the 
police. Police coercive compliance through threat of custodial sentences and long-periods 
of pre-trial detention. Prison conditions are cruel and inhumane: prisoners are placed in 
wooden stocks and hand manacles; medical facilities are poor (US State Department, 
2000 
LGDCP commences 
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2000). 
Poor and slow decision making increases damage of Asian Economic crises (Bourdet, 
2001, 2002). 
WFP launches three-year initiative to feed 70,000 malnourished children; country is still 
recovering from economic crises of 1997-1999 (BBC, 2010) 
Torture of suspected insurgents whilst in police custody is common (US State 
Department, 2001) 
2001 
Decree 14 orders opium-free by 2006. The 
Balanced Approach to Opium Elimination 
mandates ‘accelerated rural development’ 
Amended Penal Code criminalises opium 
production 
Hmong insurgents attacks several civilian and military targets. Militia and Committees 
remain responsible for surveillance and maintaining public order (US State Department, 
2002) 
Percentage surviving below the poverty line is reduced from 45% (1993) to 33% (ADB, 
2005) 
2002 
Death sentence for possession of over 500 
grams of heroin imposed 
Military operations increase the counter amplified Hmong insurgent attacks. In 
Houaphan Province: several dozen insurgents and 12 soldiers die; 100 villagers are 
arrested; and 1,000 displaced (US State Department, 2003) 
Prison conditions are ‘life threatening’ (US State Department, 2003:n.p.) 
2003 
Eradication campaigns begin 
700-800 Hmong insurgents surrender after state guarantees amnesty and resettlement 
support. Military attacks against remaining insurgents increases and terrorist attacks 
continue (US State Department, 2004) 
2004 
WFP provides emergency relief to farmers 
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While terrorist attacks continue (US State Department, 2005) the Hmong insurgents 
have been mostly suppressed and the government is stable (Forbes and Cutler, 2006) 
There are ‘no real human rights or political freedoms’ (Forbes and Cutler, 2006:177), 
however, abuse in custody has decreased (from high-levels). This said, police continue to 
use detention to extract bribes or force compliance: corruption is extensive in criminal 
justice system. In both urban and rural areas militia, civil committees (i.e. Women’s 
Union) and secret police provide extensive and intrusive surveillance network (US State 
Department, 2005) 
‘Poverty remains a serious issue but is slowly declining’: the ADB report that the 
proportion of population living in poverty declined from 46% to 31% over ten years 
(Forbes and Cutler, 2006:177). However, as northern highlands ‘has an ethnically diverse 
population of over 2 million people scattered over 5,000 villages across rugged 
mountainous terrain’ the ‘provision of services (e.g., education, health, and transport) [is] 
difficult // [and] characterized by inadequate market access, poor distribution networks, 
and lack of all-weather roads’ (ADB, 2005:6-7). 
2005 Opium-Free 
2009 
While the numbers living in poverty declined to 27.1% in 2008, inequality has increased with poverty levels significantly higher in remote highlands 
‘where agricultural productivity is low and poverty reduction activities are limited’. (Jönsson, 2010:243-244). 
References: All un-cited information from Stuart-Fox (1997) or Chapter 9. 
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Annex 1:7. Viet Nam 
First Hmong migrations from China 1820-40  
Becomes French protectorate 1893  
French declare Hanoi capital of Indochina (Templer, 1999) 1890  
 1899 Opium monopoly established 
 1905 Monopoly procure domestic opium. 
 
1907 
Monopoly increase opium procurement 
drive 
Ho Chi Min demands self-determination from French (Keylor, 2001)  1919  
 1918-
1925 
Unsuccessful endeavour by monopoly to 
control highland production 
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) founded (Keylor, 2001) 1930  
 
1938 
Inability of foreign suppliers to reach 
monopoly stimulates domestic production. 
Control over production is minimal 
ICP organises Vietminh guerrillas against Japanese during World War II (Keylor, 2001) 1941  
Vietminh seizes power from Japanese and declare independent Democratic Republic 
(Keylor, 2001). Conflict created famine in which 2 million die (Templer, 1999) 
1945 
 
  389
6,000 Vietminh die in French re-occupation. Vietminh occupy countryside and begin 
organising guerrilla movement against the French – First Indochina War begins (Keylor, 
2001) 
1946 
 
Vietnam invades Laos (Stuart-Fox, 1997) 1953  
Geneva conference temporally splits country into North/South at the 17th Parallel. It is 
agreed that country will reunify within two years under a UN supervised election (Keylor, 
2001) 
1954 
Production prohibited in North Viet Nam 
Communist insurgency in South Viet Nam commences (BBC, 2010) 1957  
North Vietnamese military begin supporting Viet Cong (Keylor, 2001) 1959  
Viet Cong overthrow South Vietnamese President (BBC, 2010) 1963  
American bombing raids on North Viet Nam commence (BBC, 2010). 1964  
500,000 US soldiers stationed in South Viet Nam (BBC, 2010). 
1967 
Demand for SE Asian opium inflated by US 
military stationed in Viet Nam 
US begin to reduce ground troops (Keylor, 2001). 1969  
American troops leave after ceasefire agreed (BBC, 2010) 1973  
North Viet Nam invades South to unify country (Keylor, 2001). The conflict has slowed 
the economy and reduced agricultural productivity (Finklestein, 1987) 
1975 
 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam is proclaimed (BBC, 2010): hundreds of thousands 
emigrate (McWilliams, 1987) 
1976 
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Tens of thousands of prostitutes and ‘hundreds of thousands of’ drug consumers are 
arrested and placed in re-education camps; many die from malnutrition and malaria 
(Templer, 1999:242) 
Government confiscates the possessions of ethnic Chinese who are later forced to move 
to infertile highland areas or migrate (Keylor, 2001; Templer, 1999) 
1978 
 
To increase agricultural productivity relatively liberal quota and contract systems20 are 
established, purchasing prices are increased and banks allowed to lend money to local 
entrepreneurs (Cima, 1989) 
1979 
 
 ‘Socioeconomic malaise’ continues. The economy is weaker than during the War years; 
farmers are hardest hit as a 12% grain shortfall means they are unable to ‘meet the 1,500 
calories a day considered to be subsistence level’. Country is kept afloat by Soviet aid 
(Pike, 1982:72) 
A minimum of 120,000 political prisoners remain in ‘re-education’ camps. While they 
are subjected to hard labour, few are tortured or executed (McWilliams, 1983) 
1981 
 
While ‘free market-oriented’ reforms increase rice yields calorie intake remains low 
while the state is unable to adequately provide basic needs (McWilliams, 1987) 
1982 
 
There is minimal industrial manufacturing due to insufficient: energy; raw materials; 1983  
                                                 
20
 Farmers leased land within communes and once a quota was met the surplus could be sold privately (Duiker, 1985). 
 
  391
spare parts; and skilled labour (Chanda, 1984) 
Industrial growth begins to rise from the ‘abysmally’ low-levels of 1979. While food 
consumption remains low the state begins to approaches food self-sufficiency (albeit with 
200,000mt grain deficiency). USSR exchanges aid for cheap labour supply (Duiker, 1985). 
1984 
Facilitation of licit production 
Economy is in ‘shambles’: Viet Nam is one of the world's poorest nations and people 
remain malnourished. Inefficient governance has created widespread unemployment and a 
massive black market (Finkelsteign, 1987:982) 
1985 
 
Doi Moi (Renovation) campaign initiated. Country is opened to foreign investment and 
aspects of free-market economy are introduced (Han, 1989) 
1986 
First report of substantial illicit production 
Remains one worlds poorest nations: living standard is lower than in 1975 (Cima, 1989) 
Agricultural productivity is low and the bureaucracy is ‘ill-equipped to make economic 
decisions’ (Cima, 1989:786) 
1988 
 
Foreign Trade Office created to attract investment in infrastructure; European companies 
agree to explore for oil and petrol (Cima, 1989) 
1989 
 
Improvements in productivity have increased yields to a point whereby rice can be 
exported. However, bureaucratic inefficiency, outdated technology and lack of investment 
in raw materials limits further improvements productivity (Pike, 1991) 
1990 
End of licit procurement 
Illicit  production peaks 
Ten-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan launched (Hung, 2000). Emphasis is upon 
improving agricultural (especially rice) productivity for domestic consumption (Templer, 
1999) 
1991 
Article 61 prohibits opium production 
  392
Torture and abuse in police custody remain a series problem. ‘Administrative detention’ 
is more common than judicial detention. While surveillance remains intrusive, high-levels 
of corruption limit its impact (i.e. those with resources can bribe civil committees and 
police to look elsewhere) (HRW, 1992). 
While high-unemployment, low-productivity and ineffective management continue the 
‘lot of the people has improved’ even if there is mass corruption, continuing poverty and 
‘annoying surveillance’ (Avery, 1993:67). Prison conditions are inhumane (HRW, 1993) 
1992 
Negotiated and forced eradication 
commence 
Tanks and tear-gas suppress 2,000 protestors (HRW, 1994) 
1993 
Decree 06/CP provides for eradication and 
DOA 
US lifts 30-year trade embargo and direct foreign investment increases (BBC, 2010) 
The country has severe infrastructural problems, including: just 5,841 of 52,819 roads 
are paved; there are few bridges; only three airports are suitable for international traffic; 
rail travel is slow; there are just four telephones per 1,000 people; and three-quarters of the 
rural population cannot access safe drinking water (Goodman, 1995). 
1994 
Opium-Free  
 
Repression of opposition to Communist rule increases as links to outside world are 
strengthened (HRW, 1996) 
1995 
 
America invests US$700 million into 50 socio-economic projects while the World Bank 
loans US$1.5 billion. The economy grows in all major sectors:  exports increase by 27%; 
Viet Nam becomes worlds sixth largest coffee exporter; and oil production increases. 
However, productivity remains low. Five-Year Plan targets development of remote 
1996 
Ky Son commences 
Second eradication surge 
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mountainous areas (Womack, 1997) 
 1997 Production and possession criminalised 
Rural unrest increases against: high prices; corruption; land confiscation;21 taxation; and 
compulsory labour for infrastructure (HRW, 1999) rural development increases in 
response (Fforde, 2009; Hung, 2000) 
Many protestors are placed under ‘administrative detainment’ which can include: 
detention without trial (HRW, 1999); intrusive surveillance; and restrictions on movement, 
residence and employment. Police brutality is common and prison conditions are below 
international standards (US State Department, 1999). 
1998 
DOA officially mainstreamed (in response 
to reverse conditionality) 
There are sporadic reports of rural protests. Protestors are beaten and kicked and placed 
under administrative detention. Prison conditions remain below international standards and 
are characterised by: forced confessions; forced labour; and inadequate food and medical-
care (HRW, 2000) 
1999 
 
5,000 demonstrate in Central Highlands against: official corruption; religious 
intolerance; and state intrusion on their land. The police and military restore order and, to 
prevent future disturbances, increase funding for education and agricultural productivity 
(Thayer, 2002) 
2001 
National Drug Control Action Plan 
                                                 
21
 Many farmers are forced to sell their land for infrastructural and business development. As land is in short supply violent evictions by the police are common and 
often result in conflict - compensation is seldom sufficient (Templer, 1999) 
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1990s 
Average per capita income doubled from US$146 (1991) to US$300 (1998) whilst the percentage of the population living below the poverty line 
decreased from 70% (mid-1980s) to 30-40% (2000) (Hung, 2000). It went from being food insecure to ‘the world’s largest exporter of rice’ -  
agricultural exports trebled between 1988-1996. Tourist numbers increase from less than 30,000 in the late-1980s to over 1 million by 1994 (Templer, 
1999) and 3.3 millions within the first three months of 2008 (Han, 2009). By 2000 it was ‘perhaps the best-performing country in Southeast Asia’ 
(Fforde, 2009:485). However, the country remained generally underdeveloped (Hung, 2000) agricultural productivity and living conditions in the north 
significantly lagged behind the south. Official corruption remained extensive (Templer, 1999) 
2000s 
The police and prison guards commonly tortured prisoners and suspects, who were shackled in dark cells (HRW, 2000, 2001) in conditions which 
fell ‘far short of international standards (HRW, 2005:n.p.). The use of administrative detention remained widespread throughout Viet Nam (HRW, 
2003). Economically Viet Nam represented a ‘broad dynamic picture of economic development, political and social stability’ (Han, 2008:185) driven 
by tourism, foreign direct investment and exports (Amer, 2010). The percentage living in poverty declined from 58% (1992) to 24% (2004) (Luong, 
2006).  
References: All un-cited information from Chapter 9. 
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Annex 2. Selected socio-economic indicators 
Annex 2.1. Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (rank 
score of 100) 
Sources for Annex 2:2: adapted from World Bank. (2008). World Wide Governance 
Indicators. (Consulted 3 January 2009). 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp  
 
Year ‘08 ‘07 ‘06 ‘05 ‘04 ‘03 ‘02 ‘00 ‘98 ‘96 
Afghanistan 1 2 1 3 2 3 4 0 0 4 
Burma 9 13 22 20 19 13 13 9 12 12 
Iran 14 13 13 16 15 18 22 32 28 25 
Laos 44 40 46 37 27 18 36 23 32 85 
Pakistan 1 1 5 5 6 7 10 15 11 9 
Thailand 13 17 20 28 32 47 59 58 60 48 
UK 66 67 65 61 63 64 75 84 78 77 
Viet Nam 56 56 61 59 55 52 57 54 59 56 
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Annex 2.2. Government effectiveness (rank score of 100) 
Sources for Annex 2:3: adapted from World Bank. (2008). World Wide Governance 
Indicators. (Consulted 3 January 2009). 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp  
 
Year ‘08 ‘07 ‘06 ‘05 ‘04 ‘03 ‘02 ‘00 ‘98 ‘96 
Afghanistan 9 8 5 9 13 8 3 0 0 -  
Burma 2 2 3 2 3 7 6 7 7 6 
Iran 25 25 27 26 33 37 35 41 31 21 
Laos 18 18 22 13 16 12 25 24 25 60 
Pakistan 26 31 34 34 34 35 32 27 25 32 
Thailand 59 61 65 66 64 65 63 61 60 73 
UK 94 94 94 94 94 93 94 94 98 94 
Viet Nam 45 44 45 46 37 41 36 39 29 45 
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Annex 2.3. Control of corruption (rank score of 100) 
Sources for Annex 2:4: adapted from World Bank. (2008). World Wide Governance 
Indicators. (Consulted 3 January 2009). 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp  
 
Year ‘08 ‘07 ‘06 ‘05 ‘04 ‘03 ‘02 ‘00 ‘98 ‘96 
Afghanistan 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 0   
Burma 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 4 4 6 
Iran 29 37 39 38 39 48 50 38 36 20 
Laos 6 11 11 11 12 13 20 19 28 7 
Pakistan 25 22 24 17 14 29 25 28 21 15 
Thailand 43 45 51 54 50 50 46 50 58 43 
UK 93 94 94 95 94 96 95 97 97 96 
Viet Nam 25 29 23 24 23 33 32 27 29 32 
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Annex 3. Global production data 
Annex 3:1-3. Global production data (high estimate parameters) 
Sources: Annex 3:1-6 adapted from Figures 4:1; 4:2; 5:3; 6:2; 7:4; 8:6; 9:3; 9:8; 11:1. Burma: 
adapted from, Holahan and Henningen (1972); Magnussen et al. (1980); NNICC (various 
years); NNICC (various years); INCSR (various years); RCMP (various years); UNODCCP 
(various years); UNODC (various years). 
 
Annex 3:1 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion 
(1945-2008) (0-35,000mt) 
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Annex 3:2 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion 
(1945-2008) (0-35,000mt) 
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Annex 3:3 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion 
(1945-2008) (0-35,000mt) 
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Annex 3:4-6. Global production data (low estimate parameters) 
Annex 3:4 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion 
(1945-2008) (0-35,000mt) 
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Annex 3:5 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion 
(1945-2008) (0-35,000mt) 
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Annex 3:6 Major Asian/Middle Eastern opium producers: Illicit opium production/diversion 
(1945-2008) (0-35,000mt) 
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